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If North Korea can why can't we

Preliminary Analysis: KN-23 SRBM

June 5, 2019
Jeffrey Lewis


North Korea has tested a new short-range ballistic missile called the KN-23 that can deliver a nuclear weapon-sized payload to targets throughout much of South Korea.

This missile is similar in capability to Russia’s Iskander-M, which flies on a quasi-ballistic trajectory designed to defeat missile defenses.

Despite the general similarity between the Iskander-M and the KN-23, the KN-23 exhibits differences consistent with indigenous design and production.

On May 4, North Korea conducted what it described as a “firepower strike drill” that included the launch of several “large-caliber long-range multiple rocket launchers” and at least one “tactical guided weapon” that appeared to be a new short-range ballistic missile. A commercial satellite image provided by Planet Labs confirmed the launch of a missile at 10:54 am.

On May 9, North Korea conducted a second “firepower strike drill” with “various long-range strike means,” including two short-range ballistic missiles visually identical to the one pictured on May 4.


Left: SRBM launched on May 4; right: SRBM launched on May 9. Image credits: Rodong Sinmun.

North Korea exhibited this short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) for the first time in a parade on February 8, 2018. The United States calls this missile the KN-23. Using parade photographs, CNS estimates the diameter of the missile’s solid rocket motor to be between 0.9 and 1.0 m—similar to that of Russia’s Iskander-M SRBM. The parade items match the missiles fired on May 4 and May 9, although different transporter -erector-launchers were employed on each of these three occasions, including a tracked launcher on May 9.

This missile may have been tested in an unannounced static engine test near Hamhung in in mid-October 2017. Infrared satellite images examined by CNS show a large burn scar appeared the week prior to October 17, consistent with the published date of the test.


Near infrared image of the static motor test site showing a burn scar from a possible KN-23 static motor test. Image credit: October 17, 2017, Planet Labs Inc. cc-by-sa 4.0

The KN-23 is a ballistic missile, although it is designed to fly a depressed trajectory (sometimes described as quasi-ballistic or aero-ballistic) that shortens its flight time, allows it to fly under the view of some radars, and enhances its ability to maneuver. The reported range and apogee of three missiles launched by North Korea are roughly consistent with those of the Iskander-M, which has a range of 400 km and flies a quasi-ballistic trajectory with an apogee of 50 km.

Time, Range and Apogee of KN-23 Flights
Time (KST)
Range (km) Apogee (km)
10:54 am, May 4, 2019 240 60
4:29 pm, May 9. 2019 420 50
4:39 pm, May 9, 2019 270 50
This information was provided by the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, as reported by Yonhap. “Defense ministry calls on N. Korea to halt tension-sparking acts,” Yonhap, May 7, 2019; Oh Seok-min “(5th LD) N. Korea fires two short-range missiles: JCS,” Yonhap, May 9, 2019.
Many observers have noted visual similarities between the new missile and other solid-propellant missiles. The KN-23 is similar in size and shape to Russia’s Iskander-M. However, a close analysis of the missile’s externally visible components, including the cable raceway and the actuators used to control the jet vanes, show differences from the Iskander-M (See inset).

The elongated cable raceway is unusual as it extends up into the conical section of the missile that houses the guidance and payload sections. Typically, a cable raceway runs from the bottom of the solid rocket motor to the top. The most likely explanation is that the guidance system is forward of a payload with a fixed diameter that the cabling must bypass externally, such as a nuclear warhead. The KN-23 may, therefore, be a designed as a dual-capable system of delivering conventional and nuclear payloads.

The base of the two missiles also show significant differences in the actuators and jet vanes used to steer the missile. Overall, the KN-23 appears to be indigenous, although its design appears to have been inspired by the Iskander-M and other, similar missiles, such as South Korea’s Hyunmu-2B.

Comparing the Iskander-M and the KN-23

Left: Russia’s Iskander-M with the cable raceway visible; right: The cable raceway on the KN-23 extends further up the missile, possibly suggesting a wide payload such as a nuclear warhead.


Left: The base of Russia’s Iskander-M missile showing the jet vanes and the associated actuators; Right: the base of the KN-23 shows significant differences.


Preliminary range assessment of the KN-23 using Missile Tool Kit and Missile Flyout.

Forensic analysis of the images using Tungstène, a software program that reveals the mathematical artifacts of digital alterations to images, shows that some images have been altered. These changes appear either to be cosmetic or efforts to protect sensitive information; they do not appear to alter the details of the missiles themselves.

North Korea appears to have tested the missile to a range of 420 km. Initial modeling of the missile’s performance using three programs—AGI’s Missile Tool Kit, Missile Flyout, and a CNS-developed program—suggests that it should be able to deliver a 500 kg payload to approximately a maximum range of about 450 km on a minimum energy trajectory. This result is comparable to the Iskander-M, as well the design goal for Ukraine’s Grom. This would be sufficient to deliver a conventional or nuclear payload to most targets in South Korea, including the US military hub at Pyongtaek.

Estimated Parameters of the KN-23
Diameter (meters)
0.95
Length (meters) 7.5
Total Mass (kilograms) 3,415
Fuel Mass (kilograms) 2,530
Dry Mass (kilograms) 835
Nozzle area (square meters) 0.3
Burn time (seconds) 36
Specific Impulse (ISP) 264
Thrust (kilonewtons) 180
Payload (kilograms) 500



A computer rendering of the KN-23. (KN-23 by JamesMartinCNS on Sketchfab)
The model contains significant uncertainties, although it largely agrees with the observed performance of the missile. These uncertainties stem from the challenge in measuring the dimensions of the missile and estimating the mass of the fuel, airframe, and payload. The range is sensitive to relatively small differences, on the order of 100 kg. For example, shifting 100 kilograms of mass from deadweight to fuel increases the range by about 15 percent. Additional data, including video of the missile accelerating, could reduce these uncertainties.

The flight test of this missile does not violate North Korea’s voluntary April 2018 moratoriumon intermediate-range (IRBM) and intercontinental-range missile (ICBM) tests. North Korea did not define intermediate-range missiles, but the moratorium is understood to apply to the 4,500 km-range Hwasong-12 IRBM, as well as the much longer-range Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 ICBMs.

The flight test does, however, violate several UN Security Council resolutions including UNSCR 1695 and UNSCR 1718. UNSCR 1718 “demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile.”

Some South Korean officials believe that the test violates the September 2018 inter-Korean military agreement under which the parties “agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain ….” The agreement does not, however, mention missile launches, although it is specific in many other areas. For example, it prohibits live-fire artillery drills within 5 kilometers of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).
Because kim jong il got big balls.....thats why n.korea can ...n we cant..
 
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To date, the most effective method of penetration is via terrain-hugging approach (using ground clutter for cover) and/or via saturation attacks in this form. Tomahawk cruise missiles introduce EW and VLO in the mix. This is why no country is capable of defeating a saturation attack of Tomahawk cruise missiles, not even close. Block IV is packing many surprises within.


Yes.

South Korea will receive PAC-3 MSE interceptor class to defeat Iskandar-M types.

US developed and tested SM-6 class interceptors (Aegis terminal phase) to defeat highly maneuverable airbreathing targets some years ago. Below is an example of a QBM type target - reportedly capable of impressive maneuvers.

FTX-21-002-1024x681.jpg


A section of the MARV-type warhead design is concealed within the cap on the top (LEFT) and close-up shots of this missile are not provided. It is surprising that US provided this screenshot as well, just to send a message with wink.

PAC-3 MSE is a derivative of SM-6 interceptor class. I saw a video of the maneuvers of PAC-3 standard once - very impressive to say the least, and I wonder what PAC-3 MSE can do with its dual solid rocket pulse motor.
Yes sir but Iskandar-M technology can also be tweaked and can adapt accordingly
 
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Yes sir but Iskandar-M technology can also be tweaked and can adapt accordingly
Trying to outdo US with hard power approaches, is a virtually futile excercise (very expensive and difficult path).

The objective of any type of warhead is to score a hit on the desired target, and it will never have the luxury to play GTA with increasingly smart robotic interceptors while in flight.

Russia is in the game because of its vast nuclear arsenal base inherited from former USSR - too many to throw at a potential adversary. Even then Russia is feeling insecure at present.

Russia have spent 13 straight years to develop RS-28 Sarmat ICBM which will be equipped with multiple nuclear-tipped Avangard class HGV (MiRV configuration), idea is to significantly shorten exo- atmospheric Midcourse flight path and go endo- atmospheric instead in the face of the increasingly capable American GMD network, and this platform is still WIP. On the other hand, DARPA have commenced Glide Breaker project, GMD network will be expanded to accomodate Glide Breakers as well.

Regional powers such as Pakistan and DPRK have very limited resources, and the crumbs which China and Russia throw our way continue to put a smile on our faces but these are not enough. Israel, Russia and US are increasingly willing to help India, and this should be a MAJOR concern.

Unfortunately, PSYOPS continue to blind many people...
 
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Trying to outdo US with hard power approaches, is a virtually futile excercise (very expensive and difficult path).

The objective of any type of warhead is to score a hit on the desired target, and it will never have the luxury to play GTA with increasingly smart robotic interceptors while in flight.

Russia is in the game because of its vast nuclear arsenal base inherited from former USSR - too many to throw at a potential adversary. Even then Russia is feeling insecure at present.

Russia have spent 13 straight years to develop RS-28 Sarmat ICBM which will be equipped with multiple nuclear-tipped Avangard class HGV (MiRV configuration), idea is to significantly shorten exo- atmospheric Midcourse flight path and go endo- atmospheric instead in the face of the increasingly capable American GMD network, and this platform is still WIP. On the other hand, DARPA have commenced Glide Breaker project, GMD network will be expanded to accomodate Glide Breakers as well.

Regional powers such as Pakistan and DPRK have very limited resources, and the crumbs which China and Russia throw our way continue to put a smile on our faces but these are not enough. Israel, Russia and US are increasingly willing to help India, and this should be a MAJOR concern.

Unfortunately, PSYOPS continue to blind many people...
You are right sir but I was talking about an asymmetrical approach e.g China deterred Russia and America with few icbms and about 200 nuclear warheads from mid 60s To early 80s and sir we can't sit licking MAJOR concern we will have to do something within our budget Power and capabilities. Hath pay hath rakh kar dushman Kay waar ka intizaar Tau naheen kar sakte.
and those who think that we can woo usa with good diplomacy are living in a fools paradise they have chosen their allies no matter what we do diplomatically it won't change anything.

I would love to see a good working relationship between pakistan and USA
But I don't see even semblance of it in near
future so.
 
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Basically a QBM will allow Pakistan to penetrate the S-400/AAD combo, either for non-conventional strikes or SEAD ops.
Would a CIWS work on it?
You are right sir but I was talking about an asymmetrical approach e.g China deterred Russia and America with few icbms and about 200 nuclear warheads from mid 60s To early 80s
Not really, China had big threats to face for sure. But their relations were up with the other when that with first was down. Initial Chinese systems were based on Soviet designs further modified by China.

US had started to support PRC to neutralise Soviet Union and disputes heightened. Bill Clinton was exceptionally friendly and lenient in passing on some critical techs to PRC (which they are reluctant to share with anyone, still).

Rise of China again made them belligerents.
 
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Would a CIWS work on it?

Not really, China had big threats to face for sure. But their relations were up with the other when that with first was down. Initial Chinese systems were based on Soviet designs further modified by China.

US had started to support PRC to neutralise Soviet Union and disputes heightened. Bill Clinton was exceptionally friendly and lenient in passing on some critical techs to PRC (which they are reluctant to share with anyone, still).

Rise of China again made them belligerents.
Mid 60s to early 80s
 
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Western analysts are trying their best to downplay KN-23 and disassociate it with the Iskander-M for some reason, but its clear that they didn't build this missile out of thin air. NK was provided the designs and they just introduced their own modifications on it.
This is the same case as with the current NK ICBMs (HS-12/13/14). For a while NK was failing to manufacture a reliable ICBM because of sub-optimal liquid engines. Then some Russian engines appear out of the blue, and viola, the new ICBM designs worked as intended.

Pakistan is also working on the similar type of quasi-ballistic SRBMs (Iskander etc.), its just a matter of time now.
Yes probably the russians help NK to keep uncle SAM in check and to stop their influence i
n the region.
By the way the range of this missile is not a big deal and we already have ballistic missiles of this range in arsenal.So what exactly makes this missile special and what exactly we are missing here?
Also when we developed babur missile the west speculated that there is no way we can develop such a sophisticated missile on own and they blame us for stealing the tomhahawk tech.So is this missile tech wise more superior than babur?
 
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Yes probably the russians help NK to keep uncle SAM in check and to stop their influence i
n the region.
By the way the range of this missile is not a big deal and we already have ballistic missiles of this range in arsenal.So what exactly makes this missile special and what exactly we are missing here?
Also when we developed babur missile the west speculated that there is no way we can develop such a sophisticated missile on own and they blame us for stealing the tomhahawk tech.So is this missile tech wise more superior than babur?
It's not about the range rather its about the difficulty it poses to an abm system by dint of its depressed trajectory and maybe
Some terminal phase maneuverability.
 
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US n USSR uses german technology

More like German scientists and engineers. Read Operation Paperclip. Wernher von Braun, the father of V2 rockets/ballistic missiles, surrendered to the Americans at the end of WWII. The Soviets were closing in and he, along with his brother and his team, did not want to fall into the hands of the communists. The Americans got the cream but the Soviets managed to round up some of the rocket scientists and engineers. The Americans subsequently gave citizenship to the German scientists/engineers, who then went on to not just work for the Americans but lead the important missile and space projects for the country. The Soviets did not trust the German scientists/engineers they had captured and thus used them in restricted capacity. But regardless of this fact, the subsequent American and Soviet rocket scientists/engineers were innovative in their own right and developed systems that owed nothing to the V2 programme.
 
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So russians are supplying koreans with missile tech?
Yes. Russia and China keep supplying North Korea with UN sanctions-violating equipment so NK doesnt become weak enough that US+ SK feel confident an attack on NK would be succesful. CHina has sold NK TELs which are against UN sanctions. How did broke az North Korea get an ICBM??? offcourse its CHina. THis ISkander look alike? must be Russia. Russia and CHina give NK potent weapons to poke the US and hold it at bay.
 
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Yes. Russia and China keep supplying North Korea with UN sanctions-violating equipment so NK doesnt become weak enough that US+ SK feel confident an attack on NK would be succesful. CHina has sold NK TELs which are against UN sanctions. How did broke az North Korea get an ICBM??? offcourse its CHina. THis ISkander look alike? must be Russia. Russia and CHina give NK potent weapons to poke the US and hold it at bay.
Russia yes China not so much.
 
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Would a CIWS work on it?
Sure, provided that the CIWS is present in close proximity of the QBM's target.

By the way the range of this missile is not a big deal and we already have ballistic missiles of this range in arsenal.So what exactly makes this missile special and what exactly we are missing here?
@Fawadqasim1 explained it well.

Also when we developed babur missile the west speculated that there is no way we can develop such a sophisticated missile on own and they blame us for stealing the tomhahawk tech.So is this missile tech wise more superior than babur?
Pakistan DID reverse-engineer the Tomahawk. Comparing a QBM with a cruise missile is like comparing apples and oranges. While a cruise missile has a lot more complexity in terms of moving parts (i.e. booster, fins, wings, engine, navigation), a quasi-ballistic missile incorporates technologies that are difficult to obtain (i.e. 'slow-burning' propellant, airframe capable of sustaining flight in the hypersonic regime).

However QBMs have an upper hand when it comes to the ability to penetrate the AA/BMD protection.
 
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