Desperate Pursuit:
Pakistan’s nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the crushing loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a war with India that probably triggered a January 1972 political decision (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program.
Deterring India’s nuclear weapons and augmenting Pakistan’s inferior conventional forces are widely believed to be the primary missions for Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Observers point to India’s 1974 “peaceful” nuclear explosion as the pivotal moment that gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other is plutonium. Pakistan’s main enrichment facility is a centrifuge plant located at Kahuta; Pakistan may have other enrichment sites.
The blueprint for the Gas centrifuges was stolen by Abdul Qadeer Khan from the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory in Amsterdam a subcontractor for Urenco Group which was operating a uranium-enrichment plant in Almelo, Netherlands. Besides, Islamabad gained enrichment-related technology from many sources. Comprehensive critical nuclear technology for a small nuclear weapon was provided by China, it also provided the associated delivery technology.
After India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 11 and May 13, 1998, Pakistan’s government responded on May 28 and May 30 with six tests in western Pakistan. Test yields were about 10 kilotons and 5 kilotons, according to seismic analysis. The United States imposed sanctions after the tests, but these were lifted after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. According to public estimates, Pakistan has about 90-120 nuclear weapons, though it could have more. Pakistan’s HEU-based nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of approximately 15-20 kilograms of HEU. Islamabad reportedly continues to produce HEU for weapons at a rate of at least 100 kilograms per year. Pakistan has also pursued plutonium-based warheads and continues to produce plutonium for weapons. Islamabad has received Chinese and European assistance for at least some of its plutonium program. The 40-50 megawatt heavy-water Khushab plutonium production reactor has been operating since 1998.
It appears that Islamabad is constructing additional heavy water reactors, which will expand considerably Pakistan’s plutonium production capacity, at the same site. Whether one of those reactors is already operating is unclear. According to reports, Islamabad had begun operating a “pilot-scale” reprocessing facility at the New Laboratories facility at Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology. Pakistan also appears to be constructing a second reprocessing facility at the site and may be completing a reprocessing facility located at Chasma. Pakistani plutonium-based nuclear warheads likely contain approximately 4-6 kilograms of plutonium, according to one expert estimate. Islamabad’s construction of additional nuclear reactors and expansion of its reprocessing capabilities with explicit Chinese help could indicate plans to increase and improve Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal in the near future.
U.S. Cognizance:
The United States had information during the 1970s and early 1980s that Pakistan was pursuing nuclear weapons designs, but exactly when Pakistan produced a workable nuclear explosive device is unclear. Proliferation networks stemming from Pakistan have their roots in the effort to develop a Pakistani nuclear bomb. Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used extensive clandestine procurement networks to obtain technology for its nuclear weapons program. A report from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) published September 15, 2011, stated that Pakistan, as an under-developed country with no industrial infra-structure, had to buy each and every bit of material and piece of equipment surreptitiously from abroad in the open market and had to establish a network of cover companies within the country and outside to by-pass embargoes and import all the necessary items.
According to new declassified documents or even otherwise the US turned a blind eye on Pakistan's nuclear smuggling efforts during former President Ronald Reagan's administration, fearing that any action would upset their bilateral ties at a critical time of the Afghan war.
Through the 1980s, the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet occuptation had an overwhelming priority over Pakistan's nuclear program and then President Ronald Reagan did not want to take any action that would jeopardise Pakistan's role as a conduit for US aid to the Mujahadin. But, the United States perilously cauterized attitude in the 80's is proving to have a devastating effect now, especially since revelation of AQ Khan's dreaded proliferation network was unearthed a couple of years back where he was caught selling critical nuclear technologies to rouge nations.
The nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent is a direct result of U.S. administration's ignoring Chinese weapons deals. Even when the CIA revealed nuclear arms deals between China and Pakistan, the U.S. administration refused to acknowledge that China had violated its non-proliferation pledge. - How the Clinton Administration undermined American Security by Bill Gertz, published by Regnery Publishing Inc. It seems that China intends to follow a dual track policy towards India, normal economic relations and continuing military pressure through sub continental proxies.
“Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapon stockpiles and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems.”
Delivery Vehicles:
Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons: aircraft controlled by the Pakistan Air Force and surface-to-surface missiles controlled by the Pakistan Army. Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16 fighter aircraft purchased from the United States, provided that modifications are made. It is widely believed that Islamabad has made the relevant modifications to the F-16s. Although concerns have been raised about the impact of these sales on the strategic balance in South Asia, the U.S. government maintains that the sale of additional F-16s & helicopters to Pakistan will not alter the regional balance of power. The contract for provision of an additional 18 aircraft was signed in 2006, as was the contract for the weapons for those aircraft and a contract to perform the mid-life upgrade on Pakistan’s F-16A/B model aircraft. Mirage V aircraft may also be used as delivery vehicles.
Assessing the ballistic missile threat to India and the current Pakistani ballistic missile infrastructure, the development of a 2,500-km missile will give Pakistan the technical base for developing a much longer-range missile system. Through foreign acquisition, and beginning without an extensive domestic science and technology base, Pakistan has acquired these missile capabilities quite rapidly. China and North Korea are Pakistan's major sources of ballistic missiles, production facilities, transportation erectors-launchers and other related technologies.
Pakistan is developing missiles which will enable it to strike a variety of targets at intermediate ranges with both conventional and nuclear payloads. These missiles have a common lineage to that of the vintage Soviet SCUD systems. Islamabad has several types of ballistic missiles thought to be nuclear-capable: the solid-fuel Hatf-III Ghaznavi
(Chinese M-11 Missile), with a range of approximately 300-400 kilometers; the solid-fuel Hatf-IV Shaheen
(Chinese M-9 Missile), with a range of over 450 kilometers; and the liquid-fuel Hatf-V Ghauri
(North Korean No Dong-1), with an approximate range of almost 1,300 kilometers. Ghauri supplied by North Korea and re-engineered in Pakistan to extend their strike range has faced crippling failures, the first test in 1998 led to the missile breaking up, and in a later test the Ghauri is known to have fallen in Iranian territory, leading to a diplomatic protest from Tehran. It is rumored as there is no official confirmation that Pakistan has already retired this missile, something that would have undermined the missile’s deterrent effect if it were made public.
Pakistan tested “an improved version” of the Shaheen missile, called the Shaheen-1A
(Chinese M-9 IRBM), December 15, 2015. The release described the Shaheen-1A as an “Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile,” suggesting that the missile’s range could be at least 2,700 kilometers. The solid-fuel nuclear-capable Hatf-VI Shaheen-2
(Chinese M-18 MRBM) missile, when deployed, will be “capable of reaching targets out to 2,000 kilometers”. Pakistan has also announced successful tests of a short-range ballistic missile, called the Hatf-II Abdali SRBM
(Chinese TY-3 Research Rocket), with a range of 200 kilometers. The missile “carries nuclear as well as conventional warheads". Moreover, on April 19, 2011 Pakistan announced the first successful flight test of a “newly developed Short Range Surface to Surface Multi Tube Ballistic Missile Hatf IX NASR
(Chinese Weishi-2 SRBM). The missile has a range of 60 kilometers and “carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy,” according to the press release. Pakistan has also purchased the
North Korean Taepodong-1 system which it calls the Ghauri-III.
Pakistan has also bought a ground launched version of nuclear-capable cruise missile which is called the Babur
(Ukrainian Kh-55SM/Korshun) from Ukraine and the Ra’ad (air-launched), both of which will have estimated ranges of 320 kilometers.
Grandstanding:
Like in the case of Pakistani nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the only indigenously produced parts of it ballistic weapons will be the names "Ghaznavi", "Ghauri", "Babur", "Abdali" "Shaheen" & "Nasr".
It took India and Russia several years, at least 8, to develop the ‘Brahmos’ cruise missile. It has gone into serial production only after more than 16 tests. For technological maturity, validation of complex guidance system & software and the achievement of predefined accuracy needs that kind of time gap. But Pakistan after just one test had announced that the missile (Babur) was going into serial production. Unless Pakistan has dozens of Einstein’s and Kalam’s in its ranks, this feat is next to impossible, this is not the way a weapon system is developed and inducted. A dead giveaway about the ‘imported’ parentage of Pakistani missiles is their practice of announcing tests done from ‘Undisclosed Location’.
(Anil Athale, inpad)
The secrecy in this is due to the fact that Pakistan had carried out these "new" missile tests over heavily populated corridors, a unique feat never attempted if you are testing a fresh and newly developed weapon. Another bloomer is the officially released images upon diligent analysis reveals stark similarities between images which appears to be a doctored. Hence, it can be inferred that Pakistan conducts only limited number of actual missile tests and issues fictionalized news releases on test launches through its ISI based propaganda arm. This may be owing to the fact that Pakistan has procured only limited stock of the such missile types from either China or North Korea (or other sources) and reserves these precious acquisitions for operational requirements rather than for testing purposes. This limited bluff is employed for both its posturing tactics (India centric) and to deal with its domestic compulsions.
AQ Khan Proliferation Network:
A fundamental aspect of nuclear security is ensuring that personnel with sensitive knowledge do not proliferate that expertise. Former Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan used an underground network of people to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with designs and materials related to uranium enrichment for profit. The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear, although most official U.S. reports indicate that, at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Currently, the American Foreign Relation Committee office reported that the AQ Khan proliferation network has been fundamentally dismantled. But it is a fallacy to presume that no part of that proliferation elements exists, it is believed that at least some of Khan’s associates are continuing in their black-market business.
Conclusion
Pakistan is a nuclear power that might swiftly fall into the hands of Islamists. If that happens, Pakistan might well be the most dangerous country in the world. That is so because if the Islamists take control of Pakistan, they will not worry about the consequences of launching a nuclear attack even on other nuclear powers. In fact, the prospect of retaliation action might feed into their sense of being on a martyrdom mission. They would consider a global nuclear catastrophe as saving the world from its sins.
The biggest difference between Pakistan and most Muslim states is that Pakistan has a functional electoral system that actually works. That also means it could bring the Islamists to power. Luckily, thus far, the Islamists have not yet been able to control the Pakistani electoral scene. A 2008 poll showed a minority of Pakistanis supported Islamist militants, were critical of the U.S. and sought a “moderate Islamic state.” That minority, however, is window for the Islamists waiting to be opened.
While Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons & ballistic missiles, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards.
(Adapted from the works of Paul K Kerr & Mary Beth Nikitin - Proliferation & Security Issues & other internet sources)
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Indian Defence News: IDN TAKE: Chasing Pakistan's Clandestine Nuclear & Missile Program - Analysis
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