J-15 can defeat F-35B in limited conflict: Chinese analyst|Politics|News|WantChinaTimes.com
As the F-35B consumes more fuel than the J-15, it has a combat radius of only 500 kilometers while the latter has a radius of 1,000 kilometers, as the F-35B, with its vertical take-off capability, is heavier than the US Navy's F-35C.
Note the analysis assumes that the F-35B will be using it's vertical take-off, which will burn more fuel, this wont be the case in actuality. Though the combat radii are as reported. The vertical take-off system will be used for landings, while the STOVL capabilities of the F-35 will be leveraged during its take-off, STOVL retains the capability to carry a larger load, just with a more limited deck space to operate with:
Landing and take-off:
landing:
The flight deck of a Wasp Class LHD is 831 feet. Izumo has a flight deck of 813.6 feet... still more than enough to launch a loaded F-35B in a STOVL configuration.
The Take-off distance required for the F-35B is only 550 feet, or 450 using a ski-jump. That leaves nearly 300 feet of extra, unused space!
"The F-35 Lightning II will meet U.S. Air Force Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) requirements with the F-35A, the Marine Corps' Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) requirements with the F-35B variant, and Navy Carrier Variant (CV) requirements with the F-35C. A high degree of commonality among the three variants will reduce life-cycle costs. The F-35B is the most complicated of the three variants because it can take off and land vertically in less than 500 feet of space, allowing the aircraft to be launched from small Navy ships and to drop down in confined areas."
Info acquired from
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II
and
F-35 Lightning II JSF | Info, Variants, AN/APG-81, Costs/Budget, Specs
It's maximum take-off weight of 60,000 lb is less than the J-15's of 72,000, but it's still very impressive!!!
Oh, and that max take-off weight is only 6000 lbs less than the Navy's Super Hornets!!!
From
Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
and
Aerospaceweb.org | Aircraft Museum - F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
...
Look you've provided a lot of claims, but very little supporting evidence. Support your claims, or they will be refuted!
@Nihonjin1051 - anything to add?
You are stuck in a rut, son.
For those of us who actually served in the military, people like you, those who who can only argue base upon specs, are laughable.
In a war, how to use a weapon is much more important than how many rounds can that rifle fire, or how many bombs can an aircraft carry, or how far can truck go. Military history is repleted with events that proved that truth. Take Operation Bolo back in the Vietnam War, for example...
Operation Bolo - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Before that disaster for the VPAF, the MIG-21 was thought to be near invincible. Then a bunch of American pilots flying less maneuverable F-4s shot down a few VPAF MIG-21s in one day, prompting the VPAF to ground the rest of the fleet for months to find out what the hell happened.
Now...Does that mean the F-4 was discovered to be a better fighter than the MIG-21 ? Of course not. Never mind how broadly interpreted the word 'better' can be, what it meant was that against American pilots in F-4s, one had better be extra careful. And if the Americans showed other air forces on how to use the F-4 against more maneuverable fighters, one had better be careful against those other air forces.
Currently, despite having helo carriers, the Japanese navy is several degrees over the PLAN, and when the F-35 is inducted, the JMSDF will be just one notch below a full capability carrier navy like the USN. That day will come faster than the PLAN having its own aircraft carrier besides that training aid -- the Liaoning.
And if there's one thing I would put my money on with absolute confidence, it's that Japan has based its entire naval warfare strategy on countering China. They've studied the PLAN, PLAAF and PLA, adopted the necessary counters and the JMSDF will be able to counter numerical superiority with tactics, even as China nears the west in technological capabilities.
Not to mention anti access weapon that even will put us navy in danger.
In danger, but not peril. Here's one counter.
‘If It Floats, It Fights': Navy Seeks ‘Distributed Lethality’
“If it floats, it fights,”
Rear Adm. Peter Fanta says. “That’s ‘distributed lethality'[:] Make every
cruiser,
destroyer,
amphib,
LCS [Littoral Combat Ship], a thorn in somebody else’s side.”
“It just takes arming
everything,” says Fanta, the director of surface warfare (section N96) on the Navy staff. “Lethality” simply means
more and better weapons. “Distributed” means those weapons go on more ships, operating independently across a wide expanse of ocean to pose too many threats and too many targets for an enemy to cope with all at once.
While the Navy’s offensive ambitions are constrained by its budget, however, they’re still potentially revolutionary. After 20 years of playing mostly defensive supporting roles — carrier escort,
ballistic missile defense, Tomahawk strikes on targets ashore — the Navy’s surface ships will take on a more independent and aggressive stance. That aggressiveness brings risk, especially in the face of
well-armed adversaries such as China, especially for smaller and
less robust vessels like the Littoral Combat Ship.
In wargames, says Fanta, “this is what we found: Without naming the adversary — you’re right, you lose
some LCS in a full-up nation on nation war, [but] you put entire enemy
fleetson the bottom of the ocean. Why? Because they come from everywhere and they’re all equipped with [anti-ship] weapons.”
Quantity, in other words, has a quality all its own.
What’s driving this new aggressiveness? The answer is that
top Pentagon civilians and
leading legislators are increasingly concerned about the
Chinese and Russian threat. Now the US Navy’s getting the message. Just before Christmas, the Chief of Naval Operations announced
an upgunned version of the low-cost, high-controversy Littoral Combat Ship, one with a yet-to-be-selected long-range anti-ship missile. This week, at the annual conference of the
Surface Navy Association, Fanta and other admirals make clear they want to extend that model to the entire
surface fleet. Though details are scarce until the president’s 2016 budget request comes out next month, the Navy will seek low-cost upgrades in weaponry and sensors to
add offensive firepower to existing vessels, from Aegis destroyers to amphibious assault ships to, potentially, even supply ships.
“Why not think about putting offensive weapons on our combat logistics warships?” asks
Vice Adm. Tom Rowden, who formerly held Fanta’s job and is now Commander of Naval Surface Forces. “The picture I’m painting is one of a surface force that is bristling with offensive capability, one in which a large number of ships cannot be ignored,” forcing the enemy to divide his attention and forces. Instead of an adversary being able to focus sensors and smart weapons on the one or two aircraft carriers the US can typically deploy to any given region at any given time, “distributed lethality” forces a foe to deal with dozens of destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and others, all armed with anti-ship weapons those classes lack today.
The new approach is, quite literally, about getting the most bang for the buck. While the Navy wants to
develop a new long-range anti-ship missile to replace the outdated Harpoon, its first resort is to modify the hardware it already has and buy new hardware that already exists. (One example is the Norwegian
Kongsberg missile
recently test-fired off the Littoral Combat Ship
Coronado).
“
The budget’s coming down,” Fanta says. “Distributed lethality … is taking the budget that we have and making everything out there that floats more lethal.”
“There’s a huge feeling in some areas that we should [just] cut the number of ships that you’re building or own and make those ships
perfect,” Fanta adds. This would produce
a smaller fleet of “exquisite” high-capability warships like the Death Star in
Star Wars. But Death Stars have a nasty tendency to blow up.
“If I get the
wrong ship with the exquisite systems, I’m 15 years away from fixing it,” Fanta says, citing typical development timelines for a new class of vessel. But if the Navy buys a larger number of good-enough ships, the rapid acquisition process can upgrade them as needed to meet new threats. “If somebody has something on the shelf, I go buy it and I bolt it on,” he says. “We have proven we can do that inside of six months.”
“Not every platform has to possess the most exquisite sensor or the longest-range, most capable missile,” says
Adm. Philip Davidson, the head of Fleet Forces Command. As well as distributing lethality, “we must distribute our costs. This requires a mix of high- and low-[end] surface combatants,” from the glitzy
DDG-1000 to the unglamorous LCS.
The Navy’s plan to arm Littoral Combat Ships with long-range anti-ship weapons makes the relatively lightweight ships a heavyweight threat, the admirals argued. It’s the old line about the best defense — or, as Fanta put it, “first choice of any surface warfare officer is hit the bad guy first.”
The new approach will create some culture shock and awe within the Navy.
“We’ve got a generation of warriors — not just surface warfare officers — that have been pretty much at liberty to drive to any point on the ocean and deliver power-projection fires forward without worrying much about defense [against enemy anti-ship weapons],” said Davidson. “That’s closing quickly,” he said, citing “
anti-access/area denial threats” in places as unlikely as the
Black Sea. “Lethality isn’t just about range and explosive weight: [It] must include culture and approach.”
“We’re not talking about missiles and sensors alone,” agrees Rowden. “We’re talking about people, about developing a whole new generation of warfighters comfortable with detached operations.”
Independent operations by smaller ships are the founding legends of the Navy: John Paul Jone’s
Bonhomme Richard in the Revolution, the frigate
Constitution in the War of 1812. But since World War II, the top-priority mission for surface combatants has been escorting aircraft carriers, while long-range, independent operations increasingly became the preserve of nuclear-powered submarines. Then, once the Soviet Union and the budget fell, the Navy cost-consciously phased out much of its ability to fight an enemy fleet. Destroyers refocused on new missions like attacking land targets with Tomahawks and defending against ballistic missiles. In a major conflict, war plans and wargames assumed the surface ships would operate together with the carriers, protected by their onboard aircraft.
The new concept, by contrast, calls for “hunter-killer surface action groups” of three or four warships operating far beyond a carrier’s reach. When possible, these small squadrons will stay connected via the Navy’s new long-range battle networks, sharing threat and target data over such systems as
Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter-Air (NIFC-CA). But given adversaries’ progress on
electronic warfare and
cyber attack — jamming and hacking — they also need to be prepared psychologically and tactically to operate when the links go dead, said Rowden.
So while technology gets a lot of attention, “it’s a two-pronged approach,” Rowden told reporters. building on the work of his predecessor,
Vice Adm. Thomas Copeman, Rowden is about to stand up a
Top Gun-like new “Naval Surface Warfighting Development Center” (NSWDC) to devise new tactics and dispatch trainers to inculcate them across the fleet. This, he says, “is going to be a generational task.”
The approach already has some backers on
Capitol Hill. “Any new idea that breaks the surface Navy out of the defensive-first culture that has dominated its investments and planning the last two decades and brings more offensive-minded thinking to the table should be encouraged,” says one congressional staffer who works Navy issues.
Only an offensive mindset can keep the fleet relevant in the face of increasing threats, the staffer argues. “As we talk more about operating in mature precision-guided munitions regimes, it has become common to cite the demise of the surface Navy. I think what Rowden and Fanta are saying — and I tend to agree — is that this is nonsense and a fate we don’t have to accept,” the staffer says. “By developing new warfighting concepts for our surface fleet, we not only make use of the large force structure we have already invested in, but we can also drive the maritime competition in new directions that are advantageous to our interests. Instead of
China or
Iran setting the terms of the competition, we should be seeking to define it and searching for ways to
impose costs and put them on their heels. “
From
‘If It Floats, It Fights': Navy Seeks ‘Distributed Lethality’ « Breaking Defense - Defense industry news, analysis and commentary
*NOTE, Distributed Lethality isn't the only counter the US Military is working on, it's also exploring AirSea Battle - though the name was changed earlier this year, the concept remains.
Several other tactics, strategies and doctrines are being assessed too.