IRFAN HUSAIN
AS we exchange verbal and artillery salvos with Afghanistan across the border, Iran threatens to send troops into our territory to take out the terrorists who have been killing its border guards.
Clearly not the best way to make friends in our neighbourhood. As it is, our forces are eyeball-to-eyeball with Indian soldiers on the Line of Control in Kashmir, and China has often privately complained about the activities of our tableeghis in and around Xinjiang. Chinese citizens too have been killed by our jihadis while working on engineering projects.
In brief, we have managed to antagonise all four of our neighbours. Luckily, Chinese self-interest has prevented our major benefactor from taking these pinpricks too seriously.
We have managed to antagonise all our neighbours.
But this does not alter the fact that, in a difficult region, our diplomacy has been singularly crass.
But before readers jump up and accuse our Foreign Office, let me point out that our relations with all four of our neighbours are conducted largely by the security establishment.
Over the years, the latter has usurped many of the Foreign Office’s functions but, in particular, it controls our relationship with our immediate neighbours, as well as the United States.
Relations with the latter have been rocky ever since sanctions were imposed over our bouts of martial law, as well as our nuclear programme. If you talk to our generals, you will get a litany of complaints against our principal supplier of weapons, beginning with the cut-off of arms during the 1965 war with India.
What is forgotten is that the formal pacts we entered into with the US entitled us to receive arms specifically to combat communist aggression. These modern weapons were not supposed to be used in other conflicts, especially not one of our own choosing, as the 1965 war was.
Since then, the US has used its military aid as a tool to wield influence in Islamabad. That it failed to rein in our support for the Afghan Taliban and other jihadist groups speaks volumes for the power of the military in formulating defence policy.
And it is only a short step from defence planning to shaping a foreign policy to sustain it. But to achieve all this, a high degree of public support is needed to shut out interference from elected civilian leaders. This requires a degree of control over the media, as well as a message that discredits the political leadership. Here it is often pointed out that the public has been largely brainwashed by what is seen as propaganda produced by the security establishment.
But while we docilely accept actions that isolate us regionally and globally, others do not. For years, we have been accused of using the rugged geographic nature of our borders as an excuse for cross-border militancy. Each time there is a bloody incident involving attacks on neighbouring targets from our soil, the mantra from our Foreign Office is that our borders are too porous for us to control.
However, why should surrounding countries put up with this? While Afghanistan may be too militarily weak to block incursions, should we be surprised if this vulnerability pushes it into the Indian orbit?
And as Americans suffer casualties from militant groups that have operated from Pakistani soil for years, should we be bewildered by the hostility coming our way from Washington? Had we followed a more astute long-range policy, we could have made much more of initial American dependence on Pakistan for its campaign in Afghanistan after 9/11 than we did.
Tensions with Iran are another result of confusion and lack of clarity of our long-term strategic goals. The reality is that we share a long border with our western neighbour, apart from ties rooted in history and culture. By casting our lot with Saudi Arabia, a distant and socially backward country, we risk alienating a friend of long standing.
Our relations with India are not going to improve any time soon, given the baggage both sides carry, but surely an effort to defuse the ongoing tensions would be worth the effort. And here, I must say, Nawaz Sharif has tried his best but has been thwarted at every turn.
One of the first things military history teaches us is that fighting on two fronts is suicide. And here we are, doing our best to open three fronts simultaneously. Another thing grand strategy teaches us is that defence is closely related to the economy: if we are unable to raise the necessary finances, we cannot maintain a credible military machine.
Sadly, these basic lessons seem to have escaped our security establishment. If they are going to run our foreign policy, some reading of Bismarck and Metternich is surely necessary.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1332724/historys-lessons
AS we exchange verbal and artillery salvos with Afghanistan across the border, Iran threatens to send troops into our territory to take out the terrorists who have been killing its border guards.
Clearly not the best way to make friends in our neighbourhood. As it is, our forces are eyeball-to-eyeball with Indian soldiers on the Line of Control in Kashmir, and China has often privately complained about the activities of our tableeghis in and around Xinjiang. Chinese citizens too have been killed by our jihadis while working on engineering projects.
In brief, we have managed to antagonise all four of our neighbours. Luckily, Chinese self-interest has prevented our major benefactor from taking these pinpricks too seriously.
We have managed to antagonise all our neighbours.
But this does not alter the fact that, in a difficult region, our diplomacy has been singularly crass.
But before readers jump up and accuse our Foreign Office, let me point out that our relations with all four of our neighbours are conducted largely by the security establishment.
Over the years, the latter has usurped many of the Foreign Office’s functions but, in particular, it controls our relationship with our immediate neighbours, as well as the United States.
Relations with the latter have been rocky ever since sanctions were imposed over our bouts of martial law, as well as our nuclear programme. If you talk to our generals, you will get a litany of complaints against our principal supplier of weapons, beginning with the cut-off of arms during the 1965 war with India.
What is forgotten is that the formal pacts we entered into with the US entitled us to receive arms specifically to combat communist aggression. These modern weapons were not supposed to be used in other conflicts, especially not one of our own choosing, as the 1965 war was.
Since then, the US has used its military aid as a tool to wield influence in Islamabad. That it failed to rein in our support for the Afghan Taliban and other jihadist groups speaks volumes for the power of the military in formulating defence policy.
And it is only a short step from defence planning to shaping a foreign policy to sustain it. But to achieve all this, a high degree of public support is needed to shut out interference from elected civilian leaders. This requires a degree of control over the media, as well as a message that discredits the political leadership. Here it is often pointed out that the public has been largely brainwashed by what is seen as propaganda produced by the security establishment.
But while we docilely accept actions that isolate us regionally and globally, others do not. For years, we have been accused of using the rugged geographic nature of our borders as an excuse for cross-border militancy. Each time there is a bloody incident involving attacks on neighbouring targets from our soil, the mantra from our Foreign Office is that our borders are too porous for us to control.
However, why should surrounding countries put up with this? While Afghanistan may be too militarily weak to block incursions, should we be surprised if this vulnerability pushes it into the Indian orbit?
And as Americans suffer casualties from militant groups that have operated from Pakistani soil for years, should we be bewildered by the hostility coming our way from Washington? Had we followed a more astute long-range policy, we could have made much more of initial American dependence on Pakistan for its campaign in Afghanistan after 9/11 than we did.
Tensions with Iran are another result of confusion and lack of clarity of our long-term strategic goals. The reality is that we share a long border with our western neighbour, apart from ties rooted in history and culture. By casting our lot with Saudi Arabia, a distant and socially backward country, we risk alienating a friend of long standing.
Our relations with India are not going to improve any time soon, given the baggage both sides carry, but surely an effort to defuse the ongoing tensions would be worth the effort. And here, I must say, Nawaz Sharif has tried his best but has been thwarted at every turn.
One of the first things military history teaches us is that fighting on two fronts is suicide. And here we are, doing our best to open three fronts simultaneously. Another thing grand strategy teaches us is that defence is closely related to the economy: if we are unable to raise the necessary finances, we cannot maintain a credible military machine.
Sadly, these basic lessons seem to have escaped our security establishment. If they are going to run our foreign policy, some reading of Bismarck and Metternich is surely necessary.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1332724/historys-lessons
