History & Operations of Wars in Pakistan

[ghazi52]

Captain Nurul Absar, an EME officer who was killed at Bogra on 28 May 1971 in suspicion of aiding the Mukti Bahini.

Photographs from his days at PMA Kakul.

 

[ghazi52]

Pakistan Army was the first to deploy anti-tank guided missiles - namely the Cobra missiles - in South Asia, during the dogged defense of Chawinda, days before the ceasefire of 23 Sept. 1965.

The Indian Army acquired the much vaunted SS11B1 guided missiles post-war, and equipped..

 

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Browning fire over the link canal.

 

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Yahya Khan is briefed by Major General BM Mustafa, GOC of the 18 Infantry Division, which was responsible for the ill-fated Operation Labbaik in December 1971.

 

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1965 War .............................

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"razm-e-haq-o-batil hou tou faulad hai momin."

The cities of Lahore, Sialkot and Sargodha were awarded the Hilal-i-Istaqlal for the September 1965 Operations......

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[Great Janjua]

Chumik Operation

Introduction

The Siachen dispute was added to the roster of major issues in Indo-Pakistan relations for the first time in April 1984. During the month, Indian Army airlifted mountain trained forces into position over-looking key passes in the Baltoro Range , a spur of the Karakoram Mountains , flanking the Siachen Glacier's southern rim, setting in motion a spectacular high-altitude military struggle with Pakistan that has continued unabated to the present day. Confronting one another in some areas at altitude over 6000 metres, the two armies contested for possession of a largely uninhabited wedge-shaped piece of territory, about 2500 square kilometers in size, situated just south of the Chinese border. The struggle is on till today and a number of operations have been executed by both sides for occupation or retention of key areas / posts.


Background

Chumik is a minor sub sector of Bilafond Sub Sector, which has remained quiet since 1984 with the exception of Chumik Operation in 1989. Forwarded posts of the sub sector overlook Gyong Glacier and also dominate by observation, enemies Baniya Base. A Pakistani post was established in the Location of present Sher Post in 1985. The post was later withdrawn suffering heavy losses due to avalanches and enemy artillery fire the same year. The post was re-established in 1988 by 9 Northern Light Infantry on the order of Commander Force Command Northern Area. In the early spring of 1989, there were signal intercepts indicating enemy activity in the area. On 22 February 89 , enemy helicopter's conducted reconnaissance of the area followed by inaccurate artillery fire. Reconnaissance was conducted by Helicopter and it revealed that enemy had established five new posts/bases. Enemy had also occupied off shoots of point 22158 (the highest peak in the area which came to be known as Naveed Top after this operation). This gave enemy, the vital observation over our entire sub sector which could create serious problems in holding and maintenance of own posts. Enemy started engaging our forwarded posts, Ashgar Base and escalated the situation in the sub sector , forcing us to react.

Conduct of operation

Relative strength and deployment in the area is as under:


Enemy

Enemy had intruded into Chumik area and occupied the area. Enemy's one complete battalion supported by different calibers of artillery and complete flight of Lama Helicopter took part in the operation. She established the following posts/bases which were supported through administrative bases of Bniya and Rani:

• GANGA One platoon
• SADHU One platoon (minus)
• AGRA -I One Section
• AGRA-II One Section with an artillery observer
• MG Position One Section with heavy Machine Gun
• Support Troops One Company in support role (for back up support)

Own

A company of regular troops was detailed to relieve Northern Light Infantry troops in the Chumik Sector on 10 April 1989 . The force was further strengthened later, which was necessary for the final eviction of the enemy from the Sector. Activities in this sector had intensified considerably and constant vigil was kept on the enemy activities. Risk of weakening of our forces in this area could therefore not be taken. Guns and mortars of available artillery in the area supported the operation. One company of Northern Light Infantry on relief from the sector was provided for assistance. Ten men of Special Services Group were provided for technical assistance and expertise. Four Lama Helicopters of Arms Aviation were provided to support the operation.


The Initial Plan

Company minus ex 9 Azad Kashmir was holding Chumik sub sector which was subsequently augmented by another company for offensive role. Helicopters were also provided for the operation, along with Special Services Group troops and additional 81 millimeter Mortars. It was planned to occupy the area to check the further movement of enemy. The out line plan was as follows:


Mission

To occupy the area by engaging enemy Ganga Base with observed artillery fire to interdict her Line of Communication.

Execution

• The plan/task was to be accomplished in following phases:
• Phase-I Establish Kausar Base.
• Phase-II Establish Kausar 1, Kausar 2 and Kausar 3 Bases.
• Phase-III . Occupy the area.

First Attempt


Aerial reconnaissance of the area was carried out on 16 April 1989 . The expedition was sent out in establishing Kausar Base by mid night the same day. Kausar 1 was established on 17 April at a height of 17000 feet and in the same evening Kausar 2 was also established. It was found that movement thereafter was not possible due to extreme difficult nature of terrain. The expedition was immediately called off to avoid detection by the enemy.


Second Attempt

Force Commander Northern Area decided to drop Special Services Group persons on Saddle by helicopter. Effort was made to drop the persons but helicopter could not hover at such a low level where persons could jump basically because of poor weather and configuration of ground. The mission was once again aborted.


Modified Plan

After failure of two missions, the plan was modified as under:

• Persons ex 9 Azad Kashmir and Special Service Group) to be sling – dropped at the base with the aim of occupying the area, facilitating ultimate eviction of enemy.
• Two platoon size expeditions to make efforts for link up from two directions (One platoon each from 9 Azad Kashmir and 6 Northern Light Infantry).

Execution of Plan

On 19 April 89 , the first helicopter took off. Lieutenant Naveed, a volunteer officer ex 9 Azad Kashmir was sling drooped at the Saddle. Captain Seghal and Captain Zia(got shahdat as Lt colonel on a UN mission), the pilots of helicopter also did a wonderful job and were able to release the slung officer at a flat place on the base (Naveed Base). Subsequently Naik Yaqoob, Special Services Group was also dropped to join Lieutenant Naveed. Some stores were also dropped in next sorties. But soon weather deteriorated making further drops impossible. It was 21 April when weather cleared and more persons were dropped. Then it was race between Indians and us to reach the top. Our troops made it to the top (Kamran Top) earlier than the enemy thus gaining the victory at a highest point in the world where battle has ever been fought. Eight Indian soldiers were discovered only 300 – 400 meters from Kamran Top who were forced to withdraw under own fire.


6 Northern Light Expedition

The expedition having left on 18 April was close to saddle on 25 April. Three officers with one Jawan were buried alive under tons of snow. This marked the end of expedition.


9 Azad Kashmir Expedition

The expedition under Captain Tariq took a good start on 22 April 89 . Its fire raided enemy's Agra I forcing her to vacate the base. Then proceeded to close with Agra II but could not succeed due to difficult terrain. The post was however engaged with artillery fire.


The First Blow

Enemy's intention of dominating Chumik Glacier began to fail when “Ganga Base” also known as “Thappa Base” was effectively engaged by artillery. The enemy was forced to shift the base. Destruction of Ganga Base probably forced enemy to give a second thought to her plans.


The Raid

On 30 April 1989 , a raiding party consisting of 11 persons including 4 officers was organized by Major Abdul Rehman Bilal. The party closed in with enemy machine gun position at approximately 1900 hours. The fire was opened which caught enemy by surprise. However, enemy soon retaliated with small arms and rocket fire. Own troops were relatively safe since Kamran Post was protected by a boulder. The raiding party in the meantime inflicted heavy damages to the enemy. This final blow forced enemy to withdraw asking for a meeting where almost all of our terms were accepted. The area was vacated and declared as de-militarized zone.



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Operation Chumik concluded on this day, 32 years ago! for starters, some maps.
Sher and Victor were Pakistani OPs - observation posts are crucial for calling in artillery fire-missions. their importance is augmented in high-altitude environs.

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Brigadier Raheel Sehgal; a Lama pilot with the "Chumik Saviours" at Siachen.

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He was awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat for the daring sling-insertion of troops to seize Point 22158 in April 1989.
He also carried out missions in September 1987, when Operation Qiadat was underway.
Some helmet eh?

A great operation but the pussy attitude always have undermined are abilities to think big after the operation was over, peace deal, years later the Indians capture the offshoot peaks how brave of Pakistan generals. Now they are camping at the bottom of offshoot glaciers and claim they are in Siachen only Generals can fool the public. We have lost vast amounts of territory without even putting up a fight. Lanat aisi Fauj par.

 

[ghazi52]

https://www.facebook.com/combatavia...QfBPD0w0y-VlQCGVOYgY6HEPvJQbbh&__tn__=*bH-y-R
Major Raja Aziz Bhatti (1928 – 12 September 1965) was a Staff officer in the Pakistan Army who received Pakistan's highest award for valor. He was born in Hong Kong in 1928 to a Rajput family. He moved to Pakistan before it became independent in 1947, living in the village of Ladian, Kharian, Gujrat. There he enlisted with the newly formed Pakistani Army and was commissioned to the Punjab Regiment in 1950.

On 12 September 1965, as a Company Commander in the Burki area of the Lahore sector, Major Raja Aziz Bhatti chose to stay with his forward platoon. His platoon was under incessant artillery and tank attacks for five days and nights while defending the strategic BRB Canal. Throughout the encounter, undaunted by constant fire from enemy small arms, tanks, and artillery, he was reorganizing his company and directing the gunners to shell enemy positions. In order to watch every move of the enemy, he had to place himself in an elevated position, where he was exposed to Indian forces.

He led his men from the front, under constant attack from Indian Artillery batteries. Although he tried to counter every Indian offensive in his area, he was struck in the chest by an enemy tank shell while watching the enemy's moves, and was Martyr (shaheed) on 12 September 1965.

 

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India's 4th Sikh regiment personnel who surrendered to Pakistan Army on 12th September, 1965.

 

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Will shed last drop of blood for homeland: Major Raja Aziz Bhatti's last words (12 September 1965)

Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed is the first recipient of Sword of Honour and Norman Medal from 1st PMA Long Course. An outstanding officer throughout his military career and eventually the recipient of the Highest Gallantry Award of Pakistan Army the “Nishan e Haider” during 1965 India Pakistan War.

Hundreds of books have been written on 1965 war but one of the brightest chapters among those is that of Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed. Major Bhatti was a staff officer in Pakistan army when the war of 1965 war broke out. He had been commissioned into the Pakistan army in 1950 to the Punjab Regiment.

Being posted in Burki area of Lahore, Major Aziz Bhatti had a huge responsibility on his shoulders and that was of securing Lahore, the most important border city of the country.
Shelling was going on from the other side but despite the odds, Bhatti decided to move his platoon forward. Indian tanks and artillery continued to fire but the brave major continued to move his troops forward. Major Bhatti resisted the Indian army continuously for 5 days and 5 nights without sleeping for a moment. He was stationed at one of the most strategic outposts of Lahore, defending the BRB canal.

Despite the threat, Major raja Aziz Bhatti remained on the front while leading his team and kept his platoon informed about the moves of the enemy. For this purpose, he had to place himself on a higher position as the enemy tanks and artillery continued firing. Major Bhatti was exposed to the firing of the enemy and though he tried his best to counter Indian moves, he was hit by an enemy shell in the chest and embraced martyrdom on 12 September 1965.

Before getting martyred, Major Aziz Bhatti Shaheed was given a message that he needed to get some rest and that his replacement was going to arrive soon but he responded, “Do not recall me. I don’t want to go back. I will shed the last drop of my blood in the defence of my dear homeland”.

To honour his services in the 1965 war, Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed was awarded the highest military award of Pakistan i.e. Nishan-e-Haider. He is buried at his local village Ladian in Punjab.

 

[ghazi52]

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1965 War:​

Battle of Batapur​

Admin PSF
September 6, 2021

56 years ago, on this day India crossed the international border, unannounced and attacked Lahore. Credit goes to the Pakistan Army who not only repulsed the Indian attack but successfully defended Lahore. The entire nation in general and Laborites backed their Armed Forces against this naked aggression of Indians.

Today when our third generation is celebrating the “Defense Day”, while visiting Wahga border they notice war monuments along BRBL (Bambanwala-Ravi-Bedian Link) Canal and Grand Trunk Road and get curiously wonder about their history and background. One of these war monuments is located right in the middle of dual carriage GT Road on home side of BRBL, while driving along Lahore canal one hits the GT Road near Jallo Park and turns right towards Wahga where every evening the Flag lowering ceremony is witnessed by thousands of people from both sides of the border.

Background:
During early 1965 an indigenous uprising in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) against Indian occupation forces gained momentum. Based upon this accusation in August Indian forces launched attacks against Pakistan Army posts across the entire Cease Fire Line (CFL) and captured Hajipir Pass.

Pakistan Army launched its counter offensive in Chamb Sector which threatened Indian city of Akhnoor. Indians being under pressure from Freedom Fighters and Chamb offensive in IHK, violated international border and launched an attack against Lahore as their Army Commander General J N Chaudhuri declared to hold a Barakhana (feast for troops) in Shalimar Gardens and Grand Dinner with his officers at Gymkhana Lahore on 6 September 1965.


Indian Plan:
On 9 August General J.N Chaudhuri had finalized the plan to capture Lahore as he wanted to celebrate it at Shalimar Garden and Gymkhana Club and ordered Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh who was General Officer Commanding in Charge (GOC in C) Western Command to execute this plan with his 11 Corpse to capture Lahore as under: –
*15th Infantry Division: To attack Lahore across BRBL along GT Road (Amritsar- Wagha)
* 7th Infantry Division: To attack Lahore across BRBL along Kharla- Barki Road.
*4th Mountain Division: To attack Lahore along Khem Karan – Kasur Road.
Pakistan’s preparedness along the International border:

Pakistan’s Plan:

Pakistan had failed to visualize that Indians will violate the International Border and attack Lahore without declaration of war. However, in view of intelligence reports General Headquarters (GHQ) issued warning orders to its formation at 2230 hours on 4 September to occupy battle locations at Lahore Garrison despite request by Commander 114 Brigade to move to battle location along BRBL, he was not cleared, however, on night 5/6 September 114 Brigade was allowed to move forward. The Divisional Defense Plan was as under: –

*114 Brigade: To occupy defensive positions along BRBL starting from Ravi Syphon to GT Road.
*103 Brigade: To occupy defensive positions along BRBL from Barki Bridge to Bedian Head works.
*22 Brigade: As Divisional reserve force.


The Battle of Batapur:
On 6 September at 0400 hours by Indian Standard Time, 15 Infantry Division under World War 2 veteran Major General Nirinjan Parsad crossed international border and started advancing along GT Road towards Lahore. 15 Division was supported by 14 Scinde Horse, the tank regiment equipped with Sherman tanks. The attacking force was followed by 2 Independent Armored Brigade Group. On Pakistan side it was 3 Baloch (Shwebos) under command of Lt Col Tajammal Hussain Malik which started for BRBL canal. It was at 0600 hours that leading marching troops of 3 Baloch (Shwebos) started reaching banks of BRBL and saw GT Road jammed by villagers evacuating towards Lahore in face of advancing troops of Indian 54 Brigade. At that time there was only a one-way bridge on BRBL at Batapur which was clogged by refugees.

Commanding Officer 3 Baloch (Shwebos) could see Sherman tank of 14 Scinde Horse heading for this bridge. At the same time a bullock cart loaded with fodder also crossed over the bridge. Commanding officer immediately ordered one of his recoilless rifles to get hold of the cart and release the animals and deploy their rifle to take on advancing Indian Sherman tank. In the meantime, rest of the soldiers took positions in the open on home bank of BRBL and opened fire on advancing troops of 3 Jat Regiment of 54 Brigade.

As the Indian Advancing Sherman tank reached the bridge, the recoilless rifle of 3 Baloch (Shwebos) which had taken position behind the bullock cart fired its first round and Indian Sherman tank went into flames, thus blocking the bridge. It is pertinent to note that Pakistan Army did not blow up this bridge over BRBL as it served the main GT Road and all villages up to international border used to commute on it daily.

The battle for destruction of bridge by own troops and control of bridge continued till 13 September when Pioneer Platoon of 3 Baloch (Shwebos) was able to destroy it with improvised explosive devise by tying down anti-tank mines and blowing them off. The scene of destruction of Indian Sherman was later painted by Ms Anna Molka, the head of Department of Arts, Punjab University.

Role of PAF:
On 6 September two fighter jets of PAF were on armed reconnaissance at first light which was 0530 hours Pakistan Standard Time. These two Jets while over Wagha saw Indian tanks advancing along Amritsar –Lahore along GT Road and immediately took them on. The Indian advancing column proved sitting ducks for those fighters, while they emptied their guns on them the Indians ran for cover leaving their tanks and vehicles with engines running.

The Indian advancing Infantry met with a bloody nose as BRBL Canal proved a complete obstacle the Indian high command panicked as they could not fulfill the desire of their Army Commander to have a CHOTTA at Lahore Gymkhana in the evening.

Sacking of Major General Parsad:

Veteran of World War 2 got so desperate that on morning of 7 September he wanted to by- pass Batapur Bridge as brave soldiers of 3 Baloch (Shwebos) would not let him crossover and he wanted to please his Commander in Chief. Gen Parsad to explore breakthrough from Ravi Syphon/Bhini bridge side came forward himself and was ambushed by counter attacking force of 18 Baloch (3 Sindh now). He had to abandon his jeep and escaped on foot. It was not only Gen Parsad who was desperate to capture Lahore, his General officer Commanding in Chief Western Command Lt Gen Harbaksh was equally anxious. He along with Commander 11 Corpse visited Gen Parsad same day urging him to overrun BRBL and open the gates of Shalimar Garden and Lahore Gymkhana for Gen Chaudhuri, but Gen Parsad was so demoralized that he refused to continue operations.

Gen Harbaksh in his “War Dispatches” writes”, GOC 15 Division was drained of all will and vision……his attitude was passively negative and there was unmistakable air of the defeatist about him. He stated his inability to undertake any further offensive action on the plea that his formation has lost all capability of operations.” Gen Parsad was sacked and replaced by Maj Gen Mohinder Singh. Presence of General Officer Commanding in Chief Western Command, along with Commander 11 Corpse on the front line within the range of Field Artillery shows how serious Indians were for capture of Lahore and bellies their propaganda that their aim was to capture area up to BRBL Canal only.

The New GOC and fresh reinforcements:
With the change of command fresh reinforcements were sent to 3 Jat to capture Batapur Bridge and deny its destruction by 3 Baloch (Shwebos). The accurate fire by soldiers of 3 Baloch (Shwebos) did not allow Indians to reach near the bridge till 13 September when the Pioneer Platoon was able to make an Improvised Explosive Devise by making a necklace of anti-tank mines under the bridge and blowing them off along with bridge and any Indian evil designs of having BARAKHANA at Shalimar Garden and Grand Dinner Party in honour of Gen J N Chaudhuri at Lahore Gymkhana.

The Ceasefire:
Indians kept on banging their heads against BRBL Canal where they found every vigilant 3 Baloch Regiment (Shwebos) of Pakistan Army but every time they had to retreat leaving behind dead and wounded. In this sector 15 Division of Indian Army lost 486 soldiers whereas 39 soldiers of 3 Baloch (Shwebos) including one officer Capt Anwar Ul Haq embraced Shahdat. On 22 September the Security Council of United Nation passed a unanimous resolution for the ceasefire between both countries which came to effect at midnight 22/23 September 1965.

Later, President Field Marshall Mohammad Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bhahdur Shastri signed an agreement known as Tashkent Declaration to withdraw their forces to pre-August lines by 25 February 1966.

 

[ghazi52]

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the commander-in-chief Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan with officers of the 41ˢᵗ Baloch, which played a pivotal role in the capture of the Hussainiwala Enclave, in a swift and brutal engagement with the Indian 15ᵗʰ Punjab aka First Patiala..

 

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Pak Army soldiers during 65 war somewhere in northern front...