HERE’S RUSSIA’S A-100 PREMIER, THE AWACS AIRCRAFT ABLE TO DETECT U.S. F-22 AND F-35 STEALTH FIGHTERS

[Zarvan]

State media claims that AESA radar of A-100 Premier can detect airborne targets out to 600 km, and ships out to 400 km

Russia’s A-100 Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS) has made its maiden flight on Nov. 18, 2017.

The new aircraft uses the Il-76MD-90A as its platform and will replace the A-50 fleet eventually.

According to Jane’s the A-100 Premier, as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the Russian Federation named it, made its maiden flight out of the Taganrog Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex (TANTK), located near the Sea of Azov in the far west of the country. The MoD explained that all of the aircraft’s systems, including those associated with the rotating dorsal rotodome, were checked-out during the flight ahead of further trials.

The maiden flight of the aircraft came three years after Russia’s TASS news agency revealed that the first Il-76MD-90A airframe had arrived at the TANTK facility for conversion into the A-100 AWACS configuration in 2014, and six years after plans to do so were first disclosed in 2011.

Even though few details pertaining to the A-100 have been released, it has been announced that it will be built around an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar(which most probably will be scanned mechanically in azimuth and electronically in elevation), as opposed to the mechanically scanned radar of the current A-50 (NATO reporting name ‘Mainstay’).

State media said that this radar can detect airborne targets out to 600 km, and ships out to 400 km.

State media also claimed several times that thanks to this radar the aircraft will be able to detect U.S. F-22 and F-35 Stealth Fighters.

As reported by Jane’s, while the AESA radar will provide a dramatic improvement in the platform’s ability to detect and track both airborne and land-based targets, as well as making for a more reliable and easier to maintain solution, the move to the Il-76MD-90A airframe will bestow advantages from the new avionics (reduced crew workload), and improved fuel efficiency (cheaper to operate, and with increased time on station).

Photo credit: UAC

https://theaviationgeekclub.com/her...t-able-detect-u-s-f-22-f-35-stealth-fighters/

 

[Metanoia]

@gambit Your views? How does AESA fare against stealth?

 

[Rank]

fooking powerful beast!!!

 

[CriticalThought]

@gambit Your views? How does AESA fare against stealth?

It's not about AESA per se. If you could deliver the same power output and beam forming/movement, you would get the same results from mechanical steering. AESA is just more efficient at it. The key thing to ask is how they are solving the problem of radar absorbing coatings. Following possibilities come to mind:

1. Irradiate with high intensity causing heat up and detection in IR range.

2. Longer wavelengths.

3. Possibly using non-electromagnetic measurements, with AESA being just a bluff.

 

[gambit]

@gambit Your views? How does AESA fare against stealth?

First...It is the operating freq that is the most important. As public knowledge shows, the current method of shaping works best against the X-band, so if the AESA radar uses this band, there is no advantage.

However...

Let us use a 'non-stealth' body for example.

Traditional radar detection operation has the beam moving in a predictable pattern. The target produces an series of echo signals. The scanning method will not pick up the target again until the next cycle.

An AESA system can produce multiple beams and this is its greatest tactical asset. If the target is deem important enough, one beam can be assigned to this critical target while other beams performs other functions. The beam that is assigned to this critical target will provide pretty much real time continuous update for whatever usage by anyone. Remember, we are still using a 'non-stealth' body.

Now we take on the 'stealth' body.

Since it is the operating freq that matters, if the AESA system cannot make consistent signal contact with the 'stealth' target, there can be no exploitation of the AESA system's greatest tactical asset -- that of assigning one beam to a critical target. The 'stealth' target has the advantage.

But if for some reason, the 'stealth' target does something tactically stupid that gave itself away, then the AESA system will be able to lock onto the 'stealth' target and assign a beam to it.

https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/e3awacs/

The radome scans at six revolutions a minute.

A 'non-stealth' target will be updated six times per second. And there really is no escape.

A 'stealth' target maybe detected in second 1, but there is a mechanical gap between 1 and 2 and 3 and so on. The 'stealth' target can easily escape detection in any of those gaps.

So just because the system is an AESA, that does not guarantee an effective defense against 'stealth'. The AESA system still has to contend with the problem of how to detect the 'stealth' target in the first place. It is the tracking via multiple beams generation and continuous assignment that make the AESA system superior to the traditional mechanical system.

 

[Sinnerman108]

First...It is the operating freq that is the most important. As public knowledge shows, the current method of shaping works best against the X-band, so if the AESA radar uses this band, there is no advantage.

However...

Let us use a 'non-stealth' body for example.

Traditional radar detection operation has the beam moving in a predictable pattern. The target produces an series of echo signals. The scanning method will not pick up the target again until the next cycle.

An AESA system can produce multiple beams and this is its greatest tactical asset. If the target is deem important enough, one beam can be assigned to this critical target while other beams performs other functions. The beam that is assigned to this critical target will provide pretty much real time continuous update for whatever usage by anyone. Remember, we are still using a 'non-stealth' body.

Now we take on the 'stealth' body.

Since it is the operating freq that matters, if the AESA system cannot make consistent signal contact with the 'stealth' target, there can be no exploitation of the AESA system's greatest tactical asset -- that of assigning one beam to a critical target. The 'stealth' target has the advantage.

But if for some reason, the 'stealth' target does something tactically stupid that gave itself away, then the AESA system will be able to lock onto the 'stealth' target and assign a beam to it.

https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/e3awacs/

A 'non-stealth' target will be updated six times per second. And there really is no escape.

A 'stealth' target maybe detected in second 1, but there is a mechanical gap between 1 and 2 and 3 and so on. The 'stealth' target can easily escape detection in any of those gaps.

So just because the system is an AESA, that does not guarantee an effective defense against 'stealth'. The AESA system still has to contend with the problem of how to detect the 'stealth' target in the first place. It is the tracking via multiple beams generation and continuous assignment that make the AESA system superior to the traditional mechanical system.

The # of simultaneous beams an AESA radar can assign is proportional to the number of Tx elements it has.
but the more the Tx elements, the lower the power per element
Even using expensive fancy materials and metals has not fully solved the over heating problem yet.

design paradox

Thus I believe what the Russians may have done with the rotating dome is employ larger more powerful Tx elements while using the good old rotation for scanning 360

 

[randomradio]

The # of simultaneous beams an AESA radar can assign is proportional to the number of Tx elements it has.
but the more the Tx elements, the lower the power per element
Even using expensive fancy materials and metals has not fully solved the over heating problem yet.

design paradox

Thus I believe what the Russians may have done with the rotating dome is employ larger more powerful Tx elements while using the good old rotation for scanning 360

The Russian radar isn't an analog AESA, it's a digital AESA. Digital AESAs don't 'exactly' have the problem that you have outlined because each T/R module can emit multiple beams. So each T/R module can switch between one beam or many beams based on the need. As for heating issues, the radar will have GaN, the safe operating temperature of these modules is more the temperature at which GaAs can fail.

The radome won't rotate, it will be fixed.

 

[Sinnerman108]

The Russian radar isn't an analog AESA, it's a digital AESA. Digital AESAs don't 'exactly' have the problem that you have outlined because each T/R module can emit multiple beams. So each T/R module can switch between one beam or many beams based on the need. As for heating issues, the radar will have GaN, the safe operating temperature of these modules is more the temperature at which GaAs can fail.

The radome won't rotate, it will be fixed.

What do u do ?

 

[randomradio]

What do u do ?

Why?

 

[Super Falcon]

Russia has superior weapons than USA in electronic field than usa

 

[scionofPakwattan]

Why?

I am curious as well as to what you do professionally.

 

[Pepsi Cola]

First...It is the operating freq that is the most important. As public knowledge shows, the current method of shaping works best against the X-band, so if the AESA radar uses this band, there is no advantage.

However...

Let us use a 'non-stealth' body for example.

Traditional radar detection operation has the beam moving in a predictable pattern. The target produces an series of echo signals. The scanning method will not pick up the target again until the next cycle.

An AESA system can produce multiple beams and this is its greatest tactical asset. If the target is deem important enough, one beam can be assigned to this critical target while other beams performs other functions. The beam that is assigned to this critical target will provide pretty much real time continuous update for whatever usage by anyone. Remember, we are still using a 'non-stealth' body.

Now we take on the 'stealth' body.

Since it is the operating freq that matters, if the AESA system cannot make consistent signal contact with the 'stealth' target, there can be no exploitation of the AESA system's greatest tactical asset -- that of assigning one beam to a critical target. The 'stealth' target has the advantage.

But if for some reason, the 'stealth' target does something tactically stupid that gave itself away, then the AESA system will be able to lock onto the 'stealth' target and assign a beam to it.

https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/e3awacs/

A 'non-stealth' target will be updated six times per second. And there really is no escape.

A 'stealth' target maybe detected in second 1, but there is a mechanical gap between 1 and 2 and 3 and so on. The 'stealth' target can easily escape detection in any of those gaps.

So just because the system is an AESA, that does not guarantee an effective defense against 'stealth'. The AESA system still has to contend with the problem of how to detect the 'stealth' target in the first place. It is the tracking via multiple beams generation and continuous assignment that make the AESA system superior to the traditional mechanical system.

Is there a possibility of assigning multiple beams to a stealth target to improve radar consistency?

 

[gambit]

Is there a possibility of assigning multiple beams to a stealth target to improve radar consistency?

Yes, the idea is not new regardless of the type of target. If you scan a storm cloud with multiple freqs, you will get a better internal view of the cloud.

https://www.nasa.gov/content/goddar...ld-campaign-demonstrates-two-new-instruments/

Radars flying with multiple frequencies can study more precipitation types and identify where they occur inside clouds, giving scientists a more complete picture of the inner workings of a rainstorm.

It is no different in principle against a man-made low radar observable target.

Different freqs will produce different pulse characteristics which will give different resolutions on the 'stealth' target, just like the storm cloud example above. But the TACTICAL problem remains, namely, you have to find the 'stealth' target in the first place.

 

[sputnik]

State media claims that AESA radar of A-100 Premier can detect airborne targets out to 600 km, and ships out to 400 km

Russia’s A-100 Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS) has made its maiden flight on Nov. 18, 2017.

The new aircraft uses the Il-76MD-90A as its platform and will replace the A-50 fleet eventually.

According to Jane’s the A-100 Premier, as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of the Russian Federation named it, made its maiden flight out of the Taganrog Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex (TANTK), located near the Sea of Azov in the far west of the country. The MoD explained that all of the aircraft’s systems, including those associated with the rotating dorsal rotodome, were checked-out during the flight ahead of further trials.

The maiden flight of the aircraft came three years after Russia’s TASS news agency revealed that the first Il-76MD-90A airframe had arrived at the TANTK facility for conversion into the A-100 AWACS configuration in 2014, and six years after plans to do so were first disclosed in 2011.

Even though few details pertaining to the A-100 have been released, it has been announced that it will be built around an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar(which most probably will be scanned mechanically in azimuth and electronically in elevation), as opposed to the mechanically scanned radar of the current A-50 (NATO reporting name ‘Mainstay’).

State media said that this radar can detect airborne targets out to 600 km, and ships out to 400 km.

State media also claimed several times that thanks to this radar the aircraft will be able to detect U.S. F-22 and F-35 Stealth Fighters.

As reported by Jane’s, while the AESA radar will provide a dramatic improvement in the platform’s ability to detect and track both airborne and land-based targets, as well as making for a more reliable and easier to maintain solution, the move to the Il-76MD-90A airframe will bestow advantages from the new avionics (reduced crew workload), and improved fuel efficiency (cheaper to operate, and with increased time on station).

Photo credit: UAC

https://theaviationgeekclub.com/her...t-able-detect-u-s-f-22-f-35-stealth-fighters/

If Russian are seeing F-22 then Iranian UAVs are seeing as well. it should be noted the ALL Syrian Allies are using Iraninan UAVs for laser targeting including artillery shelling. Russian Command center in Syria is having info abt. all the flying objects in Syrian Sky at any given movement.

 

[randomradio]

https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/e3awacs/

A 'non-stealth' target will be updated six times per second. And there really is no escape.

A 'stealth' target maybe detected in second 1, but there is a mechanical gap between 1 and 2 and 3 and so on. The 'stealth' target can easily escape detection in any of those gaps.

So just because the system is an AESA, that does not guarantee an effective defense against 'stealth'. The AESA system still has to contend with the problem of how to detect the 'stealth' target in the first place. It is the tracking via multiple beams generation and continuous assignment that make the AESA system superior to the traditional mechanical system.

This part will confuse anybody who isn't attentive enough.

The A-100 does not have a "rotodome". The AESA radar is fixed and it has either 3 or 4 faces.

It's the same with the IAF's Phalcon. The dome does not rotate. Each of these faces have a 120 deg FoV, so the entire airspace is constantly monitored without any time lag.

This is the structure of our new radar that's coming up on an A330. 4 faces.

With the exception of the E-2D, there are no AESA-equipped AWACS aircraft today that have rotodomes. The E-2D's rotodome rotates because it has only 2 radar faces. Two won't give you 360 deg capability. It's a sacrifice due to the size constraints since it uses UHF.

You are basically talking about an issue that does not exist outside America.