Disclaimers by President Karzai and Dr Manmohan Singh, or Pakistan Foreign Offices feeble attempt to downplay it notwithstanding, the Strategic Partnership agreement signed by Afghanistan and India last week signals a paradigm shift in the regional equation.
It allows India to position itself as a key player at the centre stage of the endgame in the war-torn country while the US and its Nato allies prepare for their planned exit by 2014. The timing, scope, content and accompanying statements are enough to ring alarm bells in the GHQ and Aabpara. This is the first such agreement Afghanistan has signed with any country, coming ahead of the one being negotiated by the US, apparently envisaging bases to maintain some forces even after withdrawal to protect its strategic and economic interests.
The message is unmistakably loud and clear. Army Chief Gen Kayanis warning to Kabul against Afghan incursions and FO spokespersons condescending advice to President Karzai to demonstrate maturity and responsibility are indicative enough of the discomfort being felt here.
The moth-eaten concept of strategic depth was shred to tatters long ago. Here we see a serious jolt to the fanciful ideas that given its strategic proximity, military strength and historical or traditional links with a vast swathe of the Afghan populace for whom it has made huge sacrifices, Pakistan is favourably placed to fill the post-Isaf withdrawal power vacuum.
Instead, there is a new alignment of forces inimical to Pakistans long-term national interests and stakes; an increasingly disillusioned if not hostile US, the ever-antagonistic Northern Alliance, an emerging global power eager to assert it and Karzai at the centre make combustible combine to squeeze Pakistan in the great game.
The agreement contains an MoU on cooperation in the field mineral resource development; bilateral engagement in close political cooperation; Indian assistance in training; equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan security forces and finally the commitment to strengthening trade and economic, scientific and technological cooperation.
All of these have, in one way or another, a bearing on the national and strategic interests of Pakistan in particular and China in general. Asif Zardari made a conscious effort to cultivate ties with Karzai amid frequent bilateral visits. He chose Karzai as the only foreign guest to attend his coronation ceremony as president on September 20, 2008. This was a sensible move displaying an uncharacteristic farsightedness. Most of it appears to have gone to waste as Karzai continues to make virulent statements even after pronouncing Pakistan a twin brother in the immediate flush of triumphant announcements in New Delhi.
The American stamp on the accord is unmistakable and stems from Hillary Clintons controversial statement in New Delhi urging India to play an enhanced role in the region, commensurate with its newly acquired economic and military prowess. The Indian premier minced no words while signing the accord with Karzai to let the world see a glimpse of what he was envisioning in the unfolding scenario. Twice he referred to the withdrawal year reaffirming Indias commitment to stand by the people of Afghanistan as they prepare to assume the responsibility for their governance and security after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014.
Karzai reportedly conveyed to Singh that the strategic engagement between the two countries, which includes a big Indian effort to build Afghanistans security capacities, will help prepare Kabul for the withdrawal of international forces. The Karzai visit creates more of a natural window for India to have a sustainable role in Afghanistans post-2014 era. In a more vicious vein, Karzai also made common cause with India against Pakistan on the terrorism issue when he obliquely repeated American accusations against the ISI by saying that his country recognises the dangers that this region faces through terrorism and radicalism that is being used as an instrument of policy.
For the most part of the last three decades, India has maintained a low-profile role in Afghanistan. But in the wake of 9/11 and the US invasion, India began a diffident entry with diplomatic expansion along Pakistans border amid repeated apprehensions that its consulates are fomenting insurgency in Balochistan. Pakistan grudgingly approved Indias economic assistance to Afghanistan but warned that any military presence would be unacceptable.
In deference to Pakistan which had facilitated their occupation of Afghanistan, the Americans initially did not encourage upfront Indian involvement and let it focus on soft power economic aid and trade. But in time India committed the highest economic packages worth about two billion dollars to Afghanistan. The deal adds a new dimension to these economic relations and Singh even envisioned Afghanistans economic integration with the Indian economy. It envisages Indias push for huge oil and mining assets in Afghanistan, apparently excluding China which has been active on this count for long. Singh also hopes that both countries will try to operationalise their trilateral MoU signed with Iran to end Afghanistans landlocked isolation and dependence on Pakistan to reach the sea. The accord brightens Indias chances of bagging a lucrative mining contract for Hajigak, said to be the regions largest untapped reserve of iron ore, and provides an opportunity to hunt for oil in northern Afghanistan.
The key element of the accord, Indian assistance to equip and train Afghan security forces, is what has perturbed Pakistan. A low-key training programme has been in place for some time in Indian academies. But the accord goes beyond that and means Indian boots in Afghanistan and that is a lot more disconcerting for Pakistan. It is apparent that Obama wants to steadily outsource this task on which the US is spending $12 billion that is increasingly becoming unsustainable and difficult to justify to the domestic electorate.
The accord is vague on this count but the intent is obvious. Karzai has stubbornly sat on Pakistans offer in this regard made two years ago by Gen Kayani when he declared in Kabul: Strategically, we cannot have an Afghan army on my western border which has an Indian mindset. If we have an army trained by Pakistan, there will be better interaction on the western border. Our objective is that at the end of all this (Afghanistan), we should not be standing in the wrong corner of the room and should remain relevant in the region. This is our greatest challenge.
The military establishment has to revamp its entrenched thinking and come up with a more innovative approach to stay relevant in the evolving landscape.
The writer is a senior journalist based in Islamabad. Email: mafzalkhan@ gmail.com
India in the endgame - Afzal Khan
