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Primarily they"ll be mostly used for counter-insurgency.

India's terrain rule out the Heli being used for CI ops. I dont think they will be any bit effective in the jungles of Central India or Kashmir. They will be good for Combat Air support over the plains of Punjab, deserts of Rajasthan and Gujarat and will be most effective in hunting out the tanks.
 
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India's terrain rule out the Heli being used for CI ops. I dont think they will be any bit effective in the jungles of Central India or Kashmir. They will be good for Combat Air support over the plains of Punjab, deserts of Rajasthan and Gujarat and will be most effective in hunting out the tanks.

You are right, but that is as far as Pakistan goes. You forgot Aksai Chin, where the terrain is suitable for use of armour, including armoured cars and APCs. Consider that China's obvious logistics superiority will allow her to build up not only infantry superiority but armoured formations in concentration also. In 62, this aspect was not fully developed by either side. Considering the logistics difficulties on the Indian side, there is a probability of a considerable superiority of armour in favour of the PLA. Only armour-killing attack helicopters can stem the onrush. The LCH will be eminently suited for this, as it has excellent high-altitude performance.

Unfortunately, it will face formidable attack helicopters, MANPADs and short-range SAMs; in this respect, its speed of 275 kph is a handicap. Only a doctrinal shift in deployment and use will help; these assets will have to be deployed under tight control and coupled with its own defensive shields of infantry, anti-aircraft artillery and SAM batteries, to face off its threats.

As you have pointed out with regard to CI and Kashmir, it will also be less than useful in Arunachal Pradesh' jungles on mountains. Other flatland terrains that border India are unlikely to be battlezones in any serious way in the near future.
 
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Primarily they"ll be mostly used for counter-insurgency.

Wisdom - and the reverse - about counter-insurgency doesn't belong here, but the last thing one should do in counter-insurgency is to escalate the technology. Effective counter-insurgency is utterly useless without the counter-insurgency force being down-to-earth, used to operating off-road as a practice, not as a deviation, well-protected against small arms fire, equipped with minimalist weaponry never exceeding light machine guns, never extending to mortars or anything of a larger calibre, and using lorries, rail transport, rotary-wing transport and STOL aircraft only for superior off-theatre logistics, as force-multipliers. In other words, a force that operates more or less like a guerrilla force operates, including marching in small groups and concentrating at very high speed for an action, dispersing at equal high-speed after actions. These are best positioned as forces that use speed and movement as their main methods of prevailing over the enemy, and carry limited amounts of ammunitions, to avoid weighing themselves down.

For those who think that mop-up and consolidation is part of the job-description, this should be left to separate forces flown in to the scene of action even as it continues, able to move in and consolidate while the original strike-force moves out, either into ambush positions or into a change of targetted activity. Mobile strike forces and follow-up forces should not be combined but should be encouraged to be separate and to act in close coordination. Follow-up forces, in contrast to strike forces, should be more heavily armed, in terms of carrying greater quantities of ammunition, and larger percentages of machine guns, again with ammunition, as their role should be to move at great strength over small distances, with complete confidence that they cannot be overcome.

The third echelon should be specialised health-care, education, law and order, judicial and social engineering troops, dedicated to delivering those services that are assigned to the state to deliver, and that get dislocated during hostilities to the detriment of the state position that it is responsible for delivering these services and therefore responsible for collection of taxes and providing an administrative framework.

Between these three echelons, and a strong political steering committee, preferably a bi-partisan committee, there should be no scope for failure, provided that adequate time is allowed for these protracted operations in the teeth of virulent propaganda and attacks on the government's soft targets and personnel.

You will notice that attack helicopters are prominent by their absence.
 
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Apropos of Joe Shearer's post above; the best way to deal militarily with an insurgent is like an insurgent. Live close to the land and live off the land. If there was any other viable way then ' carpet bombing' and 'agent orange' would have worked long years ago! They did'nt.

For an internal insurgency, the civilian option must never be overlooked, since that is the only method that strikes at the root of the insurgency.
 
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I wonder if the underside of the LCh should have cam that is sky colored so when enemies look at it from the ground it will blend with the sky.....the colors may have to change.....at least test different varieties in different environments to see what is best... Also, we should definitely begin researching immediately new camo that changes to external, environmental differences.......ay forest, jungle...I think that is where US research is looking at...its based off marine animals like octopus and starfish that can immediately change colors to suit their environment. Its amazing how most of our weapons and tech has been inspired and copied from Mother Nature. Most cutting edge research in the West uses input form nature to develop new tech. Food for thought for India, especially with so many undiscovered plant, insect, species.

---------- Post added at 07:08 AM ---------- Previous post was at 07:07 AM ----------

Damn proud to see the camo....now we need to put that on the uniforms and all weapons ASAP.
 
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Apropos of Joe Shearer's post above; the best way to deal militarily with an insurgent is like an insurgent. Live close to the land and live off the land. If there was any other viable way then ' carpet bombing' and 'agent orange' would have worked long years ago! They did'nt.

For an internal insurgency, the civilian option must never be overlooked, since that is the only method that strikes at the root of the insurgency.

True ; but I specifically added the word Indian terrain because Gunships are of great use in the barren mountainous terrain in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

It is just our jungles dont allow the Gunship ops to a large extent.
 
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We can say "they should do this" or "they should do that" sitting here but I think Indian Army knows what strategy is best for Indian conditions and environment. Because they know and understand the terrain and our motherland better than us.
 
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We can say "they should do this" or "they should do that" sitting here but I think Indian Army knows what strategy is best for Indian conditions and environment. Because they know and understand the terrain and our motherland better than us.



Nah no necessarily....everybody makes mistakes and corruption can blight any progress. So I think it is important for folks to voice their opinions in open forums.....coz you never know who may be reading.


Murthy and Anthony for Election......The SOuth Will RISE!!!
 
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True ; but I specifically added the word Indian terrain because Gunships are of great use in the barren mountainous terrain in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

It is just our jungles dont allow the Gunship ops to a large extent.

I hope you noticed post 513, which covered Indian terrain exclusively. The points about Afghanistan and Pakistan are not entirely valid; it is only in mountains without vantage points for marksmen with MANPADs to stand within MANPAD range that attack helicopters. That presupposes a degree of flat terrain, which can be found in Afghanistan between mountain ranges. On the other hand, there are areas, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border among them, where I suspect attack helicopters will be singularly out of place. Taking the point further, I suspect that our experts from Pakistan will inform us that neither north nor south Waziristan lends itself to attack helicopter operations.
 
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^^^
Apropos of Joe Shearer's post above; the best way to deal militarily with an insurgent is like an insurgent. Live close to the land and live off the land. If there was any other viable way then ' carpet bombing' and 'agent orange' would have worked long years ago! They did'nt.

For an internal insurgency, the civilian option must never be overlooked, since that is the only method that strikes at the root of the insurgency.

I will respectfully disagree. Intelligence above anything is what is important in counter-insurgency. There is the romantic idea of fighting the guerilla like a guerilla, (plot of the second Rambo movie no?) but I think it is largely unnecessary for an army operate off the land and of the land to be effective.
 
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I will respectfully disagree. Intelligence above anything is what is important in counter-insurgency. There is the romantic idea of fighting the guerilla like a guerilla, (plot of the second Rambo movie no?) but I think it is largely unnecessary for an army operate off the land and of the land to be effective.

Intelligence (or the need thereof) is generic to fighting any conflict, not just an insurgency. About Rambo; Mr. Rambo or even Gen. Rambo will not last long in any counter insurgency operation. There was nothing romantic about the Viet Cong for instance, but a lot that was effective.
 
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Intelligence (or the need thereof) is generic to fighting any conflict, not just an insurgency. About Rambo; Mr. Rambo or even Gen. Rambo will not last long in any counter insurgency operation. There was nothing romantic about the Viet Cong for instance, but a lot that was effective.

I think, intelligence is differentially important in different kinds of wars and also the kind of intelligence needed to fight an insurgency is different from the conventional idea of intelligence in war (ie troops disposition, concentration) but more human intelligence like relationships between people, cell structure, political motivation, stuff like that.
 
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Murthy and Anthony for Election......The SOuth Will RISE!!!

Antony is a good guy. Vote of antony!

Murthy? Excuse me, I don't want a call-center CEO whose coolie army works day night for doing contract work of western MNC's.

That whole $1 Billion profit is waste and his company can't even produce a single biometric technology patent for country, who has to rely on foreign software firms for UID project, shelling out Indian tax-payer's hundreds of crores, in royalties.

Besdies that, Murthy will eat up all Indian tax-payer's money on importing foreign solutions & products, just like his company relies on western products for earning all bread and butter. Typical Romanian, polish style cheap outsourced contractor.

Heck, even those small Israeli firms are making world-class VOIP software patents and image recognition algorithms earning them millions of $$ in royalties from American firms. What Murthy's coolie-firm invented, other than relying on bits & pieces thrown by western firms?
 
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