I think a US base will not happen because neither the US or Bangladesh is interested to have it, as there is no significant benefit to either parties.
ACSA:
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
US has ACSA contract with 76 countries, basically its for logistics, not a security treaty of any kind, that could make war a binding obligation. But I do not see why US would need any logistics passing through Bangladesh, so no possibility for this either.
World Insight Essay Series: United States Naval Base in Bangladesh, A Review
April 10, 2013 by AIDemocracy Leave a Comment
A timely perspective by Arafat Kabir, contributing author, on the implications of the United States’ naval presence in East Asia.
No sooner had Secretary of State Hilary Clinton departed Dhaka earlier this year, than an influential Indian newspaper claimed that the United States is planning to set up its SeventhFleet headquarters in Chittagong, Bangladesh. The momentum of this news’ rapid spread is easy to imagine in the region where tensions are already running high. The State Department and Bangladesh’s foreign ministry promptly denied any such joint endeavor, however it has been reflected several times in the voice of American envoys in Dhaka. Notwithstanding either country’s denial, the later events that took place both in Dhaka and Washington are undeniably thought provoking.
Indeed, Dhaka had never hosted a number of top-ranked US naval officers in close succession until the news was made public. According to analysts, it is a commencement of laying the foundation necessary to outline a formal treaty. Not surprisingly, neither party has ruled out any such military cohesiveness. The recurrence of their denial appears to be implausible until an erudite politician and member of the current ruling party confessed otherwise. “The US in exerting momentous pressure on Bangladesh to become a part of its strategic partner in the Asia Pacific”, he told in an interview last month. So, now the question remains; is the United States seeking bases in Bangladesh? If so, why, or how will they approach? What is the alternative?
U.S. SeventhFleet:
The Seventh Fleet’s area of responsibility encompasses more than 48 million square miles; from the Kuril Islands in the north to the Antarctic in the south, and from the International Date Line to the 68th Meridian east, running down from the India-Pakistan border. At any given time, there are 60-70 ships, 120-300 aircraft and 40,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel assigned to the fleet.
US presence in Bangladesh – necessity or absurdity?:
Two of the most important enhancements of the latest Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) were published by Department of Defense (DoD) in 2010. They can be used to draw the premise of future US military presence in Bangladesh by expanding future long-range strike capabilities; and enhancing the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad.
However these directives outlined in QDR do not suggest any country which could be a future ally. If the U.S needs to dispatch its air strike forces (with its New Generation Bomber- NGB) in order to halt targets either in Iran or China, distance serves as a huge curtailment. The distance between Guam’s Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) and the Chinese capital of Beijing, is approximately 2,200 miles. In addition, the Chinese ballistic missile launch pads in Delingha are 70 miles west of Beijing. In order to drop a bomb on Iranian Nuclear facilities at Natanz, a B-2 bomber plane would need to travel at least 2,700 miles from the US air base of Diego Garcia. Launching US aircrafts from Chittagong would thus prove far more advantageous than their present launching site. In this case, the only impediment is a green light from the government. Even if India rejects an American request to use its airspace, the U.S. would be trespassing over the Indian border while launching an assault from Chittagong to China by deploying its super stealth jets.
Currently the Chinese Anti- Access or Area Denial (A2\AD) installations are denser towards the South China Sea coastal line than those on the the Bay of Bengal. Even the world’s first ever anti-ship ballistic missile developed by China known as DF-21D, relies on a chain of land based networks of installations that can be countered by the U.S. A special kind of radar named Over-the-Horizon Radar, which is used to detect ships can be jammed, malfunction, and ultimately destroyed. A new and complex network of infrastructure would be needed to make the whole system work precisely. This ambitious DF-21D system requires lethal precision to detect ships, process the data and communicate before it fires the missile.
Above all, the greatest advantage that the base in Chittagong can provide is to significantly shorten the NGB’s refueling time to increase its effectiveness. An aircraft’s true operational “reach” is defined by several different factors other than its mere combat radius. Combining aerial refueling with standoff weapons can extend an aircraft’s effective strike radius commendably. For instance, an aircraft with a 2,500 mile combat radius (or a total of 5,000 miles between aerial refueling) could reach any target in China. Extending this example, the Congressional Budget Office concluded that a future bomber with a 2,000–2,500 mile combat radius, refueled prior to combat, “would fully cover all countries” in the world.
Thus, a base in Bangladesh will help the United States broaden as well strengthen its power projectile while also fortifying the Obama administration’s position of “Containing China.” A new base in the Bay of Bengal will not only contain Chinese militarily but also have an impact economically. The Bay of Bengal is used to transport most of Japan’s imported petroleum; an American presence will push off any Chinese intention to threaten this route. Furthermore, the Bay of Bengal is assumed to be abundant in many natural resources. Several U.S. companies have already began working with Bangladesh offshore and have been planning to extend its operation in Myanmar. An incipient entente between the US and Myanmar sends China the message that the U.S. will offer no concession in sharing the resources located within the Bay of Bengal. An American naval base has potential to be the ultimate outcome of this long term strategy.
The unavoidable impediments and solutions:
First and foremost the U.S. must use each and every opportunity to win the support and confidence of the Bangladeshi people. The U.S. could utilize existing channels in society to relay its message. For example parties like liberal intellectual circles, the media, businessmen and representatives from different walks of life with a view to defending the aim and operational functionality of an American base. In this regard, the toughest task will be to appeal to the Bangladeshi political parties opposed to the installation of a base. The U.S. would be most effective by capitalizing the points where there are converging security interests. It would also be wise to guarantee Bangladesh that it will safeguard and respect its coastal sovereignty, and vow to help it practice good governance and democracy. Foreseeable requests on the Bengladeshi side include duty free access to its largest exporting good, ready-made garment. This fits with the likelihood that Bangladesh will ask that the U.S. exponentially increase its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Above all, the U.S. should offer Bangladesh a complete package of benevolent assistance extending from military to education, to trade, to the re-opening of Diversity Visas (Dvs) availability.
In addition to the challenges the U.S. will face politically in Bangladesh, appeasing India’s apprehension will be perhaps the most daunting of tasks. The present rapprochement between the two partner countries does not win the U.S. India’s assent. The U.S will seek India’s support for using its military and strategic installations off the Indian coast. Notwithstanding its shared interest in limiting Chinese influence in South Asia, India is better served to counter it autonomously. Being monitored by and American fleet floating nearby far exceeds the current relationship of developing weaponry. India is now seen to be in the race to become a commendable superpower by 2030. Thus, the US will be operating within a tremendously critical, regional balance of power equation before it can progress with its plan for base.
Alternative location:
All of this begs the question of what a feasible and appealing alternate location in South Asia will look like, should the Chittagong Port in Bangladesh be unsupported. One possibility is Myanmar’s Akiyab Port on the Bay of Bengal. The pace of lifting economic sanctions on Myanmar was accelerated when Secretary Clinton returned to the U.S. following her Asian tour that also included Dhaka. The American move to reward Myanmar with several “life-saving” incentives has been labeled quite hasty by many. Among the challengers is the Myanmarese opposition leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who is afraid that the current ruling party may have subsequently received more credit than it actually deserves. Although human rights have always been a flagship issue in American foreign policy, the U.S. has not utilized its typically strong rhetoric on these issues recently. One such instance includes a recent clash between Buddhists and the Muslim minority group of Rohingya, alleged by some to have been government sponsored and aimed at ethnically cleansing Myanmar. Similar clashes have continued to have been reported after U.S. President Barack Obama’s unprecedented state visit to Myanmar. Such an American indolence to appropriately warn Myanmar over its intermittent violation of human rights has caused some to speculate that the United States may have further plans to utilize Myanmar to build a strategic shield in this region led by the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
Based on this it seems likely that either Chittagong or Akiyab or another naval port in Myanmar is an option being debated at PACOM. It can be conclude that China appears will provide the same deterrence to this as India serves in the case of Bangladesh. However, present situation implies that Myanmar is more interested in rebuilding a warm relationship with western powers than pandering to the issues dominant in its relations with China. Especially with the emerging tensions between North and South Korea, it is the U.S. which appears eager to be the vanguard of global security in South Asia. These diverse and interwoven situations will leave the U.S. to ponder its navigation toward a collaborative approach to regional stability.
http://www.aidemocracy.org/students...ted-states-naval-base-in-bangladesh-a-review/
