From Pakistan, Diplomats Wrote About a Vexing Ally
By JANE PERLEZ, DAVID E. SANGER and ERIC SCHMITT
Published: November 30, 2010
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Less than a month after President Obama testily assured reporters in 2009 that Pakistan’s nuclear materials “will remain out of militant hands,” his ambassador here sent a secret message to Washington suggesting that she was worried about just that.
The ambassador’s concern was a stockpile of highly enriched uranium, sitting for years near an aging research nuclear reactor in Pakistan. There was enough to build several “dirty bombs” or, in skilled hands, possibly enough for an actual nuclear bomb.
In the cable dated May 27, 2009, the ambassador, Anne W. Patterson, reported that the Pakistani government was yet again dragging its feet on an agreement reached two years earlier to have the United States remove the material.
She wrote to senior American officials that the Pakistani government had concluded that “the ‘sensational’ international and local media coverage of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons made it impossible to proceed at this time.” A senior Pakistani official, she said, warned that if word leaked out that Americans were helping remove the fuel, the local press would “certainly portray it as it as the United States taking Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”
The fuel is still there.
It may be the most unnerving evidence of the complex relationship — sometimes cooperative, often confrontational, always wary — between America and Pakistan nearly 10 years into the American-led war in Afghanistan. The cables, obtained by WikiLeaks and made available to a number of news organizations, make it clear that underneath public reassurances lie deep clashes over strategic goals on issues like Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban and tolerance of Al Qaeda, and Washington’s warmer relations with India, Pakistan’s archenemy.
Written from the American Embassy in Islamabad, the cables reveal American maneuvering as diplomats try to support an unpopular elected government that is more sympathetic to American aims than is the real power in Pakistan, the army and intelligence agency so crucial to the fight against militants. The cables show just how weak the civilian government is:
President Asif Ali Zardari told Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. that he worried that the military might “take me out.”
Frustration at American inability to persuade the Pakistani Army and intelligence agency to stop supporting the Afghan Taliban and other militants runs through the reports of meetings between American and Pakistani officials.
That frustration preoccupied the Bush administration and became an issue for the incoming Obama administration, the cables document, during a trip in January 2009 that Mr. Biden made to Pakistan 11 days before he was sworn in. In a meetingh Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the army chief of staff, Mr. Biden asked several times whether Pakistan and the United States “had the same enemy as we move forward.” wit
“The United States needs to be able to make an objective assessment of Pakistan’s part of the bargain,” Mr. Biden said, according to a Feb. 6, 2009, cable.
General Kayani tried to reassure him, saying, “We are on the same page in Afghanistan, but there might be different tactics.” Mr. Biden replied that “results” would test that.
The cables reveal at least one example of increased cooperation, previously undisclosed, under the Obama administration. Last fall, the Pakistani Army secretly allowed 12 American Special Operations soldiers to deploy with Pakistani troops in the violent tribal areas near the Afghan border.
The Americans were forbidden to conduct combat missions. Even though their numbers were small, their presence at army headquarters in Bajaur, South Waziristan and North Waziristan was a “sea change in thinking,” the embassy reported.
The embassy added its usual caution: The deployments must be kept secret or the “Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance.”
Within the past year, however, Pakistan and the United States have gingerly started to publicly acknowledge the role of American field advisers.
Lt. Col. Michael Shavers, an American military spokesman in Islamabad, said in a statement that “at the request of the Pakistanis,” small teams of Special Operations forces “move to various locations with their Pakistani military counterparts throughout Pakistan.”
Moreover, last week in a report to Congress on operations in Afghanistan, the Pentagon said that the Pakistani Army had also accepted American and coalition advisers in Quetta.
The cables do not deal with the sharp increase during the Obama administration in drone attacks against Al Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas with Pakistan’s tacit approval. That is because the cables are not classified at the highest levels.
A Deep Skepticism
Over all, though, the cables portray deep skepticism that Pakistan will ever cooperate fully in fighting the full panoply of extremist groups. This is partly because Pakistan sees some of the strongest militant groups as insurance for the inevitable day that the United States military withdraws from Afghanistan — and Pakistan wants to exert maximum influence inside Afghanistan and against Indian intervention.
Indeed, the consul general in Peshawar wrote in 2008 that she believed that some members of the Haqqani network — one of the most lethal groups attacking American and Afghan soldiers — had left North Waziristan to escape drone strikes.
Some family members, she wrote, relocated south of Peshawar; others lived in Rawalpindi, where senior Pakistani military officials live.
In one cable, Ms. Patterson, a veteran diplomat who left Islamabad in October after a three-year stint as ambassador, said more money and military assistance would not be persuasive.
“There is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning support for these groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India.”
In a rare tone of dissent with Washington, she said Pakistan would only dig in deeper if America continued to improve ties with India, which she said “feeds Pakistani establishment paranoia and pushes them closer to both Afghan and Kashmir focused terrorist groups.”
The groups Ms. Patterson referred to were almost certainly the Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group financed by Pakistan in the 1990s to fight India in Kashmir that is accused of the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India.
The highly enriched uranium that Ms. Patterson wanted removed from the research reactor came from the United States in the mid-1960s. In those days, under the Atoms for Peace program, little thought was given to proliferation, and Pakistan seemed too poor and backward to join the nuclear race.
But by May 2009, all that had changed, and her terse cable to the State and Defense Departments, among others, touched every nerve in the fraught relationship: mutual mistrust, the safety of the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, broken promises and a pervasive fear that any talk about Pakistan’s vulnerability would end whatever cooperation existed.
The reactor had been converted to use low-enriched uranium, well below bomb grade, in 1990, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, or I.A.E.A. But the bomb-grade uranium had never been returned to the United States and remains in storage nearby. Ms. Patterson’s cable noted that Pakistan had “agreed in principle to the fuel removal in 2007.”
But time and again the Pakistanis balked, and she reported that an interagency group within the Pakistani government had decided to cancel a visit by American technical experts to get the fuel out of the country. She concluded that “it is clear that the negative media attention has begun to hamper U.S. efforts to improve Pakistan’s nuclear security and nonproliferation practices.”
Any progress, she suggested, would have to await a “more conducive” political climate.
On Monday, Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement confirming that “the US suggestion to have the fuel transferred was plainly refused by Pakistan.” It said that the United States had provided the fuel but did not mention that, under the terms of such transfers, the United States retained the right to have the spent fuel returned.
The ambassador’s comments help explain why Mr. Obama and his aides have expressed confidence in Pakistan’s nuclear security when asked in public. But at the beginning of the administration’s review of its Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy, a highly classified intelligence report delivered to Mr. Obama said that while Pakistan’s weapons were well secured, there was deep, continuing concern about “insider access,” meaning elements in the military or intelligence services.
In fact, Ms. Patterson, in a Feb. 4, 2009, cable, wrote that “our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in GOP [government of Pakistan] facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon.”
Mr. Obama’s review concluded by determining that there were two “vital” American interests in the region. One was defeating Al Qaeda. The second, not previously reported, was making sure terrorists could never gain access to Pakistan’s nuclear program. That goal was classified, to keep from angering Islamabad.
Asked about the current status of the fuel at the research reactor, Damien LaVera, a spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Energy Department, said, “The United States supplied Pakistan with fuel for a research reactor decades ago for the purpose of producing medical isotopes and scientific research.” Implicitly acknowledging that the material remains there, Mr. LaVera added that “the fuel is under I.A.E.A. safeguards and has not been part of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.”
One secret cable offers another glimpse into another element of the nuclear gamesmanship between the United States and its Pakistani allies: Even while American officials were trying to persuade Pakistani officials to give up nuclear material, they were quietly seeking to block Pakistan from trying to buy material that would help it produce tritium, the crucial ingredient needed to increase the power of nuclear weapons.
After providing specific details of the proposed sale, a Dec. 12, 2008, secret cable to the American Embassy in Singapore, seeking help to stop a transaction that was about to take place, concluded, “We would have great concern over Pakistan’s potential use of tritium to advance its nuclear weapons program.”
Reports of Army Abuses
The cables also reveal that the American Embassy had received credible reports of extrajudicial killings of prisoners by the Pakistani Army more than a year before the Obama administration publicly acknowledged the problem and before a video that is said to show such killings surfaced on the Internet.
The killings are another growing source of tension between the nations, complicated by American pressure on Pakistan to be more aggressive in confronting militants on its own soil.
In a Sept. 10, 2009, cable labeled “secret/noforn,” meaning that it was too delicate to be shared with foreign governments, the embassy confronted allegations of human rights abuses in the Swat Valley and the tribal areas since the Pakistani Army had begun fighting the Taliban a few months earlier.
While carefully worded, the cable left little doubt about what was going on. It spoke of a “growing body of evidence” that gave credence to the allegations.
“The crux of the problem appears to center on the treatment of terrorists detained in battlefield operations and have focused on the extrajudicial killing of some detainees,” the cable said. “The detainees involved were in the custody of Frontier Corps or Pakistan army units.” The Frontier Corps is a paramilitary force partly financed by the United States to fight the insurgents.
The Pakistani Army was holding as many as 5,000 “terrorist detainees,” the cable said, about twice as many as the army had acknowledged.
Concerned that the United States should not offend the Pakistani Army, the cable stressed that any talk of the killings must be kept out of the press.
“Post advises that we avoid comment on these incidents to the extent possible and that efforts remain focused on dialogue and the assistance strategy,” the ambassador wrote. This September, however, the issue exploded into public view when a video emerged showing Pakistani soldiers executing six unarmed young men in civilian clothes. In October, the Obama administration suspended financing to half a dozen Pakistani Army units believed to have killed civilians or unarmed prisoners.
The cables verge on gossipy, as diplomats strained to understand the personalities behind the fractious Pakistani government, and particularly two men: General Kayani and President Zardari.
Often, the United States finds that Mr. Zardari, the accidental leader after the assassination of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, is sympathetic to American goals — stiff sanctions on terrorist financing, the closing down of terrorist training camps — but lacks the power to fulfill his promises against resistance from the military and intelligence agencies.
Mr. Zardari’s chief antagonist, General Kayani, emerges as a stubborn guarantor of what he sees as Pakistan’s national interest, an army chief who meddles in civilian politics but stops short of overturning the elected order.
Early in the Obama administration, General Kayani made clear a condition for improved relations. As the director general of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, from 2004 to 2007, he did not want a “reckoning with the past,” said a cable in 2009 introducing him to the new administration.
“Kayani will want to hear that the United States has turned the page on past ISI operations,” it said. General Kayani was probably referring to the peace accords with the Taliban from 2004 to 2007 that resulted in the strengthening of the militants. If the general seems confidently in charge, the cables portray Mr. Zardari as a man not fully aware of his weakness.
At one point he said he would not object if Abdul Qadeer Khan, revered in Pakistan as the father of its nuclear weapons program, were interviewed by the International Atomic Energy Agency but tacitly acknowledged that he was powerless to make that happen.
Mr. Zardari, who spent 11 years in prison on ultimately unproved corruption charges, feared for his position and possibly — the wording is ambiguous — his life:
the cables reveal that Vice President Biden told Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain in March 2009 that Mr. Zardari had told him that the “ISI director and Kayani will take me out.”
His suspicions were not groundless. During their fourth meeting in a week in March 2009, a period of political turmoil,
General Kayani told the ambassador that he “might, however reluctantly,” pressure Mr. Zardari to resign and, the cable added, presumably leave Pakistan.He mentioned the leader of a third political party, Asfandyar Wali Khan, as a possible replacement.
“Kayani made it clear regardless how much he disliked Zardari he distrusted Nawaz even more,” the ambassador wrote, a reference to Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister.
By 2010, after many sessions with Mr. Zardari, Ms. Patterson had revised the guarded optimism that characterized her early cables about Mr. Zardari.
“Pakistan’s civilian government remains weak, ineffectual and corrupt,” she wrote on Feb. 22, 2010, the eve of a visit by the F.B.I. director, Robert S. Mueller III. “Domestic politics is dominated by uncertainty about the fate of President Zardari.”
That assessment holds more than eight months later, even as Mr. Obama in October extended an invitation to the Mr. Zardari leader to visit the White House next year, as the leader of a nation that holds a key to peace in Afghanistan but appears too divided and mistrustful to turn it for the Americans.
Jane Perlez reported from Islamabad, and David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt from Washington. William J. Broad and Andrew W. Lehren contributed reporting from New York.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/world/asia/01wikileaks-pakistan.html?_r=1&src=tptw
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Concerned Cables
DATE 2009-05-27 16:32:00
SOURCE Embassy Islamabad
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 001152
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PARM, KNNP, MNUC, PK
SUBJECT: U.S. REMOVAL OF PAKISTAN RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL ON
HOLD
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (S) Kamran Akhtar, Disarmament Director in Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Poloff on May 26 that the recent spate of media attention on Pakistan's nuclear security has led the GOP to delay an important nonproliferation effort, the removal of U.S.-origin highly-enriched uranium spent fuel from a Pakistani nuclear research reactor. The GOP agreed in principle to the fuel removal in 2007, but has been slow in scheduling a visit by U.S. technical experts to discuss logistical and other issues. In recent months, the Strategic Plans Division and Ministry of Foreign Affairs both indicated progress on the matter and a proposed visit for late May was under review. However, according to Akhtar, a recent GOP interagency review of the program concluded that the "sensational" international and local media coverage of the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons made it impossible to proceed at this time. If the local media got word of the fuel removal, "they certainly would portray it as the United States taking Pakistan's nuclear weapons," he argued. The visit will have to be delayed for 3-4 months or until the political climate makes it more conducive to hosting a U.S. visit, he stated.
2. (S) Comment: As noted in previous post reporting, the GOP is extremely sensitive to media focus on Pakistan's nuclear program. In a sign of their growing defensiveness, the Foreign Office Spokesman took significant time out of his May 21 press conference to address nuclear security, stating categorically, "there is simply no question of our strategic assets falling into the wrong hands." To a question about reported offers of U.S. help with nuclear security, he responded, "we do not need this assistance." With the postponement of the nuclear fuel removal, it is clear that the negative media attention has begun to hamper U.S. efforts to improve Pakistan's nuclear security and nonproliferation practices. End Comment. PATTERSON
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
DATE 2009-10-09 07:25:00
SOURCE Embassy Islamabad
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002449
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2034
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: (S) PAKISTAN ARMY GHQ AGAIN APPROVES EMBEDDING
U.S. SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS
REF: ISLAMABAD 2116
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (a)(b)(c), and
(d)
1. (S) Summary: The Pakistani Army has for just the secondtime approved deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in Bajaur Agency, occurred in September (reftel). Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces. The developments ofthe past two months thus appear to represent a sea change in their thinking. End Summary.
2. (S) Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) informed ODRP that it approved a request from the Army's 11 Corps Commander, Lt. General Masood Aslam, for U.S. SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to deploy to ––––, South Waziristan and –––– ––––, North Waziristan, in the FATA, in order to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general operational advice to the 11 Corps' –––– –––– –––– ––––. The 11 Corps had informally approached ODRP about our providing such support approximately one week ago; ODRP responded positively.
3. (S) SOC(FWD)-PAK support to 11 Corps would be at the –––– and would include a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video. SOC(FWD)-PAK's initial CONOPs envision deployment of six personnel each to –––– –––– –––– ––––. In order to finalize our planning and obtain formal go-ahead from CENTCOM, ODRP has requested additional information on the timing and purpose of the 11 Corps' planned military operations from Brigadier General Amjad Shabbir, the Army's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO).
4. (S) This is just the second time that GHQ has approved deployment of U.S. special operations elements to support Pakistani military operations. In September 2009, four SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded with the Frontier Corps (FC) at –––– ––––, in Bajaur Agency in the FATA, provided ISR for an FC operation (reftel). This support was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location.
5. (S) In recent days, the FC informally approached ODRP for a repeat deployment of SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to –––– ––––. SOC(FWD)-PAK is preparing a CONOP while the FC obtains approval from GHQ.
6. (S) Comment: U.S. special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role. The Pakistani Army leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their operations. The recent approval by GHQ -- almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani -- for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to Bajaur and the Waziristans appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking. Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point. The Pakistanis are increasingly confident that we do not have ulterior motives in assisting their operations. In addition, the direct recipients of SOC(FWD)-PAK training appear to have recognized the potential benefits of bringing U.S. SOF personnel into the field with them for operational advice and other support. In addition, the success of the initialdeployment to –––– –––– likely helped catalyze the follow-up requests for new and repeat support.
7. (S) Comment Continued: These deployments are highly politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or related matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or U.S. media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance. End Comment.
ISLAMABAD 00002449 002 OF 002
PATTERSON
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5243
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0970
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RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 2344
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 7946
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 6977
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
DATE 2009-09-23 15:09:00
SOURCE Embassy Islamabad
CLASSIFICATION SECRET//NOFORN
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 002295
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINR, MOPS, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: REVIEWING OUR AFGHANISTAN - PAKISTAN STRATEGY
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (S/NF) Summary: In response to queries posed by the National Security Council, Embassy Islamabad believes that it is not/not possible to counter al-Qaeda in Pakistan absent a comprehensive strategy that 1) addresses the interlinked Taliban threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2) brings about stable, civilian government in Afghanistan, and 3) reexamines the broader role of India in the region. As the queries presuppose, the ending of Pakistani establishment support to terrorist and extremist groups, some Afghan-focused and some India-focused, is a key element for success. There is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India. The only way to achieve a cessation of such support is to change the Pakistan government's own perception of its security requirements.
End Summary.
2. (S/NF) Al-Qaeda can operate in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) largely because the Taliban-related groups in these areas continue to challenge the writ of the Pakistani government. Unilateral targeting of al-Qaeda operatives and assets in these regions is an important component of dealing with the overall threat. It is not/not, however, sufficient in and of itself to force al-Qaeda out of the FATA, so long as the territory remains largely ungoverned space. Increased unilateral operations in these areas risk destabilizing the Pakistani state, alienating both the civilian government and military leadership, and provoking a broader governance crisis in Pakistan without finally achieving the goal. To be effective, we must extend the writ of the Pakistani state into the FATA in such a way that Taliban groups can no longer offer effective protection to al-Qaeda from Pakistan's own security and law enforcement agencies in these areas. We should be under no illusion, however, that this effort will not require a multi-year, multi-agency effort.
3. (S/NF) Taliban groups in Pakistan and the regional threat posed by al-Qaeda, however, cannot be effectively dealt with absent a broader regional strategy that leads to stability in Afghanistan. Fear that the ISAF mission in Afghanistan will end without the establishment of a non-Taliban, Pakhtoon-led government friendly to Pakistan adds to the Pakistani establishment's determination not to cut its ties irrevocably to the Afghan Taliban. They fear that withdrawals of NATO countries on a date certain from Afghanistan is only the thin edge of a wedge that will be followed by other coalition partners, including the United States. Discussions of deadlines, downsizing of the American military presence, or even a denial of the additional troops reportedly to be requested by Gen. McChrystal are taken as evidence that reinforces this perception. General Kayani has been utterly frank about Pakistan's position on this. In such a scenario, the Pakistan establishment will dramatically increase support for Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which they see either as ultimately likely to take over the Afghan government or at least an important counter-weight to an Indian-controlled Northern Alliance.
4. (S/NF) Most importantly, it is the perception of India as the primary threat to the Pakistani state that colors its perceptions of the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan's security needs. The Pakistani establishment fears a pro-India government in Afghanistan would allow India to operate a proxy war against Pakistan from its territory. Justified or not, increased Indian investment in, trade with, and development support to the Afghan government, which the USG has encouraged, causes Pakistan to embrace Taliban groups all the more closely as anti-India allies. We need to reassess Indian involvement in Afghanistan and our own policies towards India, including the growing military relationship through sizable conventional arms sales, as all of this feeds Pakistani establishment paranoia and pushes them closer to both Afghan and Kashmir-focused terrorist groups while reinforcing doubts about U.S. intentions. Resolving the Kashmir dispute, which lies at the core of Pakistan's support for terrorist groups, would dramatically improve the situation. Enhanced USG efforts in this regard should be considered.
5. (S/NF) Money alone will not/not solve the problem of al-Qaeda or the Taliban operating in Pakistan. A grand bargain that promises development or military assistance in exchange for severing ties will be insufficient to wean Pakistan from policies that reflect accurately its most deep-seated fears. The Pakistani establishment, as we saw in 1998 with the nuclear test, does not view assistance -- even sizable assistance to their own entities -- as a trade-off for national security vis-a-vis India. The lack of faith in USG intentions in Pakistan and in relation to India makes such a bargain untenable in the eyes of the Pakistani establishment. Development assistance in the context of the Pakistani counter-insurgency strategy must be accelerated and refined in order to extend the government writ to the FATA, to stabilize regions at-risk for insurgent activity and recruitment, and to offer incentives for those that desire to leave terrorist groups. It can and should not/not be viewed as a pay-off for behavior change by the Pakistani establishment.
6. (S/NF) In the final analysis there is no short-cut to dealing with the al-Qaeda problem in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is inextricably linked to and cannot be divorced from the Taliban problem in both countries. Nor can we hope to develop a strategy for minimizing Taliban influence and thereby al-Qaeda operational space in Pakistan's FATA absent a strategy that brings about stability in Afghanistan; the notion that precision or long-range counter-terrorism efforts can suffice are equally illusory. Afghan instability by definition leads the Pakistani establishment to increase support for the Taliban and thereby, unintentionally, create space for al-Qaeda. No amount of money will sever that link. Rather, we must reassess our regional approach and find ways to reassure the Pakistanis that they can address their long-standing national security objectives most effectively -- both to the east and to the west -- by working closely with the U.S.
PATTERSON
SECRET
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O 231509Z SEP 09
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DATE 2009-09-10 14:40:00
SOURCE Embassy Islamabad
CLASSIFICATION SECRET//NOFORN
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 002185
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2034
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PTER, MOPS, MASS, KJUS, PK
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT PAKISTAN SECURITY
FORCES' HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
REF: ISLAMABAD 2074
Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d
1. (S/NF) A growing body of evidence is lending credence to allegations of human rights abuses by Pakistan security forces during domestic operations against terrorists in Malakand Division and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. While it is oftentimes difficult to attribute with accuracy any responsibility for such abuses, reporting from a variety of sources suggests that Frontier Corps and regular Pakistan Army units involved in direct combat with terrorists may have been involved. The crux of the problem appears to center on the treatment of terrorists detained in battlefield operations and have focused on the extra-judicial killing of some detainees. The detainees involved were in the custody of Frontier Corps or Pakistan Army units. The allegations of extra-judicial killings generally do not/not extend to what are locally referred to as "the disappeared" -- high-value terrorist suspects and domestic insurgents who are being held incommunicado by Pakistani intelligence agencies including the Inter-Services Intelligence Division (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) in their facilities.
2. (S/NF) Revenge for terrorist attacks on Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps personnel is believed to be one of the primary motivating factors for the extra-judicial killings. Cultural traditions place a strong importance on such revenge killings, which are seen as key to maintaining a unit's honor. Senior military commanders have equally and repeatedly stressed their concerns that the court's are incapable of dealing with many of those detained on the battlefield and their fears that if detainees are handed over to the courts and formally charged, they will be released, placing Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps troops at risk. This fear is well-founded as both Anti-Terrorism Courts and the appellate judiciary have a poor track record of dealing with suspects detained in combat operations such as the Red Mosque operation in Islamabad and have repeatedly ordered their unconditional release. Post assesses that the lack of viable prosecution and punishment options available to the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps is a contributing factor in allowing extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses of detained terrorist combatants to proceed. There may be as many as 5000 such terrorist detainees currently in the custody of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps from operations in Malakand, Bajaur, and Mohmand. As operations in these areas and other parts of the FATA proceed, this number will increase.
3. (S/NF) NWFP Police have also been implicated in the abuse and extra-judicial killing of terrorist suspects that they believe responsible for attacks on police stations and individuals in the run-up to the conflict. This is a separate problem set from those detained in combat by Frontier Corps and Pakistan Army units. The NWFP Inspector General of Police has publicly announced the establishment of a Human Rights Unit within his office to prevent, investigate, and punish human rights violations committed by his forces. As a component of the police training program that we are now standing up for the NWFP, post intends to offer assistance to the Inspector General of Police and his new unit on education and prevention of human rights abuses and investigations and prosecutions where abuses are suspected.
4. (S/NF) In an effort to stem extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses of these detained in combat by Pakistan security forces, post is proposing a multi-pronged approach as follows:
Short Term -- Diplomatic Engagement: Continue to privately raise this issue repeatedly and at the highest levels of the Pakistan government and military. Ensure that expressions of concern over the alleged extra-judicial killings coupled with calls for transparent investigations and, as appropriate, prosecution are included in the talking points of all senior USG civilian and military visitors in meetings with Pakistani civilian and military counterparts. Timeline: Ongoing. Funding: None required.
-- Offer Assistance: Coordinate with the British High Commission on an offer of assistance to the Defense Minister and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). To the Defense Minister propose assistance in drafting a new Presidential Order that would create a parallel administrative track for charging and sentencing terrorists detained by the military in combat operations. Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act are already well underway. To the COAS, propose bringing over a team of American and British experts to evaluate the detainee issue and to determine jointly what assistance is required from coalition partners. If COAS agreement is forthcoming, bring over a team of American military lawyers to meet with Pakistan military officials with a view to obtaining concurrence on training in battlefield evidence collection, investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses by military personnel, and assistance on drafting the new Presidential Order proposed to the Defense Minister: Timeline: Meeting with COAS and Defense Minister by end of September 09. Team deployed by October 09. Funding: Reallocation of existing Foreign Assistance funding.
-- Evaluate Detainee Situation: Local Pakistan military commanders and FATA/NWFP officials have approached various offices with request for assistance on dealing with detained combatants under the guise of reintegration. Post proposes bringing over a senior representative from INL's prison reform office to lay the groundwork for a visiting team that would conduct a formal assessment of conditions and infrastructure/personnel/systems needs of the local prison system for potentially housing these detainees. This report would form the baseline for development of an assistance strategy to help the GOP address the issue. Timeline: INL initial visit in September 2009. Followed by assessment mission in October 2009 with report to be completed by November 2009. Funding: INCLE funds will need to be reallocated.
Medium Term
-- Draft Ordinance: Get UK agreement to lead a team of British, and possibly American, experts to work with the Pakistan Defense Ministry and Army to draft a new Presidential Ordinance for the administrative prosecution and punishment of terrorists detained in combat operations (this process is already underway in Pakistan). Representatives of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will need to agree to participate in the drafting process. Post will approach the HRCP at an appropriate time but will require Washington/Geneva assistance in obtaining ICRC agreement. Adoption of the Presidential Ordinance would offer a credible way for the Pakistan military/government to prosecute and punish terrorists detained in combat operations. Timeline: Deploy team by December 09 with a view to completing ordinance by April 2010. Funding: Reallocation of existing Foreign Assistance funds.
-- Pakistani JAG and Intelligence Officer Training: Offer Detainee Operations training for Pakistan's JAG and intelligence officers. This five-day course would cover evidence collection on the battlefield, proper detainee handling, interrogations, international humanitarian law, laws governing internal armed conflicts, and war crime prosecutions. Timeline: Training courses to begin by January 2010. Funding: IMET funds have been allocated for this training. Long Term -- Assist in Implementation of Ordinance: Provide training to Pakistan military and Frontier Corps personnel on collection of battlefield evidence and its use in prosecution. Coordinate with British on providing appropriate training for personnel of administrative structure to be established through Presidential ordinance. Timeline: Training courses to begin by May 2010. Funding: Reallocation of existing IMET and other Foreign Assistance funding. -- Prison Reform: Design and fund a prison reform program to construct/rehabilitate existing federal/provincial prisons to accommodate terrorists detained in combat operations both pre-trial and post-conviction. Convince other donors to assist GOP in developing post-release programs to reintegrate into their communities detainees deemed not fit for trial or those who have served their sentences. Timeline: Launch prison reform program by October 2010. Approach donors on reintegration by September 2010 through SRAP. Funding: New INCLE funds will be needed.
4. (S/NF) Comment: Post fully recognizes that there is little that the USG can do to change the culture of revenge that underlies many of the extra-judicial killings taking place in the Malakand Division and FATA. However, it is our view that if senior commanders are offered a viable alternate to deal with detained combatants and a credible detention facility under control of the Prisons Department is established, the prevalence of human rights abuses will diminish. Post recognizes that much of this is dependent on goodwill within the Pakistan military and civilian establishment that can easily erode if too much public criticism from USG officials over these incidents is forthcoming. For this reason, post advises that we avoid comment on these incidents to the extent possible and that efforts remain focused on dialogue and the assistance strategy outlined above. End Comment.
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AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
USMISSION GENEVA
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
NSC WASHINGTON DC
DATE 2009-04-03 22:17:00
SOURCE Embassy Santiago
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTIAGO 000324
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: OVIP (BIDEN, JOSEPH), PREL, ECON, PGOV, SOCI, UK, PK,
AF
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN'S MARCH 27 MEETING WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN
SANTIAGO 00000324 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Simons for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
(......)
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AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
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11. (C) Turning to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Vice President Biden described the importance of combating terrorism and noted the different elements of the Obama administration's policy. First, the focus in Afghanistan is on Al Qaida. The Obama administration will not make an open-ended commitment to building freedom and democracy in Afghanistan because it is not realistic. Second, there is no real possibility of defeating Al Qaida without also dealing with Pakistan. Third, he recognized that the United States cannot solve the problem on its own. The whole world needed to engage.
12. (C) Vice President Biden said he worried that NATO countries in Europe underestimated the threat from the region and viewed the problem as an economic development issue rather than a security issue, despite the fact that Afghan opium is primarily exported to Europe and Europe has been the victim of several terrorist attacks originating from the region. Vice President Biden described the complex nature of the security problem in Afghanistan, commenting that &besides the demography, geography and history of the region, we have a lot going for us.8
13. (C) Vice President Biden noted that the current U.S. commitment of 63,000 troops to Afghanistan is the result of a vigorous internal policy debate and would not be sustainable politically for more than two years without visible signs of progress. After two years, the extraordinary cost of maintaining a robust military presence in Afghanistan would make additional commitment increasingly difficult. After Afghan elections the Administration intends to review the situation again. Currently there is little capacity for the Afghan government to execute many of the functions of government. In many areas of the country, local officials have close to no knowledge of how to govern or even basic knowledge of payroll or budget. Part of the reason the Taliban is strengthening is since the Taliban has the local capacity to settle basic disputes quickly while central government courts can take six to eight months to process a case.
14. (C) The idea of a strong rule of law under a centralized
SANTIAGO 00000324 003.2 OF 003 Karzai government was not realistic. New policy towards the Taliban should reflect the reality of the Afghan government's lack of capacity. Our policy should first aim to stabilize the urban areas and surrounding rural communities and then seek to exploit divisions within the Taliban, co-opting moderate elements rather than simply defeating militarily all elements of the Taliban.
15. (C) On Pakistan, Vice President Biden commented that it was difficult to convince Pakistan to commit to developing its counter-insurgency potential. The threat from India leads Pakistan to devote the bulk of its defense spending to conventional warfare capabilities. However, something must be done in the meantime. We need to develop our relationship with Pakistan beyond its current transactional nature to a long-term strategic partnership. We should begin with $1.5 billion per year in economic assistance that is unconditional and supplement that with military assistance that is conditioned on the modernization of its command structure and active action in the field to combat insurgents. It would be difficult to convince Congress to support such a plan, particularly the unconditional civilian component.
16. (C) Vice President Biden noted that the United States wants to empower the UN and wants active European participation in resolving the threats in Pakistan and Afghanistan. With the exception of the UK and a few others, very few Europeans are taking action. Germany completely dropped the ball on police training but NATO countries should continue to provide assistance that is within their capacity to deliver.
17. (C) Brown agreed that there was a significant terrorist threat emanating from the region. More than 30,000 Pakistanis travel back and forth to the UK each year and two-thirds of the terrorist threats that UK security forces investigate originate in Pakistan -- including one on-going investigation. The roots of terrorism in Pakistan are complicated and go beyond the madrasas to, in some areas, a complete societal incitement to militancy. Zedari's commitment to combating terrorism is unclear, although he always says the right things.
18. (C) Brown agreed on the need for a shared commitment and noted that the only way to reduce the threat and eventually draw down NATO's commitment to the region was by increasing the capacity of Afghanistani and Pakistani security services. Dividing the Taliban would greatly reduce its effectiveness, though doing this made the Iraq problem look easy by comparison.
19. (S) Vice President Biden commented that Zedari had told him two months ago that ISI director &Kiyani will take me out.8 Brown thought this unlikely and said that Kiyani did not want to be another Musharraf, rather he would give civilian leadership scope to function. However, he was wary of the Sharif brothers and Zedari.
20. (U) The Office of the Vice President cleared this message.
SIMONS
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DATE 2009-02-06 15:03:00
SOURCE Embassy Islamabad
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000270
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2034
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MARR, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: CODEL BIDEN'S MEETING WITH COAS KAYANI AND ISI
PASHA
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: Senators Biden and Graham met with Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Kayani and Director General of ISI LTGen Pasha on January 9 to underscore bipartisan support for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Senator Biden emphasized the need for the American people to see results soon in Afghanistan, and he wanted to be sure the U.S. and Pakistan had the same enemy as we moved forward. Senator Biden sought Kayani's views about what kind of Afghanistan would represent success for Pakistan.
2. (S) Kayani said the U.S. and Pakistan were on the same page, but there would be tactical differences. Cooperation with U.S. military, with whom he had excellent relations, had improved. Kayani stressed the military's support for Pakistan's civilian government. He described his campaign in Bajaur and plans to confront the insurgents in the rest of the tribal agencies. Kayani said he urgently needed help for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Kayani was candid that the government has essentially abandoned the Swat valley. Senator Graham emphasized the need to prosecute the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) leaders involved in the Mumbai attacks and to incorporate the tribal agencies into Pakistan's legal system. End summary.
3. (S) Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), accompanied by Ambassador and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Director Antony Blinken, met with COAS Kayani and DG ISI Pasha January 9 for ninety minutes. Senator Biden asked Kayani to describe his view of a stable Afghanistan.
4. (S) Senator Graham added his presence emphasized bipartisan support for Pakistan. (He had just visited Pakistan three weeks ago.) Senator Graham said he was going to support the Biden-Lugar bill, but he needed to convince his constituents of the value of investing in schools in Pakistan instead of South Carolina. Pakistan needed to prosecute those involved in the Mumbai attacks and be seen as a country that observed the rule of law.
5. (S) Kayani replied that Pakistan and the US had a convergence of interests. Kayani's goal was a peaceful, friendly and stable Afghanistan. Kayani said he had no desire to control Afghanistan. In fact, he said, anyone who wanted to control Afghanistan was ignorant of history, since no one has ever controlled it. Kayani noted there had been confusion about the policy of "strategic depth" but for him "strategic depth" meant a peaceful Afghanistan "on his back." But the Pashtuns have to be accommodated, Kayani added. Biden asked if Kayani made a distinction between the Pashtuns and the Taliban. Kayani replied that the Taliban were a reality, but the Afghan government dominated by the Taliban had had a negative effect on Pakistan.
6. (S) Kayani recalled he told Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen that the U.S. needed realistic expectations of what the Pakistani military could achieve and that these expectations had to be clearly articulated. Kayani described his campaign in Bajaur and his plans to confront the insurgents in other tribal agencies, but he repeatedly said he had capacity problems, particularly regarding equipment. Kayani said he needed urgent support for the 150,000 people displaced from the fighting. He said the military had undertaken hundreds of sorties in Bajaur, and the population of Bajaur was so far supportive of the military efforts. Senator Graham mentioned the success of the CERP program in Iraq and Afghanistan which had put money in the hands of commanders for urgent community needs.
7. (S) Kayani recounted the situation in Swat in which the provincial government had made accommodations with the militants, requiring the army to retake the area repeatedly. Kayani also said the population, once it saw the army pull out, was far less likely to support it the second time around. The military had to be followed by civilian agencies or the local support would diminish.
8. (S) Kayani said military efforts needed the political support of the civilian government. He recalled that when
ISLAMABAD 00000270 002 OF 003 the Federal Investigative Agency headquarters in Lahore had been hit by suicide bombers, the citizens of Lahore had demonstrated against the government rather than against the suicide bombers. While the army had sent the message in Bajaur that it meant business, there had to be follow-up support from the civilian agencies. Kayani said as his campaign moved through the tribal agencies, the army should ideally need to use diminishing force. When they have to fight for the same ground repeatedly, it becomes increasingly difficult and demoralizing to the troops.
9. (S) Senator Biden asked Kayani if he had the capacity and could obtain sufficient resources, would he then move against Taliban leaders like Baitullah Mehsud, Commander Nazir, and the Haqqanis? Senator Biden asked Kayani if he were prepared to move into the Waziristans.
10. (S) Kayani replied that Bajaur had been the "hardest nut to crack" militarily: the Pakistani military had undertaken an operation in South Waziristan last October, but the army had moved out because of the elections. The Pakistani military had also had a fort in the middle of Waziristan which had been cut off by militants. Kayani said he was painfully aware that the army had to retake South Waziristan since ninety percent of the suicide bombers came from Baitullah Mehsud. "He has to be cut down to size," said Kayani.
11. (S) But, Kayani said, the Pakistani military could not fight everyone at once. They would have to go after Mehsud and Nazir sequentially (a point Pasha confirmed). Biden said it was important to be in agreement on this issue. Pasha said the United States and Pakistan needed to have confidence in each other. Pasha said he was hurt about the inference that he did not have a relationship of trust with CIA. He had gone to Washington for a frank talk with CIA Director Hayden and he often briefed, and sought the advice of, the RAO Chief in Islamabad. Senator Biden repeated he was not going to revisit the past. Pasha replied that there was no reason for ISI to be protecting "these people" and he had no interest in saving them.
12. (S) Senator Biden said he needed to know that the situation had changed. Senator Biden said he understood that the Pakistani military lacked capacity, but would the situation change if they had additional resources? It was important to know if we had the same enemy: the U.S. needed to be able to make an objective assessment of Pakistan's part of the bargain. Graham added that "General Musharraf had cut deals, but those deals didn't work out."
13. (S) Kayani repeated there had been considerable cooperation on the technical level with U.S. forces. But this did not mean that there would not be differences of opinion on tactics. On Afghanistan, Kayani stressed ) "past, present, and future" -- we are on the same page.
14. (S) Regarding LeT, Kayani said Pakistan would not allow small groups to dictate state policy. Pakistan had not waited for evidence and they had moved immediately. The information they had now was based on confessions. Pakistan needed Indian cooperation to move the investigation forward. Kayani also insisted that any information available about upcoming attacks be shared with Pakistan. He understood that information about the attack had been provided to India but not to Pakistan. He said repeated discussion about "the next attack and all bets were off" only provided an incentive for another attack. Biden said that what was important was Pakistan's action against LeT and similar organizations.Senator Biden said he would share what he had heard with Admiral Mullen and emphasized the need for results.
15. (S) General Kayani said he appreciated the Senators' frank response. He repeated his need for help with IDPs. Senator Biden said the system of reimbursement through Coalition Support Funds would be reexamined. Kayani said that the military had only received about $300 million of the $1 billion ostensibly reimbursed for military expenses. He was not implying that the money had been stolen, but had been used for general budget support.
ISLAMABAD 00000270 003 OF 003
16. CODEL Biden has cleared this message.
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