Flash Back Air War 1971.

[lkozhi]

In your Pakistan obsession, you deem oblivious of US in Vietnam and USSR in Afghanistan not to mention the 1965 war.
And if your observation was worth it's salt, the chest thumping banter of cold start or was it surgical strikes or perhaps, hot pursuits should have been implemented by your mighty Sena.

You are right the term only is not proper in this situation. us,ussr and pakistan has lost with superior airforce.

nobody is doing surgery now sir. only key hole .You put a hole in the host body and remove cancer. patient wont even know as it happens.

May be someone can explain why it happened? Was airforce against the war. Otherwise why put only such small airforce there? Already they wanted to loose. Is that the case?

 

[OrionHunter]

The Western Air Situation
This article is the result of over 8 months of often frustrating research. Both the Indian and Pakistani air forces have tended to fudge figures and accounts. It took time and much effort to sift through the claims, counter-claims and various accounts of the 1971 air war to arrive at some basic conclusions.

Thanks ramu for this very informative write up! However, this oneupmanship between India and Pakistan is getting tiring. One gets to see this in almost every Indo Pak forum. The wars are over. The end results are there for all to see. Whether one lost 10 aircraft or 20 doesn't matter. These are all means to an end.

And yes, both Pakistani as well as Indian pilots are good. Pilots from the Asian sub continent have repeatedly screwed pilots from Western nations in the many joint exercises conducted with them!

Cheers!

 

[Black Widow]

This list is incomplete without Indian claim.. I will appreciate you if you can list the PAF losses along with claimed victory...

 

[SQ8]

This list is incomplete without Indian claim.. I will appreciate you if you can list the PAF losses along with claimed victory...

Recommend reading claims on ACIG.. fairly accurate..
best to check book of AC Sajjad haider..
accurate with figures as well.

 

[Windjammer]

The Air War of '71 Revisited

By Group Captain Sultan M. Hali (PAF)
Few nations in their history have undergone so many trials and tribulations as has Pakistan. From its very inception, Pakistan faced wars, insurrection and natural calamities. During all the vicissitudes and adversities that the country had to endure, the Pakistan Air Force bore the brunt of them all.

As we celebrate the Golden Jubilee of our independence, there is yet another milestone which we have crossed. It is the 25th anniversary of the 1971 War. The year 1971 was, in a way, the bleakest period of our brief history when our Eastern Wing was separated form us; 93,000 Pakistan were taken prisoners of war and numerous others laid down their lives in the defence of the nation.

For reasons best known to the powers that be, the causes of the outcome of this war have been kept under wraps. Irrespective of the final result, there were individual acts of valour. The Pakistan Air Force performed extremely well and has nothing to be ashamed of. Therefore we owe it to the families of the Shaheeds and those who fought with indomitable courage, that the details of the war be discussed and credit given where it is due. It is also imperative that the lessons learnt from this major campaign are taught to the younger generation. Many veterans of the 1971 War ask, "Did they fight for nothing?". They must be answered. The Silver Jubilee of the 1971 Air War, therefore, must not remain unheralded.

Backdrop to the War Against Secessionist

A discussion on the genesis of the break-away of our Eastern Wing is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is clear that the events leading up to the separation of east Pakistan from its western half in 1971 will be interpreted differently for many decades not the least due to the fact that throughout most of that year both Pakistan and its enemies reacted to events with such mutual intransigence as could lead to only one end - the dismemberment of Pakistan. India’s collusion with the Soviet Union in 1971, formally embodied in the treaty signed that year between the two states, foreclosed the possibility of Pakistan resolving the crisis arising due to social inequality, cultural variance, topography, physical separation of more than a thousand miles and the consequent secessionist pressures.

India not only fuelled the fires of secession but stage-managed an alleged refugee crisis. The hue and cry it raised about the so-called 10 million refugees who had supposedly poured into her territory - but were never allowed to be visited by any international agency - did not fool even her staunchest supporters. Of the many countries that condemned Pakistan’s harsh suppression of the Bengalis, none failed to see the Indian forces crossing of East Pakistan’s borders on 22 November for what it was: a brazen aggression, on the strength of a superpower’s backing against a sovereign neighbouring state which had been militarily debilitated by a highly inflamed civil war.

Wars, whether premeditated or fought in righteous defence have, in the end, been judged by the modern world more for their aftermath than the logic of morality.

As the pilots of Pakistan's only squadron in the eastern wing took to the air repeatedly from Dhaka against 10 IAF squadrons attacking it from all sides, these young men were under no illusions about the end. Their spirited assaults upon the Indian fighters over Tejgaon airport were clearly visible to foreign correspondents from the roof of the nearby Dhaka Intercontinental Hotel. Several of the newsmen took pictures and movie-shots of Indian fighters being chased and shot down by the handful of outnumbered No. 14 Squadron pilots who continued, even as their ability to operate from Dhaka diminished with the increasingly cratered runway, to write another glorious chapter of courage and perseverance in the history of the PAF.

Balance of Forces

By 1971, the Indian forces had learnt their lessons well and created for themselves ascendancy, both strategically and tactically, as well as a superiority in defence planning and the higher direction of war. During that year, while Pakistan’s political leadership was ensnared in a power crisis, the Indians had planned, and prepared with deliberation for an invasion of East Pakistan - with clearly set political and military goals.

In terms of military hardware, the IAF stood fifth largest in the world after the USA, USSR, France and China. It possessed over 1200 aircraft, some of them belonging to the very advanced category and the remainder of substantial capabilities. The inventory of advanced aircraft which were capable of performing multiple roles, comprised of 232 MiG- 21s, 128 Su-7s and 165 Gnats. These were backed by some 300 relatively old but still operational Hunters (199), Mysteres (61) and indigenously produced HF- 24 Maruts (54) . Nearly 85 Canberra night-bombers were also available. Even the obsolete Vampire (224) and Ouragon (50) fighters could be used in areas uncontested by the PAF, to add to the IAF’s overwhelming numerical superiority . On the other hand, the PAF too had combat aircraft which could, in performance, match the IAF to a reasonable degree, but the PAF was numerically at a forbidding disadvantage. After 1965, the US embargo had degraded the spares support for the F- 86s, F-104s and B-57s. The dependence now lay on the freshly acquired Chinese F-6s, a short range air defence fighter, and a handful of Mirage-IIIs. The US embargo affected only Pakistan because India got almost all of its equipment from the Soviet Union.

In the interlude between the wars, the IAF had also developed an elaborate airfield infrastructure which, given Pakistan’s crippling geographic disadvantage of lack of depth, gave the IAF an enhanced capability to reach targets deep inside Pakistan. Additionally, with Soviet assistance, the Indian air defence system had been greatly improved while its terminal defence of airfields had also been upgraded with very effective rapid fire radar-controlled AAA guns as well as surface to air missiles (SAMs).

Thus, the situation in the western theatre was very difficult for Pakistan; while in the eastern theatre it was utterly hopeless in view of the ongoing civil war and the PAF’s incredibly small size. Surrounding No. 14 Squadron, the solitary squadron of the PAF, were 10 Squadrons of 203 aircraft of the IAF, comprising of Hunters, Su-7s, MiG-25 and Gnats. There was no early warning system for Dhaka because the PAF’s mobile observer units and radar had to be withdrawn from the border and inland locations after suffering casualties at the hands of the Mukti Bahini and armed insurgents.

In short, at the advent of the 1971 war, the odds were set heavily against the PAF. It was pitted against an air force which had an overall 4:1 numerical superiority; and in East Pakistan, this numerical superiority was 10:1, with an elaborate airfield infrastructure and an effective air defence system

Pakistan’s Military Strategy

The concept of Pakistan's military strategy was that if India chose to attack East Pakistan, we shall, while maintaining a defensive posture there, open a front on the West without delay. As the events unfolded in the Eastern Wing, following the Indian attack in November, the Pakistani ground forces could not put up an effective holding action against the advancing enemy. Nor was a major counter-offensive launched in the West. Even when the much delayed decision was taken to open the western front on 3 December 1971, it was at the insistance of the PAF Air Chief, Air Marshal Rahim Khan.

Beginning of the War in the West

The PAF’s Command Operations Centre (COC) at Rawalpindi and all Air Base Command posts had been fully activated on 21 November 1971. When the order finally came on 3 December, the commanders, pilots, engineers and support personnel were so poised for action that its first strike formations were hurtling down the PAF runways within just 20 minutes of the order to launch the air offensive. The formal messages declaring a state of war were still being decoded at the bases when the strike aircraft were returning to land.

In accordance with a pre-planned assault against IAF airfields and radar stations, the first dusk strikes crossed the border at the same time and struck their targets between 1709 and 1723 in two waves with varying intervals. A total of 26 missions with 24 Sabres, 8 Mirages, 4 F-104s, 15 B-57s, 1 C-130 and 4 T-33s, were launched against 14 airfields and 2 radar installations. All aircraft returned safely. The details of the missions are given in Table-1.

The success of these initial raids can best be judged from Indian sources. The most authentic comments emanate from My Days with the IAF written by Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal, who commanded the IAF during the 1971 war. He would hardly be inclined to exaggerate the PAF’s performance. Extracts from his narrative are as follows :

Halwara

"The B-57 dropped 8 bombs, 3 of which landed on the runway, making two major craters . . ." (p.249)

Amritsar

"The attack . . . started with a visit by four Mirages. . . They made 4 to 5 craters from the beginning of the runway to about 600 meters - At 10:10 pm that night - five hourse after the Mirage attack there was just . . . one lane of runway serviceable (when 2 Su-7 pilots) took off in their Sukhois. Immediately after that a PAF B-57 came and dropped bombs." (p.256)

Sirsa

"The PAF B-57’s bombing . . . was enough to make the runway unserviceable for the night the bombs had time-delayed fuses and kept on exploding at intervals till dawn, delaying clearance and repair work." (p.271)

Jaisalmer

"One of the bombs hit the underground power cable . . . for the next six hours Jaisalmer operated on its standby generator and was without telephone facility." (p.283)

Uttar Lai

"The runway was bombed thrice on the very first evening of the war" (forcing the pilots to use the taxi way for take off and landing). That is how we operated for the first six days of war." (p.286-87)

Bhuj

". . . the PAF bombed it fairly accurately . . . The Air Force Commanding Officer found it difficult to get together enough labour to repair it." (p.291)

One other IAF source deserves mention by way of tribute to the PAF’s B-57 crew who valiantly faced the highest loss rate of the war, and persisted doggedly each night, despite their rudimentary bombs and aiming devices, in carrying the war deep into the enemy’s heartland. The narration comes from an Indian MiG-21 pilot, taken prisoner after being shot down over Pakistan. Flight Lieutenant Harish Sinhji, who belonged to a Sirsa-based squadron, stated:

"After one of PAF’s night bombing strikes on our airfield, we were all gounded for six hours. The runway had been cratered in many places. The next morning our CO took us all to the runway to show us the Pakistani pilot’s bombing accuracy. 'This is the kind of bombing accuracy the IAF pilots should achieve against Pakistani targets.' the CO said, pointing to the craters on the runway". During the following two weeks the PAF’s F-86s, Mirages, T-33s, B-57s and C-130s, (first used as bombers in the 1965 War) continued the bombing campaign against Indian airfields and radar. The IAF was kept under constant pressure, its night operations over Pakistan proportionately inhibited. Ground Action

Minutes after the Mirages and F-86s struck the IAF airfields at sunset on 3 December 1971, No 8 Division’s artillery thundered over the Indian Dharam enclave on the Pakistani side of the Ravi River, and the territory fell to General Abdul Ali Malik’s soldiers without resistance. Far to the North, General Akbar Khan was boldly launching his 12 Division towards Poonch, and in Chamb, General Iftikhar prepared to lead 23 Division across Tawi River. As dusk fell in Lahore and Kasur, General Naqvi’s 11 Division attacked across the border to gain tactical ground. Fierce battles were fought in Hussainiwala and Sulemanki by 105 and 106 Brigades while far to the south, General Mustafa postponed for 24 hours the desert assault of his ill-prepared 18 Division to capture Ramgarh.

The IAF, on the other hand, was preparing to strike back. By 9:00 pm, its Canberras were being revved up for their forays deep into Pakistan, their targets being the PAF bases which had launched the war on the Western Front.

But first to the incredible saga of some 18 F-86 pilots about to write an unforgettable chapter of indomitable courage over Dhaka, as they prepared to fight 200 aircraft with their 16.

Intrepid Under Siege

The flash message, which went out to all PAF bases at 1735 hours on 3 December, must have occasioned wry smiles in the Ops Room of No. 14 Squadron at Tejgaon airfield:

"As of this evening Pakistan is at full scale war with India. Phase three is declared with immediate effect." No. 14 Squadron and all of Eastern Command had, in fact, been in a state of full scale war since 25 March 1971. Of the 1,222 airforce men based in that wing, 645 East Pakistanis had to be laid off duty by April 1971. The PAF’s mobile observer units deployed in the countryside had to be withdrawn after 40 airmen and one officer were brutally murdered by terrorists at different locations. After March, the transfer of jet fuel from the Narayanganj depot to Dhaka airfield in bowsers also became impractical and the PAF was forced to use the C-130 in the tanker role; it brought fuel from as far away as Rangoon and Sri Lanka to keep the tanks at Dhaka airfield up. So 14 Squadron had to fight with what it had - just 16 F-86Es, 2 T-33s and 2 Alouette helicopters.

The men of 14 Squadron operated with resolute courage under these grim conditions. During March-April, the Squadron flew some 170 sorties for air support to the army which had become heavily engaged in operations against the Mukti Bahini, and by mid-year had managed significantly to reduce the scale of rebel activity. The Indian high command became perturbed at the quelling of the insurgency. New Delhi signed a treaty of military cooperation with the Soviet Union on 9 August 1971. Emboldened by this, the Indian forces decided to attack East Bengal in the guise of "self defence".

The PAF went into action on 19 November to impede this thrust and flew several missions against Indian guns and troops. It flew over 100 sorties to assist Pak Army units. It was not till 22 November that PAF met any opposition.

At 1518 hours, a flight of 3 F-86s was called out with guns and rockets to the Chaughacha area. Although after 3 attacks the Sabres were running low on fuel, the formation leader, Wing Commander Afzal Chaudhry carried out a fourth attack. During this dive he heard his No. 2 calling out that 2 Gnats were behind him. Chaudhry broke into the Gnats and shot one of them down. Soon thereafter, his wingman again called to say that 2 more Gnats were now in pursuit. Chaudhry ordered a disengagement but when he looked back he could not spot his wingman and saw his No. 3, Flight Lieutenant Pervez Mehdi, ejecting after being hit by the enemy fighters. Both his No. 3 and his wingman Flying Officer Khalil, had been shot down over Pakistani territory but were transported to India after being taken prisoner by the Mukti Bahini.

Operating under these unfavourable conditions, the AOC, Air Commodore Inamul Haq Khan prepared 14 Squadron for its ultimate test. He reorganized Tejgaon's AAA defences, dispersed all his aircraft, and mobilized special runway repair teams of army jawans and airmen. Dummy aircraft and equipment were placed in eye-catching spots at Kurmitola and Tejgaon, while the real hardware was carefully camouflaged.

Hell Hath No Fury

On 3 December 1971, as night fell in the East in the wake of the PAF’s opening salvos in the West, IAF Canberras attacked Tejgaon airfield as many as 5 times but fortunately, all their bombs fell wide off the marks and no damage was done. By first light the next morning, interceptors were launched. The first two landed without any contact with the IAF. At about 0730 the third pair led by the operations officer, Wing Commander S. M. Ahmad got airborne with Flying Officer Rashidi as wingman. Though not programmed or required to fly, Ahmad had insisted - in keeping with the PAF's tradition of its seniors leading in combat - and was soon in the thick of battle with 4 Hunters, joined minutes later by some MiG-21s and Su-7s. In the melee, the Hunters' leader shot down Ahmad’s F-86, forcing him to eject 5 miles from Kurmitola; despite an air and ground search he was never found. Rashidi, in the meanwhile, successfully extricated himself from the 'one-versus-several' situation just as another pair of PAF F-86s, comprising Sdn. Ldr. Afzaal and Flt. Lt. Saeed, was engaging 3 Hunters, a few miles away. Both Afzaal and Saeed were immediately set upon by another Hunter and was himself shot down. Only minutes later Afzaal had avenged this loss by chasing a MiG-21 and shooting it down. Although Saeed had ejected safely, he too was never found; reportedly both Saeed and Ahmad were taken away by Mukti supporters.

The next pair to scramble, Flight Lieutenant Shams and Flying Officer Gul intercepted 2 Su-7s about 3 miles north of Dhaka. The Su-7s were hit but managed to pull away.

At 0940 hours, Shams and Gul scrambled again, this time to intercept two Hunters over Dhaka. Schams fired at the first Hunter and scored hits but since the aircraft did not go down, he went into a dogfight, entered into classic scissors manoeuvres till the IAF Hunter hit the ground , giving no time to the pilot to eject. Gul chased the other Hunter which managed to get away.

The greatest air battle of the day was led again by Flying Officer Shamsul Haq - with the very young but spirited Flying Officer Shamshad on his wing - when they were scrambled around midday. Just as their wheels were locking up, 2, of a flight of 4, approaching Su-7s fired their rockets at the F-86s, which were hardly 200 feet above the trees. Shams broke into them and shot down one of the nearer pair of Sukhois with a Sidewinder, cheered by the squadron airmen watching from below. Shams and Shamshad were next directed towards Kurmitola where each of them downed a Hunter with their guns. Shamshad then returned to land but Shames spotted another Hunter over Tejgaon and fired his second Sidewinder at such close range that before its guidance system could take over, the missile streaked straight into the Hunter’s tail pipe and blew up its engine. The Indian pilots descent by parachute was in full view of many ground observers around the airfield. But now Shams was in trouble: he was suddenly surrounded by 4 MiG-21s which began to attack him in turn, driving him into a tight corner. The quick-thinking Shams immediately whipped into a max-rate steep-turn at tree-top height, with the Dhaka TV tower in the centre of it, jinking wildly as he turned. The MiGs’ attack pattern was effectively disrupted and short of fuel, they soon exited the scene.

The IAF’s afternoon raiders on 3 December, shifted their attention to the nearby Narayanganj area where the bulk fuel was stored. Squadron Leader Dilawar and Flying Officer Sajjad were scrambled at 1600 hrs to intercept one such formation of 4 Hunters, south of the airfield. Dilawar shot down one of them (piloted by Flight Lieutenant Kenneth Lemontree), then flew headlong into the other pair which quickly broke away. Dilawar then tried to aid his wingman who was being fired at by another Hunter but it was too late. Sajjad also had to eject and both he and Lemontree were picked up by PAF’s rescue helicopter. Thus ended the first day, with 14 Squadron pilots having shot down 9 enemy fighters for the loss of 3 F-86s.

On 4 December, Hunters stopped attacking Dhaka airfield and this task was taken up by Su-7s and MiG-21s. 14 Squadron remained busy in providing escort to Pak Army helicopters carrying reinforcements to the Comilla Sector.

On 5 December, Kurmitola runway was cratered by the IAF for the first time and repair work was started immediately. Tejgaon runway and 14 Squadron remained operational throughout the day and the Sabres’ interceptions forced many IAF raiders to jettison their bombs short of the two airfields. IAF also made a few napalm attacks against the AAA positions and one of the arimen’s dining halls, causing 5 casualties.

On 6 December, the IAF provided extensive support to the Indian Army in the field. No. 14 Squadron also kept itself available for air support to Pak Army Units. At 0900 hours, a formation of 4 F-86s led by Squadron Leader Dilawar, was dispatched to provide overhead cover to Pak troops at Lakshman, 20 miles north east of Dhaka. The formation engaged 4 Hunters over the battle area and Flying Officer Shamshad got a chance to bag a Hunter when his leader, Squadron Leader Dilawar’s drop tanks refused to jettison. The remaining Hunters left the scene.

Soon after this formation landed at Tejgaon, a flight of 4 MiG-21s appeared, each dropping 2 bombs. The bombing was accurately executed and 4 out of 8 made craters in the runway. From then on the airfield was kept under regular bombing attacks, severely inhibiting runway repair work. The task was further complicated because the dimensions of the craters were out of proportion to the weight of the weapons delivered. The runway surface was basically World War II quality, patched over and extended to meet the current requirements. The Russian-make 500 Kg bombs penetrated the relatively thin layer of concrete and brick-on-edge soiling, thereby churning up the soft alluvium underneath.

During the night of 6/7 December, the runway repair teams laboured tirelessly and succeeded in filling enough craters to make a 5,000 ft length available. By 0500 hours on 7 December this stretch was cleared and Squadron Leader Dilawar taxied out for an early CAP. Just then another bomber arrived overhead and, in a well-aimed attack, split the usable 5,000 ft almost exactly in half. Dilawar had to taxi back and shut down.

Thus ended the stirring last days of No. 14 Squadron in East Pakistan. Rahim Khan ordered Air Cdre. Inam to destroy the 11 remaining F-86s to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. All the remaining pilots of 14 Squadron were withdrawn via Burma, to continue their arrival at Sargodha. Their Squadron was re-equipped with F-6s. The unforgettable epic of its handful of audacious warriors rising repeatedly from the Tejgaon runway to challeng enemy who outnumbered them 10 to 1, shall remain enshrined in its history for all times to come.

Air War in the West

Drawing its lessons from 1965 war, the IAF had reviewed its target systems and assigned priority to attacking Pakistan’s vulnerable energy resources (fuel storage tanks, Sui gas fields, oil refineries) and its rail and road transportation system, most of which lay within easy reach of IAF’s forward bases. Additionally, the East Pakistani deserters from PAF provided the IAF vital information pertaining to PAF’s radar coverage, their blind spots and gaps and exact locations of vital points.

The IAF struck with 15 Canberra on the night of 3/4 December and targeted Rafiqui, Sargogha, Mianwali, Risalewala, Murid, Chandar and Mansoor air bases. On the night of 4/5 December, 6 airbases were attacked, Mansoor again receiving the maximum number of bombs, one of which cratered the main runway and the other destroyed the taxiway culvert. Chandaar airfield was also cratered at two places but both air bases were soon recovered. One of the Canberras was shot down at night by Flt. Lt. Naeem Ata with a missile from his Mirage.

The IAF lost its second Canberra on the night of 5/6 December to Sargodha’s AAA gunners. One crater on Sargodha’s main runway again forced the base to switch operations from alternative runways. Another bomb impacted on a night engineering facility where Sqn. Ldr. Dar and Flt. Lt. Wasim were working; both embraced shahadat.

During the next four nights, the IAF’s night bombing campaign began to decline sharply - a fact not fully explained by the waning moon - and totally ceased during the remaining 8 nights of the war except once, on 14/15 December when only Mansoor was attacked by 3 Canberras, without causing any significant damage. PAF B-57s, on the other hand, continued their nightly assaults against Indain targets without a break till cease-fire was declared.

In retrospect, the Indian night bombing campaign did little to frustrate the PAF’s night or day operations.

Battle of the Airfields

On 4 December, the IAF retaliated with force and determination. Using about 70 Hunters and Su-7s in flights of twos and fours, it began a series of strikes against 12 air bases and 2 radar installations of the PAF. Most of the strike routing indicated the IAF’s full knowledge-through defecting East Pakistani officers of the numbers, types and locations of PAF radar; this enabled them to exploit the radar gaps and arrive undetected over their targets. This compelled PAF to fly continuous Combat Air Patrols (CAPs). A classic battle took place in the morning near Pimple Hill when a raid led by Squadron Leader Murli, OC No. 20 Hunter Squadron at Pathankot raided Peshawar. Flight Lieutenant Salim Beg Mirza of No. 26 Squadron engaged in a low level encounter which was at timed so low that puffs of dust could rise from the ground. Ultimately, Salim shot down the Hunter and Murli was killed. The same morning Flight Lieutenant Javed Latif of No. 23 Squadron, deployed at Risalewala, alongwith Flying Officer Riffat Munir, both flying F-6s, chased a raiding pair of Su-7s and despite the Su-7’s superiority, Javed Latif destroyed the Su-7 over the railway line near Faisalabad while Riffat Munir chased other Su-7 away. On the same day, at dusk, Squadron Leader Ahsan and Flight Lieutenant Qazi Javed were scrambled in 2 F-6s from Mianwali to intercept a pair of raiding Hunters. While the F-6s were still on the taxi- track, the lead Hunter pulled up for attack, squadron leader Ahsan pulled his aircraft of the taxi-track. Qazi Javed, though caught in an awkward position, immediately got airborne as the second Hunter was pulling up for the attack. Despite his limited experience, Javed displayed extreme dexterity and skill. He gunned down the Hunter over Lake Khabakki. Its pilot ejected and was taken POW.

At the end of the day, PAF pilots from different bases had destroyed 10 and damaged 4 enemy fighters while Pak AAA gunners destroyed another 4. In contrast, the PAF lost only one F-86 on the ground at Murid and the radar at Badin was slightly damaged.

On 5 December, two IAF Hunters attacked Sakesar radar. Wing Commander Saad Hatmi and Flight Lieutenant Shahid Raza, flying F-6s, were on a CAP mission. They were vectored towards the incoming raid. Hatmi permitted his enthusiastic No. 2 to lead the interception. The Hunters were flying low and became visible to the F-6 pair only when they pulled up for the attack. The eager Shahid Raza commenced firing from a distance even when the Hunter leader was beyond his range but perhaps his final bullets hit their mark. The wreckage was discovered later. (Shahid Raza was the last casualty of PAF when on 17 December he was shot down by AAA over Shakar Garh, after the ceasefire had been declared). The second Hunter managed to get under Hatmi’s F-6 and then executing a John Derry manoeuvre tried to get behind the F-6 leader. Hatmi was too experienced to fall in the trap but marveled at the daring IAF pilot. He managed to position himself and shot the Hunter which blew into pieces and fell near Khabakki Lake.

PAF continued its day strikes throughout the war, and in its 100 strikes over enemy airfields and radar, it lost only two aircraft, both F-104s. On 5 December Sqn. Ldr. Amjad H. Khan’s F-104 was shot down by flak while attacking Amritsar radar and he was taken POW. The loss of the second F-104 occurred when Wing Commander M. L. Middlecoat, was intercepted over the sea near Jamnagar by a MiG-21 on 12 December but Middlecoat could not be rescued by IAF (after ejecting over water). The battle of the airbases raged on but after experiencing heavy losses on the first two days, the IAF switched over greater air effort to interdiction of Pakistan’s major rail and road communications which run close to the border.

 

[Windjammer]

On 14 December, the highest gallantry award in the Indian Air Force (the Prem Vir Chakar) was awarded to Flying Officer Nirmaljit Singh Sedhen of No. 18 Gnat Squadron. He was shot down by Flight Lieutenant Salim Beg Mirza during an epic battle in full view of the people of the Srinagar Valley. On this fateful mission, Wing Commander Changezi had led an attack on Srinagar airfield with a formation of four F-86s and two escorts comprising Flight Lieutenant Saleem and Flight Lieutenant Abdul Rahim Yousefzai. All PAF aircraft returned safely after the mission.

Air Transport Operations

The small but effective Air Transport fleet of C-130s operated on war footing throughout the year. On 30 January 1971, the Indians staged the drama of the hijacking of an Indian Airline Fokker (F-27) to Pakistan. Using the incident as a pretext, over-flight rights of all Pakistani aircraft over Indian territory were cancelled. India had succeeded in making the transportation of troops and ammunition to East Pakistan difficult. The aircraft now had to night stop at Drigh Road (Karachi) and route via Colombo. PIA Boeings were also placed at the disposal of PAF to supplement the transportation of troops.

Versatile Roles in East Pakistan

Realizing the law and order situation in East Pakistan, in the month of May 1971, one C-130 was permanently positioned in East Pakistan while its crew was rotated every three months. The highly versatile C-130s were employed in nearly all possible roles. They were used for crucially needed tactical airlift, airborne assault, evacuation of casualties and even the tanker role.

Assault Operations at Lal Munir Hat/Sylhet Airfields. There were numerous episodes of valour and grit and harrowing tales of escape and evasion but the most daring were the recapture of Lal Munir Hat and Sylhet airfields. After Shaikh Mujibur Rahman declared independence on 25 March 1971, the Mukti Bahini took over the control of Lal Munir Hat and Sylhet airfields. Their recapture was essential for the Army to regain control of the lost territory. This was achieved by launching very daring Air Landed Assaults on 3 April to recapture Lal Munir Hat and on 8 April to regain Sylhet. Both missions were very hazardous and had to be meticulously planned and boldly executed since the C-130 is a sitting duck to ground fire. For the initial assaults, two C-130s were employed, one flown by Squadron Leader N. A. Khan with Flying Officer Zubair as his co-pilot and Flight Lieutenant Ashraf as the Navigator. The other C-130 was flown by Wing Commander Yousuf. Both aircraft approached low-level over the river, flying over hostile territory and loaded with commandos of the elite Special Services Group carrying only small arms. As they approached the airfield, to their dismay they discovered portions of the runway blocked with logs strewn by insurgents. The first C-130 managed to land and while its engines were running, the troops fanned out to occupy the area. Some Commandos cleared the runway. Within minutes the C-130 was airborne while the second C-130 which had been circling overhead, keeping vigil, now landed to off-load its measure of troops. Within no time, both C-130s were on their way, egressing at tree-top level on the same perilous route to continue their vital support to the army. Subsequent missions were flown to secure the airfields. After the control of the Pakistan Army was established, mercy missions were flown on the return flight to evacuate Dhaka's non- Bengali civilians whose lives were threatened. On 18 April, as many as 200 passengers were air-lifted in one sortie since the evacuees had surrounded the aircraft and would not leave. The C-130s flew a total of 125 missions in support of the ground troops between April and October 1971. This entailed over 300 hours of flying under the most hazardous and strenuous conditions, without losing a single aircraft.

War-Time Offensive Missions (C-130)

After the successful and enterprising employment of the C-130s for the carpet bombing role in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the PAF used these vulnerable but potential equivalent of heavy bombers again in the 1971 War. Of the 9 successful bombing missions launched by the C-130s, the most accomplished one was the attack on Jaisalmer on the night of 5/6 December. Flight Lieutenant Mir Alam, along with his navigator Flight Lieutenant Wajid and Co-Pilot Flying Officer Riffat Jameel were detailed for this mission. As the aircraft was being loaded with the ‘mix bag’ of 500-pounder bombs with delay fuses of 30 seconds up to 72 hours, only 35 of a possible 25 were loaded. When Mianwali was raided by IAF Canberras, Mir Alam decided to press on with only 35 bombs to expedite his take-off but the ATC told him to switch off and take shelter. The C-130 crew knew that as long as the C-130 remained on ground, even a shrapnel could ignite the bombs and blow up the whole base. Undeterred by the on-coming raid, Mir Alam took-off as the AAA guns of Mianwali were declared ‘free’ to shoot down the attacking IAF Canberras. Making a safe egress, the C-130 set course for its target. Approaching from the IP (Initial Point), the crew were lucky to spot the airfield quite by chance because of the moonlight (the position of Jaisalmer airfield had been marked erroneously on the maps and a B-57 had missed the target a day earlier because of this error). Mir Alam pulled up the nose of the aircraft as the Navigator gave the green light for the bombs to be released. Indian AAA opened up simultaneously and the whole sky appeared to be lit up. After successfully dropping the load of bombs, the loadmaster reported huge fires on the ground from the exploding bombs. The captain asked the Navigator for the course to steer to return home. He was told to steer on a westerly heading and wait for a couple of minutes. It transpired that Flight Lieutenant Wajid had not prepared a flight plan for the return flight. Overwhelmed by the intelligence briefings of Jaisalmer being defended by over 200 Shilka guns and SAM batteries, the Navigator had actually considered it a foregone conclusion that it was a one way mission. The success of the mission was reported by Wing Commander Fatmi and his crew returning from another mission on a C-130 the same night. An IAF HF-24 pilot shot down and taken POW a few days later also reported:

"The B-57 formation raid on Jaisalmer on the night of 5/6 December was highly successful, over 200 casualties had occurred, two hangars and a fuel dump were destroyed and the fires burnt for two days"

Flight Lieutenants Mir Alam and Wajid and Flying Officer Riffat Jameel were awarded Sitara-e-Jurat for their valour.

The Land Battles

The Air Chief had acquired a clear understanding of how the Air Force was expected to support the Army once operations on the frontiers opened. Pakistan’s holding corps, divisions and independent brigades were well-balanced except 18 division which had too large an area of responsibility a 560-mile front from Rahimyar Khan to Badin in the South.

PAF Air Headquarters had emphasized that whenever any offensive Operations were intended by 18 Division, the PAF should be given a specified notice so as to enable it to activate the nearby Jacobabad air base and to deploy aircraft there in accordance with the contingency plan. Just before the war started, and unknown to the PAF, 18 Division was given an unscheduled task to prepare for a two-brigade offensive to capture Ramgarh.

In the event, none of the holding formations, except 18 Division in the south and 8 Armoured Brigade Group in Shakargarh salient, got into the kind of tight corner which required massive emergency air support to avoid a catastrophe. Table-2 summarizes the air support provided to the main Army formations during the war.

In the Chamb-Jaurian Sector, Major General Ifthikhar’s 23 Division captured Chamb by 8 December after several bravely fought actions. PAF Sabres form Peshawar were called in to support this Division and assisted in softening enemy defences on both banks of the Tawi River. The following day, F-86s and F-6s from Murid and Sargodha also joined in and destroyed 18 medium guns and an ammunition dump. PAF fighters providing cover to Pak troops in this area met fierce opposition. On 10 December, Wing Commander Moin-ur-Rub and Flight Lieutenant Taloot patrolling in F-86Es intercepted 2 Su-7s and shot them down over Jaurian. At the same place on the same day, a pair of F-86Fs led by Squadron Leader Aslam Chaudhry with Flight Lieutenant Rahim Yousefzai as his wingman engaged 6 Indian Hunters. The leader was apparently cornered by the IAF fighters and was declared missing while his wingman managed to fight his way out after claiming one Hunter.

In the early hours of 5 December, during a convoy interdiction mission in the same area, Squadron Leader Israr Quresh's T-6G Harvard was hit by enemy ground fire and a shell fractured the pilot’s right arm. Profusely bleeding, the pilot flew the aircraft back with his left hand and landed safely. The World War II vintage prop-engined trainers were pressed into service and performed satisfactorily in the assigned role of enemy convoys at night.

The largest number of air support sorties (206) were flown in the Shakargarh area when a grave situation developed against Major General Malik’s 8 Division after its first night’s success in capturing the Dharam enclave on the Ravi. A strong multi-directional attack had been launched by the Indian Army across the Ravi and from Samba in the North, to capture. Shakargarh and deeper objectives, but the PAF’s timely intervention effectively frustrated this Indian move.

Meanwhile, 8 Division continued to fight local actions successfully, inflicting casualites on enemy troops who managed to advance through some gaps in the Pakistani minefields. In this area, the PAF’s F-6s and F-86s from Sargodha, Murid, Peshawar and Risalewala provided extensive battlefield support and interdiction with guns, rocket and bombs along with Mirage photo recce whenever requested. During the period 7-17 December, the PAF attacked three bridging attempts across the river, effectively disrupting the bridging operations and in the process destroying or disabling 56 tanks, 114 vehicles and several troop concentrations in the bulge, as well as in the surrounding areas of Samba, Jassar and Dera Baba Nanak.

Air engagements over these areas occurred frequently. On 7 December, Flight Lieutenants Atiq and Mushaf in their F-6s met 4 Su-7s and downed one each. On 8 December, enemy AAA claimed Flight Lieutenant Fazal Elahi’s F-86 and he was killed. On 11 December, Wing Commander Ali Imam Bokhari, Squadron Leader Cecil Chaudhry and Flight Lieutenant Momin Arif in 3 F-86s were pitted against 5 Su-7s. Bokhari shot down one and damaged another while Cecil shot down one Su-7. It was poetic justice. A day earlier, Cecil’s aircraft had been hit by AAA and he had ejected in enemy territory close to the Indo-Pak border. His formation had enabled him to make good his escape to the safety of the Pakistan troops by continuously strafing the area. The incessant barrage from the F-86Es' Browning guns kept the Indian troops at bay and they could not venture to capture Cecil. Within hours he was back to his base and exactly 24 hours later, he exacted his revenge by shooting down an Su-7 at approximately the same spot.

In the last encounter over this area, Squadron Leader Salim Gauhar in an F-86 spotted a light observation aircraft and shot it down. In the Sialkot area, Major-General Abid Zahid’s 15 Division lost Pukhlian salient on the night of 3/4 December because it was held too lightly, mostly by Rangers. After that they kept the enemy at bay. The PAF was asked for 6 sorties of interdiction but lost an F-6 to enemy flak on 7 December. Flight Lieutenant Wajid Ali was taken POW.

In the Narowal sector, where the Indians had made an incursion, on the morning of 13 December, Group Captain Sajjad Haider and Flight Lieutenant Zulfiqar Shah were on cockpit standby in their Mirages. Sajjad Haider, affentionately known as 'Nosey Haider', the commander of the celebrated No. 19 Squadron in the 1965 Indo-Pak War and leader of the acclaimed Pathankot strike was commanding the Flying Wing at Sargodha. His seniority did not deter him from leading from the front. Throughout the war he had been guiding and leading the various squadrons under his command with valour and grit but had remained devoid of a kill. On this fateful morning the pair were scrambled to intercept a pair of IAF Hunters engaged in interdiction of our lines of communication in the Sector. Up as a flash, the pair were vectored to the area. Sajjad Haider spotted his opposite number and carefully positioning himself, fired a missile and saw the Hunter being hit. In the meanwhile Flight Lieutenant Zulfiqar sighted the other Hunter. Group Captain Haider directed his No. 2 to go after the other enemy aircraft. Flight Lieutenant Zulfiqar gave chase and the Hunter dived below to about 20-30 feet above the ground but Zulfiqar got him in his gun sight. As he raised the pipper; he let go a burst of two seconds. It was like air to ground strafing. There was no element of side ways error and he saw the bullet rip through the Hunter from one end to the other. It had no chance. Incidently, Zulfiqar saw puffs of AAA fire and realized that he had penetrated deep into enemy territory. He saw the Kathua hills approaching, so he pulled up and turned back to safety.

In the Lahore Sector, 10 Division commanded by Major-General Naqvi fought several successful tactical actions. The Division used only 7 sorties of close support and battlefield interdiction. In the Kasur sector, Major-General Majid’s 11 Division began its limited operation on 3 December and captured the important Hussainiwala enclave. The Indian Army’s subsequent attempts to retake Hussainiwala failed despite IAF assistance. The PAF’s F-86s and Mirages flew 37 sorties in support of this Brigade and accounted for several vehicles and an ammunition dump, apart from a number of enemy troops.

The most significant action occurred in the area of 105 Brigade Group led by Brigadier Amir Hamza where an imaginative and courageous assault on Suleimanki succeeded magnificently. It was in this battle that the brigade commander earned a HJ and one of his officers, Major Shabbir Sharif, the highest gallantry award of Nishan-e-Haider. The PAF’s contribution was in the form of 50 F-86 sorties from Rafiqui which attacked Indian bunkers, troop concentrations and aircraft overhead during which Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti shot down a Hunter over Suleimanki-Fazilka area on 7 December.

On 14 December, Flight Lieutenant Aamer Ali Sharieff, in an epic air battle over Nainkot shot down a superior aircraft, the much acclaimed MiG-21, with his F-6.

The debacle facing 18 Division’s attack against Ramgarh was not due to bad luck. When the Air Chief learnt of this impending attack on 4 December, he advised GHQ that the area was out of reach of PAF both from Sargodha and Karachi in close vicinity. It took only 4 of the 6 Hunters based at Jaisalmer to destroy or disable most of the Pakistan tanks on 5 and 6 December.

It goes to the credit of the PAF that it played a decisive role in preventing the enemy advance in the Chor-Nagar Parkar sector. Composite formations of T-33, F-86 and B-57s were flown during the day to attack the Indian forces advancing toward Hyderabad. Nearly 150 sorties were flown and Masroor based pilots claimed 20 tanks, 63 vehicles, 5 trains, 3 bulk fuel stores and an ammunition dump. Additionally, PAF shot down 3 enemy aircraft in the sector. On the final day of the war, the last aerial encounter turned out to be a dogfight between a MiG-21 and the relatively slow and much older F-86 Sabre. The F-86 flown by Flight Lieutenant Maqsood Amir emerged as the victor and the Indian MiG-21 Pilot Flight Lieutenant Tejwant Singh, who ejected after being hit, was taken prisoner.

Acts of Valour by PAF Airmen. The invisible wingmen of PAF, its technicians and airmen deserve special praise. They worked non-stop to arm, refuel and turn-around the aircraft for its next mission in record time. They worked tirelessly and were the main force behind the success of the aerial encounters. Though the list is countless but three who merit special mentions are:-

Junior Technician Muhammad Latif: During the fateful air raid on PAF Murid on 8 December, in which 5 F-86s on air defence alert were exposed to enemy air attacks, realizing that our pilots strapped to their seats were exposed to grave danger, Muhammad Latif disregarded personal safety, ran up to each aircraft ad helped the pilots to unstrap and take cover. He managed to help each one of them but in the process he was fatally wounded by enemy fire and attained Shahadat. For his outstanding courage and devotion to duty, he was awarded Tamgha-e-Jurat.

Leading Aircraftman Muhammad Azam Nasir: During an enemy air raid on PAF Chandar, instead of taking shelter, he proudly faced the Indian bomber with a G-3 rifle and kept on firing at the attacking aircraft. A bomb fell within 6 yards of where he stood and Azam Nasir attained martyrdom. For his outstanding courage and devotion to duty he was awarded Tamgha-e-Jurat.

Corporal Technician Syed Shaukat Ali: While a POW in India he conducted himself in an upright and fearless manner. He twice tried to escape from the POW camp. In the second attempt he received fatal bullet injuries; even then he pounced on the armed guard in a bid to prevent him from firing at his colleague Corporal Technician Nawab. For his outstanding and excellent performance he was awarded the Tamgha-e-Jurat.

In Support of the Navy

In 1971, all the PAF could do in support of the Navy was to provide daytime strikes against ships at sea and that too only up to 250 miles. Despite making it clear to Maritime Headquarters, the first mission the Navy demanded of the PAF was a night strike against enemy ships 270 miles out at sea. Even then the PAF did its best to help out to the limits of its means and capacity. Every night, PAF B-57s and F-86s were tasked at PN’s request to search and destroy Osa missile boats. They flew at different heights and in different patterns, they improvised imaginative techniques to utilize their onboard equipment and all the knowledge that they possessed to try and locate the elusive boats, but to no avail; they just did not have the right equipment. PAF had all the sympathy for PN in its loss of two ships on the second night of the war.

The PAF flew 35 missions on B-57s, F-86s, F-104s and T-33s in PN’s support besides making 127 sorties available to the Navy for visual reconnaissance.

Some missions did achieve a high measure of success. On the night of 5/6 December, a B-57 piloted by Flight Lieutenant Shabbir struck Okha harbour putting its fuel tanks on fire, and scoring direct hit on a ammunition dump and the missile boat jetty. The fire burnt for several days. The fire menace of missile boats attacks on Pakistani Naval installations ceased thereafter. On 10 December, F-104s attacked Okha again. Its leader, Wing Commander Arif Iqbal shot down an Indian Naval Alize aircraft.

Critical Analysis: Through the immoral Indian aggression against East Pakistan succeeded resoundingly. Defeat is a perpetual orphan and many egos and reputations had to be protected by finding alternative reasons for failure in battle. Air forces of most countries have a major role to perform in war in support of their armies and navies. This sometimes leads to an elemental human tendency to ‘reward’ the supporting arm with the scapegoat role. Some aspects requiring critical analysis are discussed below :-

Failure to Retaliate in the West: Eventual defeat in East Pakistan was almost certainly a consequence of West Pakistan’s failure to launch a timely and hard hitting offensive into Indian territory.

Living in David's Shadow. An unrealistically powerful image of the PAF had been created after the 1965 War. Although the PAF had paid a heavy toll by losing some of its best fliers in the 1965 war, yet in 1971 too it was well-prepared, well-trained and well-led. Although the majority of the PAF’s hierarchy tried to dispel this dangerous notion both within the air force and without, the David and Goliath illusion gained favour and the notion took root that PAF would always be on call ‘anytime, anywhere’ to relieve imminent misadventures on land and at sea.

Denudation of East Pakistani Element. The PAF, like its sister services had suddenly been dinuded of some 30% (East Pakistani element) of its technical manpower. This factor degenerated PAF ‘s strength which already faced a 1:4 ratio of strength vis-a-vis the IAF.

Advantage to IAF through defectors. The East Pakistani defectors to India provided them a major advantage by pinpointing exact locations of various PAF radar, their pickup envelopes, the gaps and blind spots. Relocation of PAF radar could not be achieved without compromising their performance. IAF pilots fully exploited this vital information and initial raiders sneaked up to their targets undetected. PAF had to mount continuous CAP to plug the gaps.

Air Defence Operations. The grossly deficient radar cover in West Pakistan provided low level surveillance only to the few main air bases. There were only 5 low-looking radar against a projected requirement of nearly 50. Although it was PAF’s clear victory over to the interdiction strategy, the IAF changeover from airfield strikes to interdiction of the rail/road system proved all the more frustrating for the PAF due to its radar deficiency.

Diminutive Pre-emptive Strike. Despite the effects caused by the PAF, pre-emptive strikes against the IAF airfields as conceded by Air Chief Marshal P C Lal, the pre-emptive strikes launched by PAF on 3 December by about 36 aircraft were unable to create the effects it had aimed at. This was no pre-emptive strike such as the Israelis launched in 1967. Twelve days had passed since the Indian invasion of East Pakistan, so the IAF was expecting an attack on the Western front. It was thus prepared for such an eventuality. Most of its aircraft were placed in concrete revetments and dispersed over a large number of airfields, many of which were beyond the range of PAF aircraft. During the strike it was discovered that Awantipura airfield had been abandoned and obstructed by the enemy. With the wisdom of hindsight it can be said that better results could have been expected if the ‘pre-emptive’ strike had been launched sooner and with a greater number of aircraft.

Air Effort Generation and Force Viability. In 1965, the PAF fought with 9 squadrons in the Western theatre while in 1971 with 10-1/4 (squadrons) . Though the conflict was shorter by a third, the air operations in the two theatres were twice as intensive. The average rate of sorties per day was 201 in 1971 versus 107 in 1965. The PAF flew 46% more air support for the Army and Navy, and launched 34% more air defence sorties than in 1965. The IAF flew 7,546 sorties on all types of aircraft, including those against East Pakistan. This compares with 3,027 sorties by the PAF in both theatres. For an Air Force possessing only 22% of its adversary’s combat aircraft, the PAF’s ability to generate this vastly superior rate of air effort speaks very high of its combat and maintenance crew. An overall comparison of different types of missions flown during the two wars is shown in Table 3.

IAF Sortie Generation Rate. The IAF Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command, Air Marshal M. M. Engineer, boasted in his Order-of -the Day issued on 18 December 1971, that his airforce had flown "more than 3000 sorties" in the 15 days of war which comes to an average of 200 sorties per day. However, according to conservative Western estimates, which are much lower than the PAF estimates of the Indian Air Force strength, the Indians had more than 600 combat aircraft . A force of this size should have enabled the Indians to launch upward of 1200 sorties per day. Given an allowance that a portion of the total IAF strength was engaged in East Pakistan, the actual air effort that the IAF claims to have put up during the war against Pakistan in the West was only a fraction of its capabilities. No better vindication of the PAF concept of operation is possible.

Award of Kills. The basis of the award was stringent. Each claim had to be confirmed by either gun-camera film or an identifiable wreckage. The renowned American test pilot Brigadier-General Charles E. "Chuck" Yeager who was at that time, the US Defence Representative to Pakistan and who volunteered to join PAF’s helicopter teams documenting downed IAF aircraft, says in his autobiography:

". . . the Pakistanis scored a three-to-one kill ratio, knocking out 102 Russian-made Indian jets and loosing 34 airplanes of their own (including the F-86s self destroyed by No. 14 Sqn.). I am certain about the figures because I went out several times a day in a chopper and counted the (IAF) wrecks below. I counted the wrecks on Pakistani soil, documented them by serial numbers, identified the components such as engines, rocket pods, and new equipment on newer airplanes like the Su-7 and the MiG-21J, their latest supersonic fighter. The PAF did not claim any aircraft that may have been destroyed during strikes against enemy airfields except the 5 which were clearly visible on gun-camera film. The PAF, nevertheless, admitted to its loss of 6 F-86s and 1 B-57 during IAF attacks against PAF bases. In East Pakistan, the gallant 14 Squadron and Dhaka’s valiant AAA gunners shot down 28 IAF aircraft. Without Redemption. The PAF had successfully accomplished the first difficult phase of its task: repelling a four times larger force’s assault against itself while providing substantial air support to the Pak Army everywhere. The culmination of the airforce mission now remained to be enacted. Plans were set for a fresh concentrated assault on pre-selected IAF airfields as a prelude to establishing control of the air over the area of General Tikka’s offensive; this would have led to the final and most crucial phase of the PAF’s contribution: massive direct support and battle field interdiction to sustain the momentum of that offensive, while retaining control of the air overhead. But the offensive did not materialize despite a last attempt by Air Marshal Rahim Khan on the evening before the cease fire, to persuade the President to "Let Tikka go’. Thus it came to pass that the Pakistan Army, chafing on the battlefield, and the PAF poised at its bases, were both denied their most powerful act of reprisal - for want of a timely decision!

In the atmosphere of national rage and humiliation that prevailed after the defeat and surrender in East Pakistan, it was difficult for the PAF to derive any real comfort from an acknowledgment that it had acquitted itself honourably during those last fateful days. This recognition came, befittingly enough form the army C-in-C in a letter to the Air Chief dated 1 January 1972:

". . . I wish the Army was in a position to exploit the excellent favorable air situation that was made possible by your small yet hard hitting Air Force . . ."
General Manekshaw’s Admission

An Indian news daily, the Indian Express of 1 February, 1972, reporting on a lunch reception by the Press Association in honour of the three Services Chiefs, their Chief of Army Staff, General S. H. F. J. Manekshaw, who having paid tributes to the Indian Armed forces said, ". . . an impression has been created that the Pakistanis had not fought well. They fought extremely well, if they had not, India would not have suffered heavy casualties."

 

[ramu]

The article posted by WJ is not a reply to the article I posted. Their is no evidence that the claims made by either side holds much water unless accepted by the other side or wreckage recovered. In the absence of both, it is hard to believe the versions on both sides.

 

[Mav3rick]

in wat sense u mean ur army hasnt been able to defeat by india?
In 1971 whether 90000POW came under the earth that india captured?
pls don waste time in trolling !!!
Read real facts and cum here rather than taught wrong histories in ur schools and pakistan army misinformation campaigns so they can earn money KId!!!!

Well, it's quite easy to say that India defeated Pakistan in 1971 war but was it actually India that beat Pakistan or the policies of Pakistan imposed upon Bangladesh that forced Bengalis to fight for their true rights? What was more crushing for the military and political leadership....the Indian Army or the internal hatred, chaos and massive rebellion against Pakistan Army by the Bengalis?

Such was the resolve to fight against India that PAF grounded perhaps one of their best fighter pilots, M. M. Alam just because he was a Bengali and was not being trusted. If you guys continue to believe that you could ever defeat Pakistan in a war and it helps you sleep at night then by all means do. I am merely trying to provide you some honest insight.

As for future conflicts I can predict a war with India over water in Kashmir. I hope I am wrong and that India comes to her senses and stop trying to turn Pakistan into a desert. But if push comes to shove, we shall see who has a better military, hopefully decisively this time!

 

[Rajaraja Chola]

Well, it's quite easy to say that India defeated Pakistan in 1971 war but was it actually India that beat Pakistan or the policies of Pakistan imposed upon Bangladesh that forced Bengalis to fight for their true rights? What was more crushing for the military and political leadership....the Indian Army or the internal hatred, chaos and massive rebellion against Pakistan Army by the Bengalis?

Such was the resolve to fight against India that PAF grounded perhaps one of their best fighter pilots, M. M. Alam just because he was a Bengali and was not being trusted. If you guys continue to believe that you could ever defeat Pakistan in a war and it helps you sleep at night then by all means do. I am merely trying to provide you some honest insight.

As for future conflicts I can predict a war with India over water in Kashmir. I hope I am wrong and that India comes to her senses and stop trying to turn Pakistan into a desert. But if push comes to shove, we shall see who has a better military, hopefully decisively this time!

Well Pakistanis proudly claim they defeated USSR in afghanistan through ISI(with more CIA help ofcourse)!!!
But did the mukthi bahini created by itself?
U mean to say RAW didnt play any part in creating, funding, training which ultimately led to ur defeat!!!!!
But situation is changed now!!!
PM. manmohan singh is admired by all and i doubt a war in his tenure!!!But am afraid to say his successors might not be like him!!
Regarding water wars i think u are hearing to terrorist HAFEEZ SAEED words whose hatred for india (due to his personal experienc durin partition) is well known)!!
Pakistani officials accepted INDIA is not stealing any waters BUT BECAUSE OF NON DESILTING OF CANALS AND RIVERS CAUSING A PROB IN DOWNSTREAMS!!!!

 

[AmberDutt]

Right.. then every "real" aviation enthusiast is an idiot to celebrate people like Erich hartmann and Adolf Galland... maybe Germany won the war.
All your talk is simple insecure gibberish.... a tiny fraction of your ego that cannot admit that we did well.. go read the other discussion of the 71 war..
and why the PAF did not provide support..

I and John Doe here have had that long drawn discussion like adults..
And I am not going to waste another thread on a Cynical egomaniac who is here to beat his chest.

Sorry for the delay in the response since I missed your post.

First of all, I didnt realize that calling other members names like egomaniac is allowed as long as your name appears in bold red letters on top of your avatar.. well, live and learn as they say..

And here we are not celebrating individual heros, but discussing the role of PAF in the Air war of 1971 and whether that role helped Pakistan in the over all battle.

And sir, do point out the parts of my post which sound gibberish or insecure or even insulting towards PAF..

 

[SQ8]

Sorry for the delay in the response since I missed your post.

First of all, I didnt realize that calling other members names like egomaniac is allowed as long as your name appears in bold red letters on top of your avatar.. well, live and learn as they say..

And here we are not celebrating individual heros, but discussing the role of PAF in the Air war of 1971 and whether that role helped Pakistan in the over all battle.

And sir, do point out the parts of my post which sound gibberish or insecure or even insulting towards PAF..

YAWN!!

Really.. is there an abstract for the topic??. a set list of parameters given by the thread starter?? or did you just conveniently bring that up by yourself to remove the individual and operational accomplishments that the PAF achieved?

Pretty much ALL of your posts revolve around the same mantra of how the PAF's accomplishments mean nothing since Pakistan lost the war..
As to how it failed to provide support when you dont even seem to give any idea of what the PAF's objectives were and how they were to be accomplished.
If you dont know the objectives .. the battle plan.. how can you say it was achieved or not??
How and where was the PAF supposed to provide support to the PA, maintaining what force availability?
I see nowhere in your posts except a picture of bangladesh with no useful meaning other than a cynical torment..
and a tirade on how the PAF failed to provide support to the army from god knows what source...along with bleaching over the achievements by giving an example of the olympics.. brilliant..
I refer you again to the discourse between me and John Doe on a similar thread as to how discussion are done..
instead of the blind rhetoric you brought to the thread.
Till then.. Ill regard your posts as nothing more than egoistic attempts to belittle the PAF.

 

[AmberDutt]

YAWN!!

Really.. is there an abstract for the topic??. a set list of parameters given by the thread starter?? or did you just conveniently bring that up by yourself to remove the individual and operational accomplishments that the PAF achieved?

I am just taking my cue from the title that says air war 1971 and not individual accomplishments in air war 1971. And no talk of removing any operational accomplishments. Only looking at them in context of the over all theater of war.. After all the air war of 1971 was a part of 1971 Indo Pak war and not a separate event in it self

Pretty much ALL of your posts revolve around the same mantra of how the PAF's accomplishments mean nothing since Pakistan lost the war..
As to how it failed to provide support when you dont even seem to give any idea of what the PAF's objectives were and how they were to be accomplished.

Well these posts have been in response to posts that over glamorized the role and achievement of PAF in 1971 without the context of the over all war. And if PAF's objectives were not in line with the Pak's objectives of winning the war, then do enlighten us on what was the PAF doctrine at that time.. Was it Scoring individual air to air kills (that did not change the course of war) ??

If you dont know the objectives .. the battle plan.. how can you say it was achieved or not??
How and where was the PAF supposed to provide support to the PA, maintaining what force availability?
I see nowhere in your posts except a picture of bangladesh with no useful meaning other than a cynical torment..
and a tirade on how the PAF failed to provide support to the army from god knows what source...along with bleaching over the achievements by giving an example of the olympics.. brilliant..
I refer you again to the discourse between me and John Doe on a similar thread as to how discussion are done..
instead of the blind rhetoric you brought to the thread.
Till then.. Ill regard your posts as nothing more than egoistic attempts to belittle the PAF.

First of all, Thanks for the offer of guidance on how discussions are done. I shall take that under advisement.
Secondly, I am not trying to define PAF's support strategy for PA in 1971. Just commenting that whatever it was, it didnt work well enough to allow PA the successes it needed on the ground.
Thirdly, my example of Olympics was based on a ludicrous statement that the result of the war does not matter while judging the performance of the airforce of the nation that lost the war.

And finally to your comments about whether my posts are egoistic attempts or not, I will pay attention to your views on that once you yourself learn to communicate and debate without passing childish and insulting comments in lieu of solid arguments. Till then I will regard your posts as nothing more than irrelevant responses full of noise but devoid of substance ..

 

[FaujHistorian]

As a Pak, I am proud to say that in 1965, Pakistan had air-superiority. All because of quantity and quality of American tech.

However Indians learned their lesson, and in 1971 they were no longer bacha loag aka little men in the air.

Since the fateful days of 1971, Indians have further increased their air-strength, while we have stagnated. Our airforce could never compete with numbers, but we had better American technology.

Thanks to Islamism, we have closed American source, even self destroying our Orions all by ourselves.

Now we want to use Cheeni tech to face off the latest EU and American tech. There is no chance.

Look what happened to our jawans in Kargil. Indian airforce used pint pointed bombing and we just watched. Couldn't do a squat. Our airforce was nowhere to be found. Please don't tell me false stories of thunder. At this point we cannot face Indian air force.

So we should not put ourselves to sleep by telling ourselves lullabies of air victories of the past.

We cannot thump our chests on borrowed stuff while our people go hungry. If Indians are hell bent on spending gazillions on borrowed hardware, let them.

We should declare at least 25 years of peace and work hard on improving ourselves, our economy, our education system, and our industry. Good and strong private industry is the sole source of strong airforce. So let's build ourselves first.

Our current path is the path of self-destruction. The sooner we leave this path of ignorance, the better.

peace.