Fifth Generation Plane Era! Is it really going to be so?

[Kamakazi 69]

Very interesting thread this. Well I personally believe that 5th. gen. planes are worth the hype, but to harness their true potential, one must use them in conjunction with 4th. gen. aircraft. At least till 2020, 4th. and 4.5th gen. planes aren't going anywhere.

Yes, gradually 5th. gen planes will be doing more and more jobs, but even the Americans are going to use the F-15 as a strike platform and for support.
Numerically speaking in a conflict the F-22, owing to its limited numbers due to its price tag and its quite frankly cr*p combat ready rate will be used in conjunction with the F-35 in order to present a formidable air superiority package.

 

[Thomas]

What is new in 6th gen aircraft?

Boeing is working on 6th generation though not much is known for sure. And I guarantee you Lockheed skunk works is as well.


Sixth Generation Goes Robotic
October 26, 2007: The U.S. Air Force believes that its next generation fighter will not have a pilot on board. As is customary, development of the next generation fighter gets underway just as the latest ("fifth generation") F-22 is entering service. Thus, two years after the F-15 entered service in 1979, planning got under way to develop the F-22.

UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) are not particularly popular in the U.S. Air Force, but that is not the case in many other countries. Air force generals around the world see the unpiloted jet fighter as a way to break the monopoly the U.S. Air Force has had on air supremacy for the last sixty years. Most Americans don't even think of this long domination of the air, but potential enemies of the United States are well aware of it, and that domination has a profound effect on how those nations do their military planning. In effect, if you think about going to war with the United States, you take for granted that American aircraft will control the skies above. Robotic jet fighters could change that. And this is forcing American air force generals to confront a very unsavory prospect; a sixth generation fighter that is flown by software, not a pilot.

It's not just that most of the those American air force generals began their careers as fighter pilots. No, the reason is more practical. American air superiority has largely been the result of superior pilots. The U.S. didn't always have the best aircraft, but they always had the most talented and resourceful pilots. And that's what gave the U.S. its edge. Will that translate to software piloted fighters? Research to date seems to indicate it will.

Meanwhile, simulations, using fighter flown by software, versus those flown by humans, have been used for over two decades. The "software pilots" have gotten better, and better. Moreover, a fighter without a pilot is more maneuverable (because some maneuvers are too stressful on the human body.) UAV fighters can be smaller, cheaper, stealthier and more expendable. But the key to software pilots is the development of superior tactics, and artificial intelligence (AI) that is more capable than anything your opponent can come up with.

The U.S. Air Force, and several other air forces, have already created fighter pilot software, and now the United States, and Russia, are creating pilotless fighters. Many air force generals are convinced that the pilotless fighters will perform as well for real, as they have in the simulations. So convinced are U.S. Air Force generals, that they are seriously considering a sixth generation fighter that will not carry a human pilot. Otherwise, enemy pilotless fighters would have an edge over the U.S. sixth generation aircraft.

The potential superiority of U.S. pilotless fighters is partly driven by the fact that most American fighter pilots are geeks. Many can create software, and have a deep understanding of the many computers, and their software, that modern aircraft contain. It's the fighter pilots who will play a key role in creating the best "software pilots." Thus the thinking is that American control of the air will be maintained by a new generation combat aircraft controlled by software, not someone in a cockpit.

Warplanes: Sixth Generation Goes Robotic

Boeing, USAF show off supersonic bomb firing technology | NetworkWorld.com Community

The X-45 pictured here fly's itself, There is no pilot.
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/gallery/images/military/x-45/DVD-883-1.html

 

[TOPGUN]

Haha star wars it is!!

 

[Arsalan]

well my point was that to counter a fifth generation fighter plane, in my view, one do not necessarily need a fifth generation plane for itself. this can be done by something with an anti-stealth radar onboard and weapons able to engage the enemy! instead od going for a project worth billions one may better stick to the idea of anti-stealth radar system. i agree that this wont either be a cheap option or an easy task but atleast it will yeild something taht can be termed as "good for all"..
moreover if one think that the need of surpassing the enemies line of defence is necessary in some case, for me stealthier drones are a much better approach. stealth can be acheived for a drone much easily as it can be done for a big fighter jet. drones are small and can be almost completely made of composite materials!!
so in my view a nice fighter plane with anti-stealth radar and stealthier drone for penetration attacks is the answer to the horror of the fifth generation!!
what do you guys think!!

regards!

 

[Arsalan]

Haha star wars it is!!

well this post stops me from posting an idea to dodge the Fifth generation planes,,
a rather funny but intresting one!!
but i guess i better stay away,,,,
because that was some thing even more then STAR WAR type

take care,
regards!

 

[gambit]

Continuing educating people...

Developer Hans Hellsten of Saab Microwave Systems told the conference that the AASR used a number of novel techniques. Each transmitter would transmit on stepped frequencies so that receivers could tell where a signal came from. This made it possible to determine the length of the signal path, so that if a signal was picked up at several nodes it was possible to determine the target's location precisely.

If there are multiple transmitters and receivers in this network, for each transmitter-receiver pairing, electronically speaking, the receiver must resolve what is called the 'bistatic triangle'...

12.1: HITCHHIKING On GlobalSpec

As outlined in Chapter 1, a bistatic hitchhiking receiver uses a cooperative or non-cooperative monostatic radar as the bistatic transmitter and operates at the pleasure of the host radar. Specifically, the radar must be on, illuminating regions of interest to the bistatic receiver and transmitting a useful waveform at adequate power leveis. Furthermore, the bistatic receiver must locate the host radar to solve the bistatic triangle, operate with adequate target LOS and establish time synchronization for range measurements and phase synchronization for coherent operation and clutter suppression. Both time and phase synchronization are often established by receiv-ing host radar sidelobe transmissions o ver the direct path. While these requirements are more difficult to satisfy and cannot be satisfied ail the time, when compared to operation with a dedicated transmitter (a transmitter that is designed for use with, and under the operational control of, the bistatic receiver), potentially useful applications for this concept exist.

Essentially, it is the geometry between the transmitter, the target and the receiver and it MUST be frequency dependent, meaning this particular triangle cannot have any other frequency in its resolution. That mean for each frequency involved, as the designer hinted that there would be, the receiver must know what each transmitter is doing at all time in order to associate that freq with a particular bistatic triangle resolution.

The problem is obviously on the receiver side and keep in mind that the problem is for EACH receiver in this matrix, that the computational power required for a receiver to resolve multiple bistatic triangle solutions rises as the frequency agility ability of each transmitter. To imagine the geometry can give a person a headache so if the reader imagine this matrix to have three transmitter and one receiver it will be easier to scale up the complexity. If each transmitter is range with 10 different frequencies, that is ten different bistatic triangle resolutions for any moment in time of operation. Now add in the other two, each with its own ten freqs. The designer can install limits as to how many freqs the receiver can process but this would be the result of a cost/benefit analysis as well as if there is a need for mobility.

If this matrix is to have multiple receivers as the designer hinted, then the system can assign 'hard pairings', meaning there would be dedicated transmitter-receiver associations, note that this 'hard pairing' can be deceptive because it is possible to assign one receiver to several transmitters. So it is possible in a matrix of three transmitters and three receivers, we can 'hard pair' one receiver with two transmitters and we can also limit the receiver to process only six freqs instead of the capable ten freqs from each transmitter. We can do a 'soft pairing' in that we can program a receiver to recognize the three transmitters in the matrix but pair only with two at any time.

Now the reader can scale up to as many transmitters-receivers matrix as he can and it is clear the technical complexity required in a bistatic radar system versus a monostatic one. Actually, if there are multiple transmitters and receivers, the system can be called 'multistatic' but the foundation of the matrix is still bistatic. The communication links must be extremely robust either from being hard wired or from an encryption standpoint if there is going to be over-the-air (OTA) data links. Timing between freqs to be communicated to the receivers, multiple, since the system is supposed to be frequency agile, must be at least in the picoseconds range and the fact that the target is non-cooperative, meaning having a very low observable figure, timing is even more crucial.

One disadvantage: the transmitter and receiver had to be on opposite sides of the target, so it could not be detected until it had entered the defended airspace. To get around that problem and still intercept targets in a timely manner, Swedish planners expected to exploit the system's accuracy - it could locate targets within 1.5 m - and command-guide a high-speed missile on to the target.

Yes and no. The original article is here...

Ares Homepage

Regarding the illustration in the above link, aircrafts do not have the same dimensions and therefore the 'shadow region' area will differ. As long as the bistatic triangle can be produced, the transmitter-receiver pairing, hard or soft, and that triangle MUST be produced, the transmitter and receiver does not have to be directly opposite of each other.

But because the system used range rather than bearing to locate its targets, the antennas did not need to have accurate bearing resolution. Also, the system's use of UHF, its independence from target RCS and the fact that bistatic systems have long pulse times meant that the necessary power was modest.

True for all points with a caveat that a bistatic system is not inherently limited to any frequency or any mode of transmission: continuous wave (CW) or pulsed. Any radar engineer will say that nothing is really 'invisible' at 1ghz and below but at the expense of target range and speed resolutions. For a multistatic system, coarse range resolutions will be able to 'bracket' a target to obtain its location with an accuracy comparable to that of a high freq and pulsed system.

The result was a price that caused sharp intakes of breath among the delegates. Each of the 900 nodes was expected to cost no more than 1 million Swedish kroner (about $156,000) and the entire system would be in the 1 billion kroner ($156 million) realm - pretty much chickenfeed by defense standards.

Moreover, trying to destroy an air defense radar with 900 distributed apertures is an exercise in futility. The grid pattern does not have to be continuous, and the designers intended to emplace the modules using the same techniques that are used to locate cell phone base stations.

Errr...That is indeed a bold claim.

We do not know how the system is set to resolve the multitudes of bistatic triangles. If we go back to the simple three transmitters and three receivers matrix, destroying just one transmitter could create a sufficient level of uncertainty in the entire matrix that may be outside a statistical hard point, meaning each receiver could have been designed to reject its own solutions if it deemed itself to have received insufficient data from its paired transmitters or ambiguous bistatic information. The destruction of one transmitter would definitely qualify in this simple matrix. Further...ECM tactics could create an overload of bistatic triangles for the matrix. A flight of UAVs with radar enhancers would force the matrix to either try to resolve EACH bistatic triangle as valid or decoy, or shut down altogether due to information overload.

One tactic NATO pilots routinely practiced during the Cold War against Warsaw Pact radars was to just electronically 'touched' the edges of the radar network, let the radar warning receiver (RWR) set alert the pilot that there is an active transmission there, the pilot would then back off slightly and take a different path using RWR warnings as navigation. Against this multistatic network, a flight of UAVs with radar enhancers would saturate the sky with ambiguous targets while the attacking aircrafts, which would be very low observables, used the many transmissions of the matrix to navigate through the area, all the while lobbing beamrider missiles at the transmitters. If there are sufficient amount of transmitters destroyed or damaged, the matrix is useless.

We report. You decide.

 

[pmukherjee]

What is the problem with a single receiver handling multiple frequencies simultaneously? Surely the Swedes have heard of TDM (Time Division Multiplexing) or sharing time slots with various transmitters?
Regarding different fighters presenting differing radar profiles or RCS that should be a simple matter suitable software being loaded in the computer at the main processing station or node and ensuring strict Air Defence Air space control and IFF to rule out fratricide.

 

[gambit]

What is the problem with a single receiver handling multiple frequencies simultaneously? Surely the Swedes have heard of TDM (Time Division Multiplexing) or sharing time slots with various transmitters?

Money. Surely you must understand that the more complex the more money something will cost.

Regarding different fighters presenting differing radar profiles or RCS that should be a simple matter suitable software being loaded in the computer at the main processing station or node and ensuring strict Air Defence Air space control and IFF to rule out fratricide.

I think you are missing the point about the locations of the transmitters versus receivers if I am guessing correctly. Basically, the transmitter and receiver does not have to be exactly opposite of each other. If anything, because of how a signal deflects off a target, it is known that a bistatic deflection is stronger than with a monostatic system so the bistatic set up is more tolerant to locations. Let me know if I guessed wrong and I will attempt to clarify.

 

[pmukherjee]

Money. Surely you must understand that the more complex the more money something will cost.

Agreed, it will not be as cheap as initially made out to be but it can be done.

I think you are missing the point about the locations of the transmitters versus receivers if I am guessing correctly. Basically, the transmitter and receiver does not have to be exactly opposite of each other. If anything, because of how a signal deflects off a target, it is known that a bistatic deflection is stronger than with a monostatic system so the bistatic set up is more tolerant to locations. Let me know if I guessed wrong and I will attempt to clarify.

I have got your point, gambit. My point is that the hardware used to analyse the received signals from a transiting stealth fighter can be taught to recognise the intruder despite the confusing RCS and correct the distortion caused by the creeping wave using appropriate software. Also this grid like matrix will provide a certain amount of redundancy that will help in the following:-
1. More than one transmitter illuminating a target simultaneously, thereby making detection and ranging easier.
2. The in-built redundancy tides over the problem of the accaisonal transmitter getting knocked off by ARMs.

 

[gambit]

Agreed, it will not be as cheap as initially made out to be but it can be done.

Do not forget miscellanies like heat that electronics always produce and must be dealt with. If mobility is highest priority, then system performance and capabilities will be sacrificed.

I have got your point, gambit. My point is that the hardware used to analyse the received signals from a transiting stealth fighter can be taught to recognise the intruder despite the confusing RCS and correct the distortion caused by the creeping wave using appropriate software. Also this grid like matrix will provide a certain amount of redundancy that will help in the following:-
1. More than one transmitter illuminating a target simultaneously, thereby making detection and ranging easier.
2. The in-built redundancy tides over the problem of the accaisonal transmitter getting knocked off by ARMs.

The greatest threat to low observables are bistatic systems. Currently, aside from the obviously advantageous items like an AESA antenna, the most capable system will be that of a matrix of independent monostatic radars that can coordinate with each other to form a bistatic network. Each will, not should, have its own independent power supply. Each will, not should, be mobile in all terrain. Losing any component will degrade the entire system bit by bit so having a monostatic radar that can also become either a transmitter or receiver in a bistatic network offers the highest level of flexibility and redudancy. The American AEGIS working under the Cooperative Engagement Capability system, which is not a radar system but a networking system is an example of this flexibility.

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) / AN/USG-2(V) Cooperative Engagement Transmission Processing Set

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) brings revolutionary new capability to naval air and missile defense, not by adding new radars or weapon systems, but by distributing sensor and weapons data from existing systems in a new and significantly different manner. CEC fuses high quality tracking data from participating sensors and distributes it to all other participants in a filtered and combined state, using identical algorithms to create a single, common air defense tactical display ("air picture"). The result is a superior air picture based on all sensor data available that permits significantly earlier detection and more consistent tracking of air contacts. CEC was designed against the air threat (e.g., from cruise missiles), especially in littoral waters. Undergirding CEC is a robust communications system with several orders of magnitude in improvement to bandwidth and electronic countermeasures, as well as the systemic advantages offered by the global positioning system (GPS).

Any aircraft that attempt to put on the facade of being a 'fifth generation' fighter that is NOT low observable to the extent of the F-22 or F-35 will be destroyed.

 

[Thomas]

The greatest threat to low observables are bistatic systems. Currently, aside from the obviously advantageous items like an AESA antenna, the most capable system will be that of a matrix of independent monostatic radars that can coordinate with each other to form a bistatic network. Each will, not should, have its own independent power supply. Each will, not should, be mobile in all terrain. Losing any component will degrade the entire system bit by bit so having a monostatic radar that can also become either a transmitter or receiver in a bistatic network offers the highest level of flexibility and redudancy. The American AEGIS working under the Cooperative Engagement Capability system, which is not a radar system but a networking system is an example of this flexibility.

wouldn't the radars in the F-22 and F-35 have the ability to fry bistatic systems?

http://www.electronicaviation.com/news/Military/560

I know there is an EMP air to ground missile being developed that can fry all none hardened electronic equipment within a certain radius.

 

[nightrider_saulat]

our future toys for our young upcoming skywalkers o

 

[sancho]

Granted other countries are working on 5th generation aircraft. but so far they have fallen so far behind in actually fielding them that the U.S. is already looking at testing of 6th generation concepts. Let me ask you also why have the other countries lagged so far behind the U.S.?

Why do you think US is so far ahead? Only flying 5. gen UCAV of US is X 45A and so are BAE Taranis and smaller stealth UAV versions of Dassault and Saab. Boeing only starts to think about 6. gen aircrafts, because they lost against LM in JSF competition, but their main project will be 4.75 gen F18SH block 3 now, to fill the gap till 6. gen fighters might come.

well my point was that to counter a fifth generation fighter plane, in my view, one do not necessarily need a fifth generation plane for itself. this can be done by something with an anti-stealth radar onboard and weapons able to engage the enemy! instead od going for a project worth billions one may better stick to the idea of anti-stealth radar system. i agree that this wont either be a cheap option or an easy task but atleast it will yeild something taht can be termed as "good for all"..
moreover if one think that the need of surpassing the enemies line of defence is necessary in some case, for me stealthier drones are a much better approach. stealth can be acheived for a drone much easily as it can be done for a big fighter jet. drones are small and can be almost completely made of composite materials!!
so in my view a nice fighter plane with anti-stealth radar and stealthier drone for penetration attacks is the answer to the horror of the fifth generation!!
what do you guys think!!

regards!

Two things, the main problem of drones is still the payload that it can carry internally and that is the main difference to 5. gen fighters. UCAVs won't have external weapon stations, fighters will have and even if this payload will limit the stealth capabilities, it also will increase the performance of the fighters.
Also if anti stealth radar would be the simple and easy answer, don't you think Russia would went that way years before to counter the US stealth fighters? They even got parts of the F117 that was shot down in ex Jugoslavia and still went to develop Pak Fa and Mig Skat.

 

[gambit]

wouldn't the radars in the F-22 and F-35 have the ability to fry bistatic systems?

Electronic Aviation - Aviation News - F-22 and JSF Radar Can Fry Enemy Sensors

I know there is an EMP air to ground missile being developed that can fry all none hardened electronic equipment within a certain radius.

Depends on the context of the word 'fry', which is clearly hyperbolic.

To start, electromagnetic induction is a given principle in an EMP weapon. The pulse basically induces or produces levels of voltages that the electrical structures cannot withstand. Structures like capacitors, diodes or computer 'chips' simply do not have the requisite mechanical robustness -- thin wires or board traces -- against these offending high energy pulses.

An offending pulse must have three crucial items in order for it to be a 'weapon':

- Extremely fast rise time. Thousandths of a second is sufficient to degrade the performance of the targeted system and perhaps create some minor physical damages such as fused board traces or burned diodes. Faster rise time if you want to induce deeper system damages.

- Electrical field strength (volts/meter). This is the amount of energy available for transfer, or induction, into the targeted system. Also affect distance.

- Frequency (hz) content. Or bandwidth. Determine the level of efficiency of transfer.

There are two main methods, meaning financially viable, to produce an offending pulse:

The flux capacitor...er...I mean...flux compression generator (FCG)...

Explosively pumped flux compression generator - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

And the vircator, virtual cathode oscillator...

Vircator - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

An FCG has a rise time in the millionths of a second but because of its simpler design and construction than the vircator its freq bandwidth maxed out at 1mhz or may be 2mhz, making it nearly useless against a radar system, which must be robust enough to withstand its own freqs, which can be up to the ghz bands. The best an FCG weapon can do against a radar system is to induce 'malicious' or 'ghost' currents, which would not even degrade the system but merely annoy the operator. An FCG is more effective against personal electronic devices, such as radio sets between troops and vehicles, than against electronics in tanks or aircrafts, for example.

A vircator, on the other hand, is the preferred method to wield against more complex and physically robust electronics. A vircator's pulse can be somewhat shaped and directed via a horn antenna. Its freq bandwidth is usable around 1ghz to 10ghz, which is hinted by this comment in your link...

"It could cause actual physical damage to a system providing it's on the X-band," a common frequency for military radars, said Wayne Wilson, the director of fighter business development for Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems.

The X-band for radar is the targeting band...

X band - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

X-band is used in radar applications including continuous-wave, pulsed, single-polarization, dual-polarization, synthetic aperture radar, and phased arrays. X-band radar frequency sub-bands are used in civil, military, and government institutions for weather monitoring, air traffic control, maritime vessel traffic control, defense tracking, and vehicle speed detection for law enforcement.[1]

X-band is often used in modern radars. The shorter wavelengths of the X-band allow for higher resolution imagery from high-resolution imaging radars for target identification and discrimination.

The X-band is around 8-12ghz and is also called 'centimetric' band because its wavelength is around 2.5–3.75 cm. Missiles uses the X-band.

Could the F-22's avionics turned itself into a vircator-like device and produced such an offending pulse through its AESA antenna? Personally...While I would not dismiss this as 'fanciful' the best I could say is 'high potential'. We know that through a technique called 'subarray partitioning', which I wrote elsewhere on this forum, an AESA antenna can become several smaller antennas for multiple uses such as search for one subarray, targeting for another subarray, or data relay for another subarray. But it is also known that pulse energy is related to array physical dimensions, simply put, large arrays produce more energy than smaller arrays. So if it is possible that the F-22's AESA system can become a vircator-like device to produce an offensive electromagnetic pulse purposely for inducing physical damages in electronics, my guess is that it would require the entire antenna itself to do the task. No subarrays possible.

Other issues that the link does not say are directionality and accessibility.

Directionality is simply the fact that the F-22 must face its target in order to do any damages through this method.

Accesibility is more complex. Any antenna is designed to be inductive, in other words, to be a path for electricity. Whereas the casing that houses and protect the electronics are not so intended and often the casing itself is grounded, providing a shunt for any stray voltages. So for any EM pulse to gain access to the electronics, there must be gaps somewhere on the physical construction of the avionics system. Such a gap could be a slightly ajar maintenance access panel or even a protruding wire that lead to the inside. The wire would behave exactly like an antenna.

So if it is possible that an F-22 can be a mobile high power microwave (HPM) transmitter-weapon, my guess is that the aircraft must be facing its enemy radar, transmitter or receiver, and blast away. The enemy's radar antennas would be the 'front door' to the system while the slightly ajar maintenance access panel would be a 'back door' to the system. There is no guarantee that there would always be a 'back door'. However, I doubt that this could be done from hundreds of km away. Current explosively pumped EMP devices, FCG or vircator, has lethal radius of only several hundred meters. Nuclear EMP has lethal radius of a couple thousands of km. My guess is that this capability would be best against air-air missiles to disrupt their targeting process more than it supposedly usefulness against ground radars.

But I am willing to be proved wrong.

 

[SBD-3]

well my point was that to counter a fifth generation fighter plane, in my view, one do not necessarily need a fifth generation plane for itself. this can be done by something with an anti-stealth radar onboard and weapons able to engage the enemy! instead od going for a project worth billions one may better stick to the idea of anti-stealth radar system. i agree that this wont either be a cheap option or an easy task but atleast it will yeild something taht can be termed as "good for all"..
moreover if one think that the need of surpassing the enemies line of defence is necessary in some case, for me stealthier drones are a much better approach. stealth can be acheived for a drone much easily as it can be done for a big fighter jet. drones are small and can be almost completely made of composite materials!!
so in my view a nice fighter plane with anti-stealth radar and stealthier drone for penetration attacks is the answer to the horror of the fifth generation!!
what do you guys think!!

regards!

How can you counter a passive fighter by using active radar? very difficult indeed. The most claimed Stealth finders like culchuga are receivers not emitters which focus on noise emitted by AC rather than radar signatures and requires a large coverage area to properly interpret the results as well so it will be very very difficult house such a system in relatively negligible place (nose of AC) to detect a silent stealth AC (if it does not use its radar)