CONNAN
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The contours of India’s relationship with China have been tumultuous over the last six decades. From periods of great bonhomie in the mid fifties - the ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ years to hitting rock bottom in 1962 when both nations went to war over the boundary dispute, the relationship has seen great turbulence marked by venomous animosity over the ongoing boundary dispute. Besides the boundary dispute, India’s concerns are related to China’s role in supporting insurgent groups in India’s Northeast, and in its active support to Pakistan, particularly in the nuclear field.
Recent reports of Chinese incursions in parts of Indian territory led to public opinion being inflamed in India and a dangerous hysteria being created with both countries accusing each other of intruding into their territory.
However, the issues which bedevil the two countries remain a source of concern and have the potential to lead the two countries to war. While the possibility of armed conflict erupting as of now appears remote, our ability to repulse an attack on our eastern and northern borders with China needs to be analysed and understood in context. Paradoxically, the greater our ability to protect our frontiers, the less will be the likelihood of hostilities breaking out. The question to be asked is are we prepared and what more needs to be done?
China’s strategic traditions and domestic influences will thus have a great bearing on their military thinking and policy towards India. The practical manifestation of that policy would devolve around the following:
* Avoid a protracted conflict.
* Use and manipulate information and retain information dominance to shape the battlefield.
* Constrain the adversary.
* Inflict surprise.
* Control and manage escalation.
On the naval front, the previous Naval Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta had stated that China was shaping the maritime battlefield in the region and had cautioned that the Chinese are looking 20 years ahead. As per an official from the Indian Navy, China has increased its nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. These reports while a source of concern are not something which cannot be dealt with, given the time frames involved.
From the army point of view, a much greater push is required in improving infrastructure especially with respect to logistics and communications. Procurement of guns for the artillery needs to be expedited and thought needs to be given to match Chinese missile capability so as to achieve effective deterrence. The Air force needs to ensure it has a combat edge over PLAAF in Tibet for which appropriations in the defence budget may need to be readjusted. India should also focus on developing its naval capability with a power projectionist role giving greater emphasis on the ‘anti-access’ strategy. While the biggest Chinese vulnerability in the political sphere is present in the form of Tibet, with a possibility of serious domestic fallout for the Chinese, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is also a serious Chinese concern as nearly 60 percent of their oil passes through the Indian Ocean.
request opinions for the following questions
Perhaps the time has come to question the role of the defence secretary and other civilian officials in the Ministry of Defence rather than military personal.
Could we think of making the post of Defence Secretary redundant once the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff is created?
Could we think in terms of four ‘4 star’ ranked officers in theatre commands to look after India’s security concerns against China, Pakistan, the Indian Ocean Region and our nuclear assets rather than looked after by civil service officials ?
Could we have a National Security Advisor from the defence services rather than from the civil bureaucracy or the police services? These issues need to be debated, and hopefully, some will be implemented.
Recent reports of Chinese incursions in parts of Indian territory led to public opinion being inflamed in India and a dangerous hysteria being created with both countries accusing each other of intruding into their territory.
However, the issues which bedevil the two countries remain a source of concern and have the potential to lead the two countries to war. While the possibility of armed conflict erupting as of now appears remote, our ability to repulse an attack on our eastern and northern borders with China needs to be analysed and understood in context. Paradoxically, the greater our ability to protect our frontiers, the less will be the likelihood of hostilities breaking out. The question to be asked is are we prepared and what more needs to be done?
China’s strategic traditions and domestic influences will thus have a great bearing on their military thinking and policy towards India. The practical manifestation of that policy would devolve around the following:
* Avoid a protracted conflict.
* Use and manipulate information and retain information dominance to shape the battlefield.
* Constrain the adversary.
* Inflict surprise.
* Control and manage escalation.
On the naval front, the previous Naval Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta had stated that China was shaping the maritime battlefield in the region and had cautioned that the Chinese are looking 20 years ahead. As per an official from the Indian Navy, China has increased its nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. These reports while a source of concern are not something which cannot be dealt with, given the time frames involved.
From the army point of view, a much greater push is required in improving infrastructure especially with respect to logistics and communications. Procurement of guns for the artillery needs to be expedited and thought needs to be given to match Chinese missile capability so as to achieve effective deterrence. The Air force needs to ensure it has a combat edge over PLAAF in Tibet for which appropriations in the defence budget may need to be readjusted. India should also focus on developing its naval capability with a power projectionist role giving greater emphasis on the ‘anti-access’ strategy. While the biggest Chinese vulnerability in the political sphere is present in the form of Tibet, with a possibility of serious domestic fallout for the Chinese, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is also a serious Chinese concern as nearly 60 percent of their oil passes through the Indian Ocean.
request opinions for the following questions
Perhaps the time has come to question the role of the defence secretary and other civilian officials in the Ministry of Defence rather than military personal.
Could we think of making the post of Defence Secretary redundant once the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff is created?
Could we think in terms of four ‘4 star’ ranked officers in theatre commands to look after India’s security concerns against China, Pakistan, the Indian Ocean Region and our nuclear assets rather than looked after by civil service officials ?
Could we have a National Security Advisor from the defence services rather than from the civil bureaucracy or the police services? These issues need to be debated, and hopefully, some will be implemented.
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