Well this is a matter of perspective. France has every right to define its own national security interests and threats and Russia has made Europe less stable one way or another no matter what way you look at it. India won't be doing anything of the sort for the foreseeable future.
The LGBs were Israeli correct but the Mirages are French. Do you think the Mirages could have been so quickly intergrated with the LGBs without assitance from the French OEM?
Do really France helped during Kargil war????
I know you are Dassult Fanboy.
Mirage-2000 were not gifted by France, we purchased them by spending "Tax payers Money".
Do know the facts before you Post.
Here is the Original Story:
http://www.vayuaerospace.in/images1/Selected_pdf/TheMirage2000LGBatKargil.pdf
The IAF had re-written aerial tactics during the summer of 1999 and it is required that the key factors be recorded for posterity.
IAF Mirage 2000s were originally supplied with Thomson-CSF Laser Designator Pods, known as Atlis for use with Matra 1000 lb LGBs, which were purpose-built for the destruction of reinforced targets. These weapons, although highly capable, are very expensive. The IAF decided to augment their capability by employing the standard’ dumb’ 1000 lb bomb coupled with Paveway II laser-guided bomb kits, the IAF having ordered a number of these earlier, but supplied with an incorrect part, which was later put on the embargo list. Unable to get the correct parts sent as replacements, IAF technicians had to consequently remanufacture this particular part in order to make the Paveway compatible for use with the Mirage 2000.
LGBs utilise a common laser guidance and control subassembly, with only the aerodynamic surfaces (control fins
and aerofoil group) changed to match the particular size bomb. This allows standoff capability while providing precision weapons delivery against a wide spectrum of targets. The original Paveway bomb conversion kits become known as Paveway I and with the introduction of a new set of components in 1978, the latter became known as Paveway II. The guided bomb kit directs the weapon toward a target which has been illuminated by laser energy. The desired target may be selected by the bombing aircraft, a companion aircraft, or even a ground observer. The laser energy is reflected from the target and detected by the laser semi-active guidance system.
The system processes the information, computes appropriate control commands and applies these commands to movable surfaces to effect changes in trajectory, thereby guiding the weapon to the target. The system requires no electrical connection to the unmodified delivery aircraft and is delivered in the same manner as a conventional bomb. There is no requirement for tracking or lock-on before launch, which minimises the time required for delivery with concomitant reduction in aircraft exposure to hostile ground fire.
W h e n o n 3 0 M a y 1 9 9 9 , A i r Headquarters decided to commit Mirage 2000s to the Kargil operations, these
aircraft had already been moved to forward operating locations in their air defence role. The status ‘as of early June’
was that the Mirage 2000s, their pilots and technicians were spread around certain Western Air Command airfields and their home base at Gwalior.
The Mirage 2000 aircraft had always been regarded as an air defence fighter with limited ground attack capability and consequently lacked certain resources such as bombs, hardpoint pylons, tooling, testers and ground crew experience in such matters. A major effort was initiated at Gwalior, under the AOC Air Commodore Padamjit Singh Ahluwalia, to get the platforms prepared and by 12 June the Mirage 2000s were ready for special operations The ‘backroom boys’, however, were 2000 kilometres away from the scene of action, the Aircraft System Testing Establishment (ASTE), at Bangalore, at that time in the process of integrating the Israeli Litening pod, a recce and target acquisition system, onto the Mirage 2000 and Jaguar. The trials were at a reasonably advanced stage, but the pod was still some time away from being inducted into service. ASTE Commandant Air Cmde
Parvez Khokar, a veteran of the 1971 war in the western theatre and a seasoned test pilot, called upon collective isdom of the professionals and the ASTE and then offered to make the Litening pod available to be used in Kargil. ASTE identified a team which would integrate the Litening system onto the Mirage 2000 with the weapons to be carried and also train a few No.7 Squadron pilots and technicians in order to enhance weight of attack. The three test pilots were
Wg Cdr R ‘Nambi’ Nambiar, Sqn Ldrs Rohit Verma and ‘Tee Vee’ Tiwari with Sqn Ldr Mantha, a flight test engineer, as technical authority on the pod. Along with group of highly trained and motivated armourers, these officers formed the core team, their charter identified and honed by professional discussions at the ASTE.
Sufficient equipment was obtained to clear Mirage 2000s for attack at any given time, capable of delivering LGBs. However enough ‘dumb’ bombs were not readily available, so a search was made of the IAF inventory. ‘Vintage’ 250kg bombs from the 1970s made-in-Spain for HAL Ajeet aircraft and since in storage were found and made available. A one-off trial was carried out from Jaisalmer over the Pokhran Ranges and was deemed to be successful.
These were immediately rushed into service with the Mirages of No.7 Squadron.
Initial missions were flown only using dumb bombs. The mission would depart and meet up with Mirage 2000 escorts
and then fly into Kashmir, with MiG-29s operating as top cover. The attacks took place initially on Pt 5140 near Tololing in the Dras Sector, with four strikes taking place over three days.
Daily interaction between the trials team and the ASTE formulated a strategy to put the pod into action expeditiously.
The Mirage 2000 centre line pylon was modified to carry a 1000 lb bomb along with a Paveway II LGB kit instead of the Matra LGB, which was prohibitively expensive and therefore limited in number, hence the prudent decision by Air HQ to save them for higher value targets should the conflict escalate into a full fledged war.
Credit must also be attributed to JWO BP Sharma, Sgt RP Singh, Sgt Kartar Singh and some other armourers who worked tirelessly to ensure the success of this ‘garage’ modification, then training of No.7 Squadron personnel and arming of the aircraft during the operations.
Tiwari and Nambiar were in the forefront of the attacks. The use of Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) in Kargil, Dras,Tiger Hill and many other targets with lethal accuracy, changed the entire complexion of the war and future operations.
Video footage showed the enemy abandoning their strongholds on hearing sound of aircraft, well before the weapons were even released. The high resolution FUR sensor recce capability of the pod was ably demonstrated by the accurate marking of co-ordinates of the Muntho Dhalo camp, the largest and main supply and reinforcement camp which was subsequently attacked with pin point accuracy and completely devastated.
Notable amongst No.7 Squadron’s some 200 plus attack missions were the airstrikes on Muntho Dhalo, Tiger Hill and
Point 4388 in the Dras Sector. On 16 June, the major enemy supply depot at Muntho Dhalo in the Batalik Sector was sighted by a Mirage on the LDP. The following day this was hit and destroyed by aircraft using dumb bombs. This camp was the major re-supply base in the Batalik Sector and this devastating attack left over 100 dead and 50 structures destroyed.
On 24 June, enemy command bunkers on Tiger Hill peak were hit by two Mirage 2000s employing the ‘Paveway’ Laser Guided Bomb (LGB). This was the first operational use on an LGB by the IAF. In another mission on the same day Mirages struck the same target using dumb bombs. This strike proved to be particularly effective causing severe damage to the enemy and also gave Indian Army troops on nearby hills a tremendous morale boost, this mission witnessed by the Air Chief himself who was flying backseat in another Mirage 2000TH.