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Enlightened Stupidity

They ended when Pakistan joined the WoT, a wise move orchestrated by Musharraf.
 
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Hi,

People are not talking about the most important issue after the nuclear explosion---Nawaz froze the foreign currency accounts---fearing everyone would withdraw the money----what a disaster----That idiot forgot or didnot know the loyalty the we pakistanis living abroad had for our motherland. He was only worried about saving his personal foreign account.

Incidently---india didnot freeze their foreign accounts---it is stated that indians sent home around or more than 15 billion dollars. We pakistanis could have managed 3 to 5 billion.

Kargil a failure---india lost more troops in this skirmish than whole of the 71 war---you call it a failure. It found out that its front line plane SU27 was a flop at that altitude,but then it did also find out that BOFORS--as scandulous the purchase was----no amount of money could have bought a better 'cannon'.

And where was PAF----my pakistani brethren---isn't it time to realize that that PAF had nothing to fight the air war with. What chance does an F7PG, an out dated mirage 3, or an 80's vintage and sanctioned packed F 16, with its 10 mile radar and 4 mile missile, stand against an su27, mig29 or a mirage 2000 with their bvr's. No chance at all. PAF made the wise decision to stay put.

Overall, Kargill was not as bad as people here are trying to make it---. Kargill showed us that we had the ability to take action and plan an attack and a successful one at that-----initially kargil is a success---we went in and captured the mountain---what happened afterwards is a millitary and a political failure more so. Even though pakistani generals came out at the bottom, but it for sure made us know of our short comings if we wanted to learn from our mistakes. And that was---we didnot have the backing to hold onto the real estate that we captured----maybe our generals were too arrogant---didnot know the true ground realities---troops were mistreated----chicken out factor was also involved at stars on shoulder level-----our civilian prime minister was our worst enemy---a gutless wonder----reminded me of "AKRAM PEHALWAN AND INOKI WRESTLING".

Truthfully, the army realized what its short comings were and not only the pakistani millitary took action to to rejuvinate itself---the indian army which got a big egg on its face also woke up as well.

Now, even though some very positive changes have come out in machine and technology procurement, the man management by pakistan army is very poor. This army is only and only india centric. Other than that, it is clueless how to defend itselfand has no concept that the state comes first. It performance in extremely severe internal conditions have been pathetic---case in point---every jack knew that the ssg would be a target of suicide bombers after the red mosque---but still someone walks into the mess hall----. Officers are offered chairs to sit and wait, 250 soldiers are sitting in the trucks, but they need labour from the neighbouring village to clear the road block.

A lack of professionalism by the officers----when they took al qaeda operatives as prisoners after tora bora----the commanding officer told the subordinates---not to tie down the hands of the foreign fighters as they were our muslim brothers---loaded them on the bus---these brothers over powered the guards a little later killing at least twenty guards and disappeared with their weapons. No millitary officer responsible for that miscalculation was put in front of the firing squad.

Another incident---even Musharraf mentions it in one of his speeches----terrorists are holed up in a house---this major wants to go in talk sense to his brother muslims----he does----they kill him and the others with him as well.


Right at the end of altercation aflight takes off of a spy plane with 30 plus people on board and flying parallel to the pakistani indian border-----india has two of its front line fighters blown out of the sky, between 2 to 4 helicopters downed, possibly a mirage 2000 also shot down and 4 plus mirages blown up at the base---and here they get this millitary plane---inches into their territory or inches away from their territory-----.

What pakistani millitary needs is american sales trainers giving lectures in millitary colleges and training centers to officers. That training will take out some of the rigidity that the pakistanis have in them----it will make them a little more flexible and make them think out of the box and think on their feet and make adjustments on the fly keeping pride, religion aside.

Truly out of this episode--if pakistani millitary decides to let go of it british style heirarchy and adopt the american style discipline,approach and work ethics, it will be worth the change.
 
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They ended due to 9/11 for you and jaswant-talbott discussions for India.

I am aware of that, however 9/11 did not happen until 2 years later from the point Musharraf took over.

I was responding to the point "Sanctions where on the civilian govts of NS and BB for pursuing the nuclear bomb." by suggesting that they applied to the Musharraf government as well. It was only after 9/11 that these were removed.
 
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Mastan,

I think you would find both Pakistanis and Indians disagreeing with various aspects of your post.

In any case, this is turning more and more into a "Kargil thread" when it should not be.
 
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Military sanctions were. Economic sanction were not. But some economic aid was not given. Therefore, the impact on the Pakistani economy of sanctions was negligible.

In 1985, US Congress passes legislation requiring US economic sanctions on Pakistan unless the White House can certify that Pakistan has not embarked on a nuclear weapons program. The White House certifies this every year until 1990.

Since 1985, US Congress has required that sanctions be imposed on Pakistan if there is evidence that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapons program (see 1985-1990). With the Soviet-Afghan war over, President Bush finally acknowledges widespread evidence of Pakistan’s nuclear program and cuts off all US military and economic aid to Pakistan. However, it appears some military aid will still get through. For instance, in 1992, Senator John Glenn will write, “Shockingly, testimony by Secretary of State James Baker this year revealed that the administration has continued to allow Pakistan to purchase munitions through commercial transactions, despite the explicit, unambiguous intent of Congress that ‘no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan.’” [International Herald Tribune, 6/26/1992] These sanctions will be officially lifted a short time after 9/11.

Strange is is it not ,that with no sanctions pakistan is doing better economically now then it did during sanctions.
 
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Ok this is where I split up based on what I know. The IAF very consciously NEVER came across the LoC and IB after the loss of two aircraft. The IAF claims that even the two aircraft lost across LoC initially were due to the turning radius accidentally spanning over to the Pakistani side. I can buy their point because their intent was not to escalate things across the border, rather to interdict Pakistani logistics and positions on their side of the LoC.

I also know that once IAF was inducted on their side of the border, PAF flew regular CAPs on our side. Neither side ventured across. The claim about intrusions being detected and going unchallenged is an unfounded slap in the face of the PAF because they did not need the GHQs permission to interdict these incursions. The PAF was flying just to avoid such situation (and based on what I know and have heard, this never happened). So I am really surprised by what you state knowing so otherwise.

What hurt some of the units was the fact that they were already across the LoC and PAF could not provide any support to them. This was the major gripe at the lower level but without understanding that had PAF gone across, it would have been full-fledge war with India. So my apologies to you but somehow the way you are describing things is not exactly clear. While the planning team can be faulted for not thinking through this, the PAF would be at fault for letting incursions across the LoC and IB go unchallenged (that is if I am to take your word for it, which with apologies, I do not).

I am in agreement with what you state about the need to have this stuff (Kargil) discussed at venues such as NDC and Quetta so we can learn from what we have done thus far militarily to achieve political goals.

Actually two aircrafts and a heli (MI-17) were shot down during the conflict. IAF made very regular incursions till the time they their two fighters were shot down. Flying at 400-480 knots means that even if they enter for a minutes, they will cover around 10 to 14 Km in a minute, now that too much inside especially with the point of view of Land forces. Also the Anzas fired at them did not achieve 100% kill ration; God knows how many Anzas were fired on intruding aircrafts that finally brought down two. IAF was bold because they had their COMINT/ELINT element on their side, which exactly knew the location of PAF fighters and they weren’t close enough to pose any direct threat.
As far as PAF CAPs were concerned, they weren’t effective just because of very stringent RoE. If you keep fighters 10 minutes away from IB/LOC and then also impose few other restrictions, it will adversely effect their ingress time. I really don’t want to discuss the specific RoE here but it was just like this that you are made twelfth man in the team, you are watching your team plying but cant join them. You are desperate to go inside, kick some arses, but rules don’t allow doing so.
I fully agree with you that RoE might be stringent because AHQ/GHQ didn’t want to escalate the situation but still pilots had their reservations about that .At many occasions, they could get the buggers but their hands were tied. And IAF probably knew that.
 
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Hi,

Kargil a failure---india lost more troops in this skirmish than whole of the 71 war---you call it a failure. It found out that its front line plane SU27 was a flop at that altitude,but then it did also find out that BOFORS--as scandulous the purchase was----no amount of money could have bought a better 'cannon'.

It is an incorrect statement to say that India lost more troops in Kargil than 1971.

One has to understand ballistics to understand why high altitude bombing by aircraft is not the same as under normal conditions.


Overall, Kargill was not as bad as people here are trying to make it---. Kargill showed us that we had the ability to take action and plan an attack and a successful one at that-----initially kargil is a success---we went in and captured the mountain---what happened afterwards is a millitary and a political failure more so. Even though pakistani generals came out at the bottom, but it for sure made us know of our short comings if we wanted to learn from our mistakes. And that was---we didnot have the backing to hold onto the real estate that we captured----maybe our generals were too arrogant---didnot know the true ground realities---troops were mistreated----chicken out factor was also involved at stars on shoulder level-----our civilian prime minister was our worst enemy---a gutless wonder----reminded me of "AKRAM PEHALWAN AND INOKI WRESTLING".

War have to be planned in detail. It has to encompass both the tactical aspects and the logistics aspects. Pakistan did encroach into Kargil in a very militarily audacious manner, but it could not sustain itself logistically. Unless there is an adequate logistic support, ground cannot be held. As simple as that!

One can plan audaciously tactical plans, but if logistics is given short shrift, such plans have to come a cropper.

I recommend you read the book "The Lifeblood of War" by Gen Thompson (Brassey's) to understand the importance of logistics in the history of warfare.

Truthfully, the army realized what its short comings were and not only the pakistani millitary took action to to rejuvinate itself---the indian army which got a big egg on its face also woke up as well.

Truthfully, the Indian Army got no big egg on their face. Intelligence got. But I wonder if they have drawn any lessons.

Right at the end of altercation aflight takes off of a spy plane with 30 plus people on board and flying parallel to the pakistani indian border-----india has two of its front line fighters blown out of the sky, between 2 to 4 helicopters downed, possibly a mirage 2000 also shot down and 4 plus mirages blown up at the base---and here they get this millitary plane---inches into their territory or inches away from their territory-----.

Two aircraft went down and one helicopter. The helicopter was not carrying flares.
If you fly over the Kargil area, you will realise how difficult it is to understand where the LC lies. And if you are in a supersonic aircraft, it becomes all the more difficult.


Truly out of this episode--if pakistani millitary decides to let go of it british style heirarchy and adopt the american style discipline,approach and work ethics, it will be worth the change.

If the Pak Army goes the US way, then you would have the results they are currently facing.
 
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Hi,
And where was PAF----my pakistani brethren---isn't it time to realize that that PAF had nothing to fight the air war with. What chance does an F7PG, an out dated mirage 3, or an 80's vintage and sanctioned packed F 16, with its 10 mile radar and 4 mile missile, stand against an su27, mig29 or a mirage 2000 with their bvr's. No chance at all. PAF made the wise decision to stay put.

By Su-27 if you mean Su-30 MKI , they didnt participate in Kargil operations anyway. PAFs fighter fleet is still very much potent to give a punch to any aggressor. No doubt, many airframes are old, but almost every weapon system is continiously being upgraded with modern avionics packages , just to give you few examples, Griffo M3 radar on Mirage III or RWRs on A-5. I will not compare our present fleet with F-22 Raptor,or Eurofighter but its definitely a very capable fleet in the region. And in few years when we have Block 52 F-16s, a large operational fleet of F-17s and inshallah F-10s, you will have no further complaints.
 
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From The Nation

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

“Never despise your enemy!”


BRIG (RETD) M. SHER KHAN

Those who do not learn from history will have to relive it.– George Santayana. “No one knew, though many were wise after the event, that these tribesmen were as well armed as our troops, and that they proved to be brave and formidable enemies….. Never despise your enemy is an old lesson but it has to be learnt afresh, year after year, by every nation that is warlike and brave.”

So wrote a young war correspondent named Winston Churchill about the Malakand campaign in 1879,during which the British garrison at Malakand and Chakdara forts were besieged for several days by the fierce tribesmen, the ethnic kin, maybe even ancestors, of today’s Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Then, as now, British troops faced a determined enemy described by Churchill as people “who fight without passion and kill without loss of temper.” Little has changed for the British (and US/NATO) troops today in similar terrain not far across the border in Afghanistan.

The United States, a much younger nation than the British but drunk with the arrogance as the sole surviving superpower, is now well and truly mired up to its neck in the sands and streets of Iraq, ever since George W. Bush and his coterie of warmongering hawks invaded that unfortunate country over three years ago on the flimsiest of excuses, together with a sizeable British and “Coalition of the Willing” contingents going along for the ride to lend some semblance of legitimacy to the ill-conceived and worse-executed misadventure.

Bush and company thought Iraq would be a cakewalk, and as one of his foremost advisors said before the invasion, it would be a “slam dunk” victory. And so it seemed at first as the “shock and awe” invasion by the Americans got underway. There was no resistance from Saddam Hussain and his vaunted Republican Guards, as the Iraqi military just crumbled under the onslaught. It wasn’t long before Bush proudly proclaimed “Mission Accomplished” on board a US Navy aircraft carrier after a Rambo-like landing in a fighter jet. This was followed by his envoy J. Paul Bremer announcing to wildly cheering Western war correspondents in Baghdad “Gentlemen, we’ve got him!” after the capture of Saddam Hussain.

American Forces contemptuously referred to Iraqis as towel heads and rag heads, and showed no respect whatever for the local people or their culture, traditions or sensitivities as they went about massacring innocent men, women and children (the death toll is nearing a million Iraqis but no one seems to care; the only figure that matters is US fatalities, which recently crossed the three thousand mark and is mounting by the day).

The atrocities committed at Abu Ghraib prison have become a faint, distant memory, with only a few low-ranking soldiers paying the price while every one up the totem pole of authority escaped retribution for complicity or command failure. Slowly and steadily the Iraqi resistance has risen from the ashes, and has become so potent that the only viable option left for the US and British forces is to declare a big victory and then hastily pack up and scoot. No amount of additional forces, the “surge” in troop levels that Bush has recently been talking about, is going to make a wee bit of a difference. The writing on the wall is clear: quit while you still can with a semblance of order and dignity, unless you are planning on a Vietnam-like exit from the rooftops of the US Embassy by helicopter.

The US has obviously not learnt any lessons from Vietnam, whose soldiers, and the Viet Cong, were held in very low esteem by GI Joe, and were referred to as “pyjama-clad gooks”. The “gooks” held out against the mightiest military of the world for years on end, till the tide finally turned in their favour, and then routed the most formidable army of the richest country in the world.

It took the US military a long time to recover from the trauma, till it invaded hapless Grenada on a flimsy excuse, and then ventured into Somalia under the glare of the television camera lights. The lowly Somalis, fighting for their country, shot down a US Black Hawk helicopter, and a rescue operation was launched to save the crew. The Americans walked into an ambush, and had to call for help from the UN Peacekeepers.

Pakistan’s 7th Frontier Force battalion responded, and rescued the Americans after themselves suffering several dead and wounded casualties. In no time Clinton pulled out his boys, leaving Somalia to its fate. (The Americans are fishing again in Somalia’s troubled waters, but this time through a surrogate from Ethiopia, to secure their interests in the Horn of Africa)

Ditto for Afghanistan: the “rag tag Taliban” have rebounded back with a vengeance after the initial pounding from the USAF’s Daisy Cutters and Bunker Busters. Time and the terrain are on their side; so is history, as the British know full well. Pakistan cannot be blamed for the woes of Karzai and the NATO forces, and if you know what is good for them, they should quit while they can.

The contempt for the enemy (i.e. India) syndrome has afflicted the Pakistan military too for a long time, forgetting the fact that the Indian and Pakistani forces were part of the same armed forces with similar fighting traditions till 1947. The Indian soldier was contemptuously referred to as a dal-khor bania (lentil-eating moneylender) while we prided ourselves as a superior meat-eating warrior nation.

Flushed with pride in the wake of what really was a very minor operation in the Rann of Kutch in early 1965, we dreamt of marching on Delhi and raising the Pakistani flag on the Red Fort as we sat out the hot summer of 1965 in the field, with no senior officer ever talking any sense to us brash youngsters. (My late friend Rana Bilal and I got a good dressing down from the CO when we once suggested over lunch that the Indian soldier might have some fighting qualities too and that we shouldn’t take him very lightly). With barely six infantry and one and a half armoured divisions (6 Armoured Div being nothing more than the old 100 Armoured Brigade Group which I joined on getting commissioned in 1962) we deluded ourselves into thinking that we would easily overrun the much larger Indian forces.

The Indians played from a different sheet of music, and the rest is history. No lessons were learnt, and then we found ourselves mired in East Pakistan. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the conflict, the despised Bengali Mukti Bahini were no walkover as they fought tooth and nail for their freedom, and won the day with the support of the “lala.” One thing is beyond dispute: our generals sitting in Rawalpindi were well and truly out-generaled by their Indian counterparts, and we ended up losing half the country, notwithstanding the bravery of the Pakistani rank and file. As B.H. Liddell-Hart said, “Wars are won and lost in the minds of the generals, not in the bodies of their men.”

We still learnt no lessons: addressing the students of the 1981 Armed Forces War Course in which General Musharraf was then a student, the then CGS emphatically said that one Pakistani soldier is equal to ten Indian soldiers, forgetting the old adage that “God is on the side of the bigger battalions,” while faith and hope are not cogent factors in military planning. Several years later we got embroiled in Kargil, conveniently forgetting that the Indians were not ever going to give up an inch of what they consider to be their territory without a stiff fight, come what may. After the initial setbacks and intelligence failures, they threw everything into getting the heights vacated in Kargil, and seemed willing to spread the scope of the conflict to the international border, and even to indulge in nuclear brinkmanship.

The result was that Nawaz Sharif had to dash off to Washington DC, hat in hand, to beg Clinton to broker a ceasefire; the captured heights, held at the cost of heavy loss of life, had to be vacated. He paid the price for his follies soon thereafter.
The moral of the story? Those who invade other people’s land and underestimate the resolve of the enemy to resist the occupation do so at their own grave peril. People of occupied lands, when well led and motivated, will fight to the last man to win back their country for the grasp of the occupier, no matter what.
 
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In 1985, US Congress passes legislation requiring US economic sanctions on Pakistan unless the White House can certify that Pakistan has not embarked on a nuclear weapons program. The White House certifies this every year until 1990.

Since 1985, US Congress has required that sanctions be imposed on Pakistan if there is evidence that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapons program (see 1985-1990). With the Soviet-Afghan war over, President Bush finally acknowledges widespread evidence of Pakistan’s nuclear program and cuts off all US military and economic aid to Pakistan. However, it appears some military aid will still get through. For instance, in 1992, Senator John Glenn will write, “Shockingly, testimony by Secretary of State James Baker this year revealed that the administration has continued to allow Pakistan to purchase munitions through commercial transactions, despite the explicit, unambiguous intent of Congress that ‘no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan.’” [International Herald Tribune, 6/26/1992] These sanctions will be officially lifted a short time after 9/11.

Strange is is it not ,that with no sanctions pakistan is doing better economically now then it did during sanctions.

Your quote says precisely what I was saying..That Pakistan was denied economic AID only. This means that free aid assistance packages were denied Pakistan, such as relief aid. Egypt for example gets a couple of billion in aid a year, Pakistan at the time might have been getting a billion or so. There were no economic sanctions on Pakistan like Iraq was having..for example company boycotts of the country. Even government institutions could still do business with Pakistan. The only thing that changed was that no economic aid was given. Even if you add on a billion dollars to a 50 billion economy to account for the loss of aid, you still get no improvement on a declining economy during NS and BB's time. Even if the ALL this economic aid was spent on debt relief (impossible, but just say), it might have accounted to 10 billion since 1990. By 1999, Pakistan was 30 billion in debt. So Pakistan would have been minimally 20 billion to debt (still around 35%), and it would have headed towards 30 billion within perhaps 4 or 5 years with the 2 clowns in charge. There would still have been no investment with or without this aid. The thing that made the difference was the economic reforms in 2002, as the World Bank keeps harping on about.

The other line of reasoning people such as you have, is that the present economic aid (perhaps 10 billion since 911 or something) can account for the growth in Pakistan's economy. As AM and MastanKhan rightly pointed out, it's not true. Only a semi literate could argue such a case, as you have tried, and as x-man has tried. Economically speaking, 10 billion as a proportion of the 100 billion growth since 911 is virtually nothing. The remaining 90 billion, or 150% of Pakistan's pre-911 economy has come from SOLID INTERNAL GROWTH brought about by reforms and reduced corruption measures introduced by Musharraf.

Now I know this is far too complex for you to understand, and it won't have sunk in for you. But if you get someone you know to repeat it enough, it may help.
 
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The official figures quoted for the economic aid go something like this.

1980-1990 .. 3.1 billion economic aid, 2.2 billion military aid.

1990-1999 .. 0.5 billion economic aid, 5 million military aid

1999-2007 .. 10.6 billion in BOTH economic and military aid.

From the 1999-2007 package, 6 billion has gone towards coalition support (CSFs), 2 billion on security, and around 2.5 billion to the government and development projects. You can see that the majority of the aid, will not have gone into the economy even from here. You can argue that 2.5 billion has been spent on the economy, which is nothing compared to the 100 billion growth in the economy that has occurred. From somewhere 97 billion extra dollars have been generated, which is larger than the whole economies under BB and NS. It's a statistical imposibility that these aid packages have contributed one bit to Pakistan's economic improvements.
 
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Hi,

Blain, an opinion is open to disagreement as is any analysis. So, I don't have problem with that.

But none of you guys are talking about the most important aspect----the freeze on the foreign accounts. What brought down pakistan to its kness and on the other hand the same thing changed the destiny of india.

X-man---at the onset of kargil--PAF was a sitting duck in a village fair. It is a story that the PAF can only push down the throat of believers---the pakistani public---that PAF was invincible---yes it was----by being a no show at the day of combat----now I am not saying the picture remains the same today----but kargil was a different story. An SU 30 locks on to an F 16, who has to turn around and go back home---there is no shame in admitting to the truth---we were responsible for the demise of our airforce----our cockiness got the better of us.

Salim---iraq is a destroyed nation----what you are talking about afterwards is policing matter. A civilian administrator made wrong decisions as to which direction to proceed. The U S millitary had not much say in those matters at that time. In a civil war---the civilians loose---not the millitary. At the end of the day, iraq is a destroyed nation----just like vietnam was----when the americans left.

American combat strategy at times has a foggy outlook to it. It depends how far the congress and the secretary of defence would let the millitary go. American wars are not neccessarily all out wars. Some of the time there are a lots of restrictions attached to the combat---like in vietnam----the millitary could do so much but the air force could not do what it wanted and could not fly acroos a certain point.
The lowly somalians were not the only one---the al qaeda had very well trained associates at the scene. The failure again was civilian---congress didnot allow armour in somalia. Without armour---any rag tag army can compete with any other force.

Now, about the statement by Bush---'bring it on'---I believe that there could not have been a statement that showed a lack of intelligence on the part of a world leader---.
 
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Hi,
X-man---at the onset of kargil--PAF was a sitting duck in a village fair. It is a story that the PAF can only push down the throat of believers---the pakistani public---that PAF was invincible---yes it was----by being a no show at the day of combat----now I am not saying the picture remains the same today----but kargil was a different story. An SU 30 locks on to an F 16, who has to turn around and go back home---there is no shame in admitting to the truth---we were responsible for the demise of our airforce----our cockiness got the better of us.

I agree that at that time the only real problem was BVR capability in PAF but can you tell me why not SU-30 came into Pakistan and attacked the hills occupied by Pakistan lead forces. IAF got their *** kicked with Anza MkII and Stingers. Lost a Mig 27 and Mig 21, didnot had the guts to lose SU-30.

Salim---iraq is a destroyed nation----what you are talking about afterwards is policing matter. A civilian administrator made wrong decisions as to which direction to proceed. The U S millitary had not much say in those matters at that time. In a civil war---the civilians loose---not the millitary. At the end of the day, iraq is a destroyed nation----just like vietnam was----when the americans left.

Have to disagree also Sir, since Vietnam and Iraq are no way comparable by any means what so ever.
 
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The official figures quoted for the economic aid go something like this.

1980-1990 .. 3.1 billion economic aid, 2.2 billion military aid.

1990-1999 .. 0.5 billion economic aid, 5 million military aid

1999-2007 .. 10.6 billion in BOTH economic and military aid.

From the 1999-2007 package, 6 billion has gone towards coalition support (CSFs), 2 billion on security, and around 2.5 billion to the government and development projects. You can see that the majority of the aid, will not have gone into the economy even from here. You can argue that 2.5 billion has been spent on the economy, which is nothing compared to the 100 billion growth in the economy that has occurred. From somewhere 97 billion extra dollars have been generated, which is larger than the whole economies under BB and NS. It's a statistical imposibility that these aid packages have contributed one bit to Pakistan's economic improvements.


Will Pakistan slip into debt trap?
KARACHI: Will Pakistan slip into the debt trap? This is a haunting question that has kept economic experts racking their brains for months. In this context, it was more surprising for them when they read State Bank Governor’s recent statement in which she claimed that swelling external debt is not worrisome as it does not block the GDP growth.

The experts, however, rejected the SBP Governor’s claim, saying that continued reliance on loans and foreign assistance and mounting debt maturity are extremely worrisome and if appropriate measures are not taken with immediate effect to check the current trend, it may become difficult to avoid facing a sovereign debt default and its adverse consequences for the nation’s economy.

The present government has never been able to reduce foreign debt since it assumed office in 1999 although it received record inflows of foreign aid, investment and remittances post-9/11.

Pakistan’s external debt has climbed to $36.9 billion from $33.6 billion in 1999 despite the fact the country received at least $10 billion in economic, military and development aid from the United States, over $6 billion in privatization proceeds, and a relief of $1.6 billion in loan write-offs by foreign governments over the last seven years, the experts say.


The rescheduling of Paris Club debts provided an additional relief of $1.2 to $1.5 billion annually in terms of debt service payments. Is the government’s debt management policy as sound and successful as it claims it is, or a historic opportunity to restructure the country’s high debt levels has fallen victim to political expediency or a false sense of achievement, the economists question.

Even after having received such generous assistance, Pakistan’s external debt to GDP ratio is 28 per cent - slightly worse than Africa’s 26.2 per cent, which also happens to be the average for all the developing countries. The average external debt to GDP ratio of all emerging markets declined from 42.1 in 1999 to 26.2 per cent in 2006.

Hence, the growth in debt slowed down during the last seven years. However,

Pakistan received generous foreign aid as well as much higher levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the post-9/11 period. Remittances averaged around $4 billion a year during 2003-2006 compared to an average of $1.5 billion in the 1990s.

The government’s claim of having broken the begging bowl has also proved wrong as its share in total public and publicly-guaranteed debt has increased from 37.5 per cent to 50.2 per cent in 2006.

The economic experts have already refuted the tall claims of economic growth by the power corridors and warned that the GDP growth rate could not be maintained in the current fiscal.

“Unrealistic claims of economic growth in recent days by the power corridors have made economy’s future bleak as they, instead of taking appropriate measures to arrest the negative indicators, are only making paper-claims,” said Dr Shahid Hasan Siddiqui.

At present, the trade deficit, current account deficit, budgetary deficits, internal and external debts and the pace of throwing away national assets through privatization is the highest in the history of Pakistan, Dr Shahid noted.

Pakistan has paid a very heavy price in its ongoing war against so-called terrorism. It’s time now such practices were stopped and focus directed on the nation’s economy, he advised.
 
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The present government has never been able to reduce foreign debt since it assumed office in 1999 although it received record inflows of foreign aid, investment and remittances post-9/11.

Pakistan’s external debt has climbed to $36.9 billion from $33.6 billion in 1999 despite the fact the country received at least $10 billion in economic, military and development aid from the United States, over $6 billion in privatization proceeds, and a relief of $1.6 billion in loan write-offs by foreign governments over the last seven years, the experts say.

Either you are unable to think, or won't think. Either way, people like you are dangerous. Now, Mr Economics Professor, external debt itself is not a marker of anything. US external debt is 10 trillion dollars. It depends on the size of an economy. 33 billion of a 60 billion economy is nearly at default, 39 billion of a 140 billion dollar economy is a very well balanced economy. Hardly any debt problems with Pakistan in that situation.

This has nothing to do with economic aid though, as we were discussing.

Even after having received such generous assistance, Pakistan’s external debt to GDP ratio is 28 per cent - slightly worse than Africa’s 26.2 per cent,

He's got his figures wrong here. No surprise. I'll look for the actual figure later. But even at 28 %, this is a lot better than 50% as it was in 1999. Even a jacka$$ can see the difference.

Pakistan received generous foreign aid as well as much higher levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the post-9/11 period. Remittances averaged around $4 billion a year during 2003-2006 compared to an average of $1.5 billion in the 1990s.

Remittances increased also because of other processes implemented by the government. Either way an increase of 2.5 billion per year, still doesnt answer the question of where has the extra 80% GDP growth come from?

“Unrealistic claims of economic growth in recent days by the power corridors have made economy’s future bleak as they, instead of taking appropriate measures to arrest the negative indicators, are only making paper-claims,” said Dr Shahid Hasan Siddiqui.

Very bleak :rolleyes:

At present, the trade deficit, current account deficit, budgetary deficits, internal and external debts and the pace of throwing away national assets through privatization is the highest in the history of Pakistan, Dr Shahid noted.

Obviously he doesnt realize a trade deficit can be a sign of a rapidly explanding economy, same with current accounts..External debt has decreased. It's just a guy with an agenda, again writing for a Pak newspaper spreading misinformation, either intentionally or unintentionally.

Pakistan has paid a very heavy price in its ongoing war against so-called terrorism. It’s time now such practices were stopped and focus directed on the nation’s economy, he advised.

It would pay an even greater one if it didn't support the war WoT.
 
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