Parik's article is right but incomplete so that regarding all 3 answers, I wholly
disagree and so do all technical data and studies since the 19th century, BTW!
Downsizing here is meant as the diminution of the battle load of soldiers. This is,
as said, an old trend or at least a worry amongst command planners but the exact
opposite has happened on the battlefield especially in the last 30-40 years. But
before I proceed, let me reveal a useful precision : my bodyweight has never left
the 87-92 kilos range* since the end of adolescence and I don't mean fat. I'm 1,78m.
I have seen many small and rugged men with high carrying ratios but still, to be
realistic and despite the numerous pics on the internet showing Asia's attempts at it,
you pack more on a semi trailer truck than on a moped or scooter. 40 kgs is still too much!
In 1885, a German study showed that in low to moderate temperatures, a trained soldier
could carry 22kgs for 24 kms. The same carry done under hot temperatures resulted in
such a strain on the organism that up to 24 hours of rest were required to recuperate.
At 31 kilos, however the low to moderate case yielded similar results to the 22kgs hot one
and those 31 kgs at hot temps level produced immediate and lasting effects. What's more,
physical training did nothing to help and 22kgs was recommended although never applied
By 1985**, a recent trend had more weight than 31 kgs appear on the average troop.
American soldiers on missions of 2 to 3 days carried over 45 kilos in some cases!!!
It is still the case today, was in A-Stan for instance. Tougher units may see up to 2/3-3/4
of bodyweight loads on some men when big or numerous weapons are involved. Count
in a daily re-supply of food and ammunition to support this paradigm.
Of course, this load varies in levels according to mission segments :
Fighting load of 25-30 kgs is used for contact or intense parts; still over 30% BodyWeight;
Approach load of 42-46 kgs adds the necessary eat, stay warm, sleep kit; 50-55 % BW;
Emergency load get right below 60 kgs and thus we found or 72 or 73 % of BW, three fourths!!!
One needs not be very good at maths to understand how this conflicts with the century old
German study .
All of the above is found here :
The Infantryman's Combat Load
The reasons for this over-carry situation are numerous. Apart from commanders ignoring studies
as found prior, there is the technology aspect. To reach the loads indicated above, we have added
radios for everyone, for example. In WWI, communication equipments were hard wired and fixed.
In WWII, platoons and soon after squads gained radios for the whole unit . Since, programs such
as FELIN in the French Armed Forces have made comms part of the individual equipment.
Weapons have evolved in tech too and similarly rely on electronics and both them and the radios
run on batteries. Vehicles have adapted too, becoming life bases with reserves and recharge stations
but the combats loads mentioned in my first part were precisely those concerned with what happens
when the vehicles reach their maximum extent & fall behind in capacities to provide in some way.
Another source of weight increase was brought by the protection level rising immensely. When I be-
gan serving at the time of that document above, there were no flak jackets and the likes. Helmet was it!
Nowadays, very few troops in a modern military go about without body protection gear. Favouring fire
power also has the same result. Three belts of 7,62 outweigh three belts of 5,56 no matter where.
Is there any chance that the load will go back down? Resounding NO, right there! In fact, the studies
for smaller transports ( VHM , HB Bv-206 or quads ), roboticized ground and air mules, exo-squeletons
and the likes point to the trend of high loads being entirely accepted as solutions to accompany it are
more actively sought than ways to backtrack from it.
Are there different options? It all depends on what past military culture and present equipment of your
troops allow.
If your soldiers carry loads near those mentioned but without the advantages explicitly listed ( high tech
gear and full protection / frequent replenishment ), you really need to scale back! Something is wrong.
Doing so may not be so hard either if your fighters have a great relation to their environment. In A-Stan,
in Pakistan, in some parts of India and historically in Indochine/Vietnam, light and very lightly equipped
combattants have shown victory ensuring efficiency ... mostly because they were on their home turf.
The point that my analysis wanted to uncover is that the high load option is an expeditionary practice!
A soldier in a hard built border post does not need an individual radio but a SFs operative thousands
of klicks from base needs a satellite transmission suitcase. Protective gear is useful but so is mobility
especially if added to terrain familiarity as you patrol your youth's playground mountain range. And if
you're not likely to find support in a land with minimal to none electricity infrastructure, empty batteries
will turn those NVG into a rock of sort, much less useful than knowing enemy routes and hiding spots.
If you do choose to accept the high load tactic, here is the conundrum : for every bit of tech, for every
10 kilos over that old 22 Deutsch original, for every bit of firepower, you'll have to add a helo or some
other mass moving asset. Considering how long procurements take in the specific case of India, one
is left to wonder if the soldiers won't be dead under that load by then ... dead of old age that is!!!
But past this quip, there is an Indian way to be found. Lightening the load in Bharat is not an ISO search
IMHoO. That SFs dedicated to long missions and combatting terrorism should be equipped as their
Occidental counterparts makes sense if the means are also copied from the West. Those serving in an
Infantry regiment faced with fighting the Chinese in a plain as in Waterloo or Antietam should not.
The Indian Navy should pursue high tech as that brings a load off personnels, if mostly in numbers. So
should the IAF. The rest of the troops could find it easier however to choose different paths.
Here, a Sikh or Gorkha unit may grab a few technological bricks while still relying on traditional skills.
There, the soldiers' job may benefit a lot more from a road and electrical supply being constructed.
In some place, the two might be exclusive so that traditional troops could be replaced by surveillance
( or whole ISR suites ) drones and aircrafts with SFs trained and equipped QRF units also gaining in
men to mission ratio as the Navy with yet again the cost in cash likely rising in reaction.
A comprehensive transformation should only copy foreign solutions when it brings a plus value.
Still, to close the loop, I'll re-adress our 3 friends :
When was the last time you lugged 44 kilos around for a day or two and how well did that go for you?
Just sayin' no offense and great day all, Tay.