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Diaoyu Islands News and Updates

So point for stating the obvious, as India and Japan has signed a security pact so the inclination in natural. If we help them in a conflict with China, that remains to be seen.
 
And yet with all of china divine influence it can bring its case to the UN well killers just love to do more killing than talking right?
 
Keep it civil, I have given several members infractions for off topic/trolling.
 
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In February 15th, China Marine Surveillance66 ship in the Diaoyu Islands territorial sea cruise. On the same day, China Marine Surveillance 50, 66, 137 ships continue to cruise in the Chinese Diaoyu Islands territorial waters.


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In February 15th, China photographing the Diaoyu Islands in the 137 boat.
 
Japan Explores War Scenarios With China

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As Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party national defense task force announced on Jan. 8 that it would increase the nation’s defense budget by more than 100 billion yen ($1.15 billion), three of five scenarios explored by the defense ministry recently involve the Self-Defense Forces squaring off against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

While contingencies involving North Korea’s ballistic missiles and Russia were among the scenarios the defense ministry explored, the top three all involved a crisis in the East China Sea. The first scenario examined a war between China and Japan over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. Earlier on Tuesday Japan summoned the Chinese ambassador in Tokyo for the first time since Shinzo Abe was sworn in as prime minister to protest the continued presence of official Chinese ships in waters around the islets, which are claimed by Japan, Taiwan and China.

The second scenario, meanwhile, expands on a Senkaku contingency and looks at a widening war involving PLA attempts to seize the Ishigaki and Miyako Islands west of northern Taiwan.

The third, and perhaps most controversial, scenario focuses on how Japan would react to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2021, a date reportedly chosen because it coincides with the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to the scenario, the PLA would rely mostly on amphibious vehicles, special forces, ballistic missiles, and a fighter blockade to achieve its ends.

Although the latter scenario makes it clear that the hostilities would primarily involve the PLA and Taiwanese military forces, it nevertheless raises the possibility that China would attack U.S. and Japanese bases on Okinawa, while using long-range ballistic missiles, such as the DF-21D and DF-31, to threaten aircraft carriers in the region and the Western United States should U.S. forces attempt to intervene in the conflict.

Interestingly, Japan would have a responsibility to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event the PLA engages Taiwanese forces, the Japanese-language Sankei Shimbun said in its reporting on the scenarios on Jan. 1.

There has been much speculation over the years about whether Tokyo would intervene if the PLA ever invaded Taiwan. Reports in 2007 alleged that Japanese and U.S. officials, alarmed by growing Chinese might, were considering a plan to coordinate their actions under such a contingency, with Japan providing rear-area support for U.S. forces as stipulated under the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. It is no coincidence that the efforts in 2007 also occurred when Abe, who is regarded as pro-Taiwan, was in power.

The two countries late last year also agreed to negotiate possible changes to the bilateral guidelines to better reflect changes in the strategic situation as well as give Japanese forces more room to maneuver.

While the scenarios remain in the realm of speculation, Japan’s inclusion of a Taiwan contingency again underscores the importance Tokyo places on Taiwan remaining de-facto independent. Certainly, China’s assertiveness in 2012 in both the East China and the South China Sea has done little to reassure Tokyo that it could live comfortably with a CCP-controlled Taiwan so close to its waters and territory. As such, rather than being amenable to “abandoning” Taiwan, as a handful of U.S. academics have been arguing for the sake of “improved” ties with Beijing, Tokyo may become more inclined to ensure that the island continues to serve as a natural barrier to Chinese expansion.

According to Japanese sources, the largely symbolic 100 billion yen increase in defense spending announced on Jan. 8 will serve to fund research into a new radar system and to cover fuel and other maintenance costs for early-warning aircraft. But this is only the first step, and there could be many more to come. The defense budget for FY2012 ending in March was just 4.69 trillion yen (US$61 billion), or a little more than 1 percent of GDP, leaving ample room for expansion should Japan’s strategic environment continue to deteriorate in the weeks ahead.

Image credit: Wikicommons
 
National / Politics

Japan not to disclose evidence of China radar target-lock on MSDF assets

Kyodo | Feb 19, 2013
The Japan Times

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Targeting: The Chinese frigate Jiangwei II is seen Jan. 30 in the East China Sea at the time the Defense Ministry claims that the ship's weapons control radar locked onto the Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Yudachi. | DEFENSE MINISTRY/KYODO


The government will not disclose its evidence of China’s recent locking of weapons-targeting radar on a Japanese warship because doing so would tip its hand on intelligence operations
, official sources said Monday.

The Liberal Democratic Party-led government had considered disclosure after Beijing denied Japan’s accusations that a Chinese frigate aimed its weapons radar at a Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer on Jan. 30 near the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea at the heart of a bilateral dispute.

Disclosure poses “great risk in terms of defense as it would mean that Chinese military authorities would be looking at the MSDF’s secrets concerning information-gathering operations,” a senior Defense Ministry official said.

A government source also said such disclosure would “difficult” as the evidence data touch on the “subtleties” of Japanese security.

They added that Washington’s expression of support for Tokyo’s allegation has also prompted Japan not to disclose the evidence.

The government will not officially announce its nondisclosure of the evidence, however, in a bid to maintain pressure on China, the sources said.

Japan has frequency analysis data of radio waves the MSDF warship received from the Chinese ship, photos and footage at the time of the occurrence, according to a Defense Ministry source.


The Chinese Foreign Ministry has accused Japan of “spreading false information” by alleging weapons-targeting radar was directed toward the MSDF ship. It has argued the Chinese frigate used monitoring radar and not fire-control radar.

Tokyo also said a Chinese naval ship was suspected of having directed fire-control radar at an MSDF helicopter on Jan. 19 as the chopper was flying over the East China Sea.

Japan will continue to closely monitor Chinese vessels and military jets near the islets, while at the same time keep calling on Beijing to soon engage in a bilateral maritime safety mechanism to avoid an accidental clash.

Political sources said the international community may view Japan’s decision not to reveal the evidence as a failure to produce an effective argument against China’s denial.

The radar issue has come as bilateral ties have dropped to the lowest level in years over conflicting sovereignty claims to the Senkaku, which are called Diaoyu in China.

Ties worsened in particular after Japan effectively nationalized the uninhabited chain by purchasing three of the five islands from a private Japanese owner in September.

The purchase was intended by the government then led by the Democratic Party of Japan to “stably maintain” the islets, but it sparked a fierce backlash in China.
 
sound like vietnam is jealous with china on everything from south china sea, Diaoyu islands to mining in indian ocean! vietnamese guys should keep being jealous, panic and watch china doing:yahoo:
 
National / Politics

Japan not to disclose evidence of China radar target-lock on MSDF assets

Kyodo | Feb 19, 2013
The Japan Times

nn20130219a2a-870x489.jpg

Targeting: The Chinese frigate Jiangwei II is seen Jan. 30 in the East China Sea at the time the Defense Ministry claims that the ship's weapons control radar locked onto the Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Yudachi. | DEFENSE MINISTRY/KYODO


The government will not disclose its evidence of China’s recent locking of weapons-targeting radar on a Japanese warship because doing so would tip its hand on intelligence operations
, official sources said Monday.

The Liberal Democratic Party-led government had considered disclosure after Beijing denied Japan’s accusations that a Chinese frigate aimed its weapons radar at a Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer on Jan. 30 near the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea at the heart of a bilateral dispute.

Disclosure poses “great risk in terms of defense as it would mean that Chinese military authorities would be looking at the MSDF’s secrets concerning information-gathering operations,” a senior Defense Ministry official said.

A government source also said such disclosure would “difficult” as the evidence data touch on the “subtleties” of Japanese security.

They added that Washington’s expression of support for Tokyo’s allegation has also prompted Japan not to disclose the evidence.

The government will not officially announce its nondisclosure of the evidence, however, in a bid to maintain pressure on China, the sources said.

Japan has frequency analysis data of radio waves the MSDF warship received from the Chinese ship, photos and footage at the time of the occurrence, according to a Defense Ministry source.


The Chinese Foreign Ministry has accused Japan of “spreading false information” by alleging weapons-targeting radar was directed toward the MSDF ship. It has argued the Chinese frigate used monitoring radar and not fire-control radar.

Tokyo also said a Chinese naval ship was suspected of having directed fire-control radar at an MSDF helicopter on Jan. 19 as the chopper was flying over the East China Sea.

Japan will continue to closely monitor Chinese vessels and military jets near the islets, while at the same time keep calling on Beijing to soon engage in a bilateral maritime safety mechanism to avoid an accidental clash.

Political sources said the international community may view Japan’s decision not to reveal the evidence as a failure to produce an effective argument against China’s denial.

The radar issue has come as bilateral ties have dropped to the lowest level in years over conflicting sovereignty claims to the Senkaku, which are called Diaoyu in China.

Ties worsened in particular after Japan effectively nationalized the uninhabited chain by purchasing three of the five islands from a private Japanese owner in September.

The purchase was intended by the government then led by the Democratic Party of Japan to “stably maintain” the islets, but it sparked a fierce backlash in China.

it is just because ABE does not have a pair of balls!:flame: china is not vietnam!
 
Japan and U.S. Ignored Chinese Signals and History, Blundering into the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis
Stephen Harner



Japan and U.S. Ignored Chinese Signals and History, Blundering into the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis - Forbes



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English: President Barack Obama talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao during the morning plenary session of the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit at the David L. Lawrence Convention Center in Pittsburgh. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Former students of Asian politics and international relations of a certain age (my age, or a bit older), would in college or graduate school have heard of, if not carefully read, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, by Allen S. Whiting (1960). This was a seminal study of formal or–mainly–informal signals sent by China in 1950 warning with increasing clarity and vehemence the officially U.N. (but overwhelmingly U.S.) forces under command of Douglas MacArthur, then beating back North Korea invaders and advancing up the Korea peninsula, that China was prepared to and would intervene on behalf of North Korea if its territory or vital interests were threatened.

In the event, on October 25,1950, 25 days after U.N. forces had crossed the 38th parallel, 200,000 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (redesignated by Mao Zedong the People’s Volunteer Army) soldiers, having secretly crossed the Yalu River on October 19, attacked U.N. forces, beginning an engagement that would vastly increase casualties on both sides, but especially for the PLA. Whiting’s book sought to discern at what point China’s in many cases subtle and indirect warnings might have been heeded or responded so that intervention might have been avoided.

I have been reminded of China Crosses the Yalu as I have worked through the new book on the Senkaku/Diaoyu island crisis by Yabuki Susumu (矢吹晋), professor emeritus of Yokohama City University, one of Japan’s most eminent China scholars. The book (written in Japanese) is entitled:「尖閣問題の核心 」(The Core of the Senkaku Issue), and bears a subtitle:「日中関係はどうなる」 (What is to Become of Japan-China Relations). I believe that the book is the fairest and most objective, as well as the most thorough, exposition of the positions of both Japan and China, and–critically–the U.S., on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute.

At the risk of oversimplifying, I think I can summarize Professor Yabuki’s analysis and conclusions as follows:

1.The Japanese position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue is indefensible on several counts, including most fundamentally Japan’s unconditional acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration (which required the return of all territories “stolen” from China).

2.The Meiji government’s annexation of the Ryuku Islands (theretofore an autonomous kingdom) in January 1885, within which the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were identified, followed three months later by the Qing Dynasty’s surrender of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (ending the Sino-Japanese War) are both mooted by the terms of Potsdam. The islands were and are clearly part of Taiwan, which in addition has the most legitimate claim to continuous use/occupation.

3.The Japanese position that Senkaku/Diaoyu is part of Japanese territory because it was awarded to Japan by the U.S. in the Okinawa Reversion agreement of 1971 is similarly contrary to fact. The U.S. awarded to Japan only administrative authority over the islands, not sovereignty. Sovereignty was specifically not transferred. The U.S. continued to maintain was undetermined between the three claimants and would only be determined through discussion and agreement. (As I noted in the last post, the Obama administration–in a monumental blunder–effectively changed this policy by failing to object to and stop Japanese “nationalization.”)

4.Japanese policy–and particularly public misunderstanding–has been based on the false assertion, uttered by then foreign minister Fukuda Takeo in testimony to the Upper House of Diet on December15, 1971 that Okinawa Reversion had accomplished the restoration of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Whether Fukuda misunderstood the issue, or intended to deliberately deceive the country through this testimony is unclear.

5.The Chinese position on handling the territorial issue was, before Japanese “nationalization,” grounded on the 1972 agreement between Prime Minister Tanaka Kakue-Premier Zhou Enlai, when the terms of Japan-China diplomatic relations were determined, to “shelve” the issue–i.e., to avoid any acts that sought to enforce one side’s claim to sovereignty.

6.Yabuki cites his own research and authoritative third party sources to charge that the Japanese Ministry of Finance removed from official transcripts of the Tanaka-Zhou discussions that agreement to “shelve” the issue, allowing future Japanese governments to fraudulently claim that the issue was not discussed and that China asserted a claim over the islands.

7.Under the circumstances above, the decision of the Noda government to “nationalize” the islands was a grave provocation, a fundamental change in the status quo, tantamount from the Chinese point of view to aggression and forceful annexation of Chinese territory. An equivalently forceful Chinese response to “balance” the level of its sovereign claim was inevitable.


What has reminded me of Whiting’s study are the many signals sent by China since the beginning of the current crisis (which might be traced back to the fishing boat incidence in 2010). In December 2011 I posted on the humiliation meted out to PM Noda during a short, seemingly purposeless–and certainly fruitless–trip made to Beijing. Already, Japan-China relations had cooled to near freezing. Professor Yabuki chronicles the many signals of trouble as Chinese concern over the direction of Japanese policy grew. These included the refusal of Hu Jintao in February in to meet a top level delegation of seven of Japan organizations’ heads in Beijing to commemorate the 40th anniversary of restoration of diplomatic relations. The last minute cancellations of a scheduled visit to Hu Deping, son of Japan’s last “sympathizer” in the Beijing leadership, Hu Yaobang, and a visit of China’s most senior uniformed military officer, Guo Boxiong, in May.

What concerns Yabuki most is that these signals, among many others, were hardly noticed or appreciated in Japan. Yet, they were leading to what became almost a complete breakdown in communications with China. The almost farcical, but deeply tragic, denouement of this breakdown was the “16 minute standing dialogue” between Hu Jintao and Noda held on the sidelines of the APEC conference in Vladivostok on September 9 at which each side delivered its ultimatum.

The Noda Cabinet decided the next day to implement nationalization and the following day paid the money and signed documentation. It is now very hard to believe that anyone expected Japan’s decision to have the effect of de-escalating the crisis. If anyone did they were making the same mistakes as Truman and MacArthur in 1950.
 
sound like vietnam is jealous with china on everything from south china sea, Diaoyu islands to mining in indian ocean! vietnamese guys should keep being jealous, panic and watch china doing:yahoo:

What china is doing now ? lying and threat !:taz:
 
Do you know Chinese Characters just as your ancestors did? We never called it as 鱼钓岛 but 钓鱼岛. Tell you what, if I were you, I will never try to form a alliance with Japanese. I would use it as a stake in negotiation with China and try to get some more interests as return.
Sorry, I forget about something. Anyway, nobody cares how you or your government view Diaoyu Island's issue. It is none of your business and if you want to make a difference, become US first. LOL
 
Can you provide a photograph of the original map/documents showing/substantiating that the Senkakus WAS part of China??? Did any of the documents said the they were part of China or the documents only described the islands??? Is this another China's proving her sovereignty by propaganda only???

What's the basis of China's claim over the Senkakus??? Discovery??? Discovery does not equate to ownership. Naming it??? Naming it does not make it yours. Traditional fishing grounds??? Traditional fishing grounds doesn't equate to sovereignty. Some ancient Chinese traders passed there??? Does not also equate to sovereignty. Did China developed the Senkakus??? What the hell did you develop? Did China conducted economic activities on the island??? Did China exercised effective jurisdiction and effective occupation over the Senkakus??? Did China admistered the Senkakus??? What did China administered there??? Did China erected any structure or lighthouse there??? Did the Japanese expelled any Chinese garrison there in the Senkakus???

I don't think China CAN prove her claims by just telling to all people that “China owns this and that” since in ancient times.
Good points and good question! :cheers:
Many chinese alway like that, :))
Who told you that [All Chinese = Han]
It is not "I said so", it is the Fact.

Mongolian Chinese and Han Chinese both establish Chinese history.
Han Chinese: Ming, Song, Jing...
Mongolian Chinese: Yuan, Northern Yuan.
Any more confusion?
I think you used worng term so it'll be mistake: a half of Mongolian was living in Inner Mongolia, a part of PRC which you mean!?
 
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