DG ISI Extension

[fatman17]

VIEW: Age of extensions —Syed Talat Hussain

The COAS has done precisely what the chief justice did in the case of his trusted comrades, which is not much different from the reasons we hear from the president and the prime minister for retaining important members of their cabinet and advisors

It is a reality check for those
who thought that only journalists and social workers never call it a day. The nation is now discovering that generals too do not retire. Not on time anyway. The extension in service to generals, now four in number, by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, raises important points. Some of these points go beyond the oversimplified current debate about the merits and demerits of these decisions. While the army’s chronic detractors see this as a sign of institutional audacity, those who are in favour are busy churning out procedural and technical arguments to defend the army chief’s right to add grace years to the career of his officers.

The significance of these decisions and their implications, however, transcend the right and wrong associated with these. The first factor that makes these decisions significant is the signal this sends across to the whole institution. And it is that while all the generals wearing the same rank are equal, some are more equal than others by virtue of the posts they hold. This may be stating the obvious realities of professional life, but it does have an added importance in the context of the reform process General Kayani himself has launched in the institution he heads.

One of the fundamentals of this entire effort has been to ensure that bad traditions of the Musharraf era are firmly rooted out. Restoring merit in the order of service has been one of the many ways General Kayani has pursued to break the debilitating legacy of his predecessor who made his own rules and exceptions as he blundered along the path of absolute power. But now the decision to grant service extensions to those who otherwise would retire into blissful oblivion brings back painful memories of the times General Kayani has tried so hard to cast into the dustbin of deliberately forgotten history. The finer point about the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of these extensions will be lost in the view many are likely to hold within the institution that General Kayani too favours the favourites.

These extensions are also important because they are an admission of sorts by General Kayani that in certain individuals too much investment of time and energy has been made for him to lose their vital support. Lieutenant-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha’s case falls in this basket. Both as head of the ISI and as director general military operations, he has been General Kayani’s most trusted comrade. His centrality to General Kayani’s scheme of things is reinforced by the rapport he has developed with his counterparts across the world’s most important capitals including, and primarily, Washington, Riyadh, London, and Beijing. A newcomer to the job would have taken time to develop this comfort level, first with the hot seat, and then with the hard tasks he would have to perform. But while these seemingly powerful arguments — captured in the oft-used term ‘continuity’ — imply supremacy of the individual over the ability of the institution to find a suitable replacement, this is not exactly the best way to inspire confidence in other members of the team or impress upon the sceptics the diversity of leadership and command qualities the institution claims it has for every tier.

Also applied elsewhere, the same reasoning (of continuity) can have severe negative ramifications. For instance, this would mean that, theoretically, General Kayani himself too should not retire for the same reason that has caused him to retain some of his commanders. He is very comfortable in his job. He is known to everyone across the world. He is spearheading the entire breadth of operations against the militants. He has seen through turbulent political times and has not done badly in careening through these crises. Why should he retire on time? Why not extend his tenure by a year? Why not three years even? Or ten? You see how the logic of extension-for-continuity can stretch into dangerous extrapolation? It also conjures up familiar images of men in uniform viewing either themselves or other members of the team they have handpicked as indispensable to performing national level duties. This violates the golden principle that institutions progress by strictly following best practices — age of retirement being one of these.

Just as important is to see how these extensions will impact the list of individuals in the queue for the post of the chief of army staff that is going to be up for grabs by the end of this year. Some analysts have suggested that no one in the grace period of his service can be considered for the post of the COAS, and that each extension is ‘event- or task-specific’. But this is just one interpretation and certainly not the final one. Given Pakistan’s peculiar political history and the present turbulent regional situation, appointment of the next COAS will be one of the most important decisions to be made in the coming months. But this particular decision lies with the much-maligned and controversial civilian leadership, and constitutionally there is little the army command can do anything about it. Once made, this decision will have to be obeyed. However, before the decision is made, the sequence of the line-up for the post of the chief becomes exceptionally important. Shuffling the seniority list on technical grounds can be one way to throw up the present chief’s choice for his own replacement.

And, finally, with these extensions, the army’s high command has followed the general trend in Pakistan where institutional heads are exercising authority in a manner that may be legally and technically sound but does not add to the image and prestige of the office they hold. The COAS has done precisely what the chief justice did in the case of his trusted comrades, which is not much different from the reasons we hear from the president and the prime minister for retaining important members of their cabinet and advisors. Pakistan, it seems, cannot move an inch without a few good souls working beyond the call of their official duty. So much for institutional governance!

The writer is a leading Pakistani journalist

 

[MastanKhan]

Hi,

The general should serve his time and more. There is absolutely no reason to take out a successful commanding general from completeing his task that he is successful at unless he has groomed an able candidate.

The war is going in favour of pak army at this time---so are other intrigues that pak millitary is focussing real hard upon---these candidate should be given another year or two to see the conclusion of their actions.

 

[fatman17]

ISI chief

Dawn Editorial

Thursday, 11 Mar, 2010

The speculation surrounding the future of the ISI chief Gen Pasha has been confirmed: he has been given a one-year extension in service, thus deferring his retirement later this month and allowing him to continue in his present position.

The first, and most important, question the extension raises is: why? Much of the reporting in the media has focused on Gen Pasha’s impeccable credentials and the army’s desire for ‘continuity’ in the ISI chief’s office while the state is waging a counter-insurgency. But these are really not very good reasons. Gen Pasha may be an exemplary spymaster and he may deserve the nation’s gratitude for services rendered but is he really indispensable? The Pakistan Army is supposed to be the nation’s finest institution, an organised and disciplined force that nurtures and trains its future leaders over decades of training. Surely, then, there must be another officer in the entire Pakistan Army who is capable of stepping up and filling Gen Pasha’s shoes. (Technically, the ISI chief, supposedly selected by the prime minister, can be a civilian but the army has traditionally not allowed anyone from outside the service to occupy that office.)

It is also a bit of a red herring to imply that the security situation in the country demands ‘continuity’ in the highest office of the ISI. Next door, in Afghanistan, the Americans and British have been struggling to contain a deadly insurgency for years now but there has been no talk of ‘exemptions’ and ‘special considerations’ for top military offices there. Arguably, the case for extensions in military service should be even stronger for American or British leaders in Afghanistan: after all, the generals leading the war there are operating in a foreign land and do in fact possess unique knowledge about that war. Pakistani military leaders do not suffer from these disadvantages.

There is a further problem: the Pakistan Army high command showed an astonishing lack of foresight when it appointed Gen Pasha. One glance at a calendar should have alerted those involved in Gen Pasha’s appointment that he would reach the age of retirement before his term as ISI chief would expire. Had someone who had at least three years to go before reaching the age of retirement been appointed in October 2008, the question of an extension would never have arisen. Perhaps Gen Kayani, who appointed Gen Pasha, thought he would cross that bridge when he came to it. But ad hocism of this sort cannot strengthen institutions. The army needs to accept that it must not act as a law unto itself.

 

[fatman17]

Continuing mission

Thursday, March 11, 2010

The ISI chief Lt-Gen Shuja Pasha has been given a year's extension as a three-star general. He is expected to continue at his present post. The move coincides with similar extensions given to other military men. The purpose seems to be to ensure that the military effort against militancy which is currently underway continues without any disruption. This is sensible, given that in the past there has been doubt over the degree of military commitment to the battle against the Taliban. It is only over the past two years that we appear to have succeeded in putting together a team determined to take on the militants and do everything possible to defeat them. There is now, perhaps for the first time, conviction in the country that the military does truly mean business. This is vital to injecting hope in a nation where there has been far too much despondency. For the first time we can see before us the possibility of an all-out defeat for the militants. We must hope the decision will ensure that there is no going back in the effort against militancy. Persisting with the kind of effort we see now is the only way to achieve this. It is true that in the longer run this needs to be combined with much more, but there is no getting away from the fact that defeat on the ground in physical terms is absolutely vital to getting anywhere at all.

There is another dimension to this. Unlike other ISI chiefs in the past, who had quite evidently seen themselves as above civilian authority, Lt-Gen Shuja Pasha has been willing to brief parliament on efforts against militancy; indeed he has even given an interview or two talking about the role of the agency. This is significant in a country where the military agencies in particular have remained shrouded in shadows zealously guarding all that is happening from the eyes of ordinary people. A change in this is vital. We need greater trust between the men in khaki uniform and the people they serve. In the past this has been sadly missing. The relative candour and tact adopted by men such as the ISI chief can help build this. The extension granted in service is therefore a wise step. It is important that the team we have assembled to fight militancy be kept intact till the final target is achieved.

 

[fatman17]

The indispensable and the helpless

By Cyril Almeida
Friday, 12 Mar, 2010

Just how much disregard does the army have for rules and civilians? Let’s rewind to a year and a half ago. On Sept 30, 2008 the front page of Dawn announced: ‘Kayani shakes up army command’.

The accompanying article reads: “In a major reshuffle in the army’s top command, Chief of the Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani on Monday brought in a new head of the all-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) …

“Perhaps the most surprising of all such changes is the appointment of Lt-Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha as the new director-general of ISI .... A highly professional soldier in his own right, Lt-Gen Pasha has, for the past over two years, been overseeing the ongoing security operation in the tribal areas and parts of the NWFP.”

“In his capacity as the director-general military operations (DGMO) he was directly responsible for the launching and execution of all major security strikes in Fata and Swat, the latest being the major onslaught against religious extremists in the Bajaur tribal agency.”

All stuff that’s been re-hashed in recent days, culminating with the announcement of Pasha’s one-year extension. What the report did not address, though, were two things: the prime minister’s role and how long Pasha’s term was to last.

The missing details tell a story of their own.

Several weeks ago, trying to understand the arcane rules that are meant to govern the appointment of an ISI chief, I got a quick tutorial from a former head of the spy agency.

The rules, I was told, are clear-cut. The prime minister is the appointing authority and he can appoint anyone: civilian or uniformed; man, woman or, what I suspect was a rueful joke, monkey. Of course, there is often a gulf between the de jure and the de facto when it comes to civil-military relations: traditionally, the COAS has arrogated to himself the authority to appoint his spy chief, I was also told.

The 2008 Dawn report also contains this little nugget: “Gen Kayani … has put in place a new team to implement his vision for reviving the prestige of the armed forces and for enhancing the security of the state.”

So what, you ask. The army has always been in charge of national security. Nothing surprising there.

But someone around Kayani must have scratched his head and reached for a multi-year calendar. Right, that person must have thought, the chief wants Pasha to “implement his new vision” but Pasha is supposed to be put out to pasture in March 2010. That’s just 15 months away.…

Army folks can, of course, never question their boss about promotions and the like, so even if anyone did the little arithmetic necessary to realise the obvious he would never have dared raise the issue.

But for those of us not in uniform, we must ask: why was a man with 15 months to retirement picked as the spy chief to help steer his boss’s new vision for the country’s security policy? If the job wasn’t done in 15 months, then what?

Then he gets an extension.

I haven’t met Pasha, though I suspect that even if I were to, I wouldn’t be able to establish that he has in fact done all the great and glorious things attributed to him by, funnily enough, unnamed sources in recent weeks.

But let’s assume he has done all those great and glorious things for the nation. Even then, when it’s time for him to retire, give him a medal, shake his hand and say khuda hafiz. Pakistan zindabad.

But no. We’re told, again by those oh-so-loquacious sources, that Pasha is vital, that he’s needed for the sake of ‘continuity’, that without him the ‘new’ security policy can’t be implemented.

Welcome to Club Indispensable.

It’s a great club to be a part of. Everyone loves you, the media sings paeans to your heroic deeds, and nobody thinks to ask the obvious: how does staying on reflect on your peers?

The army, its members never tire of telling us, is an institution. It is professional, its officers are world-class, its training second to none. So is there no general in his early 50s, with several decades of training under his belt, in the entire upper echelons of the Pakistan Army who can fill Pasha’s enormous shoes?

And this whole business of a ‘critical moment’ in the counter-insurgency is a red herring. Hasn’t the army itself told us to be patient? That counter-insurgencies take years to win? Don’t the textbooks on counter-insurgency suggest that they typically last at least a decade, sometimes two? How does a one-year extension fit into that bigger picture?

The most charitable explanation for Pasha’s extension, and, let’s get real, Kayani’s later this year, is that that Kayani and Pasha are fighting the good fight, that of reorienting the Pakistan Army and changing its security outlook.

That could be true. But that would also mean Kayani has decided to wage this struggle behind closed doors, away from the scrutiny of other institutions and the public the army ostensibly protects.

I don’t know about you, but I’m not terribly confident that the army has finally produced something it never has before: a general who can, with the help of just a few uniformed allies, change the course of the country’s security policy for the better.

The least charitable explanation would be that Kayani is so disdainful of the government and the man who leads it, Zardari, that he isn’t about to waste time negotiating with them as equals, or even slight unequals.

In which case, Kayani has kept Pasha by his side because he can. After all, the generals know best and the ‘bloody civilians’ just don’t get it.

In which case, we, the people, might as well pack it all up and hand it over to the generals. Here, it’s your country anyway, you guys run it. Just do us a favour and don’t do what those other guys, Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf, did. Preposterous. That’s not Kayani, you say.

Time will tell. At the moment, only this is certain: you, me and our elected representatives are mere passengers in a vehicle that we can only pray Kayani and his boys know the destination of.

Welcome to Club Helpless.

cyril.a@gmail.com

 

[All-Green]

At a time when we have had to rethink many policies and strategies entirely, it is indeed not that easy to handover to new players who may not have the stature, experience or the vision which enables them to make sense of the dynamics which are not just military in nature and have been extremely volatile in past 2 years.
Even one man can make a difference especially when he is the leader.
Kayani and Pasha combination has worked very well for Pakistan and they have mostly kept their noses out of politics.
Also they have really been very open and transparent to our elected representatives unlike their predecessors.

If the recpie is working for Pakistan then it is quite silly to make it an issue especially if there is provision for such extensions and when we are in the major offensive part of our operations...COIN is a longterm committment but the fact is that we are still elminating the major networks and headquarters, we are hardly into the hold part in many areas as still there is territory to be freed from the militants.

On one hand we even supported a usurper as chief executive because he was delivering something to us, on the other hand despite the proven results of Swat etc. even something which the rules allow is being scandalized...utterly foolish.

We should realize the fact that it is the toughest fight in our nation's history and calls for special measures, continuity of command in a major offensive is perhaps a very minor special measure and should be of no concern to the bloody civilians like us who should appreciate the fact that Army is sacrificing a lot and fighting wholeheartedly for their countrymen.

 

[Star Trek]

Some of you guys may disagree with me, but this is my take

1. There should not be any Extension of Retirement age of any Chiefs or Generals.
2. This will cause loss of opportunity to the junior colleagues who would have beocme the generals of chiefs.
3. This will create an environment of Favouritism.

There will be people who say its necessary as pak is facing WOT, but there are definitely capable people in all ranks. This is a wrong precedent.