Demographics of China (demographic time bomb)

[etylo]

Not to take this thread off topic, but at least let me offer a glimpse of a comparison of the changes relative to China's, to stay relevant to the topic:

This is from the report you linked, where the real finding is the timing of births, and not to any demographic instability:

View attachment 918948

A fertility rate of 1.6 is not exactly a "crikey" moment, considering its long term stability, and in view of the rising population overall, with data up to 2020 below. The latest dip is short term, and coincides with economic cycles and Covid. The recent changes will be short lived and are not going to affect the long term demographics significantly.

View attachment 918950

View attachment 918951

The magic ingredient is immigration, which is a benefit China has denied itself due to its nature of being a closed xenophobic authoritarian society. Hence the demographic troubles it is facing over the remainder of this century, at least.

No, not large immigration, China has already over populated land. US is the one that is xenophobic about Asians now.

 

[VCheng]

No, not large immigration, China has already over populated land. US is the one that is xenophobic about Asians now.

Every country decides for itself whatever suits it the best. In the context of this thread, if China is already overpopulated, then a drop in its population would be a good thing.

 

[etylo]

Every country decides for itself whatever suits it the best. In the context of this thread, if China is already overpopulated, then a drop in its population would be a good thing.

Thats what I am proposing, that is to drop Chinese population to even around 500 millions slowly and naturely over a long period of time so that people there have optimum living conditions.

 

[VCheng]

Thats what I am proposing, that is to drop Chinese population to even around 500 millions slowly and naturely over a long period of time so that people there have optimum living conditions.

Sounds like an excellent and appropriate plan to me, I would agree.

 

[Leishangthem]

Whenever anyone blame one child policy for chinese demography reduction ,he/she's a moron in my book.
China's population growth projectile didn't really change by one child policy,it was already declining with sporatic boost,china doesn't need 2 billion population right now.
It's about sustaining in period of jobloss by AI and automation,1.4b is already too much.China needs quality not quantity.

 

[Get Ya Wig Split]

@beijingwalker scary stuff

 

[Get Ya Wig Split]

The Chinese century is already over​

An aging population will be a permanent drag on China’s economy and its global ambitions​

MADISON, WISCONSIN – In January, China officially acknowledged that its population began to decline last year — roughly nine years earlier than Chinese demographers and the United Nations had projected.

The implications of this are hard to overstate. It means that all of China’s economic, foreign and defense policies are based on faulty demographic data.

For example, Chinese government economists have predicted that by 2049, China’s per capita gross domestic product will have reached half or even three-quarters that of the United States, while its overall GDP will have grown to twice or even three times that of its rival. But these forecasts assumed that China’s population would be four times that of the U.S. in 2049. The real figures tell a very different story. Assuming that China is lucky enough to stabilize its fertility rate at 1.1 children per woman, its population in 2049 will be just 2.9 times that of the U.S. and all its key indicators of demographic and economic vitality will be much worse.

These faulty predictions do not affect only China. They imply a geopolitical butterfly effect that could ultimately destroy the existing global order. Chinese authorities have been acting in accordance with their longstanding belief in a rising East and declining West. Similarly, Russian President Vladimir Putin believed that as long as Russia maintained stable relations with a rising China, the declining West would be powerless to hold him accountable for his aggression against Ukraine. And in its haste to abandon Afghanistan in order to focus its resources on China, the U.S. may have unwittingly emboldened Putin further.

Population aging will be a permanent major drag on China’s economy. After all, as Italy’s experience shows, the old-age dependency ratio (the number of people over 64, divided by those aged 15-64) has a strong negative correlation with GDP growth, as does the median age and the proportion of people over 64.

In 1950, Japan’s median age was 21, compared to 29 in the U.S.. As one would expect, Japan subsequently benefited from years of faster economic growth. By 1994, however, the prime-age labor force (15-59) began to decline, whereas the U.S. working-age population is not expected to fall until 2048.

By 1992, Japan’s median age was 5.5 years above that of America’s and its old-age dependency ratio began to exceed that of the U.S. Not surprisingly, its GDP growth has been lower than America’s ever since. Japan’s per capita GDP rose from 16% of the U.S. level in 1960 to 154% in 1995. But by 2022, that figure had fallen to 46% and it is likely to decline below 35% in the future.

Similarly, owing to their young populations, Taiwan and South Korea achieved rapid economic convergence for more than five decades, with per capita GDP soaring from 5% of the U.S. level in 1960 to 42% and 53%, respectively, in 2014. But both economies have since stagnated as their workforces have shrunk, putting them on track to fall below 30% of U.S. per capita GDP.

Now consider China. In 1980, its median age was 21, eight years younger than America’s, and from 1979 to 2011, its GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10%. But China’s prime-age labor force (15-59) began to shrink in 2012, and by 2015, GDP growth had decelerated to 7% before slowing further, to 3%, as of 2022. An average of 23.4 million births per year from 1962 to 1990 made China “the world’s factory.”

But even China’s own exaggerated official figures put last year’s births at just 9.56 million. Chinese manufacturing will continue to decline as a result, creating new inflationary pressures in the U.S. and elsewhere.

While China’s population was 1.5 times larger than India’s in 1975, even the Chinese government’s exaggerated official figures show that it was smaller last year (1.411 billion compared to 1.417 billion). In reality, India’s population surpassed China’s a decade ago and it remains on track to be nearly 1.5 times larger than China’s in 2050, with a median age of 39 — a full generation younger than China’s (57).

By 2030, China’s median age will already be 5.5 years above that of the U.S., and by 2033, its old-age dependency ratio will begin to exceed America’s. Its GDP growth rate will begin to fall below America’s in 2031-35, at which point its per capita GDP will hardly have reached 30% of its rival’s — let alone the 50-75% predicted by Chinese official economists. If the U.S. is overtaken as the world’s largest economy, it will be by India, not China.

To be sure, China is investing heavily in artificial intelligence and robotics to offset the economic drag of aging. But these efforts can go only so far, because continuing innovation relies on young minds. Moreover, robot workers do not consume, and consumption is the major driver of any economy.

China’s decline will be gradual. It will remain the world’s second- or third-largest economy for decades to come. But the huge gap between its waning demographic and economic strength and its expanding political ambitions may make it highly vulnerable to strategic misjudgments. Memories of past glory or fear of lost status could lead it down the same dangerous path that Russia has taken in Ukraine.

So, China’s leaders should heed the lessons of Russia’s botched invasion and wake up from their unrealistic “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation. The government’s current policy approach is a formula for demographic and civilizational collapse.

The U.S. also has lessons to learn, given its apparent failure to manage a declining Russia. America and its allies — including Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, Japan and South Korea — will also be dealing with societal aging and resulting economic slowdowns. Their combined share of the global economy already fell from 77% in 2002 to 56% in 2021, and that trend will continue.

The geopolitical implications should be obvious. If the major powers are wise, they will cooperate in good faith to forge an enduring global order before they no longer have the power to do so.

The Chinese century is already over

China’s gap between its declining demographic and economic strength and expanding strategic ambitions now constitutes a major geopolitical risk. 

www.japantimes.co.jp

 

[Get Ya Wig Split]

China’s Economic Base Is Shrinking, And Dramatically So​

Beijing has informed the world that for the first time in 70 years the nation’s population declined – by some 850,000 since the last census. It seems set to stay on this trajectory, too. United Nations (UN) demographers see future declines, from a population of 1.4 billion presently to 1.3 billion in 2050, to 800 million or so by the end of the century. This demographic reality promises to constrain the nation’s growth prospects severely, not immediately but with growing intensity over coming years. It further promises to compound economic ill effects by raising debt levels in this already debt-heavy economy. And there is little Beijing can do to mitigate these unwelcome implications.

The crucial demographic consideration, for economics at least, is the relative size of the nation’s working-age population. Because Beijing for decades imposed a one-child policy on Chinese families – for the last 45 years in fact until recently – the nation now faces a relative paucity of workers to replace the huge generation that is now retiring. The numbers of those of working age – by convention, between the ages of 15 and 64 – have in fact hardly grown at all since 2010. But the older population of retirement-age Chinese has grown a whopping 53 percent, increasing from 9 percent of the total population in 2010 to 13 percent at last measure. There are as a consequence, barely 3.5 people of working age today available to support each retiree, down from about 6.5 in 2000 and 5.5 in 2010. And that figure is expected to fall below 2.3 by 2030 and even lower in the years following.

To grasp the economic ramifications of this situation, consider the burden on these few workers. Each must support himself or herself, personal dependents, and about a third of everything each retiree needs. No three-some workers anywhere, at least on average, are productive enough to shoulder this need. The economic strain will be that much greater than the raw numbers imply because the large aging population will necessarily siphon off workers from everyday production to medical and other care needs. China will have little surplus production for the investments required for economic growth, most especially the grand projects for which China has become famous and which have so contributed to the country’s former, impressive pace of growth.

What is more damaging is that these demographics will have significant and adverse financial implications as well. The pension needs of these retirees will force considerable borrowing requirements on local governments as well as Beijing. China already carries a bigger debt burden than most countries, including even the United States. At last measure all debt – public and private – amounted to the equivalent of about $52 trillion, verging on almost three times the size of the economy. To be sure, Washington carries a bigger debt burden than Beijing does, but that is because Beijing off loads borrowing needs — to support infrastructure spending for instance — onto local governments. Pension demands will increase this burden still further and unavoidably crowd out the growth-fostering projects that in the past have done so much for China’s development.
And there is little Beijing can do to offset these ill effects. A few years ago, the authorities finally awakened to the potential economic damage of the one-child policy. They rescinded the law and allowed larger families. But even if Chinese people had immediately taken advantage of that more liberal environment, it would be 15-20 years before the change could have effect on the relative size of the country’s working-age population. As it is, the nation’s fertility rate has not risen in response to the new law. Nor is China likely to see a wave of immigration to enlarge the ranks of the working aged. On the contrary, China regularly experiences more out than in migration.

The only other avenue open for relief is in worker productivity. To this end, Beijing has emphasized the development and adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. Indeed, China has become a world leader in these areas. No doubt in time these trends will substitute algorithms, computers, and machines for labor and make the country’s relatively limited working population more productive than it is today. AI and robotics can also help by limiting the need for physical labor and thereby enabling Chinese to work at older ages than in the past. But these things can only go so far. However much these efforts can mitigate the strain imposed by demographic realities, they cannot correct for them entirely, leaving China facing slower growth with less room for grand investment projects than has been the case until now.

China’s Economic Base Is Shrinking, And Dramatically So

The problem is a paucity or young people.

www.forbes.com