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Typhoon costs soar, upgrades not ready until 2018 | Reuters

(Reuters) - The Typhoon fighter jet will cost the government a fifth more than previously forecast by the Ministry of Defence, and will not reach its potential as a multi-role aircraft until 2018, a spending watchdog said on Wednesday.

"The cost of the Typhoon project has risen substantially. Despite the Ministry of Defence (MoD) now buying 72 fewer aircraft, down from 232 to 160, a reduction of 30 percent, the forecast development and production cost has risen by 20 percent to 20.2 billion pounds," a report by the National Audit Office (NAO) said.

"This is a 75 percent increase in the unit cost of each aircraft."

The MoD has been repeatedly criticised for delays and cost over-runs on major defence projects. A parliamentary committee warned last year that the ministry could face an equipment funding gap of up to 36 billion pounds over the next 10 years.

Since then the nine-month-old coalition government has ordered cuts in defence equipment and personnel to help rein in Britain's record peacetime budget deficit.

Experts say more cuts may be needed to meet the goal of cutting the defence budget by 8 percent over four years.

The MoD agreed to purchase 232 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft under a collaborative arrangement with Germany, Italy and Spain in the mid-1980s. The number of aircraft being purchased has subsequently fallen to 160.

The NAO report said that key investment decisions on Typhoon were taken on an over-optimistic basis and that costs had risen at a rate the MoD did not predict.

It added that the objectives of the four partner nations on the project were not fully aligned and that decision-making was slow.

The aircraft was designed primarily to fulfil an air combat role but is being upgraded to become a multi-role aircraft, which can conduct both air-to-air and ground attack missions.

The Typhoon already fulfils some key defence tasks but it is unlikely to reach its full potential as a multi-role aircraft until around 2018, said Amyas Morse, the head of the NAO.

"The full multi-role capability (of Typhoon) won't be available for a number of years. Until this happens the MoD will not have secured value for money from its over 20 billion pounds investment in Typhoon," said Morse.
 
The National Audit Office (NAO) estimates that each individual aircraft is now £55m - or 75% - more expensive than originally anticipated.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12614995

£55m = 88 million dollor
 
Thats pretty steep we should go for the Rafale instead which will have AESA b4 the EF does
 
The National Audit Office (NAO) estimates that each individual aircraft is now £55m - or 75% - more expensive than originally anticipated.
Will this effect MMRCA??/ The revised bid would have already submitted. The prices of fighter jets increase every year (although not this much) but that does not mean we will have to pay to pay for this. If EF is selected we will be paying what EF consortium has proposed and we will get all those feature with jets which are in the deal.
 
Typhoon costs soar, upgrades not ready until 2018 | Reuters

(Reuters) - The Typhoon fighter jet will cost the government a fifth more than previously forecast by the Ministry of Defence, and will not reach its potential as a multi-role aircraft until 2018, a spending watchdog said on Wednesday.

"The cost of the Typhoon project has risen substantially. Despite the Ministry of Defence (MoD) now buying 72 fewer aircraft, down from 232 to 160, a reduction of 30 percent, the forecast development and production cost has risen by 20 percent to 20.2 billion pounds," a report by the National Audit Office (NAO) said.

"This is a 75 percent increase in the unit cost of each aircraft."

The MoD has been repeatedly criticised for delays and cost over-runs on major defence projects. A parliamentary committee warned last year that the ministry could face an equipment funding gap of up to 36 billion pounds over the next 10 years.

Since then the nine-month-old coalition government has ordered cuts in defence equipment and personnel to help rein in Britain's record peacetime budget deficit.

Experts say more cuts may be needed to meet the goal of cutting the defence budget by 8 percent over four years.

The MoD agreed to purchase 232 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft under a collaborative arrangement with Germany, Italy and Spain in the mid-1980s. The number of aircraft being purchased has subsequently fallen to 160.

The NAO report said that key investment decisions on Typhoon were taken on an over-optimistic basis and that costs had risen at a rate the MoD did not predict.

It added that the objectives of the four partner nations on the project were not fully aligned and that decision-making was slow.

The aircraft was designed primarily to fulfil an air combat role but is being upgraded to become a multi-role aircraft, which can conduct both air-to-air and ground attack missions.

The Typhoon already fulfils some key defence tasks but it is unlikely to reach its full potential as a multi-role aircraft until around 2018, said Amyas Morse, the head of the NAO.

"The full multi-role capability (of Typhoon) won't be available for a number of years. Until this happens the MoD will not have secured value for money from its over 20 billion pounds investment in Typhoon," said Morse.

Great news indeed. :laugh:


EF fans... :devil:
 
NAO report slams UK's Typhoon acquisition

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The Royal Air Force’s reduced fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons could cost up to £37 billion ($60.2 billion) to acquire and support over the type’s service life, but will not become the UK’s first choice aircraft for ground attack missions until around 2018, according to a new National Audit Office (NAO) report.

Published on 2 March, the government spending watchdog’s ‘Management of the Typhoon project’ overview is highly critical of what it describes as over-optimism, bad decision making and poor cost control on the part of the UK Ministry of Defence.


The RAF has so far taken delivery of 70 Typhoons from the UK’s planned offtake of 160 aircraft. Although it originally committed to buying 232 examples from the four-nation Eurofighter industry consortium, London has already cut 24 from this total by brokering the sale of 72 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and also stated its intention to renege on a planned Tranche 3B commitment for a final 48.


Despite the roughly 30% reduction in aircraft numbers, the NAO says the UK’s total development and production costs are expected to reach £20.2 billion, 20% higher than originally planned. Along with other factors, it calculates that the unit cost of each Typhoon has risen by 75%. Support costs are also one-third higher than originally expected, it says, while elements of the four-nation management structure are “complex and inefficient”.

“Our examination has shown that key investment decisions were taken on an over-optimistic basis; the project suffered from corporate decisions to try to balance the defence budget; and the department did not predict the substantial rate at which costs would rise. None of this suggests good cost control, a key determinant of value for money,” says Amyas Morse, head of the NAO.


However, the watchdog notes that analysis by its consultants “demonstrates that the amount that the department is paying for Typhoon is in line with that expected for similar kinds of aircraft.”

The RAF’s current fleet is now being used to deliver quick reaction alert cover for the UK from Coningsby in Lincolnshire and Leuchars in Scotland, and also for the Falkland Islands.

This emphasis on delivering air defence services from multiple sites has come at the expense of the RAF establishing the Typhoon as a ground-attack asset. The NAO says this will prevent it from becoming the UK’s “aircraft of choice for most ground attack missions for some years”.


“In 2009, the department slowed down the pace with which it planned to introduce new Typhoon squadrons to cut costs. As a result, it reduced the requirement for flying hours by a total of 21,100 hours over the seven years to 2015-16.” Accordingly, the report says it “has prioritised pilot training on air defence roles which is currently its key task”.

Despite the cut in flying hours, the report reveals that the lower than expected availability of spare parts caused a 13% shortfall in planned sorties across the fleet in 2009-10. Some parts had to be sourced from other aircraft to support those fighters deployed in the Falkland Islands, it says.

Meanwhile, the NAO is concerned by plans to reduce the strength of the Typhoon fleet through the retirement of 53 Tranche 1 aircraft by 2019. The retained assets will be used alongside an as-yet undetermined number of Lockheed Martin F-35C Joint Strike Fighters, but it says “the department has acknowledged that there is risk that the eventual fleet size of 107 Typhoons could result in shortfalls against mandated capability levels.”
The Eurofighter programme also involves Germany, Italy and Spain, plus export operators Austria and Saudi Arabia.

NAO report slams UK's Typhoon acquisition-02/03/2011-London-Flightglobal.com


:pleasantry::pleasantry::pleasantry:
 
exactly i agree with you that mirages are good asset to have. BTW what HMS, EWS, AASM, SPICE? i am not good with abbrevaitions.

No problem:

HMS = Helmet mounted sight ( upgraded Mirage will use Topsight I, same as Mig 29 SMT and Mig 29Ks)
EWS = Electronic Warfare Suite
AASM = French GPS/INS guided bomb kit (similar to US JDAM) in the 250/500/1000/2000lb class
SPICE = Israeli GPS/INS guided bomb kit in the 1000 and 2000lb class

AASM and SPICE are now on offer for the upgraded Mirage 2000


So the m2k is comparable to f-16? if this was so this whole mmrca tamasha would have not begun in the first place. IAF clearly wants an aircraft that can do what the mig+m2k does which would be superhornet and rafale. M2k is great asset but is already becoming a burden.

Yes, that's why in the initial MRCA competitions, the contenders were Mig 29SMT, Mirage 2000-5, F16 Block 52 and Gripen C/D, with the Mirage prefered by IAF for capabilities and a fast, as well cost-effective alternative. However, the competition increased to MMRCA and has different aims now.
I don't see where the M2K has become a burden for us, by the fact that IAF is more than happy with it and that it has no quality issues like many other IAF fighters.
 
Will this effect MMRCA??/ The revised bid would have already submitted. The prices of fighter jets increase every year (although not this much) but that does not mean we will have to pay to pay for this. If EF is selected we will be paying what EF consortium has proposed and we will get all those feature with jets which are in the deal.


Not neccesarily, because that was expectable and IAF/MoD must have even more accurate figures for costs and capabilities, so they know by now if they can afford it and if it's useful.

However, the high costs for EF was always the problem and the reason why it wasn't shortlisted in most competitions, because it don't offer enough multi role capabilities in return. If we select it, it should be clear that we pay alone for most of it's upgrades now. The EF Tranche 3A that is orderd from the partners is basically an Tranche 2 fighter with some additiona A2G capabilities and the provisions to retrofit T3B upgrades (AESA radar, TVC, possibly engine and avionic upgrades) later, that's why most people say the partners won't order the left T3B fighters and simply upgrade the older T2s and T3As to that level someday.

That's why I always said, the important point for India in regard to EF is, when these techs and weapon upgrades will be available?
In 2015 when IAF requires them, or between 2015 and 2020, when EF partners requires them, because they will phase out older fighters (mainly Tornados) only in that time. Not to forget that UK and ITA are focusing on F35 anyway and all this are risks for India, in terms of less capabilities and less future potential.
The partnership in the consortium and in the production of all EFs sounds undeniably great, but even the EF consortium admits, that if no export, or additional T3B orders comes in, the production will be limited to 2015. So where are the benefits for Indian industry, when there will be no other EFs produced, other then the Indian?
 
No problem:


AASM = French GPS/INS guided bomb kit (similar to US JDAM) in the 250/500/1000/2000lb class


Slight correction, the AASM is more than a GPS/INS guided kit. It also has an Imaging Infra red (IIR) version (called SBU 54) for extra accuracy (CEP 1m vis a vis 10m for the GPS/INS only).

It also has a semi-active laser homing (SALH) version allowing it to precisely hit moving targets (called SBU 64); though this one is in development phase.
 
Slight correction, the AASM is more than a GPS/INS guided kit. It also has an Imaging Infra red (IIR) version (called SBU 54) for extra accuracy (CEP 1m vis a vis 10m for the GPS/INS only).

It also has a semi-active laser homing (SALH) version allowing it to precisely hit moving targets (called SBU 64); though this one is in development phase.

:) I know, but to explain the difference, that was the easiest way.
 
The French average just a 180 flight hours per year, contrast that with the F-15's 270 hours and F/A-18 E/F's 360 hours per year. You start to understand the FAB's opposition to the Rafale, it is more expensive to acquire, more expensive to operate and significantly more expensive to arm.

A correction to my earlier post, the F/A-18 E/F averages 330 flight hours per year and not 360 hours.


The plan to keep F/A-18s flying
Inspection, repair programs aim to extend aging fleet
By William H. McMichael - Staff writer
Posted : Monday Feb 28, 2011 5:49:40 EST
NORFOLK, Va. — Almost 10 years of war have taken a well-documented toll on ground units and their gear. Not nearly as publicized is the wear and tear on naval tactical aircraft — even the Navy’s top-of-the-line Super Hornet.

“The life of the airplane is getting used up fairly quickly,” said Capt. Roy Kelley, commander of Carrier Air Wing 7, who led fliers on back-to-back deployments in 2009-2010. For some of the Super Hornets that made the cruise, he said, “we’re reaching the halfway point of their life. They’re relatively new, and — third deployment — some of them are approaching 3,000 flight hours already.”

It’s a concern, and not just because the newer jets are getting ridden hard. The older Hornets — F/A-18A through D models introduced in 1983 — have already had their service lives extended. These jets must hang around long enough to stock the fleet until they can be gradually retired in favor of the F-35 joint strike fighter, which is years down the road.

“We’re basically operating the aircraft, on average, about 330 hours a year, per airframe,” said Capt. Mark Darrah, the Navy’s F/A-18 program manager. “And that’s about 30 percent more than we expected, annually. And so over time, those hours accumulate.”

Big Navy is working on the problem. A program of real-time and long-range inspections and assessments, service-life extensions and modifications, naval aviation officials say, is aimed at managing fatigue life and keeping Hornets in the air.

As they do, officials insist that safety and reliability will trump all other considerations.

“For airplanes that are operating in the squadrons’ hands, out conducting missions, there are no compromises,” said Capt. Mike Kelly, force materiel officer for Naval Air Forces. “It’s about mission effectiveness, and it’s about safety.”

Navy-wide, 73 of the fleet’s 418 Super Hornets — F/A-18Es and Fs — well exceed 3,000 hours. As of January, the oldest E model had run up 3,450 flight hours while the oldest F has flown 4,350, according to the Navy’s Tactical Aircraft Programs office. Off the assembly line, the Super Hornet has a planned service life of 6,000 hours.

The older Hornets are a greater concern, having already exceeded their current limit of 8,000 flight hours — a figure already extended from the original ceiling. The Navy won’t comment on the readiness rates of deployed jets, said Lt. Aaron Kakiel, spokesman for Naval Air Forces. The data is classified and wouldn’t be available until subjected to a security review.

Mishap rates among older Hornets in which material problems were a factor are down. During fiscal 2010, the Naval Safety Center recorded 0.71 Class A mishaps — which involve loss or life or at least $1 million in damages — per 100,000 flight hours; the average rate since fiscal 2000 is 1.08. No such mishaps have been recorded during this fiscal year.

FILLING THE GAP
The F-35 program remains behind schedule, but less so since Defense Secretary Robert Gates placed the Marine Corps’ F-35B variant, formerly on the fastest development track, to the “back of the queue” behind the Air Force’s F-35A and the Navy’s carrier-capable C model, said Jeremiah Gertler, military aviation specialist with the Congressional Research Service.

The A and C models, Gertler said, previously had been held back in production while the B, considered the most challenging design of the three, received top priority for engineering and testing.

Still, the projected gap created by older Hornets running out faster than F-35s arrive has prompted the Navy to ask for 28 Super Hornets in its fiscal 2012 budget request which, along with money to extend the lives of 150 Hornets, will keep the fleet stocked until the F-35C joins the fleet, Gertler said.

Those older Hornets could, using inspections and repairs, be extended another 600 hours, to 8,600 hours, according to the Navy. Planners, however, have a more ambitious goal: 10,000 flight hours.

The effort to further extend those Hornets has its roots in a decision by Naval Air Systems Command to identify areas that would need attention should an extension occur. This consisted of structural fatigue testing on the aircraft and a seven-year effort, through 2008 and continuing periodically, to tear down selected fleet aircraft to assess the effects of fleet usage.

This work formed the basis of a set of inspection and repair procedures for service-life extension. The program has since been tweaked by Darrah’s shop, adding high-flying-hour inspections to programmed maintenance inspections. As much as possible, Kelly said, officials are trying to bundle the latter two to minimize out-of-service time.

It costs an average of $15 million for each Hornet inducted into the program.

An extension program is only one of the steps planners are taking to reduce future impact on the tactical air fleet, Darrah said.

The others are procedures common to every Navy aircraft: an intensive, phased maintenance program, careful tracking of each airframe’s hours and carrier launches and traps, and sending the best jets forward to the squadrons, which then perform their own juggling act.

“We know exactly how many hours, life-limiting factors, are on each individual aircraft,” Darrah said.

Naval Air Systems Command does a quarterly modification review of each one, with Darrah’s team meeting with one from Naval Air Forces. This group, he said, “literally makes the decisions every quarter on, bureau number by bureau number, what aircraft will be assigned to what units.”

Aircraft projected to require high-flying-hour inspections during the deployment period, for instance, do not go.

Out on the carriers, the monitoring starts with the aircraft itself, which can record many parameters in its mission computer, Kelly said. The data file is downloaded after every flight, providing the squadron with relevant usage information. Thanks to nearly two decades of connectivity improvements, that data is transferred back to Navy and industry officials, who process and analyze it before transferring conclusions to the fleet.

“We can see the fleet in almost real time,” Kelly said.

Each squadron has access to its fatigue information. So, while every airplane deployed with the squadron can handle its “full performance envelope,” as Kelly put it, the squadrons can tweak things with respect to which jets take on which missions — fuel tank and weapons demands, for example.

“We want them to sort of age the population of the aircraft together,” Kelly said.

“Our No. 1 thing is ensuring that we have the data and technical information necessary to ensure that the aircraft that are being flown both on and off of aircraft carriers, and on and off airfields all across the world, are safe,” added Darrah, a veteran naval flight officer. “And that they’re going to be able to execute their mission and remain operationally relevant.”


The plan to keep F/A-18s flying - Navy News | News from Afghanistan & Iraq - Navy Times
 
EADS mulling over KC-X protest

We are gonna see a repeat of this protest in MRCA over non selection of EF by EADS. :azn:

You must differ here:

Sandy Morris, aerospace and defence analyst at RBS, notes the USAF's request for proposals biased the decision heavily in favour of the aircraft with the lowest cost.

Imo that is the same reason why our FM scrapped the tanker competition, to get Boeing and their KC 767 in, because although less capable, it is expected to be cheaper and clearly fulfills the requirements of IAF and IN way better than the IL 78.

In MMRCA the US fighters has a similar advantage, but here ToT plays a way bigger role than in a tanker, or transport aircraft competition. That will be tricky for the US, because the Europeans (at least EF and Rafale) can offer the here and if we have a focus on ToT to improve our industry, they are clearly the best choices.
Compared to the A330 MRTT, the EF lacks also in capabilities, especially in those that makes that makes the A330 so good, the multi role capabilities!
 
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