Not sure.. Step 7 for sure.
Step 8 can be done in case upper echleon are in town but thats a difficult choice bcz then Prez Hollande will also be here.
BTW do you know whats in 21st September?
Yes yes its another CCS meeting as well as date for cabinet level approvals
@Abingdonboy @Vergennes @Picdelamirand-oil
Meteor, Scalp, Mica etc in a small Euro 0.7Bn deal where Mica will be minimum, Meteor will be limited, a Scalp will be good amount+ some other weapons
Yup its cabinet approval CCS level and formal IGA signing for sure.. step by step...
For sure Prez Hollande knows bcz what we asked and what French side agreed, no way he can justify just 36 or 36+18=54 or 80 odd jets deal.
) single sorties )
)rofl: )
@Abingdonboy
This is specially for you. Our lovely Dr had spoken
+++
White elephant — Rafale, and missed opportunity with Su-35
Posted on September 15, 2016by Bharat Karnad
The phrase ‘White elephant’ refers to an acquisition exorbitantly costly to buy, run, and upkeep and is derived from the story of a rare pachyderm that was acquired by the Thai court as a symbol of its Hindu power and religiosity and ended up beggaring that kingdom.
The 36 Rafales that the Narendra Modi regime is obtaining for the Indian Air Force are, collectively, the white elephant whose costs will sink India’s military power because there’ll be no monies left over after the full program costs (with steeply rising value of the euro) of US$30-$40 billion are borne by the luckless Indian taxpayer, to fund any other major military procurement for the next decade or so.
The Modi PMO is readying the cabinet note for approval of this buy by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), which is a formality. With nobody of political weight among his colleagues to question the PM’s choice, CCS’ OK is a foregone conclusion. This is generally what happens anyway when a military hardware selection process gets to this stage. There’s no instance, as far as I can recall, where CCS has come up with a nyet.
This reduction of CCS to a rubber stamp is an attribute of the Westminister model of government the Constituent Assembly chose without pondering the practical consequences for the country and which the ex-colonial power, Britain, incidentally, long ago trashed as inappropriate for a time when there’s lots more and revealing information available to any concerned legislators for the asking to enable informed decisionmaking.
In the IAF’s medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) sweepstakes, the Rafale was shortlisted along with the Eurofighter — Typhoon, and won the race not for any technological or operational edge it provided, but because the French have been more diligent in nursing and nurturing a “support system” over the years that seamlessly servicing strategically placed personnel in the military procurement loop and within the Indian political class, Indian armed services, and Ministry of Defence (MOD), so when it comes to pushing their wares, the French items invariably come out on tops. After all, we Indians are only human and who can resist bank accounts full of euros, employment of close relatives in French transnational corporations in Europe, and crowned by repeated trips to, where else, Paris — ooh la la?
India’s national interest, in the event, cannot compete with the inducements France can so effortlessly summon. So India is the usual Third World state ripe for Paris’ (and, generally, West’s) pickings, whatever the political dispensation in New Delhi.
The Eurofighter was finding it difficult to find traction even within its primary market — the four main countries forming the EADS consortium that produced it, the plane being dismissed by the cognoscenti as something “Germany doesn’t want, Britain can’t afford, and Spain and Italy neither want nor can afford!”. And, mind you, this ‘Typhoon’ had virtues the Rafale doesn’t, especially in terms of its potential for future development as a weapons platform with its modular structure and engineering aspects (which, by the way, EADS has foresworn because of the financial unviability of a genuinely 5th generation fighter project).
If the Eurofighter lost out because of minimal price differential (and EADS’s lack in Delhi of the French-type “support system” owing to the more straight-laced dealings by Germany, the lead player), the more economical Russian Su-35 was summarily rejected for no good reason at all. Even as earlier the request for this aircraft by the Strategic Forces Command for manned delivery of nuclear weapons was also turned down. This even though the US Air Force as long ago as 2014 dubbed it the most serious challenger to its own fifth-gen JSF-35 Lightning-II. Regarding what the Su-35 can do consider the words of USAF pilots and aviation specialists, whose statements are reproduced from a 2014 story published in the ‘National Interest’ (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-russian-bear-roars-the-sky-beware-the-deadly-su-35-11799):
With, as the story says, the Su-35 launching its weapons from “high supersonic speeds around Mach 1.5 at altitudes greater than 45,000 ft”, and the “F-35 primarily operating in the 30,000-ft range at speeds around Mach 0.9”, the Russian air-superiority fighter’s “major advantages are its combination of high altitude capability and blistering speed—which allow the fighter to impart the maximum possible amount of launch energy to its arsenal of long-range air-to-air missiles.” Or as an USAF officer put it, “The Su’s ability to go high and fast is a big concern, including for F-35”.
The Su-35 builds on the already potent Su-27 Flanker airframe, superior to the F-15 Eagle, and “adds a lighter airframe, three-dimensional thrust vectoring, advanced avionics and a powerful jamming capability.” As as an USAF pilot says “Large powerful engines, the ability to supercruise for a long time and very good avionics make this a tough platform…It’s considered a fourth gen plus-plus, as in it has more inherent capability on the aircraft [and] possesses a passive [electronically-scanned array and it] has a big off boresight capability and a very good jamming suite.” The addition of the electronic attack (EA) capability, according to the story, “complicates matters for Western fighters because the Su-35’s advanced digital radio frequency memory jammers can seriously degrade the performance of friendly radars. It also effectively blinds the onboard radars found onboard American-made air-to-air missiles like the AIM-120 AMRAAM.
But even the addition of AESA radars does not really solve the problem for F-35. “We—the U.S. Department of Defense—haven’t been pursuing appropriate methods to counter EA for years,” per a senior Air Force official with experience on the F-22 Raptor. “So, while we are stealthy, we will have a hard time working our way through the EA to target the Su-35s and our missiles will have a hard time killing them.”
The Su-35 also carries a potent infrared search and track capability that could pose a problem for Western fighters. “It also has non-EM [electro-magnetic] sensors to help it detect other aircraft, which could be useful in long-range detection,” a Super Hornet pilot said.
Another of the Su-35’s major advantages: “One thing I really like about the Su-35 is that it is a high-end truck: It can carry a ton of air-to-air ordnance into a fight,” a US Navy pilot said.
That’s the sort of trouble the US F-35 — an aircraft a full half-gen ahead of Rafale will confront going up against an ostensibly 4.5 gen (but surely 4.75 gen) Su-35s, the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) is acquiring on a priority basis. So what chance will the Rafale stand against the PLAAF Su-35s? And, remember, India will not have the full complement of 36 Rafales until the mid- to late-2020s by when the PLAAF will have transitioned fully into the 4.75-gen Su-35 and its own 5th-gen Chengdu J-20 and the Shenyang J-31. Great strategic forethought and force planning IAF!
So some Qs about the Rafale:
1) How does IAF reconcile its stress on the dogfighting capability of its fighters with its reliance on BVR 100 km range AAM Meteor, while falling in with the French and against arming the Rafale with the indigenous more advanced version of the lightweight Brahmos ALCM? So, when it comes to French aircraft, it is willing to overlook its institutional bias? (Meteor AAM versus Brahmos NG ALCM Air to Surface or Ship
2) Lacking numbers and in the “best case” context, no more than 23 Rafales will realistically be available to IAF at any given moment in time. How will these 23 be deployed, if in concentration — will they be enough to defeat the more numerous and swarming PAF or PLAAF aircraft, and if singly — again quantity pitches in against supposed quality (but for how long?) — so what use will these be in single sorties? (63% availability
3) It is a recipe, of course, for the Rafales being safely quartered, held away from harm’s way in war — considering they are simply too expensive to lose. So, another useless showpiece in the inventory? Like the EMALs-equipped Indian super-aircraft carrier? show piece
4) Because there’s virtually no commonality in spares and upkeep regimes and protocols between the Mirage 2000 and the Rafale, entirely new and more expensive servicing training and maintenance infrastructure will have to be built up at enormous cost. Because whether IAF buys 6 Rafales, or 36, the investment in this aspect is the same! And as I have argued it will result in IAF making the case in the future that with these sunk costs, IAF should be allowed to import 60 or 100 or whatever additional number of Rafales the IAF brass of the day feels comfortable touting. That’s the strategy for upping the Rafale numbers is it not? (is this something new?
5) Dassault/France will milk recurring profits (to reach the $40 billion figure) from stocking the above infrastructure with the spares and service support, and from untried and untested ordnance, such as the Meteor, each costing, what, US$2 million each. That’s the French profit plan and the lifeline0 to keep alive its industrial combat aviation capability. And IAF pays for this long term economic security of Dassault and France?
To repeat the quip by the great American comedian, WC Fields — suckers never get an even break.
https://bharatkarnad.com/2016/09/15/white-elephant-rafale-and-missed-opportunity-with-su-35/
+++
Look at the heart burn
He is more of a whacked version of ajai shulka
@anant_s @Vergennes @Picdelamirand-oil @BON PLAN @randomradio @Ankit Kumar 002 @Armani @GuardianRED @others
@Abingdonboy
This is specially for you. Our lovely Dr had spoken
+++
White elephant — Rafale, and missed opportunity with Su-35
Posted on September 15, 2016by Bharat Karnad
The phrase ‘White elephant’ refers to an acquisition exorbitantly costly to buy, run, and upkeep and is derived from the story of a rare pachyderm that was acquired by the Thai court as a symbol of its Hindu power and religiosity and ended up beggaring that kingdom.
The 36 Rafales that the Narendra Modi regime is obtaining for the Indian Air Force are, collectively, the white elephant whose costs will sink India’s military power because there’ll be no monies left over after the full program costs (with steeply rising value of the euro) of US$30-$40 billion are borne by the luckless Indian taxpayer, to fund any other major military procurement for the next decade or so.
The Modi PMO is readying the cabinet note for approval of this buy by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), which is a formality. With nobody of political weight among his colleagues to question the PM’s choice, CCS’ OK is a foregone conclusion. This is generally what happens anyway when a military hardware selection process gets to this stage. There’s no instance, as far as I can recall, where CCS has come up with a nyet.
This reduction of CCS to a rubber stamp is an attribute of the Westminister model of government the Constituent Assembly chose without pondering the practical consequences for the country and which the ex-colonial power, Britain, incidentally, long ago trashed as inappropriate for a time when there’s lots more and revealing information available to any concerned legislators for the asking to enable informed decisionmaking.
In the IAF’s medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) sweepstakes, the Rafale was shortlisted along with the Eurofighter — Typhoon, and won the race not for any technological or operational edge it provided, but because the French have been more diligent in nursing and nurturing a “support system” over the years that seamlessly servicing strategically placed personnel in the military procurement loop and within the Indian political class, Indian armed services, and Ministry of Defence (MOD), so when it comes to pushing their wares, the French items invariably come out on tops. After all, we Indians are only human and who can resist bank accounts full of euros, employment of close relatives in French transnational corporations in Europe, and crowned by repeated trips to, where else, Paris — ooh la la?
India’s national interest, in the event, cannot compete with the inducements France can so effortlessly summon. So India is the usual Third World state ripe for Paris’ (and, generally, West’s) pickings, whatever the political dispensation in New Delhi.
The Eurofighter was finding it difficult to find traction even within its primary market — the four main countries forming the EADS consortium that produced it, the plane being dismissed by the cognoscenti as something “Germany doesn’t want, Britain can’t afford, and Spain and Italy neither want nor can afford!”. And, mind you, this ‘Typhoon’ had virtues the Rafale doesn’t, especially in terms of its potential for future development as a weapons platform with its modular structure and engineering aspects (which, by the way, EADS has foresworn because of the financial unviability of a genuinely 5th generation fighter project).
If the Eurofighter lost out because of minimal price differential (and EADS’s lack in Delhi of the French-type “support system” owing to the more straight-laced dealings by Germany, the lead player), the more economical Russian Su-35 was summarily rejected for no good reason at all. Even as earlier the request for this aircraft by the Strategic Forces Command for manned delivery of nuclear weapons was also turned down. This even though the US Air Force as long ago as 2014 dubbed it the most serious challenger to its own fifth-gen JSF-35 Lightning-II. Regarding what the Su-35 can do consider the words of USAF pilots and aviation specialists, whose statements are reproduced from a 2014 story published in the ‘National Interest’ (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-russian-bear-roars-the-sky-beware-the-deadly-su-35-11799):
With, as the story says, the Su-35 launching its weapons from “high supersonic speeds around Mach 1.5 at altitudes greater than 45,000 ft”, and the “F-35 primarily operating in the 30,000-ft range at speeds around Mach 0.9”, the Russian air-superiority fighter’s “major advantages are its combination of high altitude capability and blistering speed—which allow the fighter to impart the maximum possible amount of launch energy to its arsenal of long-range air-to-air missiles.” Or as an USAF officer put it, “The Su’s ability to go high and fast is a big concern, including for F-35”.
The Su-35 builds on the already potent Su-27 Flanker airframe, superior to the F-15 Eagle, and “adds a lighter airframe, three-dimensional thrust vectoring, advanced avionics and a powerful jamming capability.” As as an USAF pilot says “Large powerful engines, the ability to supercruise for a long time and very good avionics make this a tough platform…It’s considered a fourth gen plus-plus, as in it has more inherent capability on the aircraft [and] possesses a passive [electronically-scanned array and it] has a big off boresight capability and a very good jamming suite.” The addition of the electronic attack (EA) capability, according to the story, “complicates matters for Western fighters because the Su-35’s advanced digital radio frequency memory jammers can seriously degrade the performance of friendly radars. It also effectively blinds the onboard radars found onboard American-made air-to-air missiles like the AIM-120 AMRAAM.
But even the addition of AESA radars does not really solve the problem for F-35. “We—the U.S. Department of Defense—haven’t been pursuing appropriate methods to counter EA for years,” per a senior Air Force official with experience on the F-22 Raptor. “So, while we are stealthy, we will have a hard time working our way through the EA to target the Su-35s and our missiles will have a hard time killing them.”
The Su-35 also carries a potent infrared search and track capability that could pose a problem for Western fighters. “It also has non-EM [electro-magnetic] sensors to help it detect other aircraft, which could be useful in long-range detection,” a Super Hornet pilot said.
Another of the Su-35’s major advantages: “One thing I really like about the Su-35 is that it is a high-end truck: It can carry a ton of air-to-air ordnance into a fight,” a US Navy pilot said.
That’s the sort of trouble the US F-35 — an aircraft a full half-gen ahead of Rafale will confront going up against an ostensibly 4.5 gen (but surely 4.75 gen) Su-35s, the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) is acquiring on a priority basis. So what chance will the Rafale stand against the PLAAF Su-35s? And, remember, India will not have the full complement of 36 Rafales until the mid- to late-2020s by when the PLAAF will have transitioned fully into the 4.75-gen Su-35 and its own 5th-gen Chengdu J-20 and the Shenyang J-31. Great strategic forethought and force planning IAF!
So some Qs about the Rafale:
1) How does IAF reconcile its stress on the dogfighting capability of its fighters with its reliance on BVR 100 km range AAM Meteor, while falling in with the French and against arming the Rafale with the indigenous more advanced version of the lightweight Brahmos ALCM? So, when it comes to French aircraft, it is willing to overlook its institutional bias? (Meteor AAM versus Brahmos NG ALCM Air to Surface or Ship
2) Lacking numbers and in the “best case” context, no more than 23 Rafales will realistically be available to IAF at any given moment in time. How will these 23 be deployed, if in concentration — will they be enough to defeat the more numerous and swarming PAF or PLAAF aircraft, and if singly — again quantity pitches in against supposed quality (but for how long?) — so what use will these be in single sorties? (63% availability
3) It is a recipe, of course, for the Rafales being safely quartered, held away from harm’s way in war — considering they are simply too expensive to lose. So, another useless showpiece in the inventory? Like the EMALs-equipped Indian super-aircraft carrier? show piece
4) Because there’s virtually no commonality in spares and upkeep regimes and protocols between the Mirage 2000 and the Rafale, entirely new and more expensive servicing training and maintenance infrastructure will have to be built up at enormous cost. Because whether IAF buys 6 Rafales, or 36, the investment in this aspect is the same! And as I have argued it will result in IAF making the case in the future that with these sunk costs, IAF should be allowed to import 60 or 100 or whatever additional number of Rafales the IAF brass of the day feels comfortable touting. That’s the strategy for upping the Rafale numbers is it not? (is this something new?
5) Dassault/France will milk recurring profits (to reach the $40 billion figure) from stocking the above infrastructure with the spares and service support, and from untried and untested ordnance, such as the Meteor, each costing, what, US$2 million each. That’s the French profit plan and the lifeline0 to keep alive its industrial combat aviation capability. And IAF pays for this long term economic security of Dassault and France?
To repeat the quip by the great American comedian, WC Fields — suckers never get an even break.
https://bharatkarnad.com/2016/09/15/white-elephant-rafale-and-missed-opportunity-with-su-35/
+++
Look at the heart burn
He is more of a whacked version of ajai shulka
@anant_s @Vergennes @Picdelamirand-oil @BON PLAN @randomradio @Ankit Kumar 002 @Armani @GuardianRED @others
Ksepanastre means "Missile" in SanskritI had a hunch that KSEPANATRE is a French word.
So still no answer?
Sigh!
Not Nadal.
The guy mentioned sophisticated weapons and rafael in his tweet.
Has anyone found his marbles?? Seriously?@Abingdonboy
This is specially for you. Our lovely Dr had spoken
+++
White elephant — Rafale, and missed opportunity with Su-35
Posted on September 15, 2016by Bharat Karnad
The phrase ‘White elephant’ refers to an acquisition exorbitantly costly to buy, run, and upkeep and is derived from the story of a rare pachyderm that was acquired by the Thai court as a symbol of its Hindu power and religiosity and ended up beggaring that kingdom.
The 36 Rafales that the Narendra Modi regime is obtaining for the Indian Air Force are, collectively, the white elephant whose costs will sink India’s military power because there’ll be no monies left over after the full program costs (with steeply rising value of the euro) of US$30-$40 billion are borne by the luckless Indian taxpayer, to fund any other major military procurement for the next decade or so.
The Modi PMO is readying the cabinet note for approval of this buy by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), which is a formality. With nobody of political weight among his colleagues to question the PM’s choice, CCS’ OK is a foregone conclusion. This is generally what happens anyway when a military hardware selection process gets to this stage. There’s no instance, as far as I can recall, where CCS has come up with a nyet.
This reduction of CCS to a rubber stamp is an attribute of the Westminister model of government the Constituent Assembly chose without pondering the practical consequences for the country and which the ex-colonial power, Britain, incidentally, long ago trashed as inappropriate for a time when there’s lots more and revealing information available to any concerned legislators for the asking to enable informed decisionmaking.
In the IAF’s medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) sweepstakes, the Rafale was shortlisted along with the Eurofighter — Typhoon, and won the race not for any technological or operational edge it provided, but because the French have been more diligent in nursing and nurturing a “support system” over the years that seamlessly servicing strategically placed personnel in the military procurement loop and within the Indian political class, Indian armed services, and Ministry of Defence (MOD), so when it comes to pushing their wares, the French items invariably come out on tops. After all, we Indians are only human and who can resist bank accounts full of euros, employment of close relatives in French transnational corporations in Europe, and crowned by repeated trips to, where else, Paris — ooh la la?
India’s national interest, in the event, cannot compete with the inducements France can so effortlessly summon. So India is the usual Third World state ripe for Paris’ (and, generally, West’s) pickings, whatever the political dispensation in New Delhi.
The Eurofighter was finding it difficult to find traction even within its primary market — the four main countries forming the EADS consortium that produced it, the plane being dismissed by the cognoscenti as something “Germany doesn’t want, Britain can’t afford, and Spain and Italy neither want nor can afford!”. And, mind you, this ‘Typhoon’ had virtues the Rafale doesn’t, especially in terms of its potential for future development as a weapons platform with its modular structure and engineering aspects (which, by the way, EADS has foresworn because of the financial unviability of a genuinely 5th generation fighter project).
If the Eurofighter lost out because of minimal price differential (and EADS’s lack in Delhi of the French-type “support system” owing to the more straight-laced dealings by Germany, the lead player), the more economical Russian Su-35 was summarily rejected for no good reason at all. Even as earlier the request for this aircraft by the Strategic Forces Command for manned delivery of nuclear weapons was also turned down. This even though the US Air Force as long ago as 2014 dubbed it the most serious challenger to its own fifth-gen JSF-35 Lightning-II. Regarding what the Su-35 can do consider the words of USAF pilots and aviation specialists, whose statements are reproduced from a 2014 story published in the ‘National Interest’ (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-russian-bear-roars-the-sky-beware-the-deadly-su-35-11799):
With, as the story says, the Su-35 launching its weapons from “high supersonic speeds around Mach 1.5 at altitudes greater than 45,000 ft”, and the “F-35 primarily operating in the 30,000-ft range at speeds around Mach 0.9”, the Russian air-superiority fighter’s “major advantages are its combination of high altitude capability and blistering speed—which allow the fighter to impart the maximum possible amount of launch energy to its arsenal of long-range air-to-air missiles.” Or as an USAF officer put it, “The Su’s ability to go high and fast is a big concern, including for F-35”.
The Su-35 builds on the already potent Su-27 Flanker airframe, superior to the F-15 Eagle, and “adds a lighter airframe, three-dimensional thrust vectoring, advanced avionics and a powerful jamming capability.” As as an USAF pilot says “Large powerful engines, the ability to supercruise for a long time and very good avionics make this a tough platform…It’s considered a fourth gen plus-plus, as in it has more inherent capability on the aircraft [and] possesses a passive [electronically-scanned array and it] has a big off boresight capability and a very good jamming suite.” The addition of the electronic attack (EA) capability, according to the story, “complicates matters for Western fighters because the Su-35’s advanced digital radio frequency memory jammers can seriously degrade the performance of friendly radars. It also effectively blinds the onboard radars found onboard American-made air-to-air missiles like the AIM-120 AMRAAM.
But even the addition of AESA radars does not really solve the problem for F-35. “We—the U.S. Department of Defense—haven’t been pursuing appropriate methods to counter EA for years,” per a senior Air Force official with experience on the F-22 Raptor. “So, while we are stealthy, we will have a hard time working our way through the EA to target the Su-35s and our missiles will have a hard time killing them.”
The Su-35 also carries a potent infrared search and track capability that could pose a problem for Western fighters. “It also has non-EM [electro-magnetic] sensors to help it detect other aircraft, which could be useful in long-range detection,” a Super Hornet pilot said.
Another of the Su-35’s major advantages: “One thing I really like about the Su-35 is that it is a high-end truck: It can carry a ton of air-to-air ordnance into a fight,” a US Navy pilot said.
That’s the sort of trouble the US F-35 — an aircraft a full half-gen ahead of Rafale will confront going up against an ostensibly 4.5 gen (but surely 4.75 gen) Su-35s, the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) is acquiring on a priority basis. So what chance will the Rafale stand against the PLAAF Su-35s? And, remember, India will not have the full complement of 36 Rafales until the mid- to late-2020s by when the PLAAF will have transitioned fully into the 4.75-gen Su-35 and its own 5th-gen Chengdu J-20 and the Shenyang J-31. Great strategic forethought and force planning IAF!
So some Qs about the Rafale:
1) How does IAF reconcile its stress on the dogfighting capability of its fighters with its reliance on BVR 100 km range AAM Meteor, while falling in with the French and against arming the Rafale with the indigenous more advanced version of the lightweight Brahmos ALCM? So, when it comes to French aircraft, it is willing to overlook its institutional bias? (Meteor AAM versus Brahmos NG ALCM Air to Surface or Ship
2) Lacking numbers and in the “best case” context, no more than 23 Rafales will realistically be available to IAF at any given moment in time. How will these 23 be deployed, if in concentration — will they be enough to defeat the more numerous and swarming PAF or PLAAF aircraft, and if singly — again quantity pitches in against supposed quality (but for how long?) — so what use will these be in single sorties? (63% availability
3) It is a recipe, of course, for the Rafales being safely quartered, held away from harm’s way in war — considering they are simply too expensive to lose. So, another useless showpiece in the inventory? Like the EMALs-equipped Indian super-aircraft carrier? show piece
4) Because there’s virtually no commonality in spares and upkeep regimes and protocols between the Mirage 2000 and the Rafale, entirely new and more expensive servicing training and maintenance infrastructure will have to be built up at enormous cost. Because whether IAF buys 6 Rafales, or 36, the investment in this aspect is the same! And as I have argued it will result in IAF making the case in the future that with these sunk costs, IAF should be allowed to import 60 or 100 or whatever additional number of Rafales the IAF brass of the day feels comfortable touting. That’s the strategy for upping the Rafale numbers is it not? (is this something new?
5) Dassault/France will milk recurring profits (to reach the $40 billion figure) from stocking the above infrastructure with the spares and service support, and from untried and untested ordnance, such as the Meteor, each costing, what, US$2 million each. That’s the French profit plan and the lifeline0 to keep alive its industrial combat aviation capability. And IAF pays for this long term economic security of Dassault and France?
To repeat the quip by the great American comedian, WC Fields — suckers never get an even break.
https://bharatkarnad.com/2016/09/15/white-elephant-rafale-and-missed-opportunity-with-su-35/
+++
Look at the heart burn
He is more of a whacked version of ajai shulka
@anant_s @Vergennes @Picdelamirand-oil @BON PLAN @randomradio @Ankit Kumar 002 @Armani @GuardianRED @others
The Fin Flash is correct , the Roudels are overkill (amd big)this is for all.. courtesy Shiv Aroor
Ignore the tri color in the tail fin. it got mirrored
@Abingdonboy @anant_s @Taygibay @Picdelamirand-oil @Vergennes @randomradio @Ankit Kumar 002 @MilSpec @hellfire @ranjeet @SpArK @AUSTERLITZ @nair @proud_indian @Roybot @jbgt90 @Water Car Engineer @dadeechi @Rain Man @kaykay @Joe Shearer @Tshering22 @Dandpatta @danger007 @Didact @Soumitra @SrNair @TejasMk3 @Nilgiri @SarthakGanguly @Omega007 @GURU DUTT @HariPrasad @JanjaWeed @litefire @AMCA @Perpendicular @Spectre@litefire @AMCA @Perpendicular@Ryuzaki @CorporateAffairs @GR!FF!N @migflug @Levina @Mustang06 @Param @Local_Legend @Ali Zadi @hellfire @egodoc222 @CorporateAffairs @Major Shaitan Singh @jha @SmilingBuddha @#hydra# @danish_vij @[Bregs] @Skillrex @Hephaestus @SR-91 @Techy @R!CK @zebra7 @Skull and Bones @Kraitcorp @Crixus @AugenBlick @Star Wars @GuardianRED @arp2041 @Aero @Armani https://defence.pk/members/enquencher.34831/ @others
![[Bregs]](/data/avatars/m/148/148509.jpg?1491816884){kind=avatar}
