First, it's argued that a nuclear facility wouldn't be co-located near a big population and market...
...but evidently a VERY large munitions facility has been and operates there today.
Then you admit that, yes, it WAS where your warheads were designed and developed.
B.S.? It seems not so afterall.
Next it's suggested that your absolutely egalitarian society openly embraces pashtus in many of your key nuclear security positions as, I assume from the vehemence of such defense, all your other nat'l institutions.
Then I'm reminded that Punjabis make up the bulk of your population-as though I needed reminding. Hmmm...
Then I'm reminded, rhetorically, that Islamic extremists exist in the east amidst Punjab.
Ah, but they aren't engaged in attempting to dismantle Pakistan. They are directed by your state against India and appear quite disciplined to do so. OTOH, those in the west, as Mr. Gregory suggests, are engaged in exactly such and likely possess an interest-thus a threat- to these facilities located away from India many years ago before such a militant threat emerged.
No comment.
Fundamentalist asserts that the writer doesn't know about basic component separation. Not so. Gregory clearly mentions separation of components in the article as a defensive precaution by your security procedures.
Mian Asad suggests that the gate attack couldn't possibly have been directed at a nuclear facility within the Wah complex as it's quite large and likely very far from the gate. Thus you don't build nuclear components, etc. right near the gate. Too accessible.
Fair enough. Where does the author suggest that the target of this attack was, specifically, the nuclear elements of the facility? Thanks, btw, for implying in your comments that SOMEWHERE inside this facility such related work is going on.
More relevant was the fact that this overall facility had been selected for attack. Clearly the forces committed to such were in no way capable of over-running, securing, clearing, seizing, and transporting away whatever might be found there...
...this time. Gregory's interest was in merely noting that this facility had, indeed, been recently targeted and, therefore, might be again with a more determined purpose in mind.
The author makes clear the concerns about rogue elements within your military or intelligence services that MIGHT be prepared to assist an extremist seizure of such weaponry. Nowhere does he assert that such is likely nor reflective of your institutions in their entirety.
Still, to suggest that these elements don't exist either in an active or retired capacity would be arrogant. We know of the arrest last April of a former army major who was caught on a motorway in Islamabad attempting to transport a kidnapped individual to the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan on behalf of, IIRC, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.
I'll look forward to the transcripts of your conversations with Mr. Gregory...if you've the guts to challenge his assertions. He's easily found and can be reached by e-mail here-
mailto:s.r.gregory@bradford.ac.uk.
Please do so that we may read his thoughts.
I hope you prepare your arguments better with him than here. Far too much back-tracking on the facts for my tastes. His too, I suspect.
Good luck.
Meanwhile, let's not forget the other two articles about Pakistan included in this issue.
Thanks.