Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War

[desimorty]

In its early years of fighting against both the KMT and Japanese, the Red Army had to fend for itself in remote, rural areas. The communists reduced the burden on the peasants by raising their own crops and livestock. This tradition continued into the PLA era, helping to reduce government expenditures for defense. However, the practice got out of hand in the mid-1980s and 1990s during the period of rapid economic growth, but of limited official allocations to the military. Training time was lost, graft and corruption were rampant, and profits were problematic as the PLA moved from subsistence farming and light industry into a vast array of commercial enterprises.

In 1998, President and Chairman of the CMC Jiang ordered the PLA and PAP to divest themselves of most of their commercial enterprises. However, as noted by the U.S.-China Commission:

So the PLA and PAP own industries of profit?
That is unusual. Anybody care to elaborate?

 

[CardSharp]

So the PLA and PAP own industries of profit?
That is unusual. Anybody care to elaborate?

yeah Chinese expenditure for the military was ridiculously small up until recently. Before 1979, the PLA went by the theory of "people's war", where you mobile millions of men with only rifles and light arms to fight, so the expenditure was very small.

and they were encouraged to grow their own food etc

post 1979, PLA still had a small budget but it needed to modernize, so the government thought it would be a good idea to let the PLA go into business and make money to support itself. This led to the army more focused on making money than training to fight. So they abandoned it.

The PLA is no longer allowed to own businesses.

 

[OrionHunter]

The rank and file Indian soldier in those outposts weren't to blame for this debacle, BUT the senior IA officers like Kaul are at fault for not standing up the Nehru and Krishna Menon.

Absolutely agree! The lopsided policies of the Indian government, gross interference by the politico-bureaucrat nexus, and failure of the higher direction of war by the top Army brass headed by a clueless chief were the reasons why the Indian soldier was shortchanged! Imagine, troops were inducted into high altitude areas from places like Rajasthan without even jerseys and snow boots, NO acclimatization and no training in mountain/high altitude warfare!!

Kaul was a supply officer who was clueless on tactics and strategy, directing the war from his cosy little den in Delhi, a million miles away from the action! No wonder we got a drubbing!

But thankfully we learnt our lessons after this 'debacle' and went on to pay the Chinese back with the same coin during the Nathula, Chola and Sumdorong Chu valley (Arunachal Pradesh) incidents where the Chinese got quite a pasting and had to withdraw after asking for a ceasefire. The last mentioned incident did not result in a skirmish as the Chinese withdrew after their bitter experience in the 1967 Nathula incident. With General Sundarjee, a hawk and a no-nonsense aggressive chief at the helm, the Chinese had no other option but to withdraw.

If a Sundarjee had been the chief during 1962, things would have been far different. He would have overridden the politicians (Who had no balls and still have none) and employed the Air Force for not only close air support but also for massive disruption on the Chinese lines of communications! As it is, the Chinese had no option but to withdraw due to logistic problems where the Chinese troops were left eating 'grass and weeds' according to Maxwell.

 

[CardSharp]

But thankfully we learnt our lessons after this 'debacle' and went on to pay the Chinese back with the same coin during the Nathula, Chola and Sumdorong Chu valley (Arunachal Pradesh) incidents where the Chinese got quite a pasting and had to withdraw after asking for a ceasefire. The last mentioned incident did not result in a skirmish as the Chinese withdrew after their bitter experience in the 1967 Nathula incident. With General Sundarjee, a hawk and a no-nonsense aggressive chief at the helm, the Chinese had no other option but to withdraw.

Look mate, these events get blown out of portion way too often. Two of them were platoon strength patrols who bumped into each because of the ill-defined LAC. the last one was a stand off with both sides mobilizing then demobilizing, when things were settled politically.

If a Sundarjee had been the chief during 1962, things would have been far different. He would have overridden the politicians (Who had no balls and still have none) and employed the Air Force for not only close air support but also for massive disruption on the Chinese lines of communications! As it is, the Chinese had no option but to withdraw due to logistic problems where the Chinese troops were left eating 'grass and weeds' according to Maxwell.

I think the reason why airforces weren't used on either side was because neither side had good basing around the area of battle and that terrain + fast resolution of battle + Chinese side using night attack made CAS useless.

Think about it this way. The PLA fought in Korea in 1950 against the USAF, RAF, French Airforce etc, and still pushed the US + UN armies back to the 38th. I really doubt that air power would have crippled the PLA in 1962

 

[patriot_indian]

T

The idiotic Nehru Govt didnt believe China would attack and therefore did not prepare for it, and when China attacked the troops weren't ready. .

i agree with u . i have heard from my father that our helpless jawans fought with sticks in the border with china because of lack of proper arms and ammunition . nehru was a bastard who cared for only pmship under the tutelage of gandhi in the initial years. if investigations are done transparently people will also know how nehru betrayed INA and subhash chandra bose and much more betrayals . bloody nehru family.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Shameless bump for more readership

It was a really good discussion looking back at it. No trolling at all *shock*

It was, wasn't it? A very pleasant experience, considering that everybody tried to contribute, didn't lose their tempers and become jingoes, or start making personal attacks on one another. No racist jibes against Chinese members and no curry jokes against Indian members; so it can be this way, after all.

What next, chief? There's lots we promised each other (attack is the best defence, as always), and someone needs to prioritise.

For myself, I've added a sick aunt to my existing inventory of a sick parent, and can only write in short bursts.

 

[desimorty]

Agreed. The iaf wouldn't be able to do much. There were not a lot of high value targets in Tibet at the time. I don't think we will ever see a mbt column on the border perhaps icv. But cas? The iaf rarely flew cas, not like the americans.
But anyway future endevour on the border by the pla will not be on their battlefield. A serious disadvantage unless the pla some how has the. Strategic lift capabilities of the us.
On topic, why would Cforcur give up sikkim? Is it not a problematic given the kmtkmt and it's stance?

 

[CardSharp]

It was, wasn't it? A very pleasant experience, considering that everybody tried to contribute, didn't lose their tempers and become jingoes, or start making personal attacks on one another. No racist jibes against Chinese members and no curry jokes against Indian members; so it can be this way, after all.

What next, chief? There's lots we promised each other (attack is the best defence, as always), and someone needs to prioritise.

For myself, I've added a sick aunt to my existing inventory of a sick parent, and can only write in short bursts.

Welcome back! my work is piling up too, and will have to get to it in the next couple of day, but if you are game I'd like to finish what we agreed on with discussing the PLA experience in 1979. Turnabout is fair play right? And the PLA experience in 1979 was what really catalysed the formation of the modern PLA.

 

[CardSharp]

Agreed. The iaf wouldn't be able to do much. There were not a lot of high value targets in Tibet at the time. I don't think we will ever see a mbt column on the border perhaps icv. But cas? The iaf rarely flew cas, not like the americans.
But anyway future endevour on the border by the pla will not be on their battlefield. A serious disadvantage unless the pla some how has the. Strategic lift capabilities of the us.
On topic, why would Cforcur give up sikkim? Is it not a problematic given the kmtkmt and it's stance?

It was hard enough to keep men supplies in that remote area, considering the poor logistics and lack of bases from which to fly, CAS is really out of the question for either side.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Welcome back! my work is piling up too, and will have to get to it in the next couple of day, but if you are game I'd like to finish what we agreed on with discussing the PLA experience in 1979. Turnabout is fair play right? And the PLA experience in 1979 was what really catalysed the formation of the modern PLA.

Vietnam then? OK, let's go.

 

[CardSharp]

Vietnam then? OK, let's go.

I think it a good topic because it was a pivotal moment for the PLA and it is relevant considering the current dispute over the SCS.

Would like your commentary on the first half of the article I posted before.

http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-...a-lessons-sino-indian-war-10.html#post1477146

 

[nontaibeo]

Dear friends,

I know this is a troll, but this is my last post then I leave. I joined this forum just because I see all most of Chinese members are racist with Indians, Vietnamese.

Whatever Chinese members did, they not catch but what I debate always focus on China Goverment but still got noticed from Admin. If this place was not be fair then why I have to stay.

So it's nice to knowing all of you!

Bye

 

[S10]

Vietnam then? OK, let's go.

Few important events in the Chinese military development:

1979 Vietnam War - Realized army was poorly trained, equipped and led.
Result: Standarization and professionalization of the military

1991 Gulf War - Realized People's War doctrine was no longer suitable for modern battlefield.
Result: Downsizing of military and introduction of high-tech warfare concept

1996 Second Taiwan Crisis - Realized the importance of naval power.
Result: Massive funding increase for navy as well as military R&D

1999 Kosovo Air Campaign (Bombing of Chinese Embassy) - Realized the inadequacy of PLAAF
Result: Fighter plane, bomber, trainer and transport projects accelerated

 

[CardSharp]

1991 Gulf War - Realized People's War doctrine was no longer suitable for modern battlefield.
Result: Downsizing of military and introduction of high-tech warfare concept

I seem to remember the PLA was cut regiment by regiment, and "hero regiments" were kept and standardized.

 

[lemurian]

Shameless bump for more readership

It was a really good discussion looking back at it. No trolling at all *shock*

Here's another one. The bump is much appreciated since it brought Joe back..