This is an Urban legend.
I don't know how this misinformation has become so widespread in India.
My quote was from Washington Post. So if it is a misconception, by your argument, then it is not in India alone.
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This is an Urban legend.
I don't know how this misinformation has become so widespread in India.
My quote was from Washington Post. So if it is a misconception, by your argument, then it is not in India alone.
I'll Take the liberty of posting a couple of posts related to this topic, which I made on another one. This thread seems more apt for discussions of that kind than the the one it was initially made on.
The initial thread where these posts were made can be found here
http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-...o-chinese-war-2013-2015-a-15.html#post1381921
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---------- Post added at 05:38 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:37 PM ----------
Not really. The Cholas beat quite a lot of SEA armies during their time...especially the SriVijayan Empire that held sway over that region..In fact the SriVijaya empire ceased to exist after their defeat by the Cholas.
As for 1962, sure it was a loss, but my research tells me that China would not have been able to hold onto the territory it took. The "unilateral" Chinese withdrawal would have happened anyways when the supplies to sustain combat operations ground to a halt(as they would have been if the war continued on for a few more weeks in that sector...sure some supplies would have made it through..but definitely not enough to sustain combat footing...not even close.). Correct me if I'm wrong, but at most the Chinese forces had a few more weeks of combat supplies left by the time they withdrew. This is further supported by some Chinese accounts of how hard it was for them to bring up supplies to prepare for the 1962 offensive. To have tried to hold the ground taken would have been military suicide, and I suspect the Chinese generals knew that very well.
An army marches on its stomach and if not for the unilateral withdrawal, the PLA forces would have been forced to withdraw anyways..and this time under enemy pressure and lack of supplies. The Chinese generals were smart to withdraw when they did. Ultimately imo the 1962 expedition resulted in no net Chinese gains(again correct me here if i left something out). No land gain...no agreement on subject of the disputed land either.
No one gainsays that the 1962 offensive was a successful one,,but only till it lasted.It is akin to starting a game and declaring it over unilaterally when the initial beginners/headstart advantage ceases to exist.
The 1962 Chinese offensive is analogous to the medieval era Cavalry Charges which mostly hinged on the initial damage done by a cavalry charge.Any extended melee battle of Cavalry vs heavy infantry would have resulted in the expensive Cavalry units whittled down. Thus the most common cavalry tactic during the middle ages(and even later in the Napoleonic wars) was to charge and then withdraw when the initial momentum has been lost.They would charge again later when and if battlefield situations permit. A common rule of thumb about cavalry charges is that 80% of the damage is done during the initial charge..afterward the damage dealt peters out to almost nothing. In this particular case, the Cavalry would not have been able to continue to charge cos it would not have been able to receive reinforcements/supplies.
If you do believe that the PLA could have held on to the land gained during the 1962 offensive, especially when a corps worth of Indian Army units approaching the theater, along with the newly arriving Foreign military aid, ill be most interested in hearing your argument as to how it could have been done. So basing an argument on a very limited conflict , imho seems like house built out of a deck of cards
Ahh one of the greatest Paul Newman movies of all time. Here is the clip for anyone who's not seen this excellent filmHave you watched the movie "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid"? If not, please go and watch it immediately, and refresh yourself about the rules in a knife-fight.
Ahh one of the greatest Paul Newman movies of all time. Here is the clip for anyone who's not seen this excellent film
YouTube - Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid - Best fight ever
I have always wanted to watch that film.Btw are there any spoilers in that clip?
I have always wanted to watch that film.Btw are there any spoilers in that clip?
Nah just hilarity.I just love Joe's references.
Ach! Life is unbearably dull. Nothing to do, no good threads, just fanboys slapping each other into limp-wristed surrender. And just when I feel like a good knife-fight.
Why can't one of you two good people start a thread pointing out that India isn't doing a single damn thing about defending itself against China? There's tons of evidence on that, starting with the relative allocation of forces to Pakistan and to China.
If nobody obliges, I might just wander across to that cheap, tasteless thread about Low Caste Airplane and sort things out; it's getting irritating, extremely irritating.
C'mon guys, don't just sit there, do something.
As it happens, the objectives of the Chinese had been set by them very clearly before the campaign began. These were
To defend the integral territory of the People's Republic of China;
To defend the people of the PRC and members of the CPC;
To punish the Indian 'Forward Poiicy';
To demolish Nehru's credibility in international circles.
It may be noticed that at the time of the ceasefire, all these had been achieved. The question comes to mind - why should they have set themselves new objectives?
Putting it another way: why should they have defined objectives which could not be achieved, and from which the sole outcome would have been the offering of dubious battle, with the odds against them, the supply lines impossibly extended, the Indian Army able to face them in extended order rather than in a PLA crossfire, the Indian Air Force waiting for the PLA to appear on the plains, spread out for the greater convenience of the pilots - you get the picture.
My question to people perticipating in the discussion and specially to those of Chinese origin; can we take it as a statement agreed on consensus?
Christ I've been pounding on the same points and you only accept it when Joe says them? Of course I do. I've been saying the same thing in almost every 62 related thread.
and by the way this in no ways counts as some kind of a validation of what your argument that China quote "ran away with its tail between its legs" because it didn't decide to advance into Assam.
I really suggest you read Joe's post again and carefully.
Well I'm not gonna dig up old threads to score a point over you, but I'm certainly going to use it in future as a reference.
Anyway we are going off-topic, let's not dilute the thread with profanities.
@CardSharp
@Chinese Dragon
Actually, I have a complaint against you two gents.
Just look at the thread. It says PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War.
So what were the PLA Lessons? So far, this thread was focussed on the Sino-Indian War; what about the Lessons to the PLA?
Tis a good question but I think "PLA lessons from the Sino-Vietnamese war" would be a much more interesting discussion. It more than anything else prompted a reorganization of the post cultural-revolution PLA.
Trimming the fat
The formation of the People's Armed police
Modernization program
the change in doctrine
etc
I came across was an excellent internal report made by the Guangzhou Infantry school, who's cadre actually followed units around during the battles of the 79 war and in many cases participated because no one else in the unit knew how to erect mobiles bridges, clear mines, and relay artillery targets, even though they were suppose to be strictly observers. (pretty vividly points out the damage the GPCR caused)
I wish I can access to the report still but I won't get to the university library for a couple of days.
I should have guessed that it would not be possible to fool you! With typical inscrutable Oriental cunning, you spotted that the question I posed was entirely a provocation, as any sane analyst would only add logistics capability to the mixture used by the PLA. Sure, there might be some small adjustments here and there; air superiority over Xizang, to protect railways and roadways from interdiction, armoured deployment, or at least, APC deployment by the Lanzhou Military District; better unit-level firepower through light artillery, missiles and heavy machine guns.
What else in the Sino-Indian theatre? Nothing more, unless some Bonapartist adventurer in the CPC wanted to attack through Nepal or through Burma. Those are hopefully beyond the imaginatiive and strategic planning of the PLA generals, but if a fanboy like Hong Wu can take calipers and measure distances from the Himachal frontier to New Delhi, so can a staff officer somewhere in Chengdu. These three are nerve-wracking, but it is to be hoped too bizarre for consideration by the straitjacketed military mind.
Which leaves us with your eminently sensible suggestion that analysis be done of the Sino-Vietnamese encounters, all three of them (or do you count four?). I wish you would introduce the topic with a nice essay on the subject. Even if it takes time, it will be of interest.
Above all, if you can throw some light on the changes in doctrine that you mysteriously hinted at, please do so. The curiousity is killing me. I know about the basic shift from people's war to little boundary wars, of course; is there any more?
Above all, if you can throw some light on the changes in doctrine that you mysteriously hinted at, please do so. The curiousity is killing me. I know about the basic shift from people's war to little boundary wars, of course; is there any more?