Concentrating Forces and Audacious Action: PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War

[ksgokul]

This is an Urban legend.
I don't know how this misinformation has become so widespread in India.

My quote was from Washington Post. So if it is a misconception, by your argument, then it is not in India alone.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

My quote was from Washington Post. So if it is a misconception, by your argument, then it is not in India alone.

The author of that article is an Indian (Rama Lakshmi), which is likely where the misinformation came from.

If you disagree, please find me an official statement by ANY government that supports the claim.

I have already posted an official statement by Nehru's government which categorically DENIES this urban legend.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I'll Take the liberty of posting a couple of posts related to this topic, which I made on another one. This thread seems more apt for discussions of that kind than the the one it was initially made on.

The initial thread where these posts were made can be found here
http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-...o-chinese-war-2013-2015-a-15.html#post1381921

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---------- Post added at 05:38 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:37 PM ----------

Not really. The Cholas beat quite a lot of SEA armies during their time...especially the SriVijayan Empire that held sway over that region..In fact the SriVijaya empire ceased to exist after their defeat by the Cholas.

Very true.

Presumably you are replying another comment elsewhere, since this statement by itself does not readily connect to anything else in the thread as it was.

As for 1962, sure it was a loss, but my research tells me that China would not have been able to hold onto the territory it took. The "unilateral" Chinese withdrawal would have happened anyways when the supplies to sustain combat operations ground to a halt(as they would have been if the war continued on for a few more weeks in that sector...sure some supplies would have made it through..but definitely not enough to sustain combat footing...not even close.). Correct me if I'm wrong, but at most the Chinese forces had a few more weeks of combat supplies left by the time they withdrew. This is further supported by some Chinese accounts of how hard it was for them to bring up supplies to prepare for the 1962 offensive. To have tried to hold the ground taken would have been military suicide, and I suspect the Chinese generals knew that very well.

As it happens, the objectives of the Chinese had been set by them very clearly before the campaign began. These were

1. To defend the integral territory of the People's Republic of China;
2. To defend the people of the PRC and members of the CPC;
3. To punish the Indian 'Forward Poiicy';
4. To demolish Nehru's credibility in international circles.

It may be noticed that at the time of the ceasefire, all these had been achieved. The question comes to mind - why should they have set themselves new objectives?

Putting it another way: why should they have defined objectives which could not be achieved, and from which the sole outcome would have been the offering of dubious battle, with the odds against them, the supply lines impossibly extended, the Indian Army able to face them in extended order rather than in a PLA crossfire, the Indian Air Force waiting for the PLA to appear on the plains, spread out for the greater convenience of the pilots - you get the picture.

An army marches on its stomach and if not for the unilateral withdrawal, the PLA forces would have been forced to withdraw anyways..and this time under enemy pressure and lack of supplies. The Chinese generals were smart to withdraw when they did. Ultimately imo the 1962 expedition resulted in no net Chinese gains(again correct me here if i left something out). No land gain...no agreement on subject of the disputed land either.

To respond to you, rather than to correct you, two words suffice: "their objectives".

Your argument seems to be that they succeeded because their objectives were limited. True. So?

So, you go on to say, they should have had larger, greater, objectives. They should have permanently annexed the territory under dispute or come to an agreement on the subject of the disputed land. They should not have left the matter to simmer through the decades.

There is something contradictory here, because you have also said,"The Chinese generals were smart to withdraw when they did."

It appears that we are left red-faced and embarrassed because these pesky Chinese sneaked in, wiped our clocks, and sneaked out, without the chance of a set-piece battle,where we would have reclaimed our military honour.

That is perfectly correct from our point of view. Unfortunately, these silly chaps saw it from their point of view. Inconvenient as hell, and irritating as well. But what is one to do? People are so selfish and unheeding of the social decencies. They simply didn't do what they should have done.

They should have hunkered down in a bridgehead around Tezpur, entrenched, perhaps, and allowed frontal assaults by armour, backed up by close air support to demolish their positions, yield a suitable number of prisoners to offset theirs and come to the correct conclusion, an Indian victory on the plains to offset the defeat in the hills.

Tell me, seriously: do you consider that this scenario can have been discussed and thought of favourably by the PLA?

No one gainsays that the 1962 offensive was a successful one,,but only till it lasted.It is akin to starting a game and declaring it over unilaterally when the initial beginners/headstart advantage ceases to exist.

Have you watched the movie "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid"? If not, please go and watch it immediately, and refresh yourself about the rules in a knife-fight.

The 1962 Chinese offensive is analogous to the medieval era Cavalry Charges which mostly hinged on the initial damage done by a cavalry charge.Any extended melee battle of Cavalry vs heavy infantry would have resulted in the expensive Cavalry units whittled down. Thus the most common cavalry tactic during the middle ages(and even later in the Napoleonic wars) was to charge and then withdraw when the initial momentum has been lost.They would charge again later when and if battlefield situations permit. A common rule of thumb about cavalry charges is that 80% of the damage is done during the initial charge..afterward the damage dealt peters out to almost nothing. In this particular case, the Cavalry would not have been able to continue to charge cos it would not have been able to receive reinforcements/supplies.

If you do believe that the PLA could have held on to the land gained during the 1962 offensive, especially when a corps worth of Indian Army units approaching the theater, along with the newly arriving Foreign military aid, ill be most interested in hearing your argument as to how it could have been done. So basing an argument on a very limited conflict , imho seems like house built out of a deck of cards

At the end of the day, what is your point? That the PLA didn't fight fair? That their plans were intended to give them victory, and defeat the IA? That they fought such a short, sharp war that India had no time to react? That they fought in the mountains, where India had no troops, no fortifications, no roads, and no infrastructure? That they fought in winter, at heights that Indian troops were not used to? That they did not fight the battles that India would have liked them to fight?

What, exactly?

How ridiculous can we get? Would you hold still for some re-interpretations of military history from the losers' point of view? Where do you want to start? The obstinacy and stupidity of the Vietnamese in not recognising that they were licked, when the Americans entered the battlefield? The low-down trickery of General Giap against the French at Dien Bien Phu, when the whole world knew after Sedan I and Metz that the French fought badly in fortresses? The silly antics of the Russians, sweeping aside the Wehrmacht in massed tank attacks, with close air support? Their bad manners in not giving up Stalingrad when they ought to have? Monty's rank bad sportsmanship in opposing Rommel with several times the number of tanks, personnel carriers and infantry, not to mention guns, and breaking him? German skulduggery at the Kasserine Pass? Or do you want to go back a little bit more?

Just say the word. Let's do it.

 

[CardSharp]

Have you watched the movie "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid"? If not, please go and watch it immediately, and refresh yourself about the rules in a knife-fight.

Ahh one of the greatest Paul Newman movies of all time. Here is the clip for anyone who's not seen this excellent film

Wait for the "kicker" at the end.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

Ahh one of the greatest Paul Newman movies of all time. Here is the clip for anyone who's not seen this excellent film

YouTube - Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid - Best fight ever

I have always wanted to watch that film. Btw are there any spoilers in that clip?

 

[CardSharp]

I have always wanted to watch that film. Btw are there any spoilers in that clip?

Nah just hilarity. I just love Joe's references.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I have always wanted to watch that film. Btw are there any spoilers in that clip?

Nah just hilarity. I just love Joe's references.

Ach! Life is unbearably dull. Nothing to do, no good threads, just fanboys slapping each other into limp-wristed surrender. And just when I feel like a good knife-fight.

Why can't one of you two good people start a thread pointing out that India isn't doing a single damn thing about defending itself against China? There's tons of evidence on that, starting with the relative allocation of forces to Pakistan and to China.

If nobody obliges, I might just wander across to that cheap, tasteless thread about Low Caste Airplane and sort things out; it's getting irritating, extremely irritating.

C'mon guys, don't just sit there, do something.

 

[CardSharp]

Ach! Life is unbearably dull. Nothing to do, no good threads, just fanboys slapping each other into limp-wristed surrender. And just when I feel like a good knife-fight.

Why can't one of you two good people start a thread pointing out that India isn't doing a single damn thing about defending itself against China? There's tons of evidence on that, starting with the relative allocation of forces to Pakistan and to China.

If nobody obliges, I might just wander across to that cheap, tasteless thread about Low Caste Airplane and sort things out; it's getting irritating, extremely irritating.

C'mon guys, don't just sit there, do something.

Come now, whatever happens out there, let us keep this thread a place for friends and keep things jovial and academic.

 

[LaBong]

As it happens, the objectives of the Chinese had been set by them very clearly before the campaign began. These were
To defend the integral territory of the People's Republic of China;
To defend the people of the PRC and members of the CPC;
To punish the Indian 'Forward Poiicy';
To demolish Nehru's credibility in international circles.
It may be noticed that at the time of the ceasefire, all these had been achieved. The question comes to mind - why should they have set themselves new objectives?

Putting it another way: why should they have defined objectives which could not be achieved, and from which the sole outcome would have been the offering of dubious battle, with the odds against them, the supply lines impossibly extended, the Indian Army able to face them in extended order rather than in a PLA crossfire, the Indian Air Force waiting for the PLA to appear on the plains, spread out for the greater convenience of the pilots - you get the picture.

My question to people perticipating in the discussion and specially to those of Chinese origin; can we take it as a statement agreed on consensus?

 

[CardSharp]

My question to people perticipating in the discussion and specially to those of Chinese origin; can we take it as a statement agreed on consensus?

Christ I've been pounding on the same points and you only accept it when Joe says them? Of course I do. I've been saying the same thing in almost every 62 related thread.

and by the way this in no ways counts as some kind of a validation of what your argument that China quote "ran away with its tail between its legs" because it didn't decide to advance into Assam.

I really suggest you read Joe's post again and carefully.

 

[LaBong]

Christ I've been pounding on the same points and you only accept it when Joe says them? Of course I do. I've been saying the same thing in almost every 62 related thread.

and by the way this in no ways counts as some kind of a validation of what your argument that China quote "ran away with its tail between its legs" because it didn't decide to advance into Assam.

I really suggest you read Joe's post again and carefully.

Well I'm not gonna dig up old threads to score a point over you, but I'm certainly going to use it in future as a reference.

Anyway we are going off-topic, let's not dilute the thread with profanities.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Well I'm not gonna dig up old threads to score a point over you, but I'm certainly going to use it in future as a reference.

Anyway we are going off-topic, let's not dilute the thread with profanities.

@CardSharp
@Chinese Dragon

Actually, I have a complaint against you two gents.

Just look at the thread. It says PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War.

So what were the PLA Lessons? So far, this thread was focussed on the Sino-Indian War; what about the Lessons to the PLA?

 

[CardSharp]

@CardSharp
@Chinese Dragon

Actually, I have a complaint against you two gents.

Just look at the thread. It says PLA Lessons from the Sino-Indian War.

So what were the PLA Lessons? So far, this thread was focussed on the Sino-Indian War; what about the Lessons to the PLA?

Tis a good question but I think "PLA lessons from the Sino-Vietnamese war" would be a much more interesting discussion. It more than anything else prompted a reorganization of the post cultural-revolution PLA.

Trimming the fat
The formation of the People's Armed police
Modernization program
the change in doctrine
etc

I came across was an excellent internal report made by the Guangzhou Infantry school, who's cadre actually followed units around during the battles of the 79 war and in many cases participated because no one else in the unit knew how to erect mobiles bridges, clear mines, and relay artillery targets, even though they were suppose to be strictly observers. (pretty vividly points out the damage the GPCR caused)


I wish I can access to the report still but I won't get to the university library for a couple of days.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Tis a good question but I think "PLA lessons from the Sino-Vietnamese war" would be a much more interesting discussion. It more than anything else prompted a reorganization of the post cultural-revolution PLA.

Trimming the fat
The formation of the People's Armed police
Modernization program
the change in doctrine
etc

I came across was an excellent internal report made by the Guangzhou Infantry school, who's cadre actually followed units around during the battles of the 79 war and in many cases participated because no one else in the unit knew how to erect mobiles bridges, clear mines, and relay artillery targets, even though they were suppose to be strictly observers. (pretty vividly points out the damage the GPCR caused)


I wish I can access to the report still but I won't get to the university library for a couple of days.

I should have guessed that it would not be possible to fool you! With typical inscrutable Oriental cunning, you spotted that the question I posed was entirely a provocation, as any sane analyst would only add logistics capability to the mixture used by the PLA. Sure, there might be some small adjustments here and there; air superiority over Xizang, to protect railways and roadways from interdiction, armoured deployment, or at least, APC deployment by the Lanzhou Military District; better unit-level firepower through light artillery, missiles and heavy machine guns.

What else in the Sino-Indian theatre? Nothing more, unless some Bonapartist adventurer in the CPC wanted to attack through Nepal or through Burma. Those are hopefully beyond the imaginatiive and strategic planning of the PLA generals, but if a fanboy like Hong Wu can take calipers and measure distances from the Himachal frontier to New Delhi, so can a staff officer somewhere in Chengdu. These three are nerve-wracking, but it is to be hoped too bizarre for consideration by the straitjacketed military mind.

Which leaves us with your eminently sensible suggestion that analysis be done of the Sino-Vietnamese encounters, all three of them (or do you count four?). I wish you would introduce the topic with a nice essay on the subject. Even if it takes time, it will be of interest.

Above all, if you can throw some light on the changes in doctrine that you mysteriously hinted at, please do so. The curiousity is killing me. I know about the basic shift from people's war to little boundary wars, of course; is there any more?

 

[CardSharp]

I should have guessed that it would not be possible to fool you! With typical inscrutable Oriental cunning, you spotted that the question I posed was entirely a provocation, as any sane analyst would only add logistics capability to the mixture used by the PLA. Sure, there might be some small adjustments here and there; air superiority over Xizang, to protect railways and roadways from interdiction, armoured deployment, or at least, APC deployment by the Lanzhou Military District; better unit-level firepower through light artillery, missiles and heavy machine guns.

What else in the Sino-Indian theatre? Nothing more, unless some Bonapartist adventurer in the CPC wanted to attack through Nepal or through Burma. Those are hopefully beyond the imaginatiive and strategic planning of the PLA generals, but if a fanboy like Hong Wu can take calipers and measure distances from the Himachal frontier to New Delhi, so can a staff officer somewhere in Chengdu. These three are nerve-wracking, but it is to be hoped too bizarre for consideration by the straitjacketed military mind.

Which leaves us with your eminently sensible suggestion that analysis be done of the Sino-Vietnamese encounters, all three of them (or do you count four?). I wish you would introduce the topic with a nice essay on the subject. Even if it takes time, it will be of interest.

Above all, if you can throw some light on the changes in doctrine that you mysteriously hinted at, please do so. The curiousity is killing me. I know about the basic shift from people's war to little boundary wars, of course; is there any more?

Please do, I am greatly interested in what happened in that war.

Above all, if you can throw some light on the changes in doctrine that you mysteriously hinted at, please do so. The curiousity is killing me. I know about the basic shift from people's war to little boundary wars, of course; is there any more?

Ahhh you should consult the Xinhui's and officer of engineer's posts at the world affairs board. It was a topic discussing the 10 most important changes to the PLA.

The Pacific Rim | The Rise of China


and there are also threads about taking bloated regiments, trimming them into battle groups of some sort and there is also something about a sectors being divided into theatres of control. A lot of technical stuff about unit composition and deployment doctrine. I read it a while ago.

I couldn't find the thread with a quick look but I'll look again tomorrow.