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COMMENT: Averting catastrophe in South Asia

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COMMENT: Averting catastrophe in South Asia

—Harlan Ullman

Even the possibility of the floods putting Pakistan in extremis is strong enough a rationale to get this vital strategic relationship back on track while closing the trust deficit and mitigating the legitimate differences that deeply divide us

We can joke that the US and Great Britain are two nations divided by a common language. But the gap between the US and Pakistan is neither humorous nor easily reconciled. Only a fundamental improvement in mutual understanding can rectify the enormous misunderstandings and misperceptions on both sides that threaten this crucial relationship and our mutual security.

Despite two American presidents declaring Pakistan a major non-NATO ally and promising to implement a new strategic relationship, from Islamabad’s view, the flowery prose has not been accompanied by deed. And, seen from Washington, Pakistan is often a truculent, uncooperative and difficult partner.

Pakistanis believe that American presidents have virtually unlimited power and authority to make things happen and are angry over what is seen as non-delivery of promises. The Americans do not appreciate that the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is in a coalition government needing 42 additional seats to hold a majority in a National Assembly of 342 members. Unfortunately, the White House has reversed the pitfalls of a coalition government (as in Britain or Iraq) with a perception of an absence of political leadership in Islamabad. Perhaps the loss of both Houses in November will change its mind.

Pakistanis ask what their country has gotten out of its relationship with the US so far. The US’s war on terror has cost them dearly: more than 31,000 civilian and military casualties; a spreading insurgency; and a haemorrhaging economy even before the super floods ravaged the nation.

The Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act approved $ 1.5 billion a year in support for five years or a total of $ 7.5 billion. But, only about 10 percent has been transferred for year one and most Pakistanis believe no money has arrived. Since September 11th, the US has underwritten the Pakistan Army to the tune of about $ 1 billion a year. Unfortunately, that funding has come in drips and drabs. Further, from Islamabad’s perspective, the US has done little to facilitate better relations between India and Pakistan and the $ 3.5 billion arms deal signed between New Delhi and Washington did not help.

Finally, given its stand on human rights, American silence over India’s martial crackdown in Kashmir signals to Pakistanis a double standard.

The conviction and sentencing by a Federal Court in New York of Dr Aafia Siddiqui to 86 years in prison for terrorism and attempted murder have precipitated a huge backlash intensified by NATO’s hot pursuit of Afghan terrorists into Pakistani territory this Monday. These and other incidents underscore profound Pakistani doubts over US reliability and sincerity in defining a new strategic relationship.

The Americans have equally powerful points of contention and legitimate grievances with Pakistan. The White House worries that excessive cronyism prevents competent people from serving in Pakistan’s government. Corruption remains a divisive issue. And, US leaders do not see that its strategy in Afghanistan is fully supported by Pakistan, and perceive it as even opposed. Repeated delays in obtaining visas for US military and government personnel have disintegrated into full-blown mini-crises. And Pakistan’s longstanding policy on “fraternisation with foreigners” precludes Pakistan Army officers meeting socially with foreign contemporaries without permission, which further contributes to this trust deficit.

But Pakistan is in or close to extremis precipitated by simultaneous security, economic and now humanitarian crises. Worse, a fourth, politically charged showdown between the chief justice and the government looms. The consequence could be political chaos if the chief justice rules part of the 18th Amendment unconstitutional and denies presidential constitutional immunity over allegations of wrongdoing prior to taking office.

Parallels are inexact. Watergate and the impeachment of Bill Clinton over the Affaire Lewinski crippled our government. So too, Pakistan’s government could effectively be shut down or dissolved by a chief justice preoccupied with enhancing his own authority rather than focusing on the destructive consequences for the nation.

Some misunderstandings and grievances may not be resolvable. That does not mean we cannot try. The last chance may be a very serious meeting between the two presidents to work out these differences and begin re-strengthening this strategic relationship that is absolutely vital to achieving even a modicum of peace and stability in the region. (and Obama is only visiting India & Afghanistan and not Pakistan)(added)

After Pearl Harbour and US’s entry into the war, Roosevelt and Churchill understood the need for intense, intimate and continuing dialogue. A weekend meeting at Camp David or some other remote location for the two leaders could begin such a process. Careful, advance preparation by both sides, of course, must be assured.

The driving force is the explosive ignition of Pakistan’s security, economic and political crises by the humanitarian catastrophe that Pakistan cannot handle alone. Here, even the possibility of the floods putting Pakistan in extremis is strong enough a rationale to get this vital strategic relationship back on track while closing the trust deficit and mitigating the legitimate differences that deeply divide us. Otherwise, the US and Pakistan will profoundly suffer. The only question will be how much.

The writer is senior advisor at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC and Chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders in business and government
 
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A Look At Fraying Relations Between U.S., Pakistan

September 30, 2010

NPR's Robert Siegel talks to Marvin Weinbaum, a scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington and former Pakistan analyst at the State Department, about the fraying relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.
Copyright © 2010 National Public Radio

ROBERT SIEGEL, host:

More now on the fraying relations between the U.S. and Pakistan. I'm joined by Marvin Weinbaum, who was a Pakistan analyst at the State Department. He's now scholar in residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington. Welcome.

Mr. MARVIN WEINBAUM (Middle East Institute): Thank you.

SIEGEL: U.S.-Pakistani relations seem to be in a very bad spot right now. Is that a fair summation?

Mr. WEINBAUM: Right. And I think that relationship has been fraying for some time now, particularly as our efforts in Afghanistan have gone worse than they had been. There's no question now that there's greater pressure to do something about Pakistan, to make Pakistan more of a partner in this counterinsurgency than it has been.

SIEGEL: What do you make of this argument over pursuit, sometimes it's referred to as hot pursuit? If the Taliban, whom the U.S. is fighting in Afghanistan, are getting back across the border and finding refuge in Pakistan, the U.S. seems to feel it has the right - NATO has the right to pursue them on Pakistani soil. Pakistan says no such deal, at least publicly.

Mr. WEINBAUM: Well, there has been an understanding for sometime here that a limited amount of crossing the border in hot pursuit would be acceptable. But, its like so much else in that relationship, military to military. There have been tacit understandings which are not made public because the public itself has a very limited tolerance of any kind of cooperation with the United States militarily.

SIEGEL: The U.S. is unpopular with the people of Pakistan?

Mr. WEINBAUM: I would say so. Every poll that we have suggests that we're almost in the single digits when it comes to feelings towards the United States.

SIEGEL: The democratic government of Pakistan that we heard referred to is not very popular these days, either I gather, from the polls. Do you expect that we're at the end of one of those civilian-rule cycles and that the military is coming back sometime soon?

Mr. WEINBAUM: I think most of observers would probably answer in the negative. There's really no reason for the military to want to regain formal power. At this point in time, the military gets just about everything it needs. It controls foreign policy. It controls - has a veto over domestic policy that in any way affects its interests.

Why at this juncture would it want to take on the formal responsibility, particularly in a country where things have been going so badly? It has an understanding, though, in which it defers to the elected civilian government officials because it's important that the facade here, at least, of a democratic system is maintained. It's not entirely facade. It's more than that. That symbolism here that it remains a democracy remains important.

SIEGEL: And the military controls the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan?

Mr. WEINBAUM: Absolutely. Controls foreign policy towards India, towards the United States, towards Afghanistan.

SIEGEL: You said relations have been fraying for some time. These are our allies in the war in Afghanistan, and this is the country on whose soil the enemy is based at the same time. This seems to be one those cases where each side believes that if the other side really meant what it was doing, the situation could not persist.

Pakistani people think if the U.S. really wanted to win this war, we could win it hands down. And Americans say if the Pakistanis got serious about the Taliban on their soil, they'd get rid of them already.

Mr. WEINBAUM: The heart of the problem here is that the very people who we have seen as our enemies, like the Afghan Taliban, the so-called Haqqani network, the Hezb-i-Islami, these are all insurgent groups that were fighting in Afghanistan, that these very people are not viewed as the enemy by the Pakistan government. The Pakistan government has for some time seen these people as a surrogate force in Afghanistan, particularly as they expect the Americans and their allies won't be there over the long run.

So that's the real heart of it. That's to be distinguished from the Pakistani Taliban with whom they, obviously, are in a death struggle.

SIEGEL: Marvin Weinbaum, thank you very much.

Mr. WEINBAUM: My pleasure.

SIEGEL: Marvin Weinbaum, scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute.

2010 National Public Radio
 
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The U.S. and Pakistan: An alliance too crucial to fail

By David Ignatius

Friday, October 1, 2010

ISLAMABAD

Pakistan: A strained, and crucial, alliance

Is Pakistan America's ally in the battle against terrorist groups, or a potential antagonist? That delicate question was in the air Thursday during a meeting with a senior official of the country's fearsome spy service, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate.

This has been a week when frustration on both sides boiled over. A new book by Bob Woodward, "Obama's Wars," quoted President Obama warning of a "cancer" of terrorism in Pakistan. U.S. drone attacks over the tribal areas were reported to be at a record level. And U.S. helicopters, which have been firing across the border in "hot pursuit" of insurgents, hit three Pakistani soldiers by mistake early Thursday. The Pakistanis responded by halting NATO supply trucks at the Khyber Pass.

"Pakistan is not a walkover country," warned the senior ISI official. If the United States continues its cross-border attacks, he said, "I will stand in the way of the convoys myself."

When one is thinking about Pakistan, it's usually wise to look beyond public pronouncements. The friendship is always more guarded than it might appear in the good times, and rarely as bitter as the rhetorical volleys would suggest. There's a core of mutual self-interest that normally guides the relationship.

But, that said, the alliance is badly strained. The tension comes at a time when the Pakistani government faces a barrage of internal problems -- a devastating flood, a collapsing economy, a terrorist insurgency and a political leadership preoccupied with factional squabbling and score-settling.

This is a moment, in short, when cool heads would be useful in Washington and Islamabad. Too many more tugs on the Pakistani fabric and it's going to rip -- with consequences that are hard to predict.

The senior ISI official met me at the agency's headquarters, in a conference room down a corridor of black marble pillars and decorative fountains -- an oddly elegant setting for an agency whose very name makes most Pakistanis nervous. The official began by noting one sign of continuing U.S.-Pakistani amity, which were the meetings this week between the agency's chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, and CIA Director Leon Panetta.

The official said that the two spy chiefs had "discussed everything possible" and that the ISI leader had "reassured" Panetta of Pakistan's "complete support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan" and for Afghan President Hamid Karzai's efforts at reconciliation.

The ISI recognizes America's mounting frustration over the Taliban's use of sanctuaries in Pakistan, and the implicit American threat: You deal with the havens or we will. "We understand that this has to be handled," the ISI official said. But he cautioned that because Pakistani forces are stretched so thin, a new offensive in North Waziristan won't happen soon -- which effectively means the sanctuaries will remain open.

The ISI has privately backed the drone attacks, even though the Pakistani government publicly protests them. But the official cautioned that the recent barrage may be overkill. He said that by Pakistan's count, of the 181 drone attacks since 2004, 75 have come in the past nine months. "The quality of the targets is not as good," he said. "The perception is that you are trigger-happy."

Asked about American attempts to target the Haqqani network, a ruthless Taliban faction that in the past has had links with the ISI, the official seemed to give a green light: "I would be happy if they go today. It will end so much trouble for Pakistan." But he said Pakistan would oppose any attempt to widen the so-called "box" within which Predator drones can strike targets.

The ISI official was skeptical that the United States was making much military progress in Afghanistan. ("Is there a U.S. strategy?" he asked.) And he questioned the American premise that by killing enough insurgents, it could "bargain from strength" and force the Taliban into a settlement. He complained that the United States isn't sharing its thoughts about reconciliation with the Taliban, even though Pakistan would be crucial in facilitating any deal. Privately, the ISI has argued that if America is serious about reconciliation, it should start with the Haqqanis, the hardest challenge.

This week a bad dream seemed to be coming true, with an American helicopter killing Pakistani soldiers. "No Pakistani government or military leadership can survive" if it's seen as a pushover for America, cautioned the ISI official. The anger on both sides is real. And yet top-level contacts continued, even as Pakistan was closing its border to U.S. transit.

That's the Pakistani-American paradox: No matter how furious they get, the two countries need each other, and never more than now.

davidignatius@washpost.com
 
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COMMENT: Is it over, over there? —Harlan Ullman

The crucial divergences and competing interests between the US and Pakistan are no secret. If Bob Woodward’s newest book Obama’s Wars is accurate, the White House regards Pakistan as “the cancer” that must be cured and on which success or failure in Afghanistan rests

Just when it seemed that things could not get worse, they did. One would have thought that given the ongoing catastrophic floods, conditions in Pakistan were at a nadir. But last week, several incidents lowered even that bar regarding US-Pakistani ties.

NATO forces in Afghanistan made two unauthorised incursions into Pakistan, the second killing three Frontier Corps soldiers. CIA drone strikes soared, possibly provoked last week by threats of al Qaeda attacks in Europe using operatives trained in Pakistan and carrying US and friendly passports. In response to these incidents, Pakistan closed one of the major supply routes from Karachi to Afghanistan citing ‘security’ concerns arising from a backlash to the NATO forays into Pakistan territory. However, the signal was unmistakable regardless of the rationale — violate our territory again and suffer the consequences.

But, potentially, the most damaging incident was a cell phone camera video showing Pakistani army soldiers summarily executing a handful of prisoners in their custody. The most careful investigation to determine the real identity of the executioners is essential because the impact could be powerful in shaping even greater negative public opinion in Pakistan and in the US.

Without a transparent, credible inquiry, hearings by Congress into allegations of extra-judicial executions and illegal detentions by Pakistani security forces will be inevitable. The Senate had deferred these investigations including charges that the army held hundreds, if not thousands, of prisoners suspected of terrorism, refusing to turn them over to the courts on the grounds that these suspects would be released and would return to the battlefield. Ironically, the US’s categorisation of prisoners captured in the war on terror as ‘enemy combatants’, and incarcerating them at Guantanamo Bay to circumvent trials in civilian US courts, suggests this dilemma of dealing with terrorist suspects is not limited to Pakistan.

And, unfortunately, Pakistan’s interior minister asking whether the Americans were “friends or enemies” in the light of the incursions and other incidents is not an idle question in either Pakistan or the US, reflecting the growing strain.

Both Pakistan and the US tried to reduce the impact of these events. A joint investigation of the NATO incursions and an apology by ISAF Commander General David Petraeus to the Pakistan Army Chief of Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani will help. However, inherent difficulties and tensions in the overall relationship have never been fully resolved and have been exacerbated possibly to breaking point this past week.

The crucial divergences and competing interests between the US and Pakistan are no secret. If Bob Woodward’s newest book Obama’s Wars is accurate, the White House regards Pakistan as “the cancer” that must be cured and on which success or failure in Afghanistan rests. Americans rightly will not tolerate sanctuaries in Pakistan from which Taliban fighters can rest, recuperate and return to Afghanistan to kill and maim American, NATO and Afghan forces. These sanctuaries and Pakistani reluctance to take on terrorist groups such as the Haqqani network remain major bones of contention.

Pakistan sees any encroachment on national sovereignty as intolerable. Further, given strong public antipathy to the US (as opposed to individual Americans), any presence of American forces in Pakistan is politically risky and must be limited. Given the conspiracy theories that abound, distortions and exaggerations of American military and CIA presence in Pakistan are taken as ground truth and used to whip up negative public sentiment.

Because of the historical record, many Pakistanis doubt the US’s staying power in Afghanistan and resent its fickleness in using and then abandoning Pakistan at key junctures. The consequence is that Pakistan would be justified in its long-term planning and ‘going it alone’ given the hollowness of some of Washington’s prior reassurances. The effect is to widen the growing trust deficit between the two allies.

Opportunities must be seized from these worsening conditions. Here are two: first, the forthcoming strategic dialogue to be held in Washington this month can be the forum for addressing these key issues that divide and unite us. However, the two sides must agree to be candid, forthcoming and willing to compromise based on better mutual understanding of each other. That will require presidential leadership on both sides to repair the relationship.

Second, Pakistan must determine who was responsible for the summary executions and take appropriate action. If the army was not responsible, that must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. If guilt is established, either a court martial or civil trial is essential. That happened in 1992 when the then army chief took strong action in similar circumstances.

But make no mistake, the US-Pakistan relationship is suffering. The worst outcome is for that relationship to be over, over there. Both sides must understand how severely tested this relationship has become and that without bold action by Washington and Islamabad, it may not be repaired.

The writer is senior advisor at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC and Chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders in business and government
 
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What it has to do with South Asia??? Its matter between US and Pakistan or may be Afghanistan.
 
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Rhetoric, interests strain Pakistan-US alliance

* Washington’s growing impatience with Pakistan’s perceived foot-dragging against Taliban hiding in its borderlands putting heavy strain on an alliance critical to winning Afghan war

* Robert Gibbs says status quo not acceptable

* Congressional aide says Pentagon, chain of command under pressure to show progress


ISLAMABAD: Washington’s growing impatience with Pakistan’s perceived foot-dragging against Taliban hiding in its borderlands is putting heavy strain on an alliance critical to winning the war in Afghanistan.

Since September, Pakistan has seen a surge in drone attacks as well as a cascade of leaks, criticisms and border incursions on the part of NATO forces in Afghanistan, one of which killed three Pakistani troops. Citing security reasons, it closed vital coalition supply routes to Afghanistan and wrung an apology from US Ambassador Anne Patterson for the three deaths.

Washington is concerned that some elements of the Inter-Services Intelligence had interactions with the insurgents that “may be seen as supporting terrorist groups rather than going after them”, said Pentagon spokesman Colonel David Lapan on Thursday.

The White House also sent an assessment of the Afghanistan war to US Congress this week that said Pakistani forces had avoided direct conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban this spring, in part for political reasons.

Status quo: White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said on Thursday that the status quo was not acceptable, which had been underscored in the report to Congress. The crux of the issue is that Pakistan and the US do not have the same interests in the region.

According to Stratfor, a private intelligence firm, Pakistan wants to regain influence in post-invasion Afghanistan by using Afghan Taliban taking shelter in Pakistan. The US needs to eliminate them and their sanctuaries so it could withdraw from Afghanistan.

“It’s clear the Pakistanis are frustrated with the US,” said Andrew Exum, a fellow with the Centre for a New American Security and former adviser on General Stanley McChrystal’s assessment team in Afghanistan. “What I don’t think the Pakistanis understand is how frustrated the Americans and the American public are with the Pakistanis.”

The recent assessment was especially damaging, because it could fuel concerns in Congress over continued aid to Pakistan, currently set at $7.5 billion in civilian and development aid over the next five years.

“There could be a little bit of poker playing of (the) US military basically saying, ‘We’ll take the risk of humiliating the Pakistani military, let’s see if that prompts them to take some action on their own’,” a congressional aide said.

“You know, they don’t like us doing drone attacks and sending helicopters over. ‘OK, step up and do it yourself’.”

Progress: The reason for the stepped up pressure could be a strategy review on Afghanistan due in December. “The Pentagon and the chain of command are under real pressure to show progress in Afghanistan,” the aide said.

The aide said US generals believed they were unlikely to make enough progress by July 2011 – when US President Barack Obama has said he will start to withdraw forces – as long as the Hamid Karzai government lacks credibility and militants find sanctuary in Pakistan.

“They can’t really do anything to make the Karzai government more credible. So they are trying to go after the sanctuary issue and I think they realise, and I think (General David) Petraeus realises, that the status quo has very little chance of success for them (in the timeframe they’ve been given),” said the aide.

How might these diplomatic spats affect the Afghan war effort?

Although army chief General Ashfaq Kayani is believed to have good ties with the US, other senior officers may grow tired of US doubts over Islamabad’s commitment to fighting militancy.

Hardliners in the army could argue Pakistan had lost thousands of soldiers supporting the war on militancy and is getting little in return except pressure to do more.

“At some stage, they could prevail or would at least be able to influence policy. You can’t totally disregard them,” said Imtiaz Gul, author of ‘The Most Dangerous Place’, a book about Pakistan’s Tribal Areas.

Still, neither side can afford to walk away from the other. Pakistan receives $2 billion a year in military aid and the US needs it to keep the Afghan supply lines open and fight its own militants who are supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Strategic dialogue: Overcoming these disagreements is crucial if the next round of strategic dialogue — scheduled for October 22 in Washington — is going to be successful, said Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Centre at the Atlantic Council. “I think it’s going to be critical in the next few weeks that they don’t have any flare-ups, neither do they have any lingering doubts about each other’s intentions,” he said. reuters
 
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see the same titled thread on the Pakistan's war board
 
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I meant :Rhetoric, interests strain Pakistan-US alliance
 
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Pakistan and the US have always had a give and take relationship,in which Pakistan is always found to be losing out.The Taliban threat has kept Pakistan army in the fray with the US,but there doesn't seem to be any rainbow at the end of this cloud.The Americans have an uneasy relationship with Pakistan,one because of its shaky democracy,two because of Pakistan proving to be a hotbed for radical elements of all hues and colours,who are challenging world peace.Given this and the difficult domestic situation for Obama,and the WOT which doesn't seem to be going anywhere,the writing is very much on the wall for US- PAK relations.
 
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Hope is not a strategy: James Jones

* US security adviser says Pakistan needs to do more to stem terrorism, especially when officials have information about what terrorists are doing

* Pakistan will hopefully avoid becoming next US target


LAHORE: US President Barack Obama is losing yet another adviser: National Security Adviser James Jones is resigning. Shortly before the announcement, Spiegel Online spoke to Jones about the war on terrorism and the delicate state of the US relationship with Pakistan.

Obama would have to do without Jones’ expert advice, adding that the president is expected to announce Jones’ resignation in a couple of days.

In an interview, Jones provided a progress report on the war on terrorism and explained the next important steps in America’s strategy. As the breeding ground of international terror, Pakistan would play a pivotal role in that strategy. And if Pakistan wants to remain a long-term partner to the US, Jones said, it would have to make a greater effort in the fight against terror.

He said one his purposes of visiting Germany recently was to meet German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s top foreign and security policy adviser to continue discussions on mutual interests, one of which was to warn against a terror threat to Europe published a couple days back in the US.

Do more: On why Pakistan was still the main breeding ground of terrorism, Jones said the US had been working very closely with Islamabad for a long time, adding that in some cases the country had responded quite well. “At the same time, there has been a very steady message that Pakistan needs to do more to stem terrorism, especially when they know where it is and when officials have information about what the terrorists are doing,” Jones added.

To a question if there was a possibility of Pakistan becoming the next US military target, he said, “Rational people do rational things and that Pakistan will hopefully avoid that unfortunate eventuality. But hope is not a strategy, so we have to be cognisant that there are things that could alter the relationship if we are not careful.” Jones said the enemies in the region were radicals who were targeting not only the US but also Europe, who advocate violence and want to harm the world.

He said contrary to the impression, NATO had not failed as an effective alliance in Afghanistan. “The soldiers are doing a lot and the final chapter hasn’t been written yet. We should wait and see how the transition period works out,” he added. On giving up military bases in Afghanistan and pulling out, Jones said the US had every intention of honouring its long-term commitment in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Referring to the global security situation, he said this is a historical time the US is living in and the country has had a century-defining moment – the 9/11 attacks. “Now we understand better the various threats we’re faced with – climate change, energy sources, terrorism. Poor countries are striving to rise into the globalised world and, I believe, the developed ones are beginning to understand that if they don’t address their issues seriously, these countries may be the Afghanistans and Pakistans and Iraqs of the future,” he added.

On Americas approach to the challenge, US national security adviser said the US is at a crossroads and one of the big challenges is how to “stay competitive and reorganise yourself” to face the new realities. “We need a globalised community spirit, which has a comprehensive sense of what the world should look like in 20 years,” he added. daily times monitor
 
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