Martian2
SENIOR MEMBER

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Not a right comparison, Russian's excelled in their military hardware and Aerospace programs, while Koreans in electronics and Ship building but both did not ripped of each others program to build their own, if now you get me where am i heading.
Every nation's have some form of competitive advantage, tell me what is yours which you can say is best in the world, and I will buy you developed something without external help.
Jesus, what's wrong with you? Reverse engineering or convergent independent research and development is not the same as copying. Now, I have to go find my post on reverse engineering to explain the concept to your puny brain.
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Reverse Engineering Is Extremely Difficult
For those of you who think reverse-engineering is merely obtaining a sample of high-technology and pushing the "copy" button, think again. To produce the Yu-6 torpedo, a reverse-engineered Mark 48 torpedo, it took ten years and 18 patents for brilliant teams of Chinese scientists to reproduce the Mark 48 torpedo.
Reverse-engineering is not copying. Reverse-engineering is the reinvention of the entire manufacturing process, including patents, to build the high-technology weapon or equipment. Unless you have dedicated brilliant scientists and a sufficiently-advanced high-technology base, reverse-engineering of high-technology weapons or equipment is not possible.
Let's examine the excruciating process to reverse-engineer a mere torpedo. Please read the following paragraphs on the reverse-engineering of the Mark 48 torpedo. When you're done, tell me that you're not impressed by the scientists in a developing country that reinvented a high-technology weapon made by the world's leading technological power.
Yu-6 torpedo - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"Yu-6 torpedo
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Yu-6 (鱼-6) torpedo is the Chinese equivalent of the Mark 48 torpedo. In addition to wire and active / passive homing guidance, wake homing guidance is also incorporated. Many domestic Chinese sources have claimed that Yu-6 torpedo is in the same class as the Mk 48 Mod. 4 torpedo, but official information of Yu-6 torpedo released by the Chinese government is limited and such claim thus cannot be confirmed by sources outside China.
Background
At least one Mark 48 torpedo was reportedly recovered by Chinese fishermen in the late 1970s or early 1980s, and China might have begun the reverse engineering in the 1980s. However, due to the inexperience of the Chinese technological base at the time, as well as the concentration on economic development, most of the reverse engineering attempt was put on hold after research had been completed on Otto fuel II, wire guidance and some other subsystems[/b], but some research continued on much smaller scale. The Yu-6 torpedo developmental program experienced a revival when the Chinese military realized that despite developing several torpedoes including the Yu-1, Yu-2, Yu-3, Yu-4, and Yu-5, the obsolete doctrine of having separate ASuW and ASW torpedoes proved to be unsuited for modern naval warfare and the Chinese navy needed a torpedo for both ASuW and ASW. As a result, the Yu-6 program was fully resumed in 1995 and 705th Institute was named as the primary contractor, Mr. Dong Chunpeng (董春鹏

Development
One of the difficulties encountered was that the Yu-6 torpedo had greater operating depth than all previous Chinese torpedoes, and China could not build the new casing needed. A brand new alloy was required to cast the outer casing of the Yu-6 torpedo, and under the leadership of Professor. Ding Wenjiang (丁文江


Another huge obstacle faced was the casing for the acoustic seeker required new materials to build, but China had never had any experience in this field when the reverse engineering was first attempted. Despite most reverse engineering attempt was put on hold, research in this field continued and Tianjin Rubber Research Institute (also known as Tianjin Municipal Rubber Industry Research Institute (天津市橡胶工业研究所








The propulsion system was the biggest obstacle in the development of Yu-6 torpedo. A team of three scientists including Ms. Su Li (苏丽






Over two-thirds of the technologies used for Yu-6 torpedo were new to the Chinese, and there were some serious doubts that China could complete the project on its own. Mr. Dong Chunpeng (董春鹏


Specifications
* Diameter: 533 mm
* Guidance: passive / active acoustic homing + wake homing + wire guidance
* Propulsion: Otto fuel II
* Speed: maximum > 65 kt (for attack)
* Range: maximum 45 km+ (at the cruise speed)"

Yu-6 torpedo
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The most interesting and controversial debate regarding China's reverse-engineering was the development of China's W-88 class miniaturized thermonuclear warhead. The U.S. claims that China appropriated the designs and reverse-engineered the W-88 warhead. China says that isn't true.
China says that this is a case of convergent engineering. For example, an airplane must have two wings to provide lift and an engine to provide thrust in the rear. Another example of convergent engineering is that all rockets are long and thin. In other words, form must follow function. There is only a very limited way to create a massive thermonuclear explosion using a compact warhead.
Here is the crux of the problem. "U.S. government realized that information derived from Chinese tests in 1992-1996 were similar to U.S. nuclear designs." The Chinese nuclear tests data are "similar," but not identical to U.S. nuclear tests on the W-88.

W88 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"The W88 is a United States thermonuclear warhead, with an estimated yield of 475 kiloton (kt), and is small enough to fit on MIRVed missiles. The W88 was designed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1970s. In 1999 the director of Los Alamos who had presided over its design described it as "The most advanced U.S. nuclear warhead."[1]
The Trident II SLBM can be armed with up to 8 W88 (475 kt) warheads (Mark 5) or 8 W76 (100 kt) warheads (Mark 4), but it is limited to 4 warheads under SORT."
NTI: Research Library: Country Profiles: China
"...According to the Cox Committee Report, suspicion of China's nuclear espionage started after the U.S. government realized that information derived from Chinese tests in 1992-1996 were similar to U.S. nuclear designs. This similarity, combined with other information derived from classified sources, led the Cox Committee to claim that China had stolen several bomb designs, including the U.S.' most advanced W-88 design and a design for an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb). Yet, the Cox Report has been severely criticized by both experts and officials in the United States as a political document that has several technical inaccuracies."