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Chinese provocation: Is India prepared? | idrw.org
The Chinese intrusion into Depsang Bulge in East
Ladakh, approximately 19 km inside our
perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on
April 15, has raised temperatures both militarily
and politically on either side. A series of border
personnel meetings between the militaries of the two sides have not been able to resolve the issue
so far and the standoff continues till date. It
would not be incorrect to presume that this latest
provocation from the Chinese side has been
undertaken with the tacit approval of the highest
levels in the Chinese hierarchy. As we grapple with the current situation, it has
reignited introspection as to our level of
preparedness should things go from bad to
worse.Fifty years have elapsed since the Chinese
aggression took place in 1962. A number of
articles have appeared in the media covering that period as well as the events preceding it. While
there are many reasons for the Indian Armys
debacle, and these have been discussed
threadbare in the past 50 years, there is no doubt
about the valour, courage and heroism of the
Indian soldier even in the most adverse circumstances which obtained then. Given the
right training, equipment and battlefield support,
he is better than the best in the world. With that
as the takeaway, we need to ensure that such a
setback is never ever repeated. For a realistic assessment, first and foremost,
there is need for clarity on some basic issues.
Many an analyst has discounted the very
possibility of a future Sino-Indian conflict on the
grounds that both countries stand to gain from a
cooperative engagement, that trade between the two countries is increasing exponentially over
time, that there is enough space for both to grow
simultaneously and that both are speaking in the
same voice at global forums on issues like global
warming, climate change, global economy, trade
barriers, etc. It is further suggested that China already being at
the global level, has more important issues like
Taiwan, South China Sea and finally Pacific Ocean
dominance to worry about in consonance with
its stature; therefore, it would not like to get
involved in a border skirmish with India. While it is good to be optimistic, we should not
veer too far away from pragmatism and reality,
especially where issues of national security are
concerned. The possibility of a standoff like the
present one on the LAC flaring up into a bigger
confrontation can never be ruled out. There is no getting away from the fact that China
has assiduously tried to create an impression that
India does not figure in its scheme of things and
that Indias rise and growth over the past decade
has little significance and in no way threatens
China. In an analysis carried out by Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in January
2013 titled Crux of Asia: China, India and the
Emerging Global Order, Ashley J. Tellis and Sean
Mirski highlight that Differences in the Chinese
and Indian positions sometimes arise from the two countries competing visions but more often
from their underlying geopolitical rivalry, which
appears to be sufficiently deep-rooted so as to
prevent the two states from realising any natural
accommodation. To be sure, both sides bend over
backward to conceal their differences in public, and both have often struggled to reach some
accommodation that might permit occasional
practical cooperation. But the differences in
national power and performance between the
two countries, the seeming disdain with which
China treats India, and the deep fears that India harbors about Chinas policies and intentions lead
to a never-ending contest for securing strategic
advantages. While cooperation and healthy competition are
welcome and desirable, the seeds of
confrontation are inherent between the two
nations engaged in competition, at both the
regional and global level. Considering the fact that India is one of the few
countries with which China has not resolved its
long-standing boundary issue and that it has had
a prolonged mutually beneficial ongoing
relationship with Pakistan, the possibility of a
confrontation between the two can never be ruled out. From a national security perspective, it would,
therefore, be prudent to be prepared for a threat
to our territorial integrity. The last thing that India
would want is a repeat of 1962! A second issue that needs clarity is whether we
expect to be subjected to an all-out, full-fledged
war or a limited border war. Development of
massive infrastructure in Tibet, modernisation of
the PLA Army, Navy and Air Force, growth of
Second Artillery and a fourfold increase in Chinese defence budget since 2000 gives it the
option of indulging in an all-out war. However,
given the regional and global realities, Chinese
consciousness of its image as an emerging global
power and the likely Chinese rationale of going
to war over the boundary issue, the possibility of a limited war appears much stronger. Thirdly, we need to introspect that while we may
from time to time upgrade our operational
readiness to meet the Chinese challenge, the
Chinese continue to remain far ahead and we are
invariably struggling to catch up. This is
inevitable considering the kind of military spending China is indulging in. For the financial
year 2012-13, the official Chinese military budget
was $106.4 billion, the second highest in the
world. As per Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates, the actual
expenditure is likely to be approximately one and a half times this figure. As opposed to this, the Indian defence budget
stood at a meagre $38 billion approximately. In the current financial year, the official Chinese
military budget is $115 billion approximately. In
the span of last two decades, we have seen the
PLA grow from an obsolete force, which was
given a bloody nose by the Vietnamese, into a
formidable, modernised and well-equipped military backed by an array of force multipliers.
In the same period, the Indian military has been
strenuously fighting counter insurgency battles
in both J&K and the northeast and its equipment
profile is nearing obsolescence. The danger is that
this gap between the two is likely to keep increasing with passage of time, if past trends
are any indication. Some major corrective steps
are, therefore, necessary by us before it gets too
late. To begin with, it is crucial that we spend at least
three per cent of our GDP on defence. Yearly
shortfalls on this account can never be made up
by onetime infusion at the time of a crisis. Even during the Kargil conflict, General V P Malik,
the then army chief, was constrained to say we
will fight with what we have in the light of the
shortages existing. We need to have a military
which is consistently ready to face challenges to
the country. National security, to ensure unhindered growth, is crucial. With the limited resources available, we need to
priortise our spending in such a manner that
immediate threats are taken care of before we
move on to other larger goals. It must also be
appreciated that in the ultimate analysis, victory
or defeat is measured in terms of real estate gained or lost. Thus, in case of a limited war with
China, it is important that the Army and the Air
Force who have to fight that war are allocated
larger resources to begin with. The infrastructure on our side of the Line of
Actual Control (LAC) between China and India has
yet to be developed fully, despite our best efforts
so far. This is likely to prove a handicap in
fighting a successful defensive battle. Our own
environmental restrictions and prolonged land acquisition procedures need to be fine-tuned to
hasten infrastructural development. Sixty-five
years after independence, we are still dependent
on one single, tenuous road axis in a number of
crucial sectors. Secondly, the Border Roads Organisation, which
is the prime agency responsible for creating
infrastructure in areas close to the LAC, is neither
well-equipped and staffed nor well-organised
and funded to deliver the desired results. Its
functioning needs to be thoroughly reviewed and adequate funding provided to it to complete
important infrastructure projects in a time-bound
manner. The possibility that in case of a conflict with
China, Pakistan will not hesitate to fish in troubled
waters and start something of its own on our
western border also cannot be ruled out.
Therefore, India has to be prepared to defend
itself on both fronts and must accordingly develop its capabilities. With a regime change in China having taken
place, it would be worth Indias while to work
for a mutually acceptable settlement of the
vexatious boundary issue. A resolution of this
crucial issue would reduce the possibility of
hostilities between the two countries. Further, it would avoid the threat of a two-front war,
improve bilateral relations with China and
enhance cooperation between the two countries
on regional and global issues. Finally, India has been consistent in following an
independent foreign policy which suits our
interests best. We have consciously stayed away
from being part of any alignments. However, in
the event of a continuously bellicose and
confrontationist Chinese attitude, India should keep its options open for alignments at both the
regional and global levels to meet the challenges
of a hostile environment. Diplomatic alignments
would be an additional hedge against avoiding a
repeat of 1962.
The Chinese intrusion into Depsang Bulge in East
Ladakh, approximately 19 km inside our
perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on
April 15, has raised temperatures both militarily
and politically on either side. A series of border
personnel meetings between the militaries of the two sides have not been able to resolve the issue
so far and the standoff continues till date. It
would not be incorrect to presume that this latest
provocation from the Chinese side has been
undertaken with the tacit approval of the highest
levels in the Chinese hierarchy. As we grapple with the current situation, it has
reignited introspection as to our level of
preparedness should things go from bad to
worse.Fifty years have elapsed since the Chinese
aggression took place in 1962. A number of
articles have appeared in the media covering that period as well as the events preceding it. While
there are many reasons for the Indian Armys
debacle, and these have been discussed
threadbare in the past 50 years, there is no doubt
about the valour, courage and heroism of the
Indian soldier even in the most adverse circumstances which obtained then. Given the
right training, equipment and battlefield support,
he is better than the best in the world. With that
as the takeaway, we need to ensure that such a
setback is never ever repeated. For a realistic assessment, first and foremost,
there is need for clarity on some basic issues.
Many an analyst has discounted the very
possibility of a future Sino-Indian conflict on the
grounds that both countries stand to gain from a
cooperative engagement, that trade between the two countries is increasing exponentially over
time, that there is enough space for both to grow
simultaneously and that both are speaking in the
same voice at global forums on issues like global
warming, climate change, global economy, trade
barriers, etc. It is further suggested that China already being at
the global level, has more important issues like
Taiwan, South China Sea and finally Pacific Ocean
dominance to worry about in consonance with
its stature; therefore, it would not like to get
involved in a border skirmish with India. While it is good to be optimistic, we should not
veer too far away from pragmatism and reality,
especially where issues of national security are
concerned. The possibility of a standoff like the
present one on the LAC flaring up into a bigger
confrontation can never be ruled out. There is no getting away from the fact that China
has assiduously tried to create an impression that
India does not figure in its scheme of things and
that Indias rise and growth over the past decade
has little significance and in no way threatens
China. In an analysis carried out by Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in January
2013 titled Crux of Asia: China, India and the
Emerging Global Order, Ashley J. Tellis and Sean
Mirski highlight that Differences in the Chinese
and Indian positions sometimes arise from the two countries competing visions but more often
from their underlying geopolitical rivalry, which
appears to be sufficiently deep-rooted so as to
prevent the two states from realising any natural
accommodation. To be sure, both sides bend over
backward to conceal their differences in public, and both have often struggled to reach some
accommodation that might permit occasional
practical cooperation. But the differences in
national power and performance between the
two countries, the seeming disdain with which
China treats India, and the deep fears that India harbors about Chinas policies and intentions lead
to a never-ending contest for securing strategic
advantages. While cooperation and healthy competition are
welcome and desirable, the seeds of
confrontation are inherent between the two
nations engaged in competition, at both the
regional and global level. Considering the fact that India is one of the few
countries with which China has not resolved its
long-standing boundary issue and that it has had
a prolonged mutually beneficial ongoing
relationship with Pakistan, the possibility of a
confrontation between the two can never be ruled out. From a national security perspective, it would,
therefore, be prudent to be prepared for a threat
to our territorial integrity. The last thing that India
would want is a repeat of 1962! A second issue that needs clarity is whether we
expect to be subjected to an all-out, full-fledged
war or a limited border war. Development of
massive infrastructure in Tibet, modernisation of
the PLA Army, Navy and Air Force, growth of
Second Artillery and a fourfold increase in Chinese defence budget since 2000 gives it the
option of indulging in an all-out war. However,
given the regional and global realities, Chinese
consciousness of its image as an emerging global
power and the likely Chinese rationale of going
to war over the boundary issue, the possibility of a limited war appears much stronger. Thirdly, we need to introspect that while we may
from time to time upgrade our operational
readiness to meet the Chinese challenge, the
Chinese continue to remain far ahead and we are
invariably struggling to catch up. This is
inevitable considering the kind of military spending China is indulging in. For the financial
year 2012-13, the official Chinese military budget
was $106.4 billion, the second highest in the
world. As per Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates, the actual
expenditure is likely to be approximately one and a half times this figure. As opposed to this, the Indian defence budget
stood at a meagre $38 billion approximately. In the current financial year, the official Chinese
military budget is $115 billion approximately. In
the span of last two decades, we have seen the
PLA grow from an obsolete force, which was
given a bloody nose by the Vietnamese, into a
formidable, modernised and well-equipped military backed by an array of force multipliers.
In the same period, the Indian military has been
strenuously fighting counter insurgency battles
in both J&K and the northeast and its equipment
profile is nearing obsolescence. The danger is that
this gap between the two is likely to keep increasing with passage of time, if past trends
are any indication. Some major corrective steps
are, therefore, necessary by us before it gets too
late. To begin with, it is crucial that we spend at least
three per cent of our GDP on defence. Yearly
shortfalls on this account can never be made up
by onetime infusion at the time of a crisis. Even during the Kargil conflict, General V P Malik,
the then army chief, was constrained to say we
will fight with what we have in the light of the
shortages existing. We need to have a military
which is consistently ready to face challenges to
the country. National security, to ensure unhindered growth, is crucial. With the limited resources available, we need to
priortise our spending in such a manner that
immediate threats are taken care of before we
move on to other larger goals. It must also be
appreciated that in the ultimate analysis, victory
or defeat is measured in terms of real estate gained or lost. Thus, in case of a limited war with
China, it is important that the Army and the Air
Force who have to fight that war are allocated
larger resources to begin with. The infrastructure on our side of the Line of
Actual Control (LAC) between China and India has
yet to be developed fully, despite our best efforts
so far. This is likely to prove a handicap in
fighting a successful defensive battle. Our own
environmental restrictions and prolonged land acquisition procedures need to be fine-tuned to
hasten infrastructural development. Sixty-five
years after independence, we are still dependent
on one single, tenuous road axis in a number of
crucial sectors. Secondly, the Border Roads Organisation, which
is the prime agency responsible for creating
infrastructure in areas close to the LAC, is neither
well-equipped and staffed nor well-organised
and funded to deliver the desired results. Its
functioning needs to be thoroughly reviewed and adequate funding provided to it to complete
important infrastructure projects in a time-bound
manner. The possibility that in case of a conflict with
China, Pakistan will not hesitate to fish in troubled
waters and start something of its own on our
western border also cannot be ruled out.
Therefore, India has to be prepared to defend
itself on both fronts and must accordingly develop its capabilities. With a regime change in China having taken
place, it would be worth Indias while to work
for a mutually acceptable settlement of the
vexatious boundary issue. A resolution of this
crucial issue would reduce the possibility of
hostilities between the two countries. Further, it would avoid the threat of a two-front war,
improve bilateral relations with China and
enhance cooperation between the two countries
on regional and global issues. Finally, India has been consistent in following an
independent foreign policy which suits our
interests best. We have consciously stayed away
from being part of any alignments. However, in
the event of a continuously bellicose and
confrontationist Chinese attitude, India should keep its options open for alignments at both the
regional and global levels to meet the challenges
of a hostile environment. Diplomatic alignments
would be an additional hedge against avoiding a
repeat of 1962.
