China's String of Pearls vs India's Iron Curtain

[indian_foxhound]

“India’s growing international stature gives it strategic relevance in the area ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca…India has exploited the fluidities of the emerging world order to forge new links through a combination of diplomatic repositioning, economic resurgence and military firmness”.

—Dr Manmohan Singh

“We see the Indian Navy as a significant stabilising force in the Indian Ocean region, which safeguards traffic bound not only for our own ports, but also the flow of hydrocarbons and strategically important cargo to and from the rest of the world across the strategic waterways close to our shores…And so, the safety of SLOCS will always remain a priority for India in the foreseeable future” —Admiral Sureesh Mehta

The above statements have given grist to China to defend itself on what has been touted by a US researcher as ‘China’s String of Pearls’ of bases in the Indian Ocean. Naval analyst Zhang Ming recently proclaimed that the Islands of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Archipelago could be used as a ‘metal chain’ to block Chinese access to the Straits of Malacca. China has gone further to claim that India is building an ‘Iron Curtain’ in the Indian Ocean, which is debatable.

In recent years, a number of analysts have drawn attention to the similarities of nationalism, between the rise of modern China and the rise of Wilhelmine Germany. Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria, says that “like Germany in the late 19th century, China is growing rapidly but uncertainly, into a global system (including the Indian Ocean) in which it feels it deserves more attention and honor. The Chinese military ( CMC) is a powerful political player, as was the Prussian officer corps. Like Germany, the Chinese regime is trying to hold on to political power even as it unleashes forces in society that make its control increasingly shaky.”
More recently President Obama has stated that the future of the world will depend on the USA– China relationship, and that could well turn out to be a truism. The 19th century strategic thinker Mahan had prophesised that the future of the world in the 21st century would be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean and in this, India’s expansion of its maritime power and Navy, and inroads in to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is very much on China’s radar, which deserves introspection.
It is less publicised or talked about, but in the last two decades India has stealthily straddled its interests in the Indian Ocean Rim, which includes the islands of Mauritius, Maldives, Seychelles and Madagascar and the rim states of South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique by very deft moves in foreign policy, economic sops like the double taxation exemption with Mauritius, and military inroads. This is the classical strategy of gaining influence by conjoining economic perks and power, with military diplomacy called ‘Showing the Flag’, so well perfected by larger maritime naval powers in the past. The Indian Navy has transferred offshore naval patrol vessels, provided staff and training, and refit facilities and most importantly provided naval hydrographic support to the island nations of the IOR, which steps have left strategic imprints on the recipients.

It is less known, that in the late 80s the Indian Navy moved in a Leander pretending it needed repairs, and concurrently flew in armed personnel to Victoria from Mumbai, to help ward off a coup against President Albert Rene of the Seychelles.
The coup was engineered by Col Mike ‘Mad’ Hoare of the Longreach Company of South Africa, now made public in a book Mercenary Invasion of Seychelles, by Aubrey Brooks and Graham Linscoff. In 1998 the Indian Navy’s INS Godavari berthed at Maldives, and Army troops flew in by IL-76s in ‘Op Cactus’ and staved off a coup. Dissident Abdullah Luthufi had led 80 armed mercenaries of the Sri Lankan organisation (PLOTE), in an attempt to capture and overthrow President Gayoom.
The Indian Navy has deputed warships and helicopters to provide security at the African heads’ meetings, a move very much appreciated by the population at large.

Indian Navy’s Hydrographic Arm’s Inroads in to the IOR
The Indian Navy possesses a sophisticated hydrographic cadre, with eight well equipped survey ships , numerous survey craft, a large world class electronic chart production facility in Dehradun and a hydrographic school at Goa which trains several foreign naval and civilian personnel. Much funding for the Navy’s survey ships has been contributed by the Ministry of Shipping, which allows easier induction of latest equipment, and a swifter procurement route than the cumbersome MOD’s DPP-08, which is still to prove its efficacy. China views India’s hydrographic activities as strategic inroads in to the Indian Ocean.
The Chinese and Indian swords are sheathed for the time being, but they could be out and India has to be prepared for the String of Pearls vs the Iron Curtain debate
The Indian Government, appreciative of the hydrographic work done by the Indian Navy, swiftly ordered six 600 ton Austal (Australia/USA) design Catamaran Survey ships in 2006 at the Alcock Ashdown Shipyard at Bhavnagar. The IN’s Chief Hydrographer Vice Admiral BA Rao has stated the first platform will be in service by 2010, and the balance in annual series production. The Indian Navy will then be the second Navy in the world to employ low draught catamarans with on board helicopters, which will have the advantage to speedily survey close inshore, doing away with the age old time consuming ‘boat work for survey’, which requires meticulous re-validation.
As a silent strategic arm, the Indian Navy’s hydrographic branch has made significant forays in the IOR to undertake over a dozen survey assignments for island nations and recently executed surveys in Oman and now is set to advise Saudi Arabia, for which an MOU has been signed in March this year. These successes have almost blocked out the more expensive western navies that had provided essentially needed hydrographic support to the island nations which possess large coast lines and EEZ. India’s hydrographic policy has already paid off, and will pay richer dividends in the future to compete and ward off China’s influence in the region, and its ‘String of Pearls’ that has funded ports like Gwadar in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Sittwe in Mynmar, covering the rim of India.

The Indian Ocean Matrix for India–China Relations
The Indian Ocean holds importance for India’s development in the 21st century and the Chatham House paper states, “India’s strategy is deepening not only commercially, but due to concerns over its security and hegemony in the region, which are underpinned by India’s 2004 Maritime Doctrine.” The Chinese views aired at the 2009 Malacca Straits Kuala Lumpur Conference was that ‘India is looking East and forming an Iron Curtain in the Indian Ocean’.
Indian Navys responsibility to ensure stability in the IOR, which irks the Chinese as they view the Indian Ocean as their life line for trade and energy.

The Chinese view the Indian Navy’s gathering of 28 IOR Naval Chiefs including France, a riparian state under one roof at the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in February 2008 in New Delhi and Goa for a retreat, as ganging up in the IOR. When confronted with the String of Pearls, Chinese brush it off as small change provided to poor nations for port development, adding India gets easy ADB and World Bank loans for port development. The swords were out on this.
India’s Indian Ocean African Rim grouping called IOR–ARC (the Arrangement for Regional Cooperation), and India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) forum which are groupings for commercial links, provision of energy and other resources from Africa, are viewed by the Chinese in security terms, as there is another ‘Scramble for Africas’, made famous in a book by that title by Thomas Pakenham.
India’s maritime military strategy and the Navy’s 2004 maritime doctrine, both issued by the Indian Navy are very clear that it is the Indian Navy’s responsibility to ensure stability in the IOR, which irks the Chinese as they view the Indian Ocean as their life line for trade and energy. Chi Haotin had said, ‘It is Indian Ocean not India’s Ocean’. India’s out going Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta made his mandate clear at the recent Shangri la dialogue in Singapore in the presence of Chinese General Mao, stating, “Concerted efforts at capability enhancement and capacity building of the smaller countries of the region (IOR), through active assistance of larger neighbours, would be crucial to such efforts in the long term”.

India has developed a special relationship with Mauritius, which is a fulcrum island state because of its strong Indian diaspora. India has instituted a favourable taxation treaty that makes it India’s largest offshore investor. The Indian Navy set up the Mauritius Coast Guard in the 70s, and has provided ships and personnel, and Mauritius has close security coordination with India’s CIA, the R&AW.
Chinese and Pakistan activities in the IOR are closely monitored by India’s intelligence and India has forestalled Chinese expansionist moves to lease islands in the Seychelles. The India–China competition to seek influence in the region is set to intensify as China’s cheque book diplomacy currently finds favour in small African states especially in Sudan and Zimbabwe. Deng’s philosophy of ‘the colour of the cat does not matter as long as it catches rats’, is still relevant.

When the IOR–ARC was formed, Mauritius, Madagascar and Mozambique supported India’s move to block Pakistan’s membership and later China’s access to India, Brazil, South Africa – IBSA. The Indian Navy has also made in-roads to gain over flying and berthing rights in Oman, which holds a strategic location especially for the fight against piracy off the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Navy can monitor the SLOCs of Hormuz and Aden. India has signed an MOU to provide piracy patrols to Mozambique. It was also reported that India has established a listening post in Madagascar in 2007. No denial was issued by the Government. The Chinese alluded to these issues at the Malacca Conference held in Kuala Lumpur, offering all support for the security of the Straits, in what is termed as China’s Malacca dilemma.
The India China competition to seek influence in the region is set to intensify as Chinas cheque book diplomacy currently finds favour in small African states especially in Sudan and Zimbabwe.[/COLOR

India’s Military Maritime Strategy in the IOR – C3i
India’s maritime strategy envisages a swathe of area as its watch from Aden and the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca and Mahan appears to have seen the coming importance of this region which provides 70 percent of the world’s hydrocarbons. K Santhanam, former Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and one of the architects of India’s nuclear programme , has coined the C3I theory for India–China relations and needs heeding. It envisages that India and China will seek active cooperation as China has become India’s largest trading partner, and yet both will always be in competition.

“¦China feels it has a stake in providing maritime forces and resources in the IOR when it has the capability or havens to do so.

In the future, confrontation cannot be ruled out if both nations’ interests clash, hence the C3i, as India has an unresolved border dispute with China. The ‘I’ stands for which nation will obtain superior ‘Intelligence’ and includes space and cyber warfare abilities. This writer feels the world has to be prepared for C3I as nation’s juggle to balance China and India in their relations as both are growing economic powers.
China has invested $200 million and China Harbour Engineering Company has assisted Pakistan to set up Phase One of the Gwadar deep water port, which is 75 nautical miles east of the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. India uses Bandar Abbas, which is at the narrow entrance of the Hormuz as a transit hub, to transport its $1.2 billion worth of on-going aid projects in Afghanistan.
The Chinese plan to use Pakistan’s Gwadar as the transit hub for its energy and other imported resources, especially from Africa to be ferried by road and pipeline to Central China in the not so distant future. This is a core national endeavour and aspiration for China. Hence China supports Pakistan and this leads to the importance of Pakistan–China vis a vis the India–Iran relations. This triangle needs to be factored as it could lead to challenges if any nation’s national interests, like Iran’s nuclear ambitions are at stake.
The Chinese plan to use Pakistans Gwadar as the transit hub for its energy and other imported resources, especially from Africa”¦

Much of India’s oil and gas arrives by sea from the Middle East. Hence ensuring no disruption of the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean are not only vital for the world’s economy, but for India too, and China feels it has a stake in providing maritime forces and resources in the IOR when it has the capability or havens to do so. The Nippon Foundation and China contribute generously to the Tripartite Technical Expert Group (TTEG) of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore that administer the Malacca Straits.
India recently decided to contribute $1.2 million as a response, and advanced $774,000 to the TTEG on 31st March, 2009. India has volunteered to survey wrecks in the Malacca Straits which has been accepted by the TTEG, another red rag to the Chinese.
The Chinese and Indian swords are sheathed for the time being, but they could be out and India has to be prepared for the String of Pearls vs the Iron Curtain debate in what Santhnam has coined as C3I, for it was Chi Haotin who had said, “The Indian Ocean is not India’s Ocean”. As the Chinese warn, never dig a spear in to the Dragon’s eye, and do not hammer at a stone, chisel it. The stationing of three PLA Navy ships to fight piracy off Aden and Somalia is China’s way of chiseling in to the Indian Ocean. In the 21st century, China’s PLAN may well straddle the Indian Ocean, to protect its national interests.

China’s String of Pearls vs India’s Iron Curtain » Indian Defence Review | Page 3

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

Alarmist thread.

 

[OrionHunter]

The PLA Navy believes that a base in the India ocean should be relatively stable, contain facilities for communications, repairs, replenishment of fuel, re-supply of rations and offer avenues for recreation. The most obvious choice for a Chinese base would of course, be from amongst one of the ‘pearls’ from its so called ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean.

Bangladeshi and Myanmarese Ports

The Bangladeshi and Myanmarese ports in the Bay of Bengal may be too out of the way from the standard transit routes to the Arabian Sea and hence may not be suitable in the current Chinese scheme of things. This leaves China with an option of establishing a military base either in Sri Lanka (Galle/ Hambantotta) or Pakistan (Gwadar/Pasni).

Sri Lanka (Galle/ Hambantotta)

While the Sri Lankan ports do lie astride the Arabian Sea transit route, they would still be too far away (about 2000 NM) from the current scene of action. Further, the moot question will be whether Sri Lanka would want to risk antagonizing a close and large neighbour like India, to which it is geo-politically and inseparably linked, by allowing China to set up a naval base on its territory.

Pakistan (Gwadar/Pasni)

The next best option for China would then be Pakistan, for evident reasons, i.e. close Sino-Pak economic and military association as against the uncertain India-Pak relations. Pakistan and China also share the land borders, through which such a base can be supported reasonably well. However, such a base would suffer from certain inherent disadvantages when seen from a maritime perspective. The base would be too close to India and would be well within the range of Indian naval surveillance and strike envelope. It could also be susceptible to blockade, as was witnessed off Karachi Port during the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict. Further, the Chinese warships repeatedly transiting to and from ports in Pakistan would be prone to intrusive monitoring, signature profiling, tracking and trailing by the Indian Navy, due to the very nature of their passage constraints.

Maldives

The various islands of Maldives and Seychelles present a range of opportunities for a country which seeks to maintain a holistic maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region, as it would offset all the above mentioned disadvantages associated with the Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports. China has been actively wooing both, Maldives and Seychelles with offer of economic assistance, infrastructure development and liberal financial loans / grants. There have been unconfirmed reports of Maldives having leased ‘Marao atoll’ to China for constructing a naval base.

However, India and Maldives share very strong bilateral relations built on sizable economic, security and social cooperation. India had provided security support in foiling a coup attempt against the Maldivian Government in 1988 in an operation named ‘Op Cactus’. More recently, India handed over a fast patrol craft to the Maldivian Coast Guard in 2006. The Indian Defence Minister, A K Antony visited Maldives in August 2009 and initiated a series of measures to enhance defence cooperation. India has promised to transfer two ‘Dhruv’ helicopters, 26 coastal radars and regular Dornier patrol sorties over the island nation as part of the security plan. India will also set up a 25 bed military hospital in Male and assist in setting up the Maldivian Air Force. Thus the geographical proximity of Maldives to India as also its close political ties, will pose the same dilemma to Maldives as applicable to Sri Lanka if it were to consider the basing of Chinese ships on its territory. The Chinese leadership would surely take these factors into account, when they mull over the ‘military base’ issue.

Seychelles

A base in Seychelles, which is virtually in the centre of the West Indian Ocean and the focus of the current Chinese maritime activities, would be more appropriate for the Chinese Navy. The island nation is located close enough to its energy traffic transiting through the Red Sea, as also heading homewards from the West African coast around the Cape of Good Hope. It would enable the PLA Navy to monitor this vital energy route and provide security when needed.

The biggest maritime advantage for PLA Navy would be that the naval base as also the assets using it would be well away from the prying eyes and intrusive surveillance by the Indian Navy. The base would be also be close enough to the sea route of US naval assets transiting to Diego Garcia, enabling China to mount some kind of surveillance in future as and when their capabilities grow to an appropriately advanced level.

Considering the above, the only option for the PLA Navy would be to set up a naval base at Seychelles due to its inherent advantages. There are at present NO Chinese bases anywhere in the IOR/Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea. The so called 'String of Pearls' is therefore a figment of someone's imagination.

Here's a map which shows the area in question...

 

[indian_foxhound]

The PLA Navy believes that a base in the India ocean should be relatively stable, contain facilities for communications, repairs, replenishment of fuel, re-supply of rations and offer avenues for recreation. The most obvious choice for a Chinese base would of course, be from amongst one of the ‘pearls’ from its so called ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean.

Bangladeshi and Myanmarese Ports

The Bangladeshi and Myanmarese ports in the Bay of Bengal may be too out of the way from the standard transit routes to the Arabian Sea and hence may not be suitable in the current Chinese scheme of things. This leaves China with an option of establishing a military base either in Sri Lanka (Galle/ Hambantotta) or Pakistan (Gwadar/Pasni).

Sri Lanka (Galle/ Hambantotta)

While the Sri Lankan ports do lie astride the Arabian Sea transit route, they would still be too far away (about 2000 NM) from the current scene of action. Further, the moot question will be whether Sri Lanka would want to risk antagonizing a close and large neighbour like India, to which it is geo-politically and inseparably linked, by allowing China to set up a naval base on its territory.

Pakistan (Gwadar/Pasni)

The next best option for China would then be Pakistan, for evident reasons, i.e. close Sino-Pak economic and military association as against the uncertain India-Pak relations. Pakistan and China also share the land borders, through which such a base can be supported reasonably well. However, such a base would suffer from certain inherent disadvantages when seen from a maritime perspective. The base would be too close to India and would be well within the range of Indian naval surveillance and strike envelope. It could also be susceptible to blockade, as was witnessed off Karachi Port during the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict. Further, the Chinese warships repeatedly transiting to and from ports in Pakistan would be prone to intrusive monitoring, signature profiling, tracking and trailing by the Indian Navy, due to the very nature of their passage constraints.

Maldives

The various islands of Maldives and Seychelles present a range of opportunities for a country which seeks to maintain a holistic maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region, as it would offset all the above mentioned disadvantages associated with the Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports. China has been actively wooing both, Maldives and Seychelles with offer of economic assistance, infrastructure development and liberal financial loans / grants. There have been unconfirmed reports of Maldives having leased ‘Marao atoll’ to China for constructing a naval base.

However, India and Maldives share very strong bilateral relations built on sizable economic, security and social cooperation. India had provided security support in foiling a coup attempt against the Maldivian Government in 1988 in an operation named ‘Op Cactus’. More recently, India handed over a fast patrol craft to the Maldivian Coast Guard in 2006. The Indian Defence Minister, A K Antony visited Maldives in August 2009 and initiated a series of measures to enhance defence cooperation. India has promised to transfer two ‘Dhruv’ helicopters, 26 coastal radars and regular Dornier patrol sorties over the island nation as part of the security plan. India will also set up a 25 bed military hospital in Male and assist in setting up the Maldivian Air Force. Thus the geographical proximity of Maldives to India as also its close political ties, will pose the same dilemma to Maldives as applicable to Sri Lanka if it were to consider the basing of Chinese ships on its territory. The Chinese leadership would surely take these factors into account, when they mull over the ‘military base’ issue.

Seychelles

A base in Seychelles, which is virtually in the centre of the West Indian Ocean and the focus of the current Chinese maritime activities, would be more appropriate for the Chinese Navy. The island nation is located close enough to its energy traffic transiting through the Red Sea, as also heading homewards from the West African coast around the Cape of Good Hope. It would enable the PLA Navy to monitor this vital energy route and provide security when needed.

The biggest maritime advantage for PLA Navy would be that the naval base as also the assets using it would be well away from the prying eyes and intrusive surveillance by the Indian Navy. The base would be also be close enough to the sea route of US naval assets transiting to Diego Garcia, enabling China to mount some kind of surveillance in future as and when their capabilities grow to an appropriately advanced level.

Considering the above, the only option for the PLA Navy would be to set up a naval base at Seychelles due to its inherent advantages. There are at present NO Chinese bases anywhere in the IOR/Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea. The so called 'String of Pearls' is therefore a figment of someone's imagination.

Here's a map which shows the area in question...

One of the best i have read on pdf

 

[navtrek]

India is in a very very strategic location Good for us!

 

[faithfulguy]

Why is there so many articles talking about India vs China when the actual master of Indian Ocean is the US Navy. Ignoring the presence of USN any where is a mistake.

 

[Sashan]

The PLA Navy believes that a base in the India ocean should be relatively stable, contain facilities for communications, repairs, replenishment of fuel, re-supply of rations and offer avenues for recreation. The most obvious choice for a Chinese base would of course, be from amongst one of the ‘pearls’ from its so called ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean.

Bangladeshi and Myanmarese Ports

The Bangladeshi and Myanmarese ports in the Bay of Bengal may be too out of the way from the standard transit routes to the Arabian Sea and hence may not be suitable in the current Chinese scheme of things. This leaves China with an option of establishing a military base either in Sri Lanka (Galle/ Hambantotta) or Pakistan (Gwadar/Pasni).

Sri Lanka (Galle/ Hambantotta)

While the Sri Lankan ports do lie astride the Arabian Sea transit route, they would still be too far away (about 2000 NM) from the current scene of action. Further, the moot question will be whether Sri Lanka would want to risk antagonizing a close and large neighbour like India, to which it is geo-politically and inseparably linked, by allowing China to set up a naval base on its territory.

Pakistan (Gwadar/Pasni)

The next best option for China would then be Pakistan, for evident reasons, i.e. close Sino-Pak economic and military association as against the uncertain India-Pak relations. Pakistan and China also share the land borders, through which such a base can be supported reasonably well. However, such a base would suffer from certain inherent disadvantages when seen from a maritime perspective. The base would be too close to India and would be well within the range of Indian naval surveillance and strike envelope. It could also be susceptible to blockade, as was witnessed off Karachi Port during the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict. Further, the Chinese warships repeatedly transiting to and from ports in Pakistan would be prone to intrusive monitoring, signature profiling, tracking and trailing by the Indian Navy, due to the very nature of their passage constraints.

Maldives

The various islands of Maldives and Seychelles present a range of opportunities for a country which seeks to maintain a holistic maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region, as it would offset all the above mentioned disadvantages associated with the Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports. China has been actively wooing both, Maldives and Seychelles with offer of economic assistance, infrastructure development and liberal financial loans / grants. There have been unconfirmed reports of Maldives having leased ‘Marao atoll’ to China for constructing a naval base.

However, India and Maldives share very strong bilateral relations built on sizable economic, security and social cooperation. India had provided security support in foiling a coup attempt against the Maldivian Government in 1988 in an operation named ‘Op Cactus’. More recently, India handed over a fast patrol craft to the Maldivian Coast Guard in 2006. The Indian Defence Minister, A K Antony visited Maldives in August 2009 and initiated a series of measures to enhance defence cooperation. India has promised to transfer two ‘Dhruv’ helicopters, 26 coastal radars and regular Dornier patrol sorties over the island nation as part of the security plan. India will also set up a 25 bed military hospital in Male and assist in setting up the Maldivian Air Force. Thus the geographical proximity of Maldives to India as also its close political ties, will pose the same dilemma to Maldives as applicable to Sri Lanka if it were to consider the basing of Chinese ships on its territory. The Chinese leadership would surely take these factors into account, when they mull over the ‘military base’ issue.

Seychelles

A base in Seychelles, which is virtually in the centre of the West Indian Ocean and the focus of the current Chinese maritime activities, would be more appropriate for the Chinese Navy. The island nation is located close enough to its energy traffic transiting through the Red Sea, as also heading homewards from the West African coast around the Cape of Good Hope. It would enable the PLA Navy to monitor this vital energy route and provide security when needed.

The biggest maritime advantage for PLA Navy would be that the naval base as also the assets using it would be well away from the prying eyes and intrusive surveillance by the Indian Navy. The base would be also be close enough to the sea route of US naval assets transiting to Diego Garcia, enabling China to mount some kind of surveillance in future as and when their capabilities grow to an appropriately advanced level.

Considering the above, the only option for the PLA Navy would be to set up a naval base at Seychelles due to its inherent advantages. There are at present NO Chinese bases anywhere in the IOR/Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea. The so called 'String of Pearls' is therefore a figment of someone's imagination.

Here's a map which shows the area in question...

While this article is an excellent analysis, the author has missed that India has invested enough in terms of political mileage with India helping in preventing a coup in Seychelles in 1980s - "Operation Flowers are blooming" (actually first Indian Naval intervention in Indian Ocean) and has helped Seychelles with aids including naval equipments (INS Tarmugli plus helicopters and Dorniers) in fighting pirates with Indian naval ships themselves patrolling near Seychelles waters. Overall it is one happy marriage and Seychelles is much more prudent than try to come out of one happy marriage and enter into an affair with a distant partner.

Seychelles says it would be

Seychelles, a strategically located archipelago in the Indian Ocean, on Monday assured India that it would be a “rock of dependability” for New Delhi in the area and thanked it for the support in combating piracy.

 

[Developereo]

The term "iron curtain" is already taken, almost a century ago.

Time to put that Indian inventiveness to use and come up with an original term.

 

[Sashan]

Why is there so many articles talking about India vs China when the actual master of Indian Ocean is the US Navy. Ignoring the presence of USN any where is a mistake.

While USN is the grand daddy, USN and IN has been sharing the space and influence in Indian Ocean for decades. It is the PLAN which needs to take into consideration USN besides IN if it tries to create its influence, With Obama's new Asia policy, it is going to be extremely difficult for PLAN to break the influence of USN in SCS and project power in Indian Ocean taking on two naval powers.

 

[priti]

why dont everyone go back to their own country and do what they usually do. simply wasting time and money by doing this silly macho exercise and feeling important.

 

[Shinigami]

True that. Indian ocean, pacific, south china sea,... US Navy is the master of it all

 

[Sashan]

why dont everyone go back to their own country and do what they usually do. simply wasting time and money by doing this silly macho exercise and feeling important.

For China it is not a macho exercise. It is about secuing her energy lanes. Right now it can move oil fom middle east through Malacca straights (to a certain extent through Burma) but if Malacca Straights is blocked, China is vulnerable in future conflicts. That is where Gwadar will help secure alternate lanes through Karakoram highway.

For India, it is suspicious due to string of pearls theory and the need to take on China-Pakistan due to territorial disputes with these two countries and the need to fight a 3 front war (Pakistan border, China border and Indian Ocean )

 

[priti]

For China it is not a macho exercise. It is about secuing her energy lanes. Right now it can move oil fom middle east through Malacca straights (to a certain extent through Burma) but if Malacca Straights is blocked, China is vulnerable in future conflicts. That is where Gwadar will help secure alternate lanes through Karakoram highway.

For India, it is suspicious due to string of pearls theory and the need to take on China-Pakistan due to territorial disputes with these two countries and the need to fight a 3 front war (Pakistan border, China border and Indian Ocean )

why should china secure the energy rights? its intl ocean so anyone can travel.

 

[Sashan]

why should china secure the energy rights? its intl ocean so anyone can travel.

Not rights but lanes - the routes through which it transports oil from middle east. China is an importer of oil and say it is fighting a war in future with even India, if India blocks Malacca straights, China will not have oil to run its military infrastructure after it has spent its reserves and would be starring at defeat. So it should be in a position to import/transport oil even in times of war.


See this 1971 war example

Between Operations Trident and Python, and the Indian Air Force attacks on Karachi's fuel and ammunition depots, more than 50 percent of the total fuel requirement of the Karachi zone was reported to have been blown up.[3][12] The result was a crippling economic blow to Pakistan. The damage was estimated at worth $3 billion,[12] with most of the oil reserves[6] and ammunition, warehouses and workshops had been destroyed and PAF was also hit.[12]
Python was another successful operation by the Indian Navy.[1] The Pakistani fuel reserves for the sector were destroyed and the flames could be seen even from miles away.[3] India had established complete control over the oil route from the Persian Gulf to Pakistani ports.[6][10] Shipping traffic to and from Karachi, Pakistan's only major port at that time, ceased. The Pakistani Navy's main ships were either destroyed or forced to remain in port. A partial naval blockade was imposed by the Indian Navy on the port of Karachi.[2][3][4][9]

 

[priti]

Not rights but lanes - the routes through which it transports oil from middle east. China is an importer of oil and say it is fighting a war in future with even India, if India blocks Malacca straights, China will not have oil to run its military infrastructure after it has spent its reserves and would be starring at defeat. So it should be in a position to import/transport oil even in times of war.


See this 1971 war example

Between Operations Trident and Python, and the Indian Air Force attacks on Karachi's fuel and ammunition depots, more than 50 percent of the total fuel requirement of the Karachi zone was reported to have been blown up.[3][12] The result was a crippling economic blow to Pakistan. The damage was estimated at worth $3 billion,[12] with most of the oil reserves[6] and ammunition, warehouses and workshops had been destroyed and PAF was also hit.[12]
Python was another successful operation by the Indian Navy.[1] The Pakistani fuel reserves for the sector were destroyed and the flames could be seen even from miles away.[3] India had established complete control over the oil route from the Persian Gulf to Pakistani ports.[6][10] Shipping traffic to and from Karachi, Pakistan's only major port at that time, ceased. The Pakistani Navy's main ships were either destroyed or forced to remain in port. A partial naval blockade was imposed by the Indian Navy on the port of Karachi.[2][3][4][9]

why should china and india fight war