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China's Nuclear Strike Force

China lacks a significant number of ICBMs that can cover all of USA. I think China needs up to 200 DF-31A ICBMs, all MIRV'ed. as well as new silo-based ICBMs solid-fuelled with less than 10 minutes launching time after notice with a range of 14,000-15,000kms. China also needs stealth bombers that can deliver nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

We don't know the number of ICBMs that China has right now.

The DF-31A are already MIRVed, with 3 warheads each. The warheads supposedly incorporate MaRV technology, which will enable it to dodge and evade ABM systems.

Silo-based missiles are already considered out of date methods of nuclear attack. They will be the first ones to be destroyed when the enemy launches their pre emptive strike. Mobility is key to the survival of nuclear forces.

The JL-2 has an estimated range of 14000 km while the DF-31A has 12000 km range and the DF-41 has 14000 km range. The improved DF-5A has 15000 km range, but it's silo based, so I wouldn't count on those as much.

China's stealth bomber is still under development. Once it's built, I expect it to launch HN-1/2/3 cruise missiles as well as CJ-10 and DH-10 cruise missiles. It might also carry the stealth DH-2000 and HN-2000 missiles (which are under development).
 
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We don't know the number of ICBMs that China has right now.

The DF-31A are already MIRVed, with 3 warheads each. The warheads supposedly incorporate MaRV technology, which will enable it to dodge and evade ABM systems.

Silo-based missiles are already considered out of date methods of nuclear attack. They will be the first ones to be destroyed when the enemy launches their pre emptive strike. Mobility is key to the survival of nuclear forces.

The JL-2 has an estimated range of 14000 km while the DF-31A has 12000 km range and the DF-41 has 14000 km range. The improved DF-5A has 15000 km range, but it's silo based, so I wouldn't count on those as much.

China's stealth bomber is still under development. Once it's built, I expect it to launch HN-1/2/3 cruise missiles as well as CJ-10 and DH-10 cruise missiles. It might also carry the stealth DH-2000 and HN-2000 missiles (which are under development).

There are recent rumors that PLAN has started to testify JL-3.
 
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CHINA'S STEALTHY CRUISE MISSILES


Western articles REPORTED that China is developing two kinds of stealthy cruise missiles:
- HN-2000
- DH-2000


China's current HN-3 missiles (with forward swept wings) also possess stealth technology.


Here is the report:
China's DH-10 Cruise Missile Program

China is currently developing its next-generation cruise missile, the Hong Niao-2000 (HN-2000). This missile will reportedly be equipped with millimeter wave radar, infrared image mapping, laser radar, synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) and the Chinese Beidou satellite guidance system, for accuracies of 1-3 meters. This missile will also incorporate the latest stealth technologies and have a supersonic terminal flight phase, with an expected range of 4,000km.

China is developing long-range cruise missiles such as the DH-2000 for anti-carrier strikes as well. DH-2000 will be deployed aboard China’s Type 093 nuclear attack submarines.

The report also said that China is developing cruise missiles with 5000 to 8000 km range.
The current HN-3 missiles also possess stealth technology.




Here is a picture of the HN-3 missile. Note its stealth features. China is developing two other kinds of similar (but more advanced) stealthy cruise missiles.
74233490170.jpg
 
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China has an estimated 294 megatons of thermonuclear deterrence

Rankings of world thermonuclear powers by megatons of firepower:

1. Russia - 1,273 megatons

2. United States - 570 megatons

3. China - 294 megatons (China has over half the nuclear firepower of the United States)

4. France - 55 megatons

5. Britain - 16 megatons

References:

Russia: NTI: Russia - Nuclear Disarmament
United States: NTI: United States - Nuclear Disarmament
China: NTI: China - Nuclear Disarmament
France: NTI: France - Nuclear Disarmament
Britain: NTI: United Kingdom - Nuclear Disarmament

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BoLpN.gif

China's "possible warhead assembly and production facilities" (source: NTI)

NTI: China - Nuclear Disarmament

People's Republic of China (PRC)
NPT Nuclear Weapon State


1. Arsenal Size:

Most opaque of the nuclear weapons state; limited open source information.
Operational strategic warheads: ~176 (Warheads in stockpile: 240)[1]

2. Key Delivery Systems:[2,3,4,5]

* Land-based missiles: Approximately 120.(ICBM: DF-4, DF-5A DF-31, DF-31A; MRBM: DF-3A, DF-21)
* Aircraft: 20 (Hong-6)
* SLBM: 1 Xia-class sub carrying12 JL-1s, never fully deployed; 2 Jin-class subs deployed, 1 under development can each carry 12 JL-2; however the JL-2s have not yet been deployed
* Cruise missiles: DH-10 (nuclear capable) 50-250 deployed
* No credible evidence to confirm that non-strategic weapons still remain in operational force

3. Estimated Destructive Power: 294[6]

4. Military Fissile Material Stockpile: (estimates)

Plutonium: 4 mt (+/- 20 %)[7]
HEU: 20 mt [8]

5. Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size:

Legal obligation to pursue global disarmament under Article VI of the NPT[9]

Future Commitments:

In support of verifiable FMCT negotiation. The treaty should not cover existing stockpiles[10]

6. Nuclear Weapons Policies

1. Nuclear testing:

* Observed nuclear testing moratorium since July 1996.[12]
* Signed but not ratified CTBT[13]

2. Use of nuclear weapons:

* Adopted no-first use policy[14,15]


* Negative Security Assurances to NWFZ treaty members:

Committed not to use nuclear weapons against members of:
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba. Has not signed Bangkok, but reiterates its support.[16]


* Acknowledged the commitments of the NWS to negative security assurances in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).[17]
* Expressed its support for legally binding unconditional negative security assurances.[18]

Sources:
[1] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008," Nuclear Notebook, Natural Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008, pp 42-45, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
[2] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008," Nuclear Notebook, Natural Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008, pp 42-45, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
[3] Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air Space Intelligence Center, April 2009, Federation of American Scientists.
[4] Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, US Department of Defense, The Official Home of the Department of Defense.
[5] Chinese Nuclear Forces, Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, Federation of American Scientists.
[6] Eliminating Nuclear Threats, ICNND Report, International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.
[7] International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2009, IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials - Mission.
[8] International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2009, IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials - Mission.
[9] Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations & Regimes, Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page.
[10] Statement by Ambassador Jingye Cheng to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 17 May 2006, Reaching Critical Will.
[11] Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, US Department of Defense, The Official Home of the Department of Defense.
[12] CTBTO website, Nuclear Testing page, Home: CTBTO Preparatory Commission.
[13] Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations & Regimes, Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page.
[14] Working Paper Submitted by China to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 6 May 2010, Reaching Critical Will.
[15] Statement by the Chinese Delegation on the Issue of Security Assurances at the Third Session of the Preparatory committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 7 May 2009, Reaching Critical Will.
[16] NTI Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Tutorial Protocol Chart, Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page.
[17] NTI Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Tutorial, Chapter 3, Security Assurances, Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page.
[18] Working Paper Submitted by China to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 6 May 2010, Reaching Critical Will.
 
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China has an estimated 294 megatons of thermonuclear deterrence

Rankings of world thermonuclear powers by megatons of firepower:

1. Russia - 1,273 megatons

2. United States - 570 megatons

3. China - 294 megatons (China has over half the nuclear firepower of the United States)

4. France - 55 megatons

5. Britain - 16 megatons

References:

Russia: NTI: Russia - Nuclear Disarmament
United States: NTI: United States - Nuclear Disarmament
China: NTI: China - Nuclear Disarmament
France: NTI: France - Nuclear Disarmament
Britain: NTI: United Kingdom - Nuclear Disarmament

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BoLpN.gif

China's "possible warhead assembly and production facilities" (source: NTI)

NTI: China - Nuclear Disarmament

People's Republic of China (PRC)
NPT Nuclear Weapon State


1. Arsenal Size:

Most opaque of the nuclear weapons state; limited open source information.
Operational strategic warheads: ~176 (Warheads in stockpile: 240)[1]

2. Key Delivery Systems:[2,3,4,5]

* Land-based missiles: Approximately 120.(ICBM: DF-4, DF-5A DF-31, DF-31A; MRBM: DF-3A, DF-21)
* Aircraft: 20 (Hong-6)
* SLBM: 1 Xia-class sub carrying12 JL-1s, never fully deployed; 2 Jin-class subs deployed, 1 under development can each carry 12 JL-2; however the JL-2s have not yet been deployed
* Cruise missiles: DH-10 (nuclear capable) 50-250 deployed
* No credible evidence to confirm that non-strategic weapons still remain in operational force

3. Estimated Destructive Power: 294[6]

4. Military Fissile Material Stockpile: (estimates)

Plutonium: 4 mt (+/- 20 %)[7]
HEU: 20 mt [8]

5. Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size:

Legal obligation to pursue global disarmament under Article VI of the NPT[9]

Future Commitments:

In support of verifiable FMCT negotiation. The treaty should not cover existing stockpiles[10]

6. Nuclear Weapons Policies

1. Nuclear testing:

* Observed nuclear testing moratorium since July 1996.[12]
* Signed but not ratified CTBT[13]

2. Use of nuclear weapons:

* Adopted no-first use policy[14,15]


* Negative Security Assurances to NWFZ treaty members:

Committed not to use nuclear weapons against members of:
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba. Has not signed Bangkok, but reiterates its support.[16]


* Acknowledged the commitments of the NWS to negative security assurances in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).[17]
* Expressed its support for legally binding unconditional negative security assurances.[18]

Sources:
[1] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008," Nuclear Notebook, Natural Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008, pp 42-45, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
[2] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008," Nuclear Notebook, Natural Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2008, pp 42-45, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
[3] Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air Space Intelligence Center, April 2009, Federation of American Scientists.
[4] Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, US Department of Defense, The Official Home of the Department of Defense.
[5] Chinese Nuclear Forces, Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, Federation of American Scientists.
[6] Eliminating Nuclear Threats, ICNND Report, International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.
[7] International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2009, IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials - Mission.
[8] International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2009, IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials - Mission.
[9] Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations & Regimes, Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page.
[10] Statement by Ambassador Jingye Cheng to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 17 May 2006, Reaching Critical Will.
[11] Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, US Department of Defense, The Official Home of the Department of Defense.
[12] CTBTO website, Nuclear Testing page, Home: CTBTO Preparatory Commission.
[13] Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations & Regimes, Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page.
[14] Working Paper Submitted by China to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 6 May 2010, Reaching Critical Will.
[15] Statement by the Chinese Delegation on the Issue of Security Assurances at the Third Session of the Preparatory committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 7 May 2009, Reaching Critical Will.
[16] NTI Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Tutorial Protocol Chart, Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page.
[17] NTI Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Tutorial, Chapter 3, Security Assurances, Nuclear Threat Initiative: Home Page.
[18] Working Paper Submitted by China to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 6 May 2010, Reaching Critical Will.


China now is likely having approximately 400 warheads (W-88 equivalent) as the sea based nuclear deterrence.

This is from a knowledgeable Chinese Internet poster, and his father was a retired admiral of the PLAN. And hopefully you can read the Chinese context Martian.

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The question of whether China possesses MIRV technology is critical, because it drastically affects the number of Chinese retaliatory warheads.

In 1981, China demonstrated it possessed the basic dual-use technology for MIRVs by successfully delivering three satellites into different orbits from one rocket launch.

CNS - China's Nuclear Warhead Modernization

"In September 1981, China successfully delivered three satellites with one launch vehicle, reportedly giving it an incipient multiple-warhead capability. Since the mid-1980s, China has reportedly conducted missile flight tests involving MRVs, and in May 1995, China flight-tested the DF-31 missile equipped with MRVs."

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In 2002, there were reports of a successful Chinese MIRV test on a DF-21 ballistic missile.

China successfully tests multi-warhead missiles

"China successfully tests multi-warhead missiles
Daily Yomiuri 02/10/03
Original Link: http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20030208wo41.htm

China successfully test-launched a medium-range missile with multiple warheads in December 2002, indicating a rapid modernization of China's nuclear missile capability aimed at countering the U.S. missile defense network planned for the region, sources said Friday.

The launching of the Dong Feng-21 (DF-21), with a target range of about 1,800 kilometers, was the first successful test launch of the missile with multiple warheads for China.

According to the sources, the launch was carried out in mid-December at a Second Artillery Corp's base of the People's Liberation Army in Shanxi Province, China.

It is believed that the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), which China had sought to develop quickly, was used for the missile."

Chinese MIRV Test Successful

"Chinese MIRV Test Successful
Yonhap News via JoongAng Ilbo ^ | 02/08/03 | N/A
Posted on Friday, February 07, 2003 10:14:07 PM by TigerLikesRooster

Yomiuri Shimbun of Japan reported in its Beijing dispatch on Feb. 8, 2003 that China successfully conducted the MIRV test on December, 2002, using Dong-Feng 21.

The report quoted Chinese sources as saying, "The missile launch test was conducted in mid-December last year at a PLA strategic missile base in Shaxi province, and MIRV technology was apparently employed."


This is apparently the first Chinese success of the MIRV missile test.

China is making feverish efforts to counter American Missile Defense technology and this shows that they made a meaningful progress, the paper reports."

China's Ballistic Missile Update - 2004

"China's Ballistic Missile Update - 2004
The Risk Report
Volume 11 Number 1 (November-December 2004)
...
Furthermore, advances in warhead design and multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology (including a successful test of a MIRVed DF-21) appear intended to enable China to overcome U.S. missile defenses, allowing it to maintain a credible deterrent.
...
It is estimated that 48 DF-21s have been deployed. In 2002, according to a report in Japan's Daily Yomiuri newspaper, a DF-21 equipped with several MIRV-ed warheads was successfully test-launched, making it the first Chinese missile to be successfully armed with multiple warheads. The DF-21 is capable of reaching U.S. military bases in Asia, as well as targets in Russia, India, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines."

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In 2010, Richard D. Fisher, Jr. states he "has been told by Asian military sources that the DF-31A already carries three warheads and that one deployed DF-5B carries five or six warheads. These sources speculate the new 'DF-XX' may carry a similar number of warheads."

China and START. Missile buildup may surpass U.S., Russia as they denuclearize

"China and START
By Richard D. Fisher Jr.,
The Washington Times,
20 September 2010
...
Since it started deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 1980s, China has refused to join in nuclear weapons negotiations. This did not matter as long as China deployed a small number, about 20 liquid-fueled 13,000-kilometer-range DF-5s with single warheads, until early this decade. Furthermore, China had lulled many analysts by regularly suggesting that it adheres to a doctrine of "minimum deterrence" that abjures U.S.- or Russian-level warhead numbers. But China has also rejected U.S. and Soviet levels of nuclear "transparency" as part of its deterrence calculus, with the result that nobody knows its nuclear force goals.

China began modernizing its nuclear missile forces by mid-decade, replacing early DF-5s with a similar number of improved DF-5A missiles based in stationary silos and deploying the new 7,000-to-8,000-kilometer-range, solid-fueled and mobile DF-31 and the larger 11,200-plus-kilometer-range DF-31A. In its latest report to the Congress on China`s military released on Aug. 16, the Pentagon says there are less than 10 DF-31 and "10-15" DF-31A ICBMs, up to five more than reported in the previous year`s report, covering 2008. However, in the 2010 issue of "Military Balance," Britain`s International Institute of Strategic Studies notes there is one brigade of 12 DF-31s and two brigades or 24 DF-31A ICBMs, indicating a possible increase of one new brigade from 2008 to 2009.

In addition, China may be close to fielding two more long-range nuclear missiles. First is the new 7,200-plus-kilometer-range JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Though reported to be experiencing developmental challenges, when completed, 12 each will go on the new Type 094 nuclear ballistic missile submarine, which the Pentagon estimates will number at least five, for a potential total of 60 missiles. Then there is a new yet-unidentified, larger ground-mobile ICBM which has been revealed in Chinese Internet-source images since 2007, but which the Pentagon did not publicly acknowledge until its latest China report. The distinguishing feature of the "DF-XX" is its use of a large ,16-wheel Russian-style transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), likely derived from Russian-Belarus technology imported in the late 1990s.

But here is where the real danger begins: The Pentagon also notes this new ICBM is "possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV)." Starting in 2002, the Pentagon`s China report noted the People`s Liberation Army`s (PLA) interest in developing multiple warheads, with more explicit language being used in the 2009 and 2010 reports. Might some PLA ICBMs already have multiple warheads? This analyst has been told by Asian military sources that the DF-31A already carries three warheads and that one deployed DF-5B carries five or six warheads. These sources speculate the new "DF-XX" may carry a similar number of warheads.

While it is not possible to confirm these disclosures from open sources, they point to an alarming possibility: China has crossed the multiple-warhead Rubicon and, with the possibility that it can build one brigade of DF-31A and DF-XX ICBMs a year, could be capable of annual double- or triple-digit increases in its deployed nuclear warheads. Chinese sources also suggest interest in developing longer-range versions of the JL-2, which could also be MIRV-capable. While a worst-case estimate, there is good reason to consider that China`s warhead numbers could exceed 500 by 2020."
 
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9yPbT.jpg

China's DF-31A launch

Let's do the math to see if China's DF-31A mobile ICBM retaliatory force is sufficient to provide a nuclear deterrent.

"Britain`s International Institute of Strategic Studies notes" there are "24 DF-31A ICBMs, indicating a possible increase of one new brigade from 2008 to 2009." China is increasing her DF-31A ICBM force by approximately 12 missiles/one brigade a year.

We will add 12 more missiles from 2009 to 2010 and six more missiles from 2010 to middle of 2011. A reasonable estimate of China's DF-31A force is 42 ICBMs (e.g. 24 at end of 2009, 12 more for 2010, and six more for 2011).

If Richard Fisher's information is correct and China's DF-31A is MIRVed with three warheads then that means the 42 DF-31As are armed with a total of 126 warheads (e.g. 42 DF-31As x 3 MIRVed warheads = 126 warheads).

We know China possesses the technology for a W-88 class warhead with a yield of 475 kilotons. The conclusion is that China's DF-31A nuclear force is capable of retaliating against 126 cities. That does seem to be a formidable second-strike capability.

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China and START. Missile buildup may surpass U.S., Russia as they denuclearize

"China and START
By Richard D. Fisher Jr.,
The Washington Times,
20 September 2010
...
In its latest report to the Congress on China`s military released on Aug. 16, the Pentagon says there are less than 10 DF-31 and "10-15" DF-31A ICBMs, up to five more than reported in the previous year`s report, covering 2008. However, in the 2010 issue of "Military Balance," Britain`s International Institute of Strategic Studies notes there is one brigade of 12 DF-31s and two brigades or 24 DF-31A ICBMs, indicating a possible increase of one new brigade from 2008 to 2009.
...
This analyst has been told by Asian military sources that the DF-31A already carries three warheads and that one deployed DF-5B carries five or six warheads."

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The most interesting and controversial debate regarding China's reverse-engineering was the development of China's W-88 class miniaturized thermonuclear warhead. The U.S. claims China appropriated the designs and reverse-engineered the W-88 warhead. China says that isn't true.

China says this is a case of convergent engineering. For example, an airplane must have two wings to provide lift and an engine to provide thrust in the rear. Another example of convergent engineering is all rockets are long and thin. In other words, form must follow function. There is only a very limited way to create a massive thermonuclear explosion using a compact warhead.

Here is the crux of the problem. "U.S. government realized that information derived from Chinese tests in 1992-1996 were similar to U.S. nuclear designs." The Chinese nuclear tests data are "similar," but not identical to U.S. nuclear tests on the W-88.

fqook.png


W88 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"The W88 is a United States thermonuclear warhead, with an estimated yield of 475 kiloton (kt), and is small enough to fit on MIRVed missiles. The W88 was designed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1970s. In 1999 the director of Los Alamos who had presided over its design described it as "The most advanced U.S. nuclear warhead."[1]

The Trident II SLBM can be armed with up to 8 W88 (475 kt) warheads (Mark 5) or 8 W76 (100 kt) warheads (Mark 4), but it is limited to 4 warheads under SORT."

NTI: Research Library: Country Profiles: China

"...According to the Cox Committee Report, suspicion of China's nuclear espionage started after the U.S. government realized that information derived from Chinese tests in 1992-1996 were similar to U.S. nuclear designs. This similarity, combined with other information derived from classified sources, led the Cox Committee to claim that China had stolen several bomb designs, including the U.S.' most advanced W-88 design and a design for an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb). Yet, the Cox Report has been severely criticized by both experts and officials in the United States as a political document that has several technical inaccuracies."
 
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Aside from building more road- and rail-mobile DF-31As, what's next for China's ICBM program? The obvious answer is the DF-41 with 10 MIRVs.

China's ICBM nuclear forces were quiescent for 20 years until "President George W. Bush formally announced December 13 [2001] that the United States will unilaterally withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty." (See Withdrawal from ABM treaty signals escalation of US militarism)

The formal withdrawal occurred six months after notification, when "the United States withdrew from the landmark 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on June 13 [2002]." (See U.S. Withdraws From ABM Treaty; Global Response Muted | Arms Control Association)

The Chinese response was swift. China had possessed the basic technology for MIRVs in 1981, but only tested it after the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty in 2002. China's first known successful MIRV test occurred in December 2002, six months after the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

To preserve China's security through mutually-assured-destruction, China must maintain a capability to inflict sufficient damage in a counter-strike. Towards that strategic objective, China is building the DF-41 with 10 MIRVs to overwhelm any American National Missile Defense (NMD) shield.

In a counter-strike, for every DF-41 with 10 warheads, the United States must build 10 interceptors. There is also the question of how many interceptors will succeed (e.g. the success rate). I am leaving aside the question of whether the NMD is viable at all. For example, if China attacked the sea-based X-band radar sites then the NMD will be significantly impaired.

Anyway, it will always be far cheaper for China to build DF-41 ICBMs and much more expensive to defend against them. Ten DF-41s with 10 MIRVs each will require 100 interceptors. 100 DF-41s with 10 MIRVs each will require 1,000 interceptors. It is pointless to build a NMD against a near-peer opponent. The other side can easily overwhelm a NMD system.

I will leave it to you to decide whether America was safer prior to President Bush's withdrawal from the ABM treaty. Prior to 2002, China only had 20 DF-5s capable of a counter-strike against the United States. Forced to counter President Bush's NMD initiative, China is on its way to becoming armed with an ever-increasing number of MIRVs.

xpy9U.jpg

China's DF-41 ICBM is capable of carrying 10 MIRVs.

tvwJ6.jpg

Closer look at DF-41

R9OiF.jpg

DF-41 undergoing tests.

MVUun.jpg

DF-41 spotted on public road in 2007.

DlMcx.jpg

DF-41 seen again on a public road.
 
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DF-41 (CSS-X-10) (China) - Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems

"DF-41 (CSS-X-10) (China)...

Type

Inter-continental range, road/rail mobile, solid propellant, single warhead or MIRV-capable ballistic missile.

Development

The Chinese are believed to have started the design and development of the Dong Feng-41 (DF-41) in 1986, with the operational requirement to have a solid-propellant, road mobile, ballistic missile with a range of 12,000 km to replace the CSS-4 (DF-5 and DF-5A) liquid-propellant missiles. The development for DF-41 is believed to be managed by the China Aerospace Sciences and Industry Corporation (CASIC), Beijing (it was the First Academy of the Ministry of Aerospace Industries). The flight test programme is managed by the 2nd Artillery Corps, based at the Wuzhai test centre in Shanxi province. There has been one reported ground test and a simulated cold launch in October 1999, but no test flights to date, although a test was reported to have been in preparation in September 2001. Original reports stated that DF-41 used the first two stages of the DF-31, with a lengthened third stage, but it is now believed that this description referred to the DF-31A, and that the DF-41 is a new design. It is believed that the NATO designator is CSS-X-10. Reports in 1996 suggested that DF-41 would have between two and nine Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads, but it is possible that the initial build missiles will have provision for either a single warhead or up to 10 MIRV. In 2001 both rail-car and cross-country Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) projects were noted for DF-31, and it is presumed that these might also be adapted later for DF-41. These launchers appeared to use a rail-car."
 
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Modernization of a nuclear arsenal is fine, because historically, modernization means greater accuracy, and a transition from counter-value (city killers) to counter-force (pin-point military assets). It also means warhead yield goes down. It doesn't make sense to most, that the USSR/Russia and the USA, would retire their multi-megaton H-bombs and replace them with kiloton devices. But that is what has happened.

At their peak, the Russian/American arsenals numbered in the many tens of thousands. Thankfully, they have been drastically reduced. I hope China reaches a point where there is adequate deterrence, and we don't end up in another arms race where numbers of warheads is the key. And some transparency would help this. China should be a part of any future talks between Russia and the U.S. when strategic arms are on the table... we can get more of these devices put away for good.
 
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What happend if US jam China's radar ?? can China nuclear missiles still reach to US soil ?
 
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What happend if US jam China's radar ?? can China nuclear missiles still reach to US soil ?

ICBM's are built heavily shielded and can be (and are) self-contained. They don't use radar, they use inertial guidance. Once they launch, they do their thing without any signals going in or out.
 
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ICBM's are built heavily shielded and can be (and are) self-contained. They don't use radar, they use inertial guidance. Once they launch, they do their thing without any signals going in or out.

Might sound a bit Hollywood'ish but you can jam them (or in fact anything) with a directed pulse like that of an EMP.
 
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X7Cjk.jpg

China's DF-5 ICBM launch

I doubt that China will ever disclose the size of its nuclear arsenal. China wants to have it both ways. It wants to appear non-threatening. This is good for its corporate image.

On the other hand, it wants to keep the United States guessing and reap the benefit of deterrence. Also, China cannot reveal the actual size of its nuclear arsenal. Otherwise, it would have just volunteered to join U.S.-Russian disarmament talks.

However, it is possible to reach reasonable conclusions based on an analysis of open-source materials and obtain a sense of the size of China's nuclear arsenal. Let's take a close look at General Zhu Chenghu's outburst. Did he reveal China's nuclear secret in a moment of anger?

In July 2005, "a Chinese general has threatened to launch nuclear missiles at the United States, warning that hundreds of American cities could be destroyed." (See Chinese general threatens nuclear attack on US in war of words - Telegraph) Is it plausible that China had the capability to destroy hundreds of American cities in 2005 or was General Zhu completely nuts?

In 1998, Richard D. Fisher Jr. (see International Assessment and Strategy Center > Scholars > Richard Fisher, Jr.) was working "as Asian Studies Director at the Heritage Foundation" and he reported:

"Congress should question the confidence that the Clinton Administration and the defense intelligence community place on their own assessments of China's current missile force. Some reports that appeared in 1996 suggest the United States may be underestimating China's missile force. For example, during the 30th anniversary celebration of China's Second Artillery (its specialized missile force) in 1996, China's military press reported the completion of a decade-long project to build what is speculated to be a large missile base inside a mountain range.[27] A curious report that also appeared in 1996 estimates that China may have over 120 to 150 DF-5 missiles, which could be modified to carry as many as six one-megaton nuclear warheads.[28] If China is concealing ICBMs in a mountain base, then even marginal improvements to its ICBMs derived from U.S. technical know-how would contribute to a greater potential missile threat." (See Commercial Space Cooperation | The Heritage Foundation)

If Richard Fisher is correct about the 1996 reports, China had approximately 150 DF-5 ICBMs hidden in the 5,000 km Underground Great Wall. This makes sense. No one would spend a fortune and ten years to build a massive 3,000-mile ICBM complex under a mountain range to hide only a small handful of ICBMs. (See The Jamestown Foundation: single[tt_news]=35846&tx_ttnews[backPid]=459&no_cache=1 or China’s nuclear missiles hidden “underground maze” | WAREYE)

Nine years elapsed between Richard Fisher's reference to the 1996 estimate of 150 DF-5s and General Zhu's 2005 warning. Let's use a conservative estimate and say China built one new brigade each year, which is twelve DF-5 missiles. After nine years, China would have accumulated another 108 DF-5s by 2005.

General Zhu may have been referring to a total of 258 DF-5s hidden under thousands of miles of a Chinese mountain range. General Zhu may have been accurate in "warning that hundreds of American cities could be destroyed." While General Zhu's July 2005 outburst is useful for open-source analysis, he was unprofessional and deserved his public demotion in December 2005 (for possibly revealing a state secret). (See Shakeup of Top Chinese Military Command)

Anyway, it's now 2011 and the DF-5 ICBM story has taken another unexpected turn. In 1998, Richard Fisher wrote: "A curious report that also appeared in 1996 estimates that China may have over 120 to 150 DF-5 missiles, which could be modified to carry as many as six one-megaton nuclear warheads." (See Commercial Space Cooperation | The Heritage Foundation)

In September 2010, Richard Fisher reported: "This analyst has been told by Asian military sources that the DF-31A already carries three warheads and that one deployed DF-5B carries five or six warheads." (See China and START. Missile buildup may surpass U.S., Russia as they denuclearize)

From 2005 to 2011, China probably built another 66 DF-5 ICBMs. China's current total inventory of DF-5s is probably around 324 (e.g. 258 + 66 = 324). 324 DF-5s with each missile carrying "six one-megaton nuclear warheads" provide a nuclear deterrent of 1,944 one-megaton warheads.

In conclusion, it doesn't really matter how many more DF-31As (with 3 MIRVs) or DF-41s (with up to 10 MIRVs) that China builds. The Chinese most likely have had a substantial nuclear deterrent by 1996 or 2005.
 
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