Lying at the north foot of Taibai Mountain (the peak of Qinling Mountain), Taibai Mountain National Forest Park, is located in Meixian County, Shaanxi Province. Covering an area of 7,287 acres, 94.3% of which is covered with forest, it contains 10 scenic districts and over 180 attractions. Since its height above the sea level varies from 0.39 miles to 2.18 miles, Taibai Mountain National Forest Park is the highest national forest park of China. It was officially established in 1991 and has been formally open to the public since July, 1992.
Taibai Mountain National Forest Park is a fantastic place for visitors to find relaxation and refreshment. With respect to its climate, it is better to travel here in July and August, but do not forget to bring a cotton coat and rain gear. Traveling by ropeway (with a length of 0.68 mile) gives visitors the chance to appreciate the marvelous spectacle of glacier relics and sea of clouds.
Reports shine light on nuclear weapons vigilance
"Reports shine light on nuclear weapons vigilance
By WALTER PINCUS
Tuesday,
March 16, 2010
While public attention is focused on a new arms-control treaty between Russia and the United States, the slow, dull work of keeping nuclear warheads and weapons-grade uranium and plutonium protected from terrorists goes on almost unnoticed.
But two new reports have shed light on the subject.
A fascinating study on China's system of securing its nuclear weapons was published last week. Two days earlier, an update on the multiyear U.S. effort to secure Russian nuclear sites, and those of other countries, was presented to the House Appropriations subcommittee on energy and water, which has jurisdiction over funding for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.
Mark A. Stokes's study of Beijing's nuclear weapons for the Project 2049 Institute, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization focused on Asia, describes where the Chinese are storing their warheads and how they are protecting them. Stokes, who served 20 years in the Air Force, also worked in the Defense Department's office of international security affairs, where he handled China, Taiwan and Mongolia.
Stokes writes that "under its declaratory no-first-use policy, the PRC's [People's Republic of China's] nuclear deterrent has relied upon quantitative and geographic ambiguity," while the
Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission "maintains strict control over China's operational nuclear warheads." In peacetime its warheads stock is managed "through a system that is separate and distinct" from the People's Liberation Army's Second Artillery missile bases. This includes warheads for use by the air force and the navy but separate from China's civilian-controlled fissile materials.
Stokes identifies an independent organization called 22 Base as the prime group "responsible for storing and managing most of the Second Artillery's warhead stockpile." The storage complex is in central China near Taibai Mountain, one of the highest peaks in the country. Tunnels have been dug deep into the mountain, and rail lines enable constant movement of nuclear weapons in and out of the 22 Base complex. "China's warhead and handling system is designed to survive a first strike and retain sufficient operational capability for retaliation," Stokes writes.
Stokes concludes that "22 Base's physical protection system appears to be founded upon more than 'guns, gates, and guards,' " which often mark the U.S. system. While a dedicated security battalion and a cavalry company patrol the 400-square-kilometer security zone, a technical support battalion works on safekeeping warhead components. The report points out, however, that China's warheads are "most vulnerable" during their constant transport between storage and launch sites -- the movement that Beijing counts on to make itself less vulnerable to a first strike."
