Chief of Army Staff | General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

[fatman17]

Chief Minisiter Punjab, Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani attending briefing on "Operation Labbaik" at Multan Garrison today. (09-12-2010) – Photo ISPR

CM seems to be quite 'un-comfortable"!!! while the chief is 'relaxed'

 

[fatman17]

LOL! Thanks, I can do that!

However, what were the actual questions and the answers by Gen. Kayani during the interview shown above in South Waziristan?

pls refer your query to ISPR !

---------- Post added at 10:37 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:36 AM ----------

so, it is quite useless, but maybe you would care to enlighten me as to its purpose on PDF that might have escaped me.

on the contrary its quite a 'popular' thread!

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

CM seems to be quite 'un-comfortable"!!! while the chief is 'relaxed'

He had his Dunhill

 

[fatman17]

He had his Dunhill

so whats the CM 'vice'?

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

so whats the CM 'vice'?

ladoo in the backseat of the BMW, after the meeting

 

[fatman17]

Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD270, CODEL BIDEN'S MEETING WITH COAS KAYANI AND ISI

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ID e.g. #09ISLAMABAD270.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

09ISLAMABAD270 2009-02-06 15:03 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Embassy Islamabad
Appears in these articles:
The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia

VZCZCXRO5005
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DE RUEHIL #0270/01 0371503
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1371
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9783
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9608
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4409
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1023
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6720
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5644
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000270

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2034
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR PGOV PK
SUBJECT: CODEL BIDEN'S MEETING WITH COAS KAYANI AND ISI
PASHA

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S) Summary: Senators Biden and Graham met with Chief of
Army Staff (COAS) Kayani and Director General of ISI LTGen
Pasha on January 9 to underscore bipartisan support for the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Senator Biden emphasized the
need for the American people to see results soon in
Afghanistan, and he wanted to be sure the U.S. and Pakistan
had the same enemy as we moved forward. Senator Biden sought
Kayani's views about what kind of Afghanistan would represent
success for Pakistan.

¶2. (S) Kayani said the U.S. and Pakistan were on the same
page, but there would be tactical differences. Cooperation
with U.S. military, with whom he had excellent relations, had
improved. Kayani stressed the military's support for
Pakistan's civilian government. He described his campaign in
Bajaur and plans to confront the insurgents in the rest of
the tribal agencies. Kayani said he urgently needed help for
internally displaced persons (IDPs). Kayani was candid that
the government has essentially abandoned the Swat valley.
Senator Graham emphasized the need to prosecute the
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) leaders involved in the Mumbai attacks
and to incorporate the tribal agencies into Pakistan's legal
system. End summary.

¶3. (S) Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Senator Lindsey
Graham (R-SC), accompanied by Ambassador and Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Staff Director Antony Blinken, met with
COAS Kayani and DG ISI Pasha January 9 for ninety minutes.
Senator Biden asked Kayani to describe his view of a stable
Afghanistan.

¶4. (S) Senator Graham added his presence emphasized
bipartisan support for Pakistan. (He had just visited
Pakistan three weeks ago.) Senator Graham said he was going
to support the Biden-Lugar bill, but he needed to convince
his constituents of the value of investing in schools in
Pakistan instead of South Carolina. Pakistan needed to
prosecute those involved in the Mumbai attacks and be seen as
a country that observed the rule of law.

¶5. (S) Kayani replied that Pakistan and the US had a
convergence of interests. Kayani's goal was a peaceful,
friendly and stable Afghanistan. Kayani said he had no
desire to control Afghanistan. In fact, he said, anyone who
wanted to control Afghanistan was ignorant of history, since
no one has ever controlled it. Kayani noted there had been
confusion about the policy of "strategic depth" but for him
"strategic depth" meant a peaceful Afghanistan "on his back."
But the Pashtuns have to be accommodated, Kayani added.
Biden asked if Kayani made a distinction between the Pashtuns
and the Taliban. Kayani replied that the Taliban were a
reality, but the Afghan government dominated by the Taliban
had had a negative effect on Pakistan.

¶6. (S) Kayani recalled he told Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Admiral Mullen that the U.S. needed realistic expectations of
what the Pakistani military could achieve and that these
expectations had to be clearly articulated. Kayani described
his campaign in Bajaur and his plans to confront the
insurgents in other tribal agencies, but he repeatedly said
he had capacity problems, particularly regarding equipment.
Kayani said he needed urgent support for the 150,000 people
displaced from the fighting. He said the military had
undertaken hundreds of sorties in Bajaur, and the population
of Bajaur was so far supportive of the military efforts.
Senator Graham mentioned the success of the CERP program in
Iraq and Afghanistan which had put money in the hands of
commanders for urgent community needs.

¶7. (S) Kayani recounted the situation in Swat in which the
provincial government had made accommodations with the
militants, requiring the army to retake the area repeatedly.
Kayani also said the population, once it saw the army pull
out, was far less likely to support it the second time
around. The military had to be followed by civilian agencies
or the local support would diminish.

¶8. (S) Kayani said military efforts needed the political
support of the civilian government. He recalled that when

ISLAMABAD 00000270 002 OF 003

the Federal Investigative Agency headquarters in Lahore had
been hit by suicide bombers, the citizens of Lahore had
demonstrated against the government rather than against the
suicide bombers. While the army had sent the message in
Bajaur that it meant business, there had to be follow-up
support from the civilian agencies. Kayani said as his
campaign moved through the tribal agencies, the army should
ideally need to use diminishing force. When they have to
fight for the same ground repeatedly, it becomes increasingly
difficult and demoralizing to the troops.

¶9. (S) Senator Biden asked Kayani if he had the capacity and
could obtain sufficient resources, would he then move against
Taliban leaders like Baitullah Mehsud, Commander Nazir, and
the Haqqanis? Senator Biden asked Kayani if he were prepared
to move into the Waziristans.
¶10. (S) Kayani replied that Bajaur had been the "hardest nut
to crack" militarily: the Pakistani military had undertaken
an operation in South Waziristan last October, but the army
had moved out because of the elections. The Pakistani
military had also had a fort in the middle of Waziristan
which had been cut off by militants. Kayani said he was
painfully aware that the army had to retake South Waziristan
since ninety percent of the suicide bombers came from
Baitullah Mehsud. "He has to be cut down to size," said
Kayani.

¶11. (S) But, Kayani said, the Pakistani military could not
fight everyone at once. They would have to go after Mehsud
and Nazir sequentially (a point Pasha confirmed). Biden said
it was important to be in agreement on this issue. Pasha
said the United States and Pakistan needed to have confidence
in each other. Pasha said he was hurt about the inference
that he did not have a relationship of trust with CIA. He
had gone to Washington for a frank talk with CIA Director
Hayden and he often briefed, and sought the advice of, the
RAO Chief in Islamabad. Senator Biden repeated he was not
going to revisit the past. Pasha replied that there was no
reason for ISI to be protecting "these people" and he had no
interest in saving them.

¶12. (S) Senator Biden said he needed to know that the
situation had changed. Senator Biden said he understood that
the Pakistani military lacked capacity, but would the
situation change if they had additional resources? It was
important to know if we had the same enemy: the U.S. needed
to be able to make an objective assessment of Pakistan's part
of the bargain.
Graham added that "General Musharraf had cut deals, but those
deals didn't work out."

¶13. (S) Kayani repeated there had been considerable
cooperation on the technical level with U.S. forces. But
this did not mean that there would not be differences of
opinion on tactics. On Afghanistan, Kayani stressed )
"past, present, and future" -- we are on the same page.

¶14. (S) Regarding LeT, Kayani said Pakistan would not allow
small groups to dictate state policy. Pakistan had not
waited for evidence and they had moved immediately. The
information they had now was based on confessions. Pakistan
needed Indian cooperation to move the investigation forward.
Kayani also insisted that any information available about
upcoming attacks be shared with Pakistan. He understood that
information about the attack had been provided to India but
not to Pakistan. He said repeated discussion about "the next
attack and all bets were off" only provided an incentive for
another attack. Biden said that what was important was
Pakistan's action against LeT and similar organizations.
Senator Biden said he would share what he had heard with
Admiral Mullen and emphasized the need for results.

¶15. (S) General Kayani said he appreciated the Senators'
frank response. He repeated his need for help with IDPs.
Senator Biden said the system of reimbursement through
Coalition Support Funds would be reexamined. Kayani said
that the military had only received about $300 million of the
$1 billion ostensibly reimbursed for military expenses. He
was not implying that the money had been stolen, but had been
used for general budget support.

ISLAMABAD 00000270 003 OF 003

¶16. CODEL Biden has cleared this message.
PATTERSON

 

[fatman17]

Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD365, SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL KAYANI’S VISIT TO

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ID e.g. #09ISLAMABAD365.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ISLAMABAD365 2009-02-19 16:04 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO7004
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0365/01 0501617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1530
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9853
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9705
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4478
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1086
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6784
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5709
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 000365

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL KAYANI’S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

¶1. (S) Summary. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani’s February 20-27 visit to Washington comes on the heels of the government’s loss of control over Swat, continued Pakistani Army/Frontier Corps operations in the tribal areas, and still-simmering Indo-Pak tensions in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. We expect Kayani will request increased intelligence sharing (real-time SIGINT and ISR), help to modernize his helicopter fleet, increased support for civilian law enforcement, and financial compensation for Pakistanis displaced by combat. He likely will complain about delays in Coalition Support Fund payments, suggest that U.S. policy on strikes in the tribal areas be amended, and request information about plans for a U.S. troop surge in southern Afghanistan.

¶2. (C) We should recognize growing Pakistani casualties in the fight against militants, praise Kayani’s support for the civilian democratic government in Islamabad, re-iterate the long-term U.S. commitment to support Pakistan, and thank him for agreeing to send his intelligence chief and director of military operations to the Holbrooke/Riedel U.S.-Pakistan strategic review meeting in Washington. We should also thank Kayani for the GOP’s effort to ensure that U.S./NATO continues to deliver fuel and dry goods through Pakistan for our forces in Afghanistan.

¶3. (C) But we need to lay down a clear marker that Pakistan’s Army/ISI must stop overt or tacit support for militant proxies (Haqqani network, Commander Nazir, Lashkar-e-Taiba). We should preface that conversation with an agreement to open a new page in relations; Kayani, who was ISI Chief from 2004-2007, does not want a reckoning with the past. Given the GOP surrender of Swat to local taliban, we need to press Kayani to commit his now reluctant Army to retake the area after the “peace deal” inevitably fails.

¶4. (C) We should press for Pakistani prosecution of the Mumbai suspects, encourage expanded USG training of Army and Frontier Corps forces, raise the prospect of embedding U.S. military observers/advisors with the Frontier Corps, support a prioritized needs-based FMF request that builds COIN capability, ask Kayani to explain how Pakistan plans to back U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, and probe for what Indian action would allow him to redeploy troops from his eastern front to support increased combat in the Pak-Afghan border area. Suggested talking points and bio are included at paras 28-30. End Summary.

Supporting Democratic Governance
--------------------------------

¶5. (C) The civilian government headed by Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani, elected one year ago, is now stable. President Zardari’s elected position is politically secure and Gilani has a majority in parliament. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and its coalition allies rule in three of the four provinces and effectively control all three branches of federal government. Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan (with an 83% approval rating compared to Zardari’s 20% in the latest IRI poll), but he does not have the votes to bring down the government.

¶6. (C) Zardari is cementing leadership alliances so he can avoid another election until he receives international assistance to address food and fuel inflation, electricity blackouts and high unemployment. Pakistan has met its first-quarter targets under a $6.7 billion IMF Standby Agreement but the economy remains too weak to support the Pakistani military’s appetite for expensive weapons systems (particular F-16s).

¶7. (C) President Zardari and Kayani are the key decision-makers in Pakistan; they have developed a respectful if not entirely trusting working relationship. Kayani has gone out of his way to publicly defer to Zardari because he needs political support to wage successful military
ISLAMABAD 00000365 002 OF 006
operations. After eight years of military rule under Musharraf, Zardari is re-shaping civilian-military relations in the shadow of Pakistan’s history of repeated military coups. It is in USG interests for the Zardari/Gilani government to complete its full five-year term, and we should praise Kayani’s efforts to support civilian democracy.

¶8. (C) Kayani may advocate for pending legislation (Kerry-Lugar) in the U.S. Congress to triple non-military assistance to Pakistan and robust USG support for an IMF/World Bank Donors’ Conference to provide $4 billion in social safety net programs to compensate for IMF-imposed budget cuts. We anticipate that Special Representative Holbrooke will attend a Donors’ Conference in April. Kayani may request additional U.S. support for civilian law enforcement; in addition to the over $40 million of equipment and training delivered to the Frontier Corps, we are providing $15 million in additional equipment for the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) police and are working to re-program another $55 million in FY2009. There is a FY2009 supplemental request pending for another $95 million for the police.

¶9. (C) Kayani will request cash to assist more than 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have fled fighting in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Swat, NWFP. Through USAID, State/PRM and DOD, we already have provided over $10 million in assistance and are preparing to respond to new UNHCR/ICRC/World Food Program appeals for Pakistan. Of particular interest will be U.S. plans to continue/expand the delivery of $2 million in (CERP-like) assistance from DOD through the Frontier Corps to IDPs in support of Kayani’s counter-insurgency strategy.

¶10. (C) Security concerns are limiting our ability to operate, but today USAID contractors are building schools and wells, hiring workers for short-term jobs, training teachers and increasing the capacity of the FATA Secretariat to deliver services that demonstrate the writ of government in FATA.

The Big Strategic Questions
---------------------------

¶11. (S) Zardari and Gilani agree that Pakistan’s biggest threat comes from a growing militant insurgency on the Pak-Afghan border. The military and ISI have not yet made that leap; they still view India as their principle threat and Afghanistan as strategic depth in a possible conflict with India. They continue to provide overt or tacit support for proxy forces (including the Haqqani group, Commander Nazir, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and Lashkar-e-Taiba) as a foreign policy tool.

¶12. (S) The single biggest message Kayani should hear in Washington is that this support must end. It is now counterproductive to Pakistan’s own interests and directly conflicts with USG objectives in Afghanistan--where Haqqani is killing American soldiers and Afghan civilians--and the region--where Mumbai exposed the fruits of previous ISI policy to create Lashkar-e-Taiba and still threatens potential conflict between nuclear powers.

¶13. (S) Kayani will want to hear that the U.S. has turned the page on past ISI operations (he was ISI chief from 2004-2007). We should ask for his views on what political end state in Afghanistan would convince him to end proxy support for militants and probe for what would be required by India to allow him to redeploy forces from the Indian border for the fight in FATA. The reality is that, without a redeployment, he does not have the forces (however poorly trained) to combat the insurgency in FATA.

Pakistani Will. . . .
---------------------

¶14. (C) The good news is that the Army/Frontier Corps are engaged in combat in Bajaur and Mohmand, FATA. Zardari is committed to the fight; he knows that Osama bin Laden has publicly targeted Pakistan and admits “the militants are
ISLAMABAD 00000365 003 OF 006
after me and my job.” The bad news is that the militants increasingly are setting the agenda.

¶15. (C) The government’s anti-terrorism strategy is based on “dialogue, deterrence and development;” however, it lacks the military capacity to deter militants and the financial resources to develop the FATA and NWFP. Its historic fallback has been to play for time by conducting negotiations with militants, a disastrous tactic that only has made the extremists stronger. The government insists it will negotiate with tribal leaders but not with militants.

¶16. (C) However, in the latest agreement in Swat (once a tourist resort approximately 90 miles from Islamabad), the provincial government agreed to negotiate for peace in exchange for imposition of Shari’a law with the Taliban. This was recognition of de-facto Taliban control, which produced beheadings, closure of girls’ schools, a growing exodus of terrified citizens, and the desertion of outgunned and outmanned police. Ham-handed military tactics, which included indiscriminate artillery bombardment, have further alienated a population that simply wants the fighting to end. Under international pressure, Zardari has not yet signed off on the deal pending assurances it really will deliver peace; a similar negotiation in 2008 failed.

¶17. (C) Kayani, who supported the Swat deal, will argue that he does not have the forces to battle on multiple fronts, so he is picking his battles and negotiating to preserve later options. We should push back hard, noting that it will be difficult for international donors to support a government that is not prepared to go all-out to defend its own territory.

. . .vs Capability
------------------

¶18. (S) Now absorbing combat losses against formidable militants, Pakistan’s Frontier Corps (FC) and military finally have begun to accept more USG training and assistance in support of counter-insurgency (COIN). Kayani will appreciate U.S. recognition of the casualties his men have suffered, and this is an opening we should exploit to press for expanded FC and special forces (SSG) training. Kayani remains leery of too large a USG military footprint in Pakistan, but to win he must be able to fight without creating the level of civilian casualties his forces’ blind artillery and F-16 bombardments are now producing. We are responding to Pakistan Air Force requests for Close Air Support training to improve the precision of F-16s they are using in FATA. We should probe for the possible introduction of U.S. military observers/advisors to improve the COIN capability of this 1940’s force.

¶19. (S) Kayani will repeat his requests for increased intelligence sharing, notably SIGINT, in support of ongoing military operations in FATA. Pakistan has agreed to build additional tripartite Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), and this month we will expand real-time tactical/target-focused intelligence sharing through the Torkham BCC. We continue to work on delivering Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aerial capability (two B350-ERs) that Kayani has raised with all his high-level visitors.

¶20. (C) The Bush administration’s commitment to provide Pakistan with $300 million annually in FMF expires in 2009, and we need to come to agreement with Pakistan on how to restructure its FMF program to meet its long-term COIN needs. The Pakistan military has requested $1B per year for five years (FY10-14) in FMF.

¶21. (C) Kayani may request additional U.S. support for Pakistan’s F-16 program, the flagship symbol of post-9/11 re-engagement. We are about to send to Congress notification for an additional $142 million in FMF support for one part of this complex program. But we do not believe Pakistan can afford to complete a $2 billion plus program to buy 18 new F-16s, upgrade 35 older aircraft, upgrade a new base, and fund a munitions package. Given the funding and production
ISLAMABAD 00000365 004 OF 006
line implications of either bailing out the GOP or canceling the program, U.S. agencies are reviewing our options.

¶22. (C) We could not agree more with Kayani on the need to modernize Pakistan’s helicopter fleet; on any given day, they have perhaps 2-3 attack helos flying in support of COIN operations. We now are delivering spare parts for their Cobra and Bell 412s, overhauling and upgrading their MI-17s, and assessing ways to improve overall helicopter maintenance.

U.S. Strikes
------------

¶23. (S) As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has eliminated 10 of the top 20 al-Qaida operatives in Pakistan over the last year. However, the strikes have put increasing political pressure on the Pakistani government, which has struggled to explain why it is allowing an ally to violate its sovereignty. The GOP so far has denied recent media reports alleging that the U.S. is launching the strikes from bases in Pakistan. Kayani knows full well that the strikes have been precise (creating few civilian casualties) and targeted primarily at foreign fighters in the Waziristans. He will argue, however, that they undermine his campaign plan, which is to keep the Waziristans quiet until the Army is capable of attacking Baitullah Mehsud and other militants entrenched there. In recent meetings with Special Representative Holbrooke, a variety of Pakistani interlocutors (and now the press) suggested that the U.S. work jointly with Pakistan and target Mehsud or other militants who are killing Pakistanis.

Afghanistan
-----------

¶24. (C) Pakistan-NATO/Afghan cooperation and coordination across the border has improved dramatically in recent months. This includes exchanges of tactical intelligence that allows NATO forces to block passes in support of Pakistani operations and has helped lower attacks on U.S./NATO forces. In recent meetings with ISAF Commander McKiernan, Kayani raised concern about the effect of a U.S. troop build-up in southern Afghanistan, which could push militants and refugees across the border into Balochistan and prompt an influx of foreign fighters. Pakistan currently has only one Army brigade and perhaps 15 Frontier Corps wings stationed along the vast and largely unpopulated Pak-Afghan border in Balochistan.

¶25. (C) Following embarrassing militant attacks on U.S./NATO convoys last year, Pakistan has made efforts to secure Khyber Agency/Torkham Gate, through which U.S./NATO trucks deliver 30% of the fuel and 80% of the dry goods for our forces in Afghanistan. The troop surge will require us to send additional supplies through the Chaman (Balochistan) border crossing in Afghanistan; CENTCOM is now evaluating ways to improve delivery of supplies through Pakistan.

India
-----

¶26. (C) Indo-Pak tensions are still simmering, but to avoid a potential Indian military strike, the GOP needs to continue to show progress on prosecuting those Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives responsible for the Mumbai attacks. India has welcomed the GOP decision to file formal charges against the key masterminds of Mumbai; Islamabad now awaits an Indian response to requests for additional information (forensics, ballistics reports, etc) from New Delhi to support prosecution.

Nukes
-----

¶27. (S) Although he has remained silent on the subject, Kayani does not support Zardari’s statement last year to the Indian press that Pakistan would adopt a “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons. Despite increasing financial constraints, we believe that the military is proceeding with
ISLAMABAD 00000365 005 OF 006
an expansion of both its growing strategic weapons and missile programs. Pakistan’s strategic assets are under the control of the secular military, which has implemented extensive physical, personnel and command and control safeguards. Our major concern has not been that an Islamic militant could steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in GOP facilities could gradually smuggle enough fissile material out to eventually make a weapon and the vulnerability of weapons in transit. Despite a court decision to “free” nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan, the GOP continues to assure us he remains under significant travel and media restrictions.

¶28. (S/Rel Pak) Suggested Talking Points:
-- (S/Rel Pak) What is in the past is behind us. What we seek going forward is an all-encompassing bilateral relationship based on what we can accomplish for the future. We recognize your sacrifices and are well-aware of the trust-deficit that exists on each side. We must both work to overcome it.
--(C/Rel Pak) We appreciate your efforts to support stable civilian democracy in Pakistan and are working to provide a democracy dividend that improves both economic conditions and the law and order situation.
-- (S/Rel Pak) We must succeed in Afghanistan. What is your vision for what constitutes an acceptable outcome?
-- (S/Rel Pak) We want more Pakistani forces deployed to the western border to fight the militants. What conditions are necessary for you to reposition forces from the eastern to the western border?
-- (S/Rel Pak) It is time to cut your ties to extremist groups/proxy forces and urge the permanent severing of ties. Such ties hinder trust and our ability to move forward together.
-- (S/Rel Pak) Our security relationship must move beyond the provision of equipment, and we seek opportunities to expand training throughout the military.
-- (S/Rel Pak) Our ability to deliver sustained security assistance also depends on the Administration securing Congressional approval. Congress is likely to prioritize assistance to counterinsurgency-related equipment and training, as well as align its support with Pakistani performance in the field.
-- (S/Rel Pak) Strikes in the FATA are succeeding in eliminating the enemy senior leadership and collateral damage has been minimal. We are working to provide you with tactical battlefield intelligence to support your operations in FATA.

Bio Notes
---------

¶29. (U) General Ashfaq Kayani was born in Punjab in 1952, grew up in a working-class family and is the son of a former junior officer. He was commissioned in the Pakistan Army after graduating from the Pakistan Military Academy in 1971. His long career has included command at every level from Company to Corps. He has served in key staff positions, to include Military Assistant to the Prime Minister under Benazir Bhutto from 1988-1990, Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), 2000-2003, Director General, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) from 2004-2007, and Vice Chief of Army Staff in 2007. In November 2007, he became Chief of Army Staff (COAS). He is the only officer ever to have served as both DG-ISI and COAS. His term as DGMO coincided with the intense military standoff with India of 2001-2002.

¶30. (C) C) In interactions with post, Kayani is often direct, frank, and thoughtful. He has fond memories of his IMET training at Fort Leavenworth and values his personal relationships, particularly with U.S. military leaders. Kayani is married and the father of two children, a son and a
ISLAMABAD 00000365 006 OF 006
daughter. An avid golfer, he is President of the Pakistan Golf Association. He smokes heavily and can be difficult to understand as he tends to mumble.
PATTERSON

 

[fatman17]

Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD1119, KAYANI IS “DESPERATE” FOR HELICOPTERS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs


Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
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ID e.g. #09ISLAMABAD1119.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ISLAMABAD1119 2009-05-25 03:03 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO1959
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1119/01 1450349
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 250349Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2875
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0326
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0417
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4936
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1679
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 7279
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 6218
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001119

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, MARR, PK
SUBJECT: KAYANI IS “DESPERATE” FOR HELICOPTERS

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

¶1. (C) Summary and Action Request. In a two hour conversation with Ambassador May 23, Chief of Army Staff General Kayani told Ambassador he was “desperate” for helicopter support as he had only five MI-17s operational. Kayani insisted that Pakistani technicians were capable of doing required helicopter maintenance. There are two ways for the Pakistani military to acquire additional helicopters relatively quickly: (1) a lease, and we understand a waiver to enable the USG to lease MI-17s now needs only congressional notification; and (2) procurement through Pakistan’s FMF account, which also requires a waiver. We expect Pakistan to prefer the first option. Post acknowledges the frustration of dealing with the Pakistani military, but it is critical to our interests that they receive help as soon as possible to clear Swat and move on the Waziristans, the heart of cross-border operations against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Post recommends that we request expedited congressional notification of the MI-17 waiver. In the meantime, we continue to seek Cobra helicopter spare parts. End

Summary and Action Request.
¶2. (C) In a two hour conversation May 23 (septel) Chief of Army Staff General Kayani told Ambassador he was “desperate” for helicopter support. He said he could not move against North and South Waziristan until he had more lift. At that moment, he said he had five MI-17s operational. (This is a lower number than others have told us.) As has been previously reported, Kayani wanted U.S. support to lease MI-17 helicopters, and he needed spare parts for the Cobra helicopters. Ambassador said she wanted to “clear the air” about some of the offers of U.S. assistance that had gone unanswered, such as the helicopter maintenance contract and the ISR platform.

¶3. (C) Kayani said he did not need U.S. help on maintenance: the Cobras were twenty-five years old and had been maintained by Pakistani technicians. But he needed the U.S. Government to stop the constant stream of leaks from Washington. These always made it appear as if he were taking steps in response to U.S. demands. He said he had been successfully moving troops from the eastern border, but this was undermined by the drumbeat in the U.S. press that he was taking this action in response to U.S. demands. The U.S., he said, is always trying to press on him sophisticated U.S. systems, which the Pakistani military had neither the ability nor the funds to manage. Domestic political support for current combat operations would be eroded by a bigger U.S. military presence, he said.

¶4. (C) Embassy understands that the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) waiver that enables the USG potentially to procure or lease MI-17s has just been approved by the Department, and the only remaining hurdle is the Congressional notification. The notification process needs to be expedited. The Mission is considering options to assist Pakistan Army in procuring or leasing MI-17s. If the supplemental is passed, our preferred option is to use the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) to lease nine MI-17s. A U.S. controlled lease of this kind allows us to include necessary maintenance (which any contractor is likely to stipulate) and provides leverage over use of the helicopters in order to ensure the helicopters are applied in counter-insurgency activities. The nine MI-17s the Pakistanis have requested would be leased for the duration of ongoing overhauls of nine Pakistan Army MI-17s and would, in effect, be a 1-for-1 backfill of those helicopters in overhaul.

¶5. (C) Alternately, if the supplemental is not passed in time, the Mission can advise the GOP to use its FMF to buy or lease MI-17 helicopters. If the GOP chooses to use its FMF for this purpose, the Mission will need to obtain an Offshore Procurement (OSP) waiver from DOD, with State Department and Department of Treasury concurrence, and an agreement with the GOP specifying the conditions on how they intend to use these new MI-17 helicopters, The terms of the agreement will specify use of the helicopters in support of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Northwest Frontier Province, and portions of Balochistan. Further, if a purchase, the agreement will require a comprehensive
ISLAMABAD 00001119 002 OF 002
maintenance and logistics package in conjunction with the helicopters.

¶6. (C) Finally, we will require access to the helicopters above and beyond normal End Use Monitoring standards in order to certify the helicopters’ use in COIN operations. The Mission’s assessment is that because the Pakistan military has not forecast the use of FMF for helicopter procurement, the opportunity cost of using FMF to procure helicopters makes it unlikely that the GOP would choose to do so quickly. In any case, we are fully prepared to assist the Pakistan Army to address the maintenance issues of the MI-17 helicopters if it so desires. If, as General Kayani indicates, only five MI-17s are operational, we can produce the equivalent of ‘new’ helicopters by assisting the Pakistan Army to repair the helicopters that are non-operational.

¶7. (C) Other helicopters in Pakistan’s aviation fleet face equally troubling operational readiness and availability issues. We are searching for and acquiring specific critical spare items for Cobra helicopters as quickly as possible, and have provided an agreement to resume work on eight Pakistani Cobras now in the U.S. Despite the urgency of the existing situation in the NWFP and FATA, we are waiting for the GOP to sign letters of agreement on Cobra spare parts.

¶8. (C) Comment: Embassy is aware that U.S. engagement with the Pakistani military has been frustrating. Transparency is often non-existent. Offers of assistance go unanswered or are overruled at headquarters, even as Pakistan’s maintenance and training are inadequate. Still, the success of our own troop surge in Afghanistan and the stability of Pakistan’s government depend on rolling back the terrorist threat in Swat and eliminating the terrorist safehavens in the Waziristans. The inability of the GOP to control North and South Waziristan has enabled terrorists to operate throughout the country. Kayani confided to an American visitor recently that he would not be able to move to Waziristan until late summer. While that movement will not be determined solely by the availability of helicopter support, it is certainly the case that the availability of helicopters will be a key factor in making the decision to go.
PATTERSON

 

[fatman17]

Pakistan

Pakistan peace plan: General Kiyani shows true colours

General Kiyani's peace plan marks a moment of honesty in which Pakistan is finally coming clean about its resentment towards the US, writes Dean Nelson.


By Dean Nelson, South Asia Editor 6:00AM GMT 13 Dec 2010

The peace plan being promoted by Pakistan's army chief General Kiyani is proof that David Cameron was wrong when he said in India that Islamabad "cannot look both ways" in the war on terror.

It has been looking both ways, and will continue to do so, until there is a settlement to the Afghan conflict.

His promotion of the Haqqani Network, the closest of all Taliban groups to al-Qaeda and one which has inflicted heavy casualties on Nato troops in Afghanistan, amounts to an admission of what Washington and its allies have long suspected: Pakistan simply does not share its goal of defeating the Taliban, but rather sees the insurgents as a long-term ally in its eternal conflict with India.

General Kiyani's diplomatic campaign for a peace plan marks a moment of honesty in which Pakistan is finally coming clean about its resentment towards the United States and clearly outlining its security goals.

In his recent briefing he described Pakistan as Washington's "most bullied ally" and said there was a conflict between their security interests in Afghanistan.

The United States considers the Taliban leader Mullah Omar and the Haqqani Network as mortal enemies, but Pakistan does not regard them as a threat to itself. While it may have concerns about them, it regards them as reliable foes of Pakistan's only real enemy: India, which backs the Karzai government and his Northern Alliance allies.

What Pakistan fears in Afghanistan is not a Taliban takeover but an extension of Indian influence, which it believes would pose a security threat in a country it regards as its backyard.

In the WikiLeaks disclosures, Washington's erstwhile ambassador to Islamabad acknowledged this and urged a review of India's aid operations in Afghanistan. President Obama, however, during his recent visit to India, hailed New Delhi's help in Afghanistan – causing further consternation within Pakistan's military leadership.

It's difficult to see how any US president could survive the return of the Taliban to power after nine years of American losses in Afghanistan, but General Kiyani's diplomatic offensive appears to be having some success in forcing Washington to rethink what it really regards as unthinkable.

In the meantime, Pakistan and India's proxy war in Afghanistan is out in the open and will have to be resolved in any Afghan settlement.

 

[Aamir Hussain]

Would like to know more about what was offered and what was rejected!!! Memebers on this forum clamour aobut US not supporting with more sophisticated weapons systems -- maybe the truth lies hidden somewhere in these dispatches.

"Ambassador said she wanted to “clear the air” about some of the offers of U.S. assistance that had gone unanswered, such as the helicopter maintenance contract and the ISR platform."

On another paragraph

" The U.S., he said, is always trying to press on him sophisticated U.S. systems, which the Pakistani military had neither the ability nor the funds to manage."

What sophisticated weapons!!! This is revealation by itself that we do not want better systesm albeit more sophisticated!

What is going with PA they seem from these post to be dragging their feet on upgrade and repair of our helos!!!

"We are searching for and acquiring specific critical spare items for Cobra helicopters as quickly as possible, and have provided an agreement to resume work on eight Pakistani Cobras now in the U.S. Despite the urgency of the existing situation in the NWFP and FATA, we are waiting for the GOP to sign letters of agreement on Cobra spare parts."

To me the last para is Geneva Accord like situation again where Pakistan did its best to keep US engaged in tihs part of the world agianst Ex. Soviet Union by delaying the signinig and pushing in weapons to the Mujahideen.


It would be interesting to debate these points.

Thanks for the these post Fatman17

 

[air marshal]

Petraeus meets COAS: Intelligence sharing to be enhanced

Gen. David H. Petraeus, Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force, visited Pakistan Monday to meet with Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff.

According to a statement issued by the US embassy they discussed various topics of mutual interest and ways to improve regional security.

This was Gen. Petraeus' fourth visit to Pakistan as the NATO ISAF Commander, although he has long-established relationships with General Kayani and the Pakistani military from his time as the U.S. Central Command commander.

According to sources the two discussed matters related to check posts at Pakistan-Afghan border while Army chief also stressed on NATO commander to increase the number check posts on Afghan border so that activities of terrorists could be controlled.

It was also agreed in the meeting that intelligence sharing would be enhanced regarding terrorists, While NATO Commander David Petraeus also lauded the steps taken by Pakistani army for controlling the movement of terrorists and assured his complete support. His last visit to Pakistan was November 2-3.

Petraeus meets COAS: Intelligence sharing to be enhanced | Pakistan | News | Newspaper | Daily | English | Online

 

[fatman17]

Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD2427, AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KAYANI AND PASHA ABOUT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs


Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference

ID e.g. #09ISLAMABAD2427.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ISLAMABAD2427 2009-10-07 13:01 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO4334
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2427/01 2801331
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071331Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5213
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0962
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1454
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 5549
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 2334
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 7936
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 6967
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002427

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KAYANI AND PASHA ABOUT
KERRY-LUGAR

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador heard a number of complaints about the Kerry-Lugar bill from COAS General Kayani and DGISI Pasha in a two-hour meeting October 6. These focused on the history of Pressler sanctions, particularly a fear that the waiver in Kerry-Lugar would not be used and aid would be suspended. There were several clauses in the bill, such as an American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command, that rankled COAS Kayani. DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders. Ambassador emphasized the bill’s long-term commitment to Pakistan and made three points: provisions of the bill could be waived; the bill only requires certifications and “assessments;” and the bill does not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund but only, so far, to non-appropriated Foreign Military Financing. Pasha and Kayani repeated that the Army had taken huge steps this year in its bilateral cooperation with the US and in its campaign in Swat and Bajaur and was getting little public (or private) credit from the US for these historic steps. Kayani said he was considering a statement on the bill, but he was struggling with what to say. He realized that Senator Kerry and Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, were among Pakistan,s best friends. He predicted the parliamentary debate would be tough, but in the final analysis the government controlled the agenda. Kayani said the language in the bill could undermine political support for the Army’s anti-terrorist effort.

¶2. (S) Kayani said the Pakmil was going into Waziristan in force in two-four weeks. (It is not entirely clear what this meant.) He said Zardari had advised against it for political reasons and wanted to wait until spring. (Ambassador will follow up with Zardari.) Kayani said he had met with PMLN Punjab Chief Minister Shabaz Sharif and PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar in a much publicized “clandestine8 meeting solely to bring them on board for the Waziristan operation, not to discuss politics.

¶3. (S) Kayani said we should talk to President Zardari about moving forward the back-channel with India, starting with the provisions agreed to in 2006. Kayani did not have a problem but thought Zardari was unwilling to take it on at this time.

¶4. (S) Kayani said the most important element for the US in Afghanistan, and for Pakistan, was a &perception of winning.8 There was no incentive for either reintegration or reconciliation without it.

¶5. (S) DGISI Pasha said that he wanted to convey to Washington agencies that he had been to Oman and Iran to follow up on reports which he received in Washington about a terrorist attack on India. He also had been in touch with the Israelis about information about attacks against Israeli targets in India. His intelligence counterparts in Oman and Iran did not know anything so far but were on alert. Pasha indicated he was willing to meet with his Indian counterpart at any time. End Summary.

¶6. (S) Ambassador called on General Kayani late evening October 6 to discuss the Kerry-Lugar bill. (Kayani had spoken to Chairman Mullen and General McChrystal earlier in the day.) DGISI Pasha joined most of the two-hour meeting. General Kayani said there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army. Both he and Pasha claimed the bill refused to recognize the enormous progress which had been made bilaterally with the US military and against terrorism within Pakistan: he was particularly irritated at the assessment required on civilian control of the military since he had no intention of taking over the government. “If I had wanted to do this, I would have done it during the long march.8

¶7. (S) Pasha, who is usually more emotional than Kayani, said the bill had caused a negative reaction among the Corps Commanders and younger officers. Pasha said they could not figure out why these “conditions” on assistance had been raised now when the anti-terrorist efforts had improved so
ISLAMABAD 00002427 002 OF 003
much. The &conditions8 were much tougher now than in previous legislation, despite the different situation on the ground.

¶8. (S) Ambassador said there were no conditions on the assistance, only a requirement for certifications and assessments. We saw the bill as a major victory since it represented a long-term commitment to Pakistan’s development. The bill had a provision for waivers, which in her judgment would be exercised if necessary. Kayani replied that the Pressler amendment had a waiver, too, but President Bush had refused to sign it.

¶9. (S) But most importantly, the Ambassador said, the provisions in the bill did not affect &real8 money going to the security forces: it did not apply to the FY 09 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund, nor to the FY 10 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund. (There is a waivable condition in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund FY 10 that the funds cannot be used for F16s). The provisions do not apply to Coalition Support Funds; and Kerry-Lugar would only apply to Foreign Military Financing funds not yet appropriated. Kayani said he understood that, just as he understood that the amount of funding available to the Pakistani military had increased very substantially under the new Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund.

¶10. (S) Kayani said the Corps Commanders would press him to make a statement about the bill during their October 7 meeting: he had been struggling with how to handle this. He said he recognized and appreciated that Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, and Senator Kerry were great friends of Pakistan. Ambassador said any negative statements would affect Pakistan,s improving relations with our Congress. Ambassador noted that the Prime Minister had told her that the parliamentary debate on Kerry-Lugar would run for a few days, but it would not result in a vote. The government had defended the Kerry-Lugar bill very aggressively in recent days. Kayani thought the government would have a harder time in the assembly than the Prime Minister had predicted, but he agreed that the government could prevent a vote. Kayani had recommended the government bring the issue before the national assembly, it would enable the government to say it had been “informed” by the debate.

¶11. (S) DGISI Pasha asked Ambassador to convey to Washington that he had followed up on threat information that an attack would be launched against India between September-November. He had been in direct touch with the Israelis on possible threats against Israeli targets in India. He had also gone to Muscat and Tehran to engage those intelligence services on threats, and they were alerted and working with Pakistan. He reminded Ambassador that information about an attack on India had come his way and he had asked CIA to convey it to the Indians through CIA channels. (Further details about these cases available in other channels.) He said he would meet his Indian counterpart any time, noting that it was critically important that any threat information be shared with him. He emphasized that ISI was doing everything possible to reduce the possibility of an attack on India.

¶12. (S) Ambassador asked about the likelihood for restarting the back-channel with India, noting that we had received a good readout from former Foreign Minister Kasuri, who was enthusiastic about the appointment of former Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan as the back-channel negotiator. Kayani said that Ambassador should talk to Zardari about restarting the back-channel where it “left off:” he was not sure that Zardari was quite willing to wade into these political waters yet. Kayani and Pasha both said that they wanted this channel to succeed, and Kayani expressed his confidence in Riaz Khan’s integrity and intelligence.

¶13. (S) Kayani said the military was going to move into Waziristan in two-four weeks, although President Zardari had wanted him to delay. (We will discuss this with Zardari.) He had met with PMLN Chief Minister of the Punjab Shabaz Sharif and with PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar to obtain their support for the Waziristan operation, not for political reasons. (Note: This outreach appears to have been successful. In a recent meeting with PolCouns, Shahbaz
ISLAMABAD 00002427 003 OF 003
stated that the Waziristan operation was critical and needed to move forward immediately. End Note.)

¶14. (S) Kayani went over some of the discussion he had had with General McChrystal about counter-insurgency but said that the most important issue in Afghanistan was the “perception that the US was winning.” There was no chance for reintegration or reconciliation unless this took place. PATTERSON

 

[truthseeker2010]

He had his Dunhill

I think he had a Cuban cigar!

 

[fatman17]

Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD2449, S) PAKISTAN ARMY GHQ AGAIN APPROVES EMBEDDING

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs


Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference

ID e.g. #09ISLAMABAD2449.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ISLAMABAD2449 2009-10-09 07:07 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO6340
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2449/01 2820725
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 090725Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5243
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0970
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1467
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5555
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 2344
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 7946
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 6977
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002449

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 10/05/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: (S) PAKISTAN ARMY GHQ AGAIN APPROVES EMBEDDING
U.S. SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONSREF: ISLAMABAD 2116

Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (a)(b)(c), and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: The Pakistani Army has for just the second time approved deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in XXXXXXXXXXXX, occurred in September (reftel). Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces. The developments of the past two months thus appear to represent a sea change in their thinking. End Summary.

¶2. (S) Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) informed ODRP that it approved a request from the Army’s 11 Corps Commander, Lt. General Masood Aslam, for U.S. SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to deploy to XXXXXXXXXXXX South Waziristan and XXXXXXXXXXXX North Waziristan, in the FATA, in order to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general operational advice to the 11 Corps’ XXXXXXXXXXXX. The 11 Corps had informally approached ODRP about our providing such support approximately one week ago; ODRP responded positively.

¶3. (S) SOC(FWD)-PAK support to 11 Corps would be at the XXXXXXXXXXXX and would include a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video. SOC(FWD)-PAK’s initial CONOPs envision deployment of six personnel each to XXXXXXXXXXXX. In order to finalize our planning and obtain formal go-ahead from CENTCOM, ODRP has requested additional information on the timing and purpose of the 11 Corps’ planned military operations from Brigadier General Amjad Shabbir, the Army’s Director General of Military Operations (DGMO).

¶4. (S) This is just the second time that GHQ has approved deployment of U.S. special operations elements to support Pakistani military operations. In September 2009, four SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded with the Frontier Corps (FC) at XXXXXXXXXXXX in the FATA, provided ISR for an FC operation (reftel). This support was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location.

¶5. (S) In recent days, the FC informally approached ODRP for a repeat deployment of SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to XXXXXXXXXXXX. SOC(FWD)-PAK is preparing a CONOP while the FC obtains approval from GHQ.

¶6. (S) Comment: U.S. special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role. The Pakistani Army leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their operations. The recent approval by GHQ -- almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani -- for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to XXXXXXXXXXXX appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking. Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point. The Pakistanis are increasingly confident that we do not have ulterior motives in assisting their operations. In addition, the direct recipients of SOC(FWD)-PAK training appear to have recognized the potential benefits of bringing U.S. SOF personnel into the field with them for operational advice and other support. In addition, the success of the initial deployment to XXXXXXXXXXXX likely helped catalyze the follow-up requests for new and repeat support.

¶7. (S) Comment Continued: These deployments are highly politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or related matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or U.S. media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance. End Comment.
ISLAMABAD 00002449 002 OF 002
PATTERSON

 

[air marshal]

No PR503/2010-ISPR
Rawalpindi - December 13, 2010:

Her Excellency Miss Grethe Faremo, Norwegian Minister of Defence alongwith General Harald Sunde, Chief of Norwegian Armed Forces called on the Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani today at General Headquarters.

The visiting dignitaries remained with him for some time and discussed matters of mutual interest.