For real strategic depth
Thursday, February 18, 2010
Zafar Hilaly
There is no institution better than the army for PowerPoint presentations. The slides and captions say it all. There is hardly any need for the accompanying commentary. Very often all that the presenter does is to read the captions on the screen and because he reads far slower aloud than the audience does silently, sitting through a session can become tiresome. After a while, as the presenter drones on, doggedly reading aloud one caption after another, one wonders whether he believes that his audience comprises functional illiterates.
In contrast, Gen Kayani uses what is on the screen to highlight, punctuate and explain his commentary, which is why all who attended his lengthy briefing on Friday on the army's recent operations found it so riveting. What were fairly complex operations become comprehensible to the uninitiated; and what was heartening was that the fighting tactics employed seemed so novel and path-breaking, in stark contrast to my experience when I was attached to the army as a civilian probationer in East Pakistan.
We were told to "attack" the "enemy" platoon across a recently ploughed rice field. On asking why we should be so stupid as to charge an enemy across a flat field without the slightest bit of cover, and that too with the sun in our eyes, I was told to "belt up" and not try to be "too smart."
Presentations often reveal as much about the thought processes and intellect and the professional competence of the presenter as the choice of words do his communication skills. By the reckoning of most, the COAS scored straight "A's" on all four counts.
From the briefing we deduced that in contrast to how some other armies are faring across the border, in less difficult terrain and against resistance that was desultory, the army's performance has been excellent.
For example, in South Waziristan the enemy had a long time to prepare and forge a battle plan. They had a surfeit of weapons and were well stocked with ammunition. Their fortifications were strong, well dug in and with interconnecting tunnels. And yet, such was the tactical surprise the army achieved that they were routed. Apparently, the enemy had prepared to fight along roads and valleys, in other words, the traditional battlegrounds in mountainous areas, whereas the army moved at night and along sharp ridges. Such tactics completely unhinged the enemy. Like in Swat, where the army had conducted the largest heliborne operation in South Asia, jumping from airborne helicopters onto knife-edge ridges, the South Waziristan operation demonstrated that the enemy, wily and determined as he is, could be worsted on his home terrain, notwithstanding what history recounts.
The impact of the success of these operations on the morale of our troops can be gauged by the fact that the South Waziristan operation that was scheduled to take ten weeks was concluded in five. The soldiers are single-minded, convinced of their cause and supremely confident. The enemy now knows that the army has the measure of them. More importantly, so do other "neutral" tribesmen, who may have wanted to join them had they proved successful in their resistance in Swat and South Waziristan. In addition to these two major operations, the army has conducted as many as 200 of brigade strength and more, and over 500 minor operations, and all without an iota of help from outsiders. This was important, nay crucial, if we are to have the confidence to undertake such actions exclusively on our own.
One significant impact of the army's success is the greater support the army is now receiving from local tribesmen as it pursues insurgents who have fled from South Waziristan and are hiding in North Waziristan. Arms caches are being unearthed on the basis of fresh intelligence supplied by locals, and further searches are being conducted. Naturally, a "blowback" was to be expected as the enemy tries to recoup morale; hence, the recourse by the militants to suicide bombing of soft targets in cities.
The challenges that the army faces are many, such as the need to retain public support and for the people to own the solutions being proffered. Success could not be measured in the number of enemies killed, actually those numbers are immaterial. More important is how quickly, and how well, the government is able to rebuild in the areas seized from the enemy and how speedily life could return to normal. And in this regard more must be done and quickly, despite resource constraints. If we failed, the insurgents would return once the army had left.
Another challenge is to establish the writ of the government and bring critical spaces under control and to reduce the gap between public expectations and what was doable. Otherwise frustrations would grow. Hence, all segments of society -- the army, public opinion, the media -- have to be on board with an agreed strategy to demonstrate that they view the war as our war and not that of America. This happily now exists.
As for the American effort in Afghanistan, the Americans will have to show that they are winning before they could hope to have the support of the populace. This is not happening at the moment. And until it does, something that will take time, local support or the formation of, say, anti-insurgent lashkars, is out of the question.
Asked about his remark that Pakistan's policy was "India-centric" the COAS said that what determined Pakistan's strategy was Indian capability, not intentions. India's defence budget was vastly more than ours ($29 billion vs. $4 billion) and, while there is no question of matching Indian expenditure, Pakistan must acquire a capability to ward India off.
The COAS also clarified that the concept of "strategic depth" that Pakistan sought in connection with Afghanistan was never meant to suggest that Pakistan should "control" Afghanistan, but rather to have a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan as a neighbour.
While just about everything one heard was reassuring and, frankly, music to our ears, left unaddressed, if only because of time constraints, were a number of questions that the briefing raised. For example, why the urge to "mediate" between the Americans and the Taliban, considering what our experience has shown? And since when has anyone had a right to mediate or demand that they be allowed to do so? Besides, for mediation to succeed a high degree of trust must exist between the parties involved and the mediator, which is palpably not the case in Afghanistan. At best, one felt, Pakistan should offer its services as a facilitator, and, then, only if asked. This seems a prudent course, considering that Afghanistan's other neighbours may also want a similar "mediating" role.
Secondly, when have we ever had a "friendly" government in Afghanistan? Afghanistan actually opposed the admission of Pakistan to the UN in 1948. The only Afghan leader who demonstrated a willingness to recognise the Durand Line as the international border was Sardar Daud, who was killed on the eve of his visit to Pakistan in 1978, lest he "sell out" to Pakistan.
Actually, what we desire is not a government in Kabul that is "friendly," as much as one that will not align with India to threaten Pakistan's security. And that we can only ensure by keeping our guard up, giving no cause to Afghanistan to gang up against us. And if they persist in taking such other action, including the suspension of the transit trade facility which the Afghans anyway observe mostly in the breach, to make such moves grossly counterproductive.
Finally, it is difficult to comprehend the logic behind our offer to train the Afghan National Army. While it makes sense to oppose leaving the training of such a force to India, if we were to be assigned such a task today then the only conceivable enemy that the Afghan army would need to be trained to combat would be the Taliban. Training a hitherto unfriendly, Pakistan-averse Tajik-dominated force to fight a Taliban/Pakhtun opponent that is traditionally well disposed to Pakistan would require a level of dexterity that only erstwhile Byzantine courtiers possessed. It simply won't wash.
Nevertheless, an unmistakeable feeling that one took away from the briefing was that the army was in excellent hands and militarily the war was going well for Pakistan. The other was that because Gen Kayani is a man with oodles of common sense, common decency and common honesty he has made himself forever ineligible for public office.
The writer is a former ambassador. Email:
charles123it@hotmail.com
