Chengdu J-10 Emerges:
China is lifting its veil of secrecy on the elusive Chengdu J-10 fighter, which may become China's first successful fourth generation fighter. Richard D Fisher, Jr offers new insights.
THE JIAN-10 or J-10's origins can be traced back to a programmer initiated by the Chengdu Aircraft Co's competitor, the Shenyang Aircraft Co, in the form of the J-9 canard fighter proposal. Shenyang's desire to focus on what became the J-8 fighter forced the J-9 to be shifted to Chengdu in 1969, eventually producing a proposal for a 13 ton, Mach 2.5 canard fighter bearing a resemblance to Saab's JA-37 Viggen.
This reflected a preference for a pre fly-by-wire design, one which included canards to provide a better Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) performance, while the efficient delta wing provided better maneuverability. However, the J-9 never advanced beyond wind tunnel testing and by the end of the 1970s the programmer had ended because of lack of funding, an inability to surmount technical problems, and Chengdu's decision to concentrate on new versions of the J-7 (MiG-21C Fishbed).
The follow-on J-10 proposal started in the 1980s as China's answer to emerging fourth generation Soviet MiG and Sukhoi fighters. The canard configuration of the J-9 was retained, though changing strategic requirements caused by the decision of China's leadership to downgrade military priorities in the 1980s, followed by the fall of the Soviet Union, forced a prolonged development period.
Requirements also shifted from an emphasis on air-superiority to a multi-role fighter to replace the Shenyang J-6 (MiG-19 Farmer), the Xian 0-5 Fantan and the J-7.
Through the 1990s, the J-10 was the source of great speculation and intrigue, as Washington tried to contend with the J-10's new ally, Israel. Following the Reagan Administration's decision to end funding for Israel Aircraft Industries' Lavi (Young Lion) fighter in 1988, forcing its cancellation, Israel promptly offered its technology to China.
At least one Chinese defector in the early 1990s supplied the US with early design data. This led to the US release of artist's projections showing a canard fighter with elements of the Lavi, and the Lockheed-Martin F-16. However, China added to the confusion by revealing photos of two J-10 models with top members of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo. In 1996 a photo of a canard fighter was released alongside Politburo member Li Peng, a noted hard-liner. This model featured a near copy of the Lavi's vertical stabilizer but a very different fuselage and main wing. The photo was alleged to have been taken in 1990, but revealed by Taiwanese agents. In early 2000 another photo of a different J-10 model appeared in a Hong Kong publication, with Politburo member Li Rui huan. This model was also a canard fighter, but one with a different vertical stabilizer and the double-delta wing having a less pronounced sweep.
It is now known that the final prototype emerged in early 1998, the first flight taking place on March 23 that year. The J-10 has since been known to US intelligence services and, one assumes, to those of its allies. Butthe J-10 did not emerge into public view until the unofficial release of a grainy photo on the
Internet in January 2001. In subsequent months several photos emerged showing J-10s in flight and close up photos began to emerge in January 2002 (see J-10 Emerges, March 2001, p5). This led to at least one Chinese internet leaker of J-10 information being arrested. Although there is speculation that the J-10 will have an o f f i c i a l debut at the Zhuhai Air Show in November, existing photos, plus additional new data, allow for a fuller analysis of the J-10.
Israel's influence
Early 2001 photos of the J-10 reveal an F-16- size fighter with a canard configuration similar to, but not the same as, the Lavi. The J-10's outward similarity to the Lavi is evident in the shape of the shoulder-mounted canard surfaces, and in the proportion of wing and the lower fuselage ventral stabilizers as well as in the wing roots. However, the J-10 is larger than the Lavi, and also, in contrast, has a conventional straight-trailing edge delta wing with no wing tip hard points. The J-10 has a broader vertical stabilizer than the Lavi, and its under slung engine intake is more square than semi-circular as on the Lavi and the F-16.
Chinese Internet sources note that the J-10 may eventually have eleven hard points – five on the fuselage and six on the wings, though the prototypes appear to have only one fuselage hard point. Other Israeli influences cannot be seen. These are thought by the US intelligence community to include advanced composite materials, flight control technology, and avionics derived from US technology on the F-16, but sold to China by Israel.
Early flyby-wire tests were conducted on a converted J-6 with the China Test Flight Establishment (CTFE). However, Chengdu is reported to have had difficulty mastering the J-10's fly-by-wire system, which is also said to have caused the crash of one prototype. Since the early 1990s China is also alleged to have had ample access to Pakistan's F-16s, enabling it to build a data base that is also likely to have aided the J-10.
Chinese sources indicate the cockpit has three multi-function displays plus a large holographic HUD in a manner very similar to that of the Lavi. The J-10 is also said to employ a helmet display system. This could be the clunky Louyang helmet display system shown briefly during the latest Zhuhai Airshow in November 2000. Or it could be, as Taiwan sources suggest, a variant of the Israeli Elbit helmet display.
Low-level and precision attack missions will be aided by a FLIP and laser targeting pod, which are likely to be attached to a forward fuselage hard point. A compact Chinese targeting pod similar to the Israeli Litening was revealed at the 1998 Zhuhai show.
Russia's contribution
The J-10's initial radar is thought to be the Russian multi-mode Phazotron Zemchug (Pearl) which Russian sources note is a variant of the Zhuk-M being fitted to the J-8IIC (or J-8IIH according to some sources) multi-role fighter. Taiwanese sources note that the J-10's radar may also be called the Phazotron Zhuk 10 PD, with a search range of 86.5 nautical miles, and the ability to scan ten to 15 targets and track between four and six targets. Other reports note that Israel has offered the Elta EL/M-2035 radar, though its selection is less likely. It is possible that future versions of theJ-10 may feature a new Chinese multi-mode radar.
China's inability to produce a suitable engine - a long-standing problem - led to the adoption of the 12,500kg (27,560lb) thrust Saturn/Lyulka AL-31FN. This version differs from those on the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Sukhoi fighters in having the gearbox moved to the bottom of the engine. Incorporating this engine helped force the 1990s redesign of the J-10. At the 2Q01 Paris Air Show, Chinese officials revealed their intention to purchase 300 AL-31FN engines for the J-10.
Chinese, Russian and Israeli-derived systems will dominate the J-10's early weapons load. For short-range combat it will carry the PL-8, a copy of the Israeli Python-3, the PL-9, which is based on the same Israeli missile, and the Russian Vympel R-73. These AAMs all have an off-bore sight capability. For medium range combat it will carry the Chinese PL-11 and in the future, the Vympel R-77.
For attack missions the J-10 will carry free-fall and laser guided bombs, and Chinese guided missiles such as the C-801/802, or future derivatives. The J-10 could also carry a new Chinese ramjet-powered attack missile revealed at the 2000 Zhuhai show, or a co-produced version of the Russian Zvezda Kh-31P ramjet-powered anti-radar missile.
Changing with the doctrine
The prolonged development of the J-10 has had the ironic result of allowing the fighter to adjust to changing requirements of the PLAAF. The J-10 evolved from an interceptor and air superiority aircraft directed against the former Soviet Union into a multi-role fighter designed to implement new doctrines of high tech and joint-forces warfare aimed at forcing 'unification' with Taiwan.
In a Taiwan operations scenario, the J-10 will complement other PLAAF multi-role fighters, such as the Su-30MKK, Shenyang J-8IIC and Xian JH-7 attack fighters in performing o f f e n s i v e strike missions. It will also complement Su-27 and J-8II fighters in offensive counter-air sweep missions coordinated by Russian-made Beriev A:50E AWACS and other support aircraft. These, in turn, will be coordinated with ballistic missile, cruise missile, information warfare and special forces operations.
With the expected use of helmet-sighted missiles, the J-10 will have an immediate advantage over Taiwanese fighters which may lack helmet sighting systems for a number of years. Armed with the Russian R-77 self-guiding AAM or a new PRC self-guided medium-range AAM based on the AMR-1 design revealed in 1996, the J-10 would be comparable to current Taiwanese and US fighters armed with the AIM-120 AMRAAM AAM. With an expected 9g maneuvering c a p a b i l i t y , the J-10 may also prove as maneuverable as the F-16.
It is not clear how many J-10s will eventually enter PLAAF service. Between six and ten prototypes are believed to have been built so far. There is speculation that 30 could be built by 2005, while one US estimate notes that eventual production could reach 500.
However, the J-10's cost and potential complications over foreign components may inhibit the production of such large numbers.
The J-10 will also have to prove itself as worthy as the Russian Sukhoi Su-27s and Su-30MKK fighter and attack aircraft now being acquired. In addition, the PLAAF is building a new multi-role version of the Shenyang J-8II fighter (perhaps because J-10 development is not proceeding fast enough). About 100 new multi-role versions of the Shenyang J-8II fighter are to be built.
Foreign sales
Marketing the J-10 is likely to be dependent on China's success in developing a domestic engine, r e p o r t e d l y t h e 26,730lb thrust WP-15 (Wopen) turbofan. Even though it is less powerful than the AL-31F, the WP-15's success would represent a considerable advance for China. One of the first possible customers to see the J-10 was Thailand's Air Force Commander, who in 1997 had great praise for the fighter. Pakistan is another potential customer and it could meet success in Africa or even Latin America.
Although Iran is also a potential customer, in exchange for its early technical help, Israel is believed to have extracted a promise from China not to sell the J-10 in the Middle East.
In varying degrees, the J-10 will compete with other Chengdu products like the FC-1, J-7MF and J-7MG. The J-10 will cost more, but not nearly as much as its Western competitors, such as the Eurofighter, Gripen, Rafale, F-16 and F/A-18, and may perhaps be competitive with the MiG-29. China's penchant for offering 'friendship prices' could mean that more countries may have access to this multi-role fighter.
For the future, Chengdu is said to be considering upgrade options for the J-10. These include a thrust-vectored engine, a prototype of which was in a photo display at the 2000 Zhuhai Air Show, but failed to elicit comment from Chinese officials.
Also being considered is a phased array radar- either a Russian model or a new Chinese phased array radar likely to be based on foreign inputs. It is also likely that future J-10s will incorporate radar absorbing materials, if it does not already use radar absorbing paint developed in China.
Then there is a potential People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) requirement for a naval variant of the J-10 should the PLAN realize its long-standing ambition of obtaining large CTOL aircraft carriers. In 1997 the US Office of Naval Intelligence speculated that a twin engine version of the J-10 could be developed for this purpose. Such a version might use the Klimov RD-33 engine, though a more powerful version of the AL-31, such as the recently revealed AL-41, could also be used. With either engine solution, Chengdu could develop a twin-seat dedicated attack variant of the J-10.
With significant foreign help, China has finally produced a world-class fighter in the Chengdu J-10. It can be expected to be a challenge to Taiwan's Air Force, or to current generation US fighters that might have to assist Taiwan. And for the right price, China may finally be able to offer a modern fighter aircraft to compete with Western and Russian models.
Old article but some historical facts about the J-10.