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Can USA Jammed/Hacked Pakistan's F-16 ?

Of course not, for thou arst the emissary of the great white father, all hail the emissary, we the subhuman about to die salute you.
The usual scorned woman tripe aside( if you get to speak to someone who knows babayji and his history you'll know) , the "kill" switches are essentially limited to comms and to sensitive systems like the ALQ and the Sniper.
Nothing is disabled, and they are more related to anyone trying to open the systems without OEM approval or presence. @gambit

Still, I bet all my posts here that this topic will be discussed again with usual "know it all" attitude and the associated conspiracy theories.
 
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The usual scorned woman tripe aside( if you get to speak to someone who knows babayji and his history you'll know) , the "kill" switches are essentially limited to comms and to sensitive systems like the ALQ and the Sniper.
Nothing is disabled, and they are more related to anyone trying to open the systems without OEM approval or presence. @gambit

Still, I bet all my posts here that this topic will be discussed again with usual "know it all" attitude and the associated conspiracy theories.

Copy that.
 
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What you presented was nothing more than your own unsubstantiated paranoia. Degraded versions of systems to sell is NOT uncommon, even in the civilian industries. Even RR have different versions of their autos for clients of varying wealth. Degraded versions of combat systems are NOT the same as what is speculated here, which is 'AT WILL disabling of features, which you had nothing more than a silly drawing. In your paranoia, it is convenient that the speculations are only directed at US and no one else.

The problem for people like me, who have actual experience in the subjects, is that there is no way we can counter your brand of 'reasoning'. For you, your ignorance of the technical details is a strength. It gives you license to bypass common sense and a paper mache thin veneer of intellectual superiority. If we cannot disprove you, you are correct by default. It is a perversion of logic.

At will disabling of commonly used features adds unnecessary complexity to the design. In aviation, either the feature works %100 of the time or we do not use it. Either the wing generate lift or not and we crash. We would have to add verification that the feature was disabled or degraded and to the degree that we want and the disabling feature has to work absolutely when commanded.

Real world logic continues to debunk the paranoia.

If I know that PAF F-16s will be used against Israel, why bother to disable or degrade the radar? Why not disable the entire flight control system and literally ground all PAF F-16s? When I was active duty, preflight flight controls checks are done while in chocks. Every jet must do it prior to taxi. There are plenty of online videos that shows the checks where the flight control surfaces go thru their motions. With a flip of a switch at the Pentagon, we can command those checks to make PAF F-16s errs out in the chocks. Why bother with the radar or the ECM systems? That would send a clear statement to Pakistan that the US would ensure Israel -- or any US ally -- victory, right?

But that would also means the end of US alliance with anyone else, including one as close as Great Britain, because now everyone would be suspicious of any US hardware integrated into their combat systems, no matter the degree of integration, large to small. Leaders worldwide would inevitably think: The Americans have just disabled Pakistani airpower, that mean they can do it to mine based upon American political expediencies worldwide.

Trust at the international level is already a fragile thing. So now after the world learned that Pakistani airpower was rendered impotent, why should anyone trust US anymore? Installing an 'at will' disabling feature is a 'WTF' thing to do. We would screw ourselves for the next century.

I am simply amazed how you could, with a straight face, associate your good name with the above in presence of the following. This refutes every single argument you have presented on this thread so far

https://edwardsnowden.com/surveillance-programs/
Surveillance programs

Background: the US Intelligence Community

Seventeen agencies make up the US Intelligence Community, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the National Security Agency (NSA). The total budget for fiscal year 2013 for the Intelligence Community was US$52.6 billion. Although the bulk of the documents released by Edward Snowden are related to NSA operations, different Intelligence Community agencies often work together, request data together and share their intelligence with each other.

NSA operations
The NSA seems to classify its programs under three units, though these are not necessarily mutually exclusive: Special Source Operations (SSO), Global Access Operations (GAO) and Tailored Access Operations (TAO). GAO programs involve open access collection using satellites (FORNSAT), microwave intercept sites, or other forms of open collection in cooperative countries. SSO programs require privileged access for the data they collect, and TAO programs that collect data involve remote exploitation of computers or networks. In addition to these units, there is a joint NSA-CIA group called Special Collection Services (SCS), which inserts equipment in areas that are difficult to access, particularly diplomatic premises.


The Special Source Operations logo: an eagle grasping fibre-optic cables that encircle the globe.

Many of the documents initially released by Edward Snowden and reported on in mainstream media contained details on the SSO unit. In particular, under the PRISM program, service providers – including Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, YouTube, PalTalk, AOL and Yahoo – allowed the NSA to collect communications data for analysis. Also part of SSO are the programs which tap fibre-optic cables around the world – at least some of the access to these fibre-optic cables is achieved through industry cooperation. Other operations are undertaken without the knowledge of the companiesinvolved.

Another category of documents reveals NSA operations that compromise smartphones and calling patterns. Location data enables the agency to discern previously unknown relationships between individuals using its CO-TRAVELER system.Cookies and data from mobile apps are targeted by a number of NSA tools. Text messages are also routinely collected.

Other documents show screenshots of a program called Boundless Informant, which maps and graphs data from every Digital Network Intelligence (DNI) record in the SIGINT system and offers a full view of GAO’s collection capabilities. High data volumes were observed, notably in US-allied countries such as Germany and Brazil, as well as the most heavily surveilled places, such as Iran and Afghanistan. The NSA’s XKeyscore database allows for analysis of data from the combination of data from PRISM, SCS sites (also called F6 sites) and FORNSAT sites.

Project BULLRUN, an NSA program aiming to defeat the encryption used to secure network communication technologies, works with the TAO unit. Documents on BULLRUN describe capabilities against SSL/TLS, SSH, encrypted chat, HTTPS, VPN and encrypted Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VOIP).

The Snowden documents include indications of theextent and scale of the targeted TAO attacks carried out by the NSA and its international partners together with some details about individual targets. Documents also describe how TAO’s hardware and software attacks are implemented, including theinterdiction and compromise of hardware produced by US companies that is intended for use overseas.

Documents in the Snowden archive also describe operations that are primarily carried out by the NSA’s Five Eyes partners in the UK, Canada,Australia and New Zealand. There are close staffingand funding relationships between these agencies. The NSA also has particularly close relationships that include jointly staffed projects, sharing of NSA tools and raw data about US citizens with signals intelligence agencies in Germany, Sweden andIsrael.

The law behind surveillance
A number of important releases also reveal the justification that the NSA uses to enable the extent of collection and analysis mentioned above, as well as the US legislation that enables these programs. A2009 draft report from the NSA Inspector General summarises NSA activities post-9/11 and, in particular, the transition from authorisation of warrantless surveillance by President Bush to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) authorisation.

Two key parts of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) enable NSA surveillance: Section 215 of Title II in the Patriot Act of 2001 amending FISA, and Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008, also amending FISA. Section 215, entitled ‘Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations’, allows the FBI to request metadata from US service providers, as they did in a court order issued to Verizon for all call records for a three-month period in 2013. Other NSA operations, including PRISM, seem to be authorised by FAA Section 702, which does not explicitly allow for targeting of US-person data. However, certaindocuments show that programs enabled by Section 702 inevitably contain US-person data in their databases, and those databases can be used to search for US persons or analyse their metadata under appropriate procedures.

Executive Order 12333, signed by President Reagan 4 December 1981, is also an important – some would say the primary – source for NSA authorities,allowing US intelligence agencies to operate beyond the bounds of judicial and legislative oversight for foreign intelligence purposes, with the approval of the US attorney general. The NSA’s interpretation of Executive Order 12333 is not public, but the order issaid to place few restrictions on the gathering of US persons’ communications content and metadata where it is collected “incidentally” and allow the broad collection of non US persons’ data. Edward Snowden has suggested that “indefensible collection activities”, such as the upstream collection of US internet companies’ data travelling between their data centres, takes place under Executive Order 12333 authorities.

Foreign intelligence
US foreign intelligence involves extensive spying on diplomatic allies and trade partners. UN and EU embassies in New York and Washington have beenbugged by the NSA, and SCS sites are intercepting communications of US diplomatic partners overseas. Documents released in Brazilian media outlets show that the US gathers foreign intelligence by spying on participants of the Summit of the Americas and the Organization of American States and by analysing data on topics such as oil and energy. One document details a ‘success’ in pushing for Iran sanctions after significant support from NSA espionage reports on the UN Security Council.

The NSA has had extensive collaboration with the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), even paying the UK intelligence agency for access to certain operations. The GCHQ Tempora operation provided both agencies with data from a number of tapped fibre-optic cables. Intelligence and collected data is also shared between the NSA and the intelligence agencies in Germany, Israel andSweden.
 
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you are assuming USA cannot modify Indian air force aircraft to appear as NATO aircraft

Not many NATO allies use Russian military hardware...so it will be hard to make Indian Air force planes as NATO (such as appearance, compatibility with NATO signalling/comm devices etc)
 
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I am simply amazed how you could, with a straight face, associate your good name with the above in presence of the following. This refutes every single argument you have presented on this thread so far

https://edwardsnowden.com/surveillance-programs/
The real amazement is that you consider what you presented as 'refute'. If that is all you have, might as well argue that the present of normal intelligence agencies such as the KGB and the CIA make 'logical' that PAF F-16s are built with bugs and backdoors.
 
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Copy that.

LOL. Of course nothing is disabled as provided - as long as the encryption keys are provided on time. :D

(Attacking me personally will not change that fact. :lol: )
 
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LOL. Of course nothing is disabled as provided - as long as the encryption keys are provided on time. :D

(Attacking me personally will not change that fact. :lol: )

Indeed, mighty emissary thoest a citizen from a country that was created by fairy turds and elf nail clippings, thou can never be wrong, how dare a member of the subhuman Indus people question your magnificence. We who are about to die, salute you. O' emissary of the great white father.
 
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Not many NATO allies use Russian military hardware...so it will be hard to make Indian Air force planes as NATO (such as appearance, compatibility with NATO signalling/comm devices etc)

physical appearance would be hard to change. In every weapons deal the Indian air force installs custom IFF modules on all aircraft. I would not know how easy/hard it is.
 
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A simple and elegant solution, no doubt. :D



These days, everybody does it.



It depends on which precise version of the F-16 is being talked about. For example, Pakistani F-16s require encryption keys, while Israeli ones do not.
Wow @gambit experience is limited to US F16s so he wont know about PAF F16s ... but you sir know not only about PAF F16s but Israeli F16s as well. That is impressive.

Do you mind letting us know if these encryption keys are needed on Block 52s only or on the MLUs as well ... the one we got done in Turkey. I wont be wrong to assume that the old block 15s didnt have these encryption keys! And when was this encryption tech developed - looks like Pakistan must have been billed for this specialized development on its F16s. It would be interesting to know more ... as I would like to know how LM developed verified tested and certified these encrypted F16s ... for such a small customer. In record time them. Most who are familiar with Aerospace dev cycles would know.
 
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I am simply amazed how you could, with a straight face, associate your good name with the above in presence of the following. This refutes every single argument you have presented on this thread so far

https://edwardsnowden.com/surveillance-programs/

there is a simple reason to sell degraded weapon systems
1. you do not want to face your client with state of the art weapon systems you sold them
2. you do want your client to a source for leakage of technology to 3rd parties. In case of Pakistan the 3rd party is china
 
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Wow @gambit experience is limited to US F16s so he wont know about PAF F16s ... but you sir know about not only PAF F16s but Israeli F16s as well. That is impressive.

I know what I said, and you can verify that fact once again from any source you may care to trust: PAF F-16s require encryption keys that must be renewed periodically while IAF F-16s do not. What else I know or not has nothing to do with this discussion. My statement that an end-user level operator with experience on one version would not necessary be able to transport that experience to another version is also correct. (And I do not care whether I am attacked for saying it or not; the facts remain as I have stated them.)

Do you mind letting us know if these encryption keys are needed on Block 52s only or on the MLUs as well ... the one we got done in Turkey. I wont be wrong to assume that the old block 15s didnt have these encryption keys! And when was this encryption tech developed - looks like Pakistan must have been billed for this specialized development on its F16s.

Those questions are too specific for me to answer. :D

(I once posted actual documents on this topic a few years ago.)
 
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I know what I said, and you can verify that fact once again from any source you may care to trust: PAF F-16s require encryption keys that must be renewed periodically while IAF F-16s do not. What else I know or not has nothing to do with this discussion. My statement that an end-user level operator with experience on one version would not necessary be able to transport that experience to another version is also correct. (And I do not care whether I am attacked for saying it or not; the facts remain as I have stated them.)
But how you end up with sources that are aware of PAF F16s as well as IAF F16s , but the poor retired US F16 pilot who has worked in the US defense industry as well as interacted with Foreign airforces would not know. I am just very impressed sir.

Those questions are too specific for me to answer. :D
Here is a simple one Block 52s? MLUs? Non MLUs from Jordan? Or all?
 
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But how you end up with sources that are aware of PAF F16s as well as IAF F16s , but the poor retired US F16 pilot who has worked in the US defense industry as well as interacted with Foreign airforces would not know. I am just very impressed sir.

Your sarcasm aside, may I please remind you that who or what I know is not the topic here. :D

The questions you ask are simple, but too specific. I am content to fail your test, but I will stand by the statements I made above. Once again, please feel free to check them from any source you trust. (I wonder if the actual documents on this topic posted here a few years ago survived or not.)

It would be interesting to know more ... as I would like to know how LM developed verified tested and certified these encrypted F16s ... for such a small customer. In record time them. Most who are familiar with Aerospace dev cycles would know.

Interesting questions no doubt, but ones that must remain unanswered here, sadly. :D
 
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Your sarcasm aside, may I please remind you that who or what I know is not the topic here. :D

The questions you ask are simple, but too specific. I am content to fail your test, but I will stand by the statements I made above. Once again, please feel free to check them from any source you trust.
Well reason I wanted to know is to check if this is even plausible- aerospace dev cycles are not like pc apps. What you said require a specilized F16 tailor made with completely different mission computers and fms etc. And as gambit may have briefly explained there is a cert process that is followed to ensure the systems behave as per the requirements in all probable operational conditions. The mechanisim of keys development, provision is again shrouded with mystery which you seem to be aware. I have some exp in civil aero industry, and not military aero industry - but the dev challeges and cycles are quite similar. Hence it would be interesting to look at the time line of PAF F16s negotiations with US to see of this is even possible - as most learned memeber here have not seen or heared of this anywhere and it looks like is specific fic for PAF ( as you say IAF F16s dont need it). And to develop, integrate, maintain and fail proof such a mechanism on a fighter jet is going to be monumental challenege itself!
 
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