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A new report by the U.S.
Congressional Research Service
(CRS) suggests China's new
anti-ship ballistic missile
(ASBM) can be countered, and
is not, necessarily, the "game- changer"many defense
analysts predict.
Ronald O'Rourke, a CRS
specialist in naval affairs,
argues that China's new
DF-21D ASBM, dubbed the
"carrier killer,"can be defeated
by "employing a combination of active and passive
measures"along the ASBM's
"kill chain. Despite dire warnings by a
variety of defense analysts that
the U.S. risks losing an aircraft
carrier to a Chinese ASBM,
O'Rourke said the U.S. Air Force
has already "taken [China's] kill chains apart to the nth'
degree. According to "China Naval
Modernization: Implications
for U.S. Navy
Capabilities,"released in late
March, O'Rourke said there are
several areas in the sequence of events (kill chain) where
active and passive measures
can be taken to stop the
missile. These include when
the target ship is detected and
identified, when that data is transmitted to the ASBM
launcher, firing the ASBM, and
when the ASBM re-entry
vehicle finds the target ship. O'Rourke makes a number of
suggestions. First, the U.S. Navy could do
more to control
electromagnetic emissions or
using deception emitters. Second, it could also acquire
systems for disabling or
jamming China's long-range
maritime surveillance and
targeting systems, destroy
ASBMs in various stages of flight, and decoy and confuse
ASBMs as they approach their
intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs
in flight include developing
versions of the SM-3 Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD)
interceptor missile, including
the planned SM-3 Block IIA. The U.S. Navy also should
accelerate the procurement of
the Sea-Based Terminal
interceptor, which is the
planned successor of the SM-2
Block IV terminal-phase BMD interceptor. Other options include
accelerating the development
and deployment of
electromagnetic rail guns, and
accelerating development and
deployment of shipboard high- power free electron lasers and
solid state lasers, says the
report. More could be done to develop
an ASBM endo-atmospheric
target, which currently appears
dead in the Pentagon. ASBMs could be defeated as
they approach their intended
targets by equipping ships with
electronic warfare systems or
systems for generating radar-
opaque smoke clouds that confuse an ASBM's terminal-
guidance radar.
O'Rourke said the U.S. Congress
should question if the Flight III
version of the DDG-51 Arleigh
Burke-class destroyer, which
the U.S. Navy plans to procure
in 2016, will have sufficient anti-air warfare (AAW) and
BMD capability to perform
projected air and missile
defense missions against
Chinese forces, including
ASBMs. The Flight III DDG-51 would
have more AAW and BMD
capability than the current
Flight IIA DDG-51 design but
less AAW and BMD capability
than was envisioned for a now- canceled CG(X) Next Generation
Cruiser. This is largely because the
Flight III DDG-51 would be
equipped with a 12- or 14-
foot-diameter version of the
new Air and Missile Defense
Radar (AMDR) "that would have more sensitivity than the SPY-1
radar on Flight IIA DDG-51s,
but less sensitivity than the
substantially larger version of
the AMDR that was envisioned
for the CG(X),"O'Rourke said.
Breaking China's DF-21D missile kill chain: US expert - China.org.cn
@sancho what say?
Congressional Research Service
(CRS) suggests China's new
anti-ship ballistic missile
(ASBM) can be countered, and
is not, necessarily, the "game- changer"many defense
analysts predict.
Ronald O'Rourke, a CRS
specialist in naval affairs,
argues that China's new
DF-21D ASBM, dubbed the
"carrier killer,"can be defeated
by "employing a combination of active and passive
measures"along the ASBM's
"kill chain. Despite dire warnings by a
variety of defense analysts that
the U.S. risks losing an aircraft
carrier to a Chinese ASBM,
O'Rourke said the U.S. Air Force
has already "taken [China's] kill chains apart to the nth'
degree. According to "China Naval
Modernization: Implications
for U.S. Navy
Capabilities,"released in late
March, O'Rourke said there are
several areas in the sequence of events (kill chain) where
active and passive measures
can be taken to stop the
missile. These include when
the target ship is detected and
identified, when that data is transmitted to the ASBM
launcher, firing the ASBM, and
when the ASBM re-entry
vehicle finds the target ship. O'Rourke makes a number of
suggestions. First, the U.S. Navy could do
more to control
electromagnetic emissions or
using deception emitters. Second, it could also acquire
systems for disabling or
jamming China's long-range
maritime surveillance and
targeting systems, destroy
ASBMs in various stages of flight, and decoy and confuse
ASBMs as they approach their
intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs
in flight include developing
versions of the SM-3 Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD)
interceptor missile, including
the planned SM-3 Block IIA. The U.S. Navy also should
accelerate the procurement of
the Sea-Based Terminal
interceptor, which is the
planned successor of the SM-2
Block IV terminal-phase BMD interceptor. Other options include
accelerating the development
and deployment of
electromagnetic rail guns, and
accelerating development and
deployment of shipboard high- power free electron lasers and
solid state lasers, says the
report. More could be done to develop
an ASBM endo-atmospheric
target, which currently appears
dead in the Pentagon. ASBMs could be defeated as
they approach their intended
targets by equipping ships with
electronic warfare systems or
systems for generating radar-
opaque smoke clouds that confuse an ASBM's terminal-
guidance radar.
O'Rourke said the U.S. Congress
should question if the Flight III
version of the DDG-51 Arleigh
Burke-class destroyer, which
the U.S. Navy plans to procure
in 2016, will have sufficient anti-air warfare (AAW) and
BMD capability to perform
projected air and missile
defense missions against
Chinese forces, including
ASBMs. The Flight III DDG-51 would
have more AAW and BMD
capability than the current
Flight IIA DDG-51 design but
less AAW and BMD capability
than was envisioned for a now- canceled CG(X) Next Generation
Cruiser. This is largely because the
Flight III DDG-51 would be
equipped with a 12- or 14-
foot-diameter version of the
new Air and Missile Defense
Radar (AMDR) "that would have more sensitivity than the SPY-1
radar on Flight IIA DDG-51s,
but less sensitivity than the
substantially larger version of
the AMDR that was envisioned
for the CG(X),"O'Rourke said.
Breaking China's DF-21D missile kill chain: US expert - China.org.cn
@sancho what say?
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