Gambit.
I question from a novice,would it really matter if a nuke warhead landed 10m away from a carrier.Would the explosion not be enough to blow everything in sight.
That is why I always condition my argument with the attack being non-nuclear. A nuclear detonation will destroy the ship whether the detonation is at surface level or overhead.
Secondly in your opinion where are the chinese with regards to development of these missiles and what countermeasuees is the USN Thinking of adding on to its ships.
Araz
There are existing countermeasures.
Most would argue a direct assault on the descending warhead, such as a kinetic interceptor like the SM-3.
But how about seduction/distraction countermeasures?
Most thinks that electronic warfare (EW) is about 'jamming', which involves just blasting the EM spectrum with overwhelming EM noise, but seduction/distraction countermeasures are vital components that are applicable to many situations, either as standalone or in combination with other methods.
Chaff dispense is a seduction/distraction countermeasures.
Say that this DF-21D warhead is equipped with terminal radar guidance and limited maneuverability for course correction once its radar is active in descent.
If the system is sophisticated enough, it could acquire the ship, mark its radar signature and location, project a heading, and steer itself towards a point of collision based upon that projection. Chaff dispense alone may cover the ship, or it may not. Chaff eventually descend to ground and in doing so, gradually loses its effectiveness. So even if the chaff bloom is larger than the ship's RCS, since the attacking radar is sophisticated enough, it will not be 'seduced' by the larger EM signature. Even worse if there are local winds that may dissipate the chaff bloom in unwanted direction. So chaff alone is not always the best option even though it may initially cover several square kilometers -- electronically speaking.
On the other hand, say the ship detect the descending warhead before the warhead activate its radar, which it cannot do until it is no longer in the plasma cloud created by orbital descent, the ship can transmit the usual 'jamming' white noise to cover the entire radar view of any radar from any direction, then a second or two later, dispense several chaff blooms, then finally turn off the white noise 'jamming' signals. Now the warhead's radar is presented with several chaff blooms that may or may not be distinguishable from each other, and because of the previous white noise 'jamming', it never acquire the ship's radar signature to start.
Over-the-horizon (OTH) radar? The system have very poor target resolution, such as heading and location, even for slow moving ships. The system is not very mobile because the antenna/array is very large, such as tens or hundreds of meters or even kilometers in dimensions.
Over-the-horizon radar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The resolution of any radar depends on the width of the beam and the range to the target. For example a radar with a 1/2 degree beamwidth and a target at 120 km (75 mi) range will show the target as 1 km (0.62 mi) wide. Because of the long ranges at which OTH radars are used, the resolution is typically measured in tens of kilometres. This makes the backscatter system almost useless for target engagement, although this sort of accuracy is more than adequate for the early warning role. In order to achieve a beamwidth of 1/2 degree at HF, an antenna array several kilometres long is required.
So how about a few bombs delivered by a couple of B-2s to completely disrupt the array's physical layout? The highlighted example of 1/2 degree is just to demonstrate what is necessary physically for antenna/array dimensions. That beamwidth is too small to perform volume search on the vast ocean. So a beamwidth of 3-5 deg is more practical. If a beamwidth of 1/2 deg will show the aircraft carrier as 1 km wide, what will a 3-5 deg beamwidth will show the ship? How about several km wide?
Imagine a ship several kilometers wide...
So even if the antenna/array is less than kilometers in dimensions, it is still a fixed structure and therefore a viable target for US B-2s or even low flying B-1s to take out, effectively blinding the DF-21D system.
All of this have been discussed before. But just like loony 9/11 conspiracy theories, given enough time, the DF-21D will be brought up again as if it is something shockingly new.
