StormShadow
SENIOR MEMBER
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Air Marshal T. M. Asthana (retd), a fighter pilot, was the first Commander-in-Chief of India’s Strategic Forces Command which operationalises the country’s nuclear arsenal. He tells Anand K. Sahay that if India faces a nuclear hit from terrorists in Pakistan — which he considers unlikely — it can retaliate with nuclear or conventional forces, and possesses the capability for a surgical strike.
Q. Last Sunday, terrorists in Pakistan attacked the Mehran naval base near Karachi and destroyed two sophisticated maritime surveillance and attack aircraft. This has led to fears that Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile and fissile material are no longer safe from theft by militants. Is India at particular risk of a possible terror strike using nuclear materials? What is our response mechanism like in such a scenario?
A. The retaliation against terrorist organisations can be nuclear or with conventional weapons. If we have ascertained that a nuclear strike from the Pakistan side is by a terrorist outfit, and we want to hit back using nuclear weapons, then we should inform Pakistan that we are not striking at the country but only to destroy a particular group.
We know the sites of the terrorist outfits. We only need to decide the strength of the nuclear weapon to be used. It will obviously be tactical, of a particular yield that does not cause damage beyond, say, a brigade strength.
But my preference would be to use conventional force in retaliation. I think in nine out of ten cases, this should suffice. We should continue hitting them till they raise the white flag.
Q. Have scenarios of this nature been discussed in government in your experience?
A. Of course.
Q. The course you are suggesting calls for extreme precision in operation — something like what the Americans deployed to take out Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad. Do we have the capability?
A. We certainly have the capability.
Q. If we strike at a terrorist site in Pakistan in retaliation, you don’t think Pakistan as a country will respond using its official forces? Is that something to be taken into account?
A. When we go in, we should seek to convince Pakistan and the USA etc —unless you are sure you don’t care what they think. But that’s unlikely in India.
Q. It is being said that Pakistan is developing tactical nuclear weapons in a big way for use against India. Can these be special target of theft by terrorist groups, especially when they are said to have insider support in the Pakistan nuclear establishment, the armed forces or the ISI?
A. There are rumours, and also some reports, that they are developing tactical nuclear weapons. I doubt this very much. A tactical nuclear weapon is for use against enemy forces, not the population, and is a sub-kiloton device. Our policy is “no first use”. We won’t be the first to use nuclear weapons of any kind against any country. But the retaliation from our side will be massive if a nuclear device is used against us. I wonder if that is an acceptable risk for Pakistan to take — using a tactical weapon against India and inviting a massive retaliation.
Q. What can be India’s response in the event of a failed attempt by terrorists in Pakistan to steal fissile material or a nuclear device?
A. There is no requirement of a response from our side except to strengthen intelligence, our security systems, to have more than a single layer of security. Remember, our policy is only of retaliation against NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical weapons) strike. I think there is not even a small chance of that unless there is provocation from their side. Please remember, we will hit back massively even if Lashkar-e-Tayyaba or any of the terrorists drops a bomb on India. The principle remains the same. We will hit back.
Q. How safe are Pakistan’s nuclear systems — its production facilities and bomb storage sites? Pakistan’s weapons are said to be kept on the move in order to make them less susceptible to theft or attack. Doesn’t that make them susceptible to theft.
A. There is international hue and cry about Pakistan’s nuclear safety because of Taliban, Al Qaeda and others. But no one has said what the final answer is.
The director of strategic planning in Pakistan’s nuclear authority has said lately that the command authority is based on the “two-man rule”, ie clearance is required from two persons for mating and launch (bringing together the weapon and the trigger, and then the launching of it). They also say they have their own — not taken from the US — PALs (Permissive Action Links) to authorise mating and launch. They also claim to have a comprehensive and intrusive personnel reliability system which means screening of all employees before, during and after their stint in the nuclear area. I take this with a pinch of salt.
Anyway, these claims had not come to light earlier. Before, every time they spoke on these issues, they spoke of their doctrine of ‘first use’ (not hesitating to be the first to strike with a nuclear weapon). Apart from the security systems Pakistan now claims, there is always the standard stuff of phoney bunkers, dummy warheads to fool the enemy. In short, Pakistan is trying to say it is very difficult for unauthorised personnel to assemble a device.
Q. Can this be taken at face value?
A. There can be discussion about that. But we find it difficult to believe that any form of terrorist organisation is capable of assembling and launching a nuclear device unless they have insiders with them who have the knowledge. Even if they could steal a weapon, they will have to develop a trigger mechanism for it. A trigger doesn’t work unless the code and authorisation known. So, this scenario is extremely unlikely, although nothing can be ruled out.
Q. What about the “dirty bomb” scenario — terrorists stealing fissile material with help from insiders, assembling a device etc?
A. This is a far-fetched thing. Even if you have insider support, remember that in the nuclear set-up, things are compartmentalised; no one has full knowledge except at top levels. If you steal fissile material, you have to find ways to house the stuff, then develop a trigger mechanism and finally a launch vehicle and the avionic suite (that goes with it). In any case, if any (fissile) material or device is stolen, it becomes Pakistan’s moral responsibility to report the theft to the appropriate international agencies. Else, there are consequences.
Q. Last Sunday, terrorists in Pakistan attacked the Mehran naval base near Karachi and destroyed two sophisticated maritime surveillance and attack aircraft. This has led to fears that Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile and fissile material are no longer safe from theft by militants. Is India at particular risk of a possible terror strike using nuclear materials? What is our response mechanism like in such a scenario?
A. The retaliation against terrorist organisations can be nuclear or with conventional weapons. If we have ascertained that a nuclear strike from the Pakistan side is by a terrorist outfit, and we want to hit back using nuclear weapons, then we should inform Pakistan that we are not striking at the country but only to destroy a particular group.
We know the sites of the terrorist outfits. We only need to decide the strength of the nuclear weapon to be used. It will obviously be tactical, of a particular yield that does not cause damage beyond, say, a brigade strength.
But my preference would be to use conventional force in retaliation. I think in nine out of ten cases, this should suffice. We should continue hitting them till they raise the white flag.
Q. Have scenarios of this nature been discussed in government in your experience?
A. Of course.
Q. The course you are suggesting calls for extreme precision in operation — something like what the Americans deployed to take out Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad. Do we have the capability?
A. We certainly have the capability.
Q. If we strike at a terrorist site in Pakistan in retaliation, you don’t think Pakistan as a country will respond using its official forces? Is that something to be taken into account?
A. When we go in, we should seek to convince Pakistan and the USA etc —unless you are sure you don’t care what they think. But that’s unlikely in India.
Q. It is being said that Pakistan is developing tactical nuclear weapons in a big way for use against India. Can these be special target of theft by terrorist groups, especially when they are said to have insider support in the Pakistan nuclear establishment, the armed forces or the ISI?
A. There are rumours, and also some reports, that they are developing tactical nuclear weapons. I doubt this very much. A tactical nuclear weapon is for use against enemy forces, not the population, and is a sub-kiloton device. Our policy is “no first use”. We won’t be the first to use nuclear weapons of any kind against any country. But the retaliation from our side will be massive if a nuclear device is used against us. I wonder if that is an acceptable risk for Pakistan to take — using a tactical weapon against India and inviting a massive retaliation.
Q. What can be India’s response in the event of a failed attempt by terrorists in Pakistan to steal fissile material or a nuclear device?
A. There is no requirement of a response from our side except to strengthen intelligence, our security systems, to have more than a single layer of security. Remember, our policy is only of retaliation against NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical weapons) strike. I think there is not even a small chance of that unless there is provocation from their side. Please remember, we will hit back massively even if Lashkar-e-Tayyaba or any of the terrorists drops a bomb on India. The principle remains the same. We will hit back.
Q. How safe are Pakistan’s nuclear systems — its production facilities and bomb storage sites? Pakistan’s weapons are said to be kept on the move in order to make them less susceptible to theft or attack. Doesn’t that make them susceptible to theft.
A. There is international hue and cry about Pakistan’s nuclear safety because of Taliban, Al Qaeda and others. But no one has said what the final answer is.
The director of strategic planning in Pakistan’s nuclear authority has said lately that the command authority is based on the “two-man rule”, ie clearance is required from two persons for mating and launch (bringing together the weapon and the trigger, and then the launching of it). They also say they have their own — not taken from the US — PALs (Permissive Action Links) to authorise mating and launch. They also claim to have a comprehensive and intrusive personnel reliability system which means screening of all employees before, during and after their stint in the nuclear area. I take this with a pinch of salt.
Anyway, these claims had not come to light earlier. Before, every time they spoke on these issues, they spoke of their doctrine of ‘first use’ (not hesitating to be the first to strike with a nuclear weapon). Apart from the security systems Pakistan now claims, there is always the standard stuff of phoney bunkers, dummy warheads to fool the enemy. In short, Pakistan is trying to say it is very difficult for unauthorised personnel to assemble a device.
Q. Can this be taken at face value?
A. There can be discussion about that. But we find it difficult to believe that any form of terrorist organisation is capable of assembling and launching a nuclear device unless they have insiders with them who have the knowledge. Even if they could steal a weapon, they will have to develop a trigger mechanism for it. A trigger doesn’t work unless the code and authorisation known. So, this scenario is extremely unlikely, although nothing can be ruled out.
Q. What about the “dirty bomb” scenario — terrorists stealing fissile material with help from insiders, assembling a device etc?
A. This is a far-fetched thing. Even if you have insider support, remember that in the nuclear set-up, things are compartmentalised; no one has full knowledge except at top levels. If you steal fissile material, you have to find ways to house the stuff, then develop a trigger mechanism and finally a launch vehicle and the avionic suite (that goes with it). In any case, if any (fissile) material or device is stolen, it becomes Pakistan’s moral responsibility to report the theft to the appropriate international agencies. Else, there are consequences.
