TACTICAL DRONE: The Evolution of Bayraktar TB2
in 2020 ROTAX was
unable to impede use of its dual-use engine,
Canada
did impose an embargo on the WESCAM MX-15 Electro-Optical system,
and BAYKAR
was able to replace the MX-15 with the indigenous Aselsan CATS system
Two eventful years passed. What is the state of the TB2 today? How did it continue to perform in Libya, and then in Azerbaijan and Ukraine?
TB2’s excellent performance in Libya and Azerbaijan remains uncontested. However, in Ukraine a dearth of visual evidence gave birth to false and contradicting claims. In this new article, our first priority is to set the record straight in Ukraine, examine the evolution of the TB2, recognize its runaway international export success, and finally try once more to predict what the future may hold for the now world-famous Tactical Drone !
LIBYA
In Libya, Haftar’s LNA comically claimed the destruction of more TB2s than Libya actually procured; we were able to confirm three lost airframes in our prior article (Tail Numbers T92, T94 and T95)
Last year, new information came to our attention. During the Libyan campaign, BAYKAR apparently upgraded the TB2 Line-of-Sight (
LOS)
communication link, expanding its range to
250 km from 150 km. In addition, BAYKAR constantly improved the autonomous flight software, to safely guide the aircraft in case of temporary loss of communications, until their reestablishment
After these upgrades TB2 losses in Libya apparently came to a halt.
The three downed airframes in Libya were largely intact, without penetrating fragment damage, implying their loss was probably caused by Electronic Interference or other communication link failure. Therefore, the strengthening of the commlink and associated software may largely explain how further losses were averted.
Further indirect confirmation from Ukraine: Ukrainian officers stated on the record, that the TB2 is the only UAV capable of flying under dense Russian Electronic Warfare (EW) measures.
AZERBAIJAN
Nagorno-Karabakh, the center of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, has been arguably the most successful operating theater for the Bayraktar TB2.
In the space of a few weeks, TB2s managed to destroy about 80 Tanks, more than 150 howitzers, artillery pieces and rocket launchers as well as a significant number of light vehicles, and personnel
TB2s became the nemesis of Anti-Aircraft (AA) systems with more than 20 confirmed kills.
The majority of destroyed systems were of the Strela and OSA types, but some modern high-end systems — including 1 TOR and 2 S-300’s — were destroyed as well
In conclusion, Bayraktar TB2 became a main contributor to the swift and decisive victory of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Furthermore, this was achieved with the loss of just one airframe during the entire 6-week war.
UKRAINE
The TB2 contribution in the Ukrainian war remains controversial, primarily due to scant visual evidence. Ukraine suddenly stopped publishing videos of TB2 strikes after the first few days of the war.
The few videos published before the cutoff show widespread destruction of Russian supplies of ammunition and fuel in the Northern front, and the demise of some Anti-Aircraft (AA) systems. After a few days into the war, the flow of information completely ceased.
We believe the halt was imposed for reasons of operational security. We give no credence to rumors claiming the halt was mandated by the manufacturing company and/or country.
No more videos were published afterwards, with the exception of some rare videos released by the Ukrainian Navy.
The dearth of information gave birth to conflicting claims on the role of the Bayraktar TB2 in the Ukrainian war. The Russians claim, in Haftar infamy, to have destroyed more TB2s that Ukraine actually owns. The Ukrainians claim that the TB2 is one of their most effective weapons.
Where does the truth lie? To answer this question, we must first revisit the capabilities of the platform
TB2 MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES
1) TB2 in Local Conflicts: An Exceptionally Versatile Platform
TB2 was originally designed for counter terrorism, as Türkiye needed a UAV platform to address illegal activities in its borders, including operations of the PKK terrorist group
This mission was a resounding success: soon after the TB2 was added to Turkish Armed Forces inventory, PKK largely lost the ability to conduct operations inside Türkiye and to infiltrate terrorists through the Iraq and Syrian borders.
In 2020 in a more conventional theater, in Syria’s Idlib province (operation Spring Shield), the Turkish general staff decided to use the TB2 in a deep-strike role. Fighter jet operations were not feasible as Russia used its S-400 systems to restrict North Syrian airspace.
The TB2 performed flawlessly in Syria, decimating Assad’s heavy assets and armor, as well as lighter vehicles and personnel. In an even more impressive feat, it managed to destroy several Pantsir AA systems, earning a reputation as an “AA-killer”
In our prior article we have already established the “limited furtivity” of the TB2. Capitalizing on its limited ability to evade detection, TB2s managed to destroy multiple Pantsir systems, taking advantage of the
8+ km maximum range of MAM-L munitions
This capability was further demonstrated in Libya were upwards of 20 Pantsir systems were destroyed. In Nagorno Karabakh and Ukraine, a limited number of more advanced Anti-Aircraft systems (TOR, BUK and S-300) were also destroyed
In conclusion TB2 proved to be an
extremely versatile platform, suitable both for counter insurgency, as well as low and medium intensity conflicts. It ideally operates at a certain
“stand-offish” distance from its targets but may also be able to penetrate behind front lines in a
deep-strike role, depending on the capability of the adversary’s Air Defense
2) TB2 in Densely Protected Airspace
The conflict in Ukraine is the first full scale War in Europe since World War II. Its scale resembles an imagined Soviet Invasion of Western Europe, as envisaged by NATO
The
A10 Warthog was designed specifically for this type of battlefield, with the mission to destroy massive scale Soviet armor and artillery. The Soviets riposted with their own specialized ground attack planes especially the Su-25.
A
dense multi-layered Air Defense environment is exactly what Russia built over South and East Ukraine: it would thus be irrational to expect the TB2 to be able to casually penetrate it. We caution our readers, that “
Limited” is the key word in our concept of “limited furtivity”:
TB2 is not a stealth platform
TB2 critics unreasonably expect the small drone to be able to perform flawlessly in an environment where even an A-10 ground attack fighter would be challenged today. This is disingenuous at best, nonsensical at worst
How Ukraine operated the TB2
During the first few weeks of the War, the Ukrainian Armed Forces operated the TB2 quite effectively.
They used BAYKAR’s Mobile Control Stations to disperse TB2s away from Airports, limiting potential losses on the ground from Russian Air Force attacks and Kalibre cruise missile strikes.
They also operated the TB2 in a clever strategic manner. Recognizing the hazardously built, incomplete Russian air defenses, and most importantly the fragility of Russian logistics throughout the North, they concentrated their strikes on challenged logistic lines.
Repeated TB2 strikes on railway and track convoys of ammunition and fuel further degraded Russian logistics in the North front
We can safely assume that a similar, more or less intense pace continued throughout the first month of operations. TB2s contributed to heavy Russian losses in both materiel and personnel in the North front, which inevitably led to their decision to withdraw.
Indeed, after approximately one month, the Russians retreated from the North and regrouped towards the South and East. This move signaled the start of the second phase of operations, and tilted the fortunes of war heavily towards Russia
Ukraine after the start of Russian withdrawal from the North Front (marked in blue color) source: The Economist
In the South and East, the proximity of Crimea, the presence of battle-hardened local militias of Donbass and the apparent competence of local field command, resulted in significant early Russian advances towards Kherson and Melitopol. This facilitated their operations and gave them enough time to organize their formidable multi-layered Air Defense, vastly complicating TB2 operations in the second phase of the conflict.
Furthermore, Ukraine under duress made certain unwise tactical decisions regarding deployment and operation of the TB2. Ukrainian forces operated TB2s in several dangerous missions of no apparent tactical importance, presumably for theatrical and/or propaganda purposes.
TB2s were used for strikes deep inside Russia, mainly in Belgorod, where Ukraine should have anticipated minimal results. They should have also realized that TB2s would be challenged to get to their targets and even more challenged to come back. At least two TB2s were lost over Russian Federation territory as a result.
Other doubtful missions of no apparent tactical value were the obsessively repeated raids on Snake Island. At least one Ukrainian Navy TB2 was lost; it was later recovered by Russian forces in the waters around the island.
Objective Facts: TB2 Achievements in Ukraine
TB2 videos from the first few days of the war demonstrate a focus on Russian supply lines, with scores of direct hits on railway ammunition and fuel wagons, armored vehicles, and Air Defense systems. Although we have no videos afterwards, we believe these successful operations continued throughout the first month of the war until the Russians withdrew from the North.
What happened in the second phase, after the Russian withdrawal, is less clear. Nevertheless, we have several confirmed TB2 operations:
- TB2s attacked and set on fire Russian fuel depots deep inside Russian Federation territory, in the city of Belgorod.
- A TB2 tracked the cruiser Moskva, according to the ship’s crew. It apparently occupied the ship’s air defenses while Moskva was attacked and sunk by anti-ship missiles.
- In Snake Island a TB2 destroyed a helicopter while Russia troops were disembarking.
- TB2s destroyed several AA systems, including Pantsir and Strela, as well as two small patrol boats of the Raptor class around Snake Island.
- A TB2 was probably involved in the attack against the large Alligator class landing ship Orsk while the ship was unloading materiel in the port of Berdyansk. The ensuing fire destroyed and sunk the ship, damaging two other landing ships docked nearby.
- We know that a TB2 tracked the Russian tugboat Vasily Bekh, and we suspect it may have designated the target for a laser ordinance from another platform. Claims that the tugboat was hit by Harpoon missiles are unlikely.
The reason most of these strikes are on Naval targets is not a coincidence. The Black Sea is a far more permissive environment, with limited air-defense. It is therefore an ideal hunting ground for the TB2.
We can clearly see that although it became increasingly difficult for the TB2 to operate in the dense Air Defense environment of the South and East fronts, it
remained a useful platform when operated wisely.
Objective Facts: TB2 Losses in Ukraine
Ukrainian forces operated the TB2 effectively during the first phase of the war. In the second phase, they seemed to take certain unwise decisions under considerable pressure.
They frequently operated the TB2 in dangerous missions of no tactical importance, contributing to increased losses.
Panos Hadjikomninos, Aug 5, 2022 Two years ago, in May 2020, I published an article on BAYKAR (BAYKAR: Small Company, Great Ambition 1), which remains one of the most authoritative articles on the Bayraktar TB2. The article also proved remarkably prescient. Its forward-looking assertions were...
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