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Battle-inoculated militants last stand?
By Ismail Khan
Friday, 16 Oct, 2009
The militants brazen attack on the heavily-guarded General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi and almost simultaneous multiple and spectacular attacks in Kohat, Lahore and Peshawar have belied all assessments of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan breathing its last after the death of its leader Baitullah Mehsud.
The TTP has bounced back and with a vengeance. Indeed, those who had written off the TTP and were waiting for it to unravel are now gearing up for what they believe is the militant umbrella organisations last attempt to forestall an imminent military assault on their bastion in South Waziristan.
The attacks, including the massive bombing in Peshawar, have taken a heavy toll.
Government officials believe that the attacks demonstrated a desperate attempt to terrorise the people and pressurise the government to halt the operation. But they have also underlined the TTPs reach, network and its ability to carry out coordinated strikes at will with amazing speed and skill.
The attack on the GHQ and the multiple strikes in Lahore appear to have been well-planned and conducted and carried out by its cells strategically located in major cities to strike wherever they wanted on a single signal.
This has generated a debate of sorts on the existence of the so-called Punjabi Taliban or the connection of southern Punjab with the rising militant attacks in the countrys most populous province.
Amjad Farooqi (killed during an exchange of fire with security agents in Nawabshah during the Musharraf era) was the inspirational figure for the mastermind of GHQ attack Mohammad Aqeel alias Dr Usman to lead one group of the so-called Punjabi Taliban.
Notwithstanding Punjab officials denial of the existence of ethnic militant groups in the province, the list of militant commanders hailing from the Punjab is long. Umar Aqdas, Qari Yasin, Qari Zafar, Asmatullah Maawia and Badar Mansur are just a few famous names to mention, besides 30/40 other small-type commanders operating from South and North Waziristan.
Some of these commanders have been in operation since the early 1990s. They had special training camps in Khost and later in Kabul including one led by Riaz Basra, the slain leader of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.
To complicate matters further, disillusioned by Pakistans peace overtures towards India, Kashmiris or the Pakistanis who once espoused the Kashmiri cause, including Ilyas Kashmiri and Rashid Rauf, have also joined the ranks of the Taliban in Pakistans tribal borderlands.
That they all are well-trained, battle-hardened and ideologically committed and motivated is something admired even by the tribal militants. The Punjabi Taliban are known for their tenacity, motivation and fighting skills not just in our badlands but also in Afghanistan.
For years in the past, these fighters used Afghanistan to get what investigators call battle-inoculation to come back and fight in the Indian-held Kashmir. One war complimented the other. The scenario and the mindset have changed. On a given day, there are more attacks in Pakistan than there are in Afghanistan and India.
Some commentators now believe that it is wrong to distinguish the militants on the basis of their ethnicity. It is wrong to equate militancy with one race or ethnic group, said one analyst. In essence, those who fight are not fighting because they belong to a particular race or speak a particular language. Their motivation is different, it is ideological rather than racial, the analyst remarked.
An official argued that the distinction of the Taliban on the basis of ethnicity was as flawed as the distinction of good Taliban and bad Taliban that is those who have chosen not to fight the state and instead focus on the Jihad in Afghanistan and those who have turned their guns on Pakistan.
It is a mindset that changes with circumstances. Those who used to fight in the Indian-held Kashmir are now fighting Pakistani forces. The circumstances have changed and so has their mindset, the official maintained.
Mohammad Jamil, who was caught while fighting for the Taliban with the US-led coalition forces in November 2001, was handed over to the Pakistani security forces. He was interrogated by a Joint Interrogation Team of all intelligence agencies and it was declared that he posed no security threat to Pakistan. Later, he turned out to be one of the suicide bombers in an attack on Pervez Musharraf in Jhanda Chichi.
Now, the larger question is how will the sudden and dramatic spike in the militants attacks shape the states response. Will these attacks achieve the end objective that is to force the state to buckle under and bring it to its knees to sue for peace, especially when a military operation in Waziristan appears just round the corner?
Historically speaking, the surge in attacks have almost always been followed by calls for peace talks from political quarters that, some government officials claim, have been the political voice of the Taliban.
But a senior military official insisted the time for talks was over. It is too late now. The time for talks is over. It is finished. They know that we are coming after them and we know that we are going after them. It is a matter of time now.
DAWN.COM | Pakistan | Battle-inoculated militants? last stand?
By Ismail Khan
Friday, 16 Oct, 2009
The militants brazen attack on the heavily-guarded General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi and almost simultaneous multiple and spectacular attacks in Kohat, Lahore and Peshawar have belied all assessments of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan breathing its last after the death of its leader Baitullah Mehsud.
The TTP has bounced back and with a vengeance. Indeed, those who had written off the TTP and were waiting for it to unravel are now gearing up for what they believe is the militant umbrella organisations last attempt to forestall an imminent military assault on their bastion in South Waziristan.
The attacks, including the massive bombing in Peshawar, have taken a heavy toll.
Government officials believe that the attacks demonstrated a desperate attempt to terrorise the people and pressurise the government to halt the operation. But they have also underlined the TTPs reach, network and its ability to carry out coordinated strikes at will with amazing speed and skill.
The attack on the GHQ and the multiple strikes in Lahore appear to have been well-planned and conducted and carried out by its cells strategically located in major cities to strike wherever they wanted on a single signal.
This has generated a debate of sorts on the existence of the so-called Punjabi Taliban or the connection of southern Punjab with the rising militant attacks in the countrys most populous province.
Amjad Farooqi (killed during an exchange of fire with security agents in Nawabshah during the Musharraf era) was the inspirational figure for the mastermind of GHQ attack Mohammad Aqeel alias Dr Usman to lead one group of the so-called Punjabi Taliban.
Notwithstanding Punjab officials denial of the existence of ethnic militant groups in the province, the list of militant commanders hailing from the Punjab is long. Umar Aqdas, Qari Yasin, Qari Zafar, Asmatullah Maawia and Badar Mansur are just a few famous names to mention, besides 30/40 other small-type commanders operating from South and North Waziristan.
Some of these commanders have been in operation since the early 1990s. They had special training camps in Khost and later in Kabul including one led by Riaz Basra, the slain leader of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.
To complicate matters further, disillusioned by Pakistans peace overtures towards India, Kashmiris or the Pakistanis who once espoused the Kashmiri cause, including Ilyas Kashmiri and Rashid Rauf, have also joined the ranks of the Taliban in Pakistans tribal borderlands.
That they all are well-trained, battle-hardened and ideologically committed and motivated is something admired even by the tribal militants. The Punjabi Taliban are known for their tenacity, motivation and fighting skills not just in our badlands but also in Afghanistan.
For years in the past, these fighters used Afghanistan to get what investigators call battle-inoculation to come back and fight in the Indian-held Kashmir. One war complimented the other. The scenario and the mindset have changed. On a given day, there are more attacks in Pakistan than there are in Afghanistan and India.
Some commentators now believe that it is wrong to distinguish the militants on the basis of their ethnicity. It is wrong to equate militancy with one race or ethnic group, said one analyst. In essence, those who fight are not fighting because they belong to a particular race or speak a particular language. Their motivation is different, it is ideological rather than racial, the analyst remarked.
An official argued that the distinction of the Taliban on the basis of ethnicity was as flawed as the distinction of good Taliban and bad Taliban that is those who have chosen not to fight the state and instead focus on the Jihad in Afghanistan and those who have turned their guns on Pakistan.
It is a mindset that changes with circumstances. Those who used to fight in the Indian-held Kashmir are now fighting Pakistani forces. The circumstances have changed and so has their mindset, the official maintained.
Mohammad Jamil, who was caught while fighting for the Taliban with the US-led coalition forces in November 2001, was handed over to the Pakistani security forces. He was interrogated by a Joint Interrogation Team of all intelligence agencies and it was declared that he posed no security threat to Pakistan. Later, he turned out to be one of the suicide bombers in an attack on Pervez Musharraf in Jhanda Chichi.
Now, the larger question is how will the sudden and dramatic spike in the militants attacks shape the states response. Will these attacks achieve the end objective that is to force the state to buckle under and bring it to its knees to sue for peace, especially when a military operation in Waziristan appears just round the corner?
Historically speaking, the surge in attacks have almost always been followed by calls for peace talks from political quarters that, some government officials claim, have been the political voice of the Taliban.
But a senior military official insisted the time for talks was over. It is too late now. The time for talks is over. It is finished. They know that we are coming after them and we know that we are going after them. It is a matter of time now.
DAWN.COM | Pakistan | Battle-inoculated militants? last stand?
