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PAUL KELLY, EDITOR-AT-LARGE From: The Australian Cookies must be enabled | The Australian
WITH Julia Gillard's foreign policy in the spotlight the issue cannot be ignored: how long will the obsolete and discredited ALP policy be allowed to prejudice Australia's ties with India, the emerging third biggest economy in the world?
Gillard's theme these days is Australia's ability to adapt to the new Asian century, yet such claims are mocked by her government's incapacity to conduct foreign policy on merit.
That the ALP national conference should continue to impair Australia's economic and strategic interests is intolerable. If this situation continues uncorrected at the December national conference then the Gillard government must be held to account for allowing Labor's antiquated obsessions about uranium and nuclear power to prevent Australia from following an India policy that its ministers know to be desirable and inevitable.
The issue is that the ALP platform stops Labor selling uranium to India. The greater issue, however, transcends uranium. It is whether the Labor Party in its structure and culture is competent to run a national interest foreign policy for the Asian century. The jury remains out.
The director of the international security program at the Lowy Institute, Rory Medcalf, says a Labor failure to change policy in December will not constitute "absolute disaster" in relations with India. "But a decision to stick with the old policy will convince India's political elites that Labor is never going to be a natural partner for a rising India," Medcalf tells Inquirer. "It will be a signal that Labor simply does not trust India. This is a real shame."
It will also signal something more: that Gillard is prepared to allow an outdated party mindset to compromise the national interest. This decision is a defining event for Gillard, Kevin Rudd and Labor.
India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, declined to attend the Commonwealth meeting in Perth. The official explanation is schedule pressure. The last Indian prime minister to visit Australia was Rajiv Gandhi in 1986. That tells you about India's priorities.
Former foreign minister Stephen Smith said in February last year the Rudd government had moved to place India "firmly in the front rank of Australia's international partnerships". Scathing of past efforts, Smith said "the era of inactivity and even neglect is over". It is true that Rudd, Gillard and Smith, backed by Resources Minister Martin Ferguson, have made significant advances with India. The problem is these ministers are yet to convince their party.
At the Perth meeting India has made its concerns apparent. Commonwealth Business Council chief, Indian diplomat Mohan Kaul, said a change in Australian policy was "important to India".
Gillard said last Monday she expected the issue would be raised with her at the Commonwealth meeting.
Consider the facts. Australia exports uranium yellowcake to China, Japan, South Korea, the US, Taiwan and several European countries. Approval is finalised for export to Russia. With Australia holding some of the world's largest reserves its policy has global import. The present ban on uranium sales to India was imposed by the Rudd government in 2008, reversing a Howard government decision. There is no justification, strategic or economic, for the ban.
Former Labor senator and foreign affairs specialist Stephen Loosley told this paper: "The Indians have sent a clear and unambiguous message at Perth. They regard this issue as important to them."
Medcalf argues that New Delhi does not immediately need our uranium but responds to Labor's ban with "frustration and bafflement". The situation is so bad that Australia, in Medcalf's words, "refuses even to talk" to India about uranium exports.
How patronising is this? It is absurd given that India, along with the US and China, will be one of the big three world powers this century. The ban betrays that unique blend of Australian hubris and naivety that so damages this country.
India's concerns, so far, have been greeted with weasel words from the Australian side. For four years Labor ministers have strung India along with the message "don't worry, the policy will change". But nothing has changed.
The history reveals a sorry story. When John Howard visited India in 2006, almost from the moment of his arrival Singh raised the possibility of uranium sales. Their talks, Howard said, "left a lasting impression on me". Howard seized his chance. He felt this was a tipping point with India. For years relations had gone nowhere, lost in those spurious common interests of cricket and language. Bilateral ties lacked commercial weight or strategic meaning.
"This was a big prize," Howard said. He changed policy and if Howard had been re-elected in 2007 Australia would have sold uranium to India. Yet that was just part of a far bigger story. Howard's visit coincided with the shift by US President George W Bush to make India a strategic partner, symbolised in the historic 2008 US-India civil nuclear deal.
Bush's India policy setting up a new US-India partnership will be more significant for the coming century than his Iraq war policy.
Australia's ambitions for India have been transformed. India's growth has generated a resources nexus. India is Australia's fourth largest export market and will become number two behind China. Australia has now taken a decision: it wants India as a strategic partner.
The logic is convincing given New Delhi's growing economic power, its US ties, its regional influence and its potential as a balancer against China. When Rudd visited India in 2009, he proposed a strategic partnership between the two nations. But progress has been slow.
Medcalf says: "There remains difficulty in persuading New Delhi to treat Australia as a diplomatic priority." Indian views of Australia are often old-fashioned or unflattering or dominated by bad-news events; witness the attacks on Indian students in Melbourne. The message is: fashioning any joint Australia-India strategic project will be a daunting task.
On uranium, Labor policy is that export recipients must be members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The treaty, originating in the 1970s, is based on a bargain between the established nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear members. Because India became a nuclear power after conclusion of the treaty it is not a member.
The US-India deal, however, in Medcalf's words, helps to create "an informal status for India which in some ways parallels that of a recognised nuclear weapon state". India's record on non-proliferation is superior to that of both China and Russia yet, unlike India, they can buy our uranium because they meet Labor's NPT membership test.
In 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the main governing body that determines nuclear export policy, authorised a waiver that permitted uranium exports to India. The Rudd government backed this waiver. Smith correctly told India this showed our acceptance of India's credentials. In fact, it creates an absurdity: Labor supports other nations selling uranium to India, but not Australia.
India wants this anomaly terminated. If other nations sell uranium to India with our approval then why can Australia not do the same? Given we will sell to Russia and China, how can Australia tell India it doesn't pass muster?
The ALP policy as it impacts on India is devoid of justification. It mocks our commercial interest, but this issue is not about export income. Total uranium exports are worth a modest $1 billion compared with $63bn for iron ore. The real argument is political and strategic - uranium policy is the obstacle blocking the path to the partnership Australia wants with India.
Rudd said this week - being "very, very blunt" - that India's civil nuclear industry did not depend on Australian uranium. That's right. But this is not an argument for keeping the policy. Just the reverse - it is an argument for changing the policy. If India has all the uranium it needs, then uranium from Australia, virtually the last supplier to come aboard, is not going to accentuate profileration risks.
There once was a time when Labor had the usual craven excuse of electoral sensitivity for sticking by the wrong policy. That excuse is dead. Does anybody today think that selling uranium to India will trigger massive voter defections from Labor? You have to be kidding. If Labor has got to the stage that its leaders cannot defend such a policy change then they shouldn't be in the business of politics.
Stephen Loosley says: "I believe if the government argued the national interest and stood up to the Greens it would strengthen Labor's electoral position."
Senior ministers know this policy is wrong. Many admit this in private. Their excuses for inaction are irrelevant; namely that the policy is about the NPT and not India, as such, or that India doesn't need our uranium now.
National Conference is a factional bargain. If Labor doesn't change its policy, that will reflect superior priorities. What are they: same-sex marriage or asylum-seekers? Frankly, that would only make Labor look worse.
This farce about uranium bans in the ALP platform has been going on since the 1977 Perth conference, and that's nearly two political generations. In 2011, there's one message to Labor: get over it. This policy achieves nothing, and claims that it assists a safer world are deluded.
The test for Gillard is how much political capital she will expend for her Asian century foreign policy. So far, Labor has expended no political capital on relations with India. If this continues then Labor casts doubt not just on its commitment to India, but on its ability as a party to manage Asia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scathing remakrs on Gillard's govt. by Australian media.
WITH Julia Gillard's foreign policy in the spotlight the issue cannot be ignored: how long will the obsolete and discredited ALP policy be allowed to prejudice Australia's ties with India, the emerging third biggest economy in the world?
Gillard's theme these days is Australia's ability to adapt to the new Asian century, yet such claims are mocked by her government's incapacity to conduct foreign policy on merit.
That the ALP national conference should continue to impair Australia's economic and strategic interests is intolerable. If this situation continues uncorrected at the December national conference then the Gillard government must be held to account for allowing Labor's antiquated obsessions about uranium and nuclear power to prevent Australia from following an India policy that its ministers know to be desirable and inevitable.
The issue is that the ALP platform stops Labor selling uranium to India. The greater issue, however, transcends uranium. It is whether the Labor Party in its structure and culture is competent to run a national interest foreign policy for the Asian century. The jury remains out.
The director of the international security program at the Lowy Institute, Rory Medcalf, says a Labor failure to change policy in December will not constitute "absolute disaster" in relations with India. "But a decision to stick with the old policy will convince India's political elites that Labor is never going to be a natural partner for a rising India," Medcalf tells Inquirer. "It will be a signal that Labor simply does not trust India. This is a real shame."
It will also signal something more: that Gillard is prepared to allow an outdated party mindset to compromise the national interest. This decision is a defining event for Gillard, Kevin Rudd and Labor.
India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, declined to attend the Commonwealth meeting in Perth. The official explanation is schedule pressure. The last Indian prime minister to visit Australia was Rajiv Gandhi in 1986. That tells you about India's priorities.
Former foreign minister Stephen Smith said in February last year the Rudd government had moved to place India "firmly in the front rank of Australia's international partnerships". Scathing of past efforts, Smith said "the era of inactivity and even neglect is over". It is true that Rudd, Gillard and Smith, backed by Resources Minister Martin Ferguson, have made significant advances with India. The problem is these ministers are yet to convince their party.
At the Perth meeting India has made its concerns apparent. Commonwealth Business Council chief, Indian diplomat Mohan Kaul, said a change in Australian policy was "important to India".
Gillard said last Monday she expected the issue would be raised with her at the Commonwealth meeting.
Consider the facts. Australia exports uranium yellowcake to China, Japan, South Korea, the US, Taiwan and several European countries. Approval is finalised for export to Russia. With Australia holding some of the world's largest reserves its policy has global import. The present ban on uranium sales to India was imposed by the Rudd government in 2008, reversing a Howard government decision. There is no justification, strategic or economic, for the ban.
Former Labor senator and foreign affairs specialist Stephen Loosley told this paper: "The Indians have sent a clear and unambiguous message at Perth. They regard this issue as important to them."
Medcalf argues that New Delhi does not immediately need our uranium but responds to Labor's ban with "frustration and bafflement". The situation is so bad that Australia, in Medcalf's words, "refuses even to talk" to India about uranium exports.
How patronising is this? It is absurd given that India, along with the US and China, will be one of the big three world powers this century. The ban betrays that unique blend of Australian hubris and naivety that so damages this country.
India's concerns, so far, have been greeted with weasel words from the Australian side. For four years Labor ministers have strung India along with the message "don't worry, the policy will change". But nothing has changed.
The history reveals a sorry story. When John Howard visited India in 2006, almost from the moment of his arrival Singh raised the possibility of uranium sales. Their talks, Howard said, "left a lasting impression on me". Howard seized his chance. He felt this was a tipping point with India. For years relations had gone nowhere, lost in those spurious common interests of cricket and language. Bilateral ties lacked commercial weight or strategic meaning.
"This was a big prize," Howard said. He changed policy and if Howard had been re-elected in 2007 Australia would have sold uranium to India. Yet that was just part of a far bigger story. Howard's visit coincided with the shift by US President George W Bush to make India a strategic partner, symbolised in the historic 2008 US-India civil nuclear deal.
Bush's India policy setting up a new US-India partnership will be more significant for the coming century than his Iraq war policy.
Australia's ambitions for India have been transformed. India's growth has generated a resources nexus. India is Australia's fourth largest export market and will become number two behind China. Australia has now taken a decision: it wants India as a strategic partner.
The logic is convincing given New Delhi's growing economic power, its US ties, its regional influence and its potential as a balancer against China. When Rudd visited India in 2009, he proposed a strategic partnership between the two nations. But progress has been slow.
Medcalf says: "There remains difficulty in persuading New Delhi to treat Australia as a diplomatic priority." Indian views of Australia are often old-fashioned or unflattering or dominated by bad-news events; witness the attacks on Indian students in Melbourne. The message is: fashioning any joint Australia-India strategic project will be a daunting task.
On uranium, Labor policy is that export recipients must be members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The treaty, originating in the 1970s, is based on a bargain between the established nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear members. Because India became a nuclear power after conclusion of the treaty it is not a member.
The US-India deal, however, in Medcalf's words, helps to create "an informal status for India which in some ways parallels that of a recognised nuclear weapon state". India's record on non-proliferation is superior to that of both China and Russia yet, unlike India, they can buy our uranium because they meet Labor's NPT membership test.
In 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the main governing body that determines nuclear export policy, authorised a waiver that permitted uranium exports to India. The Rudd government backed this waiver. Smith correctly told India this showed our acceptance of India's credentials. In fact, it creates an absurdity: Labor supports other nations selling uranium to India, but not Australia.
India wants this anomaly terminated. If other nations sell uranium to India with our approval then why can Australia not do the same? Given we will sell to Russia and China, how can Australia tell India it doesn't pass muster?
The ALP policy as it impacts on India is devoid of justification. It mocks our commercial interest, but this issue is not about export income. Total uranium exports are worth a modest $1 billion compared with $63bn for iron ore. The real argument is political and strategic - uranium policy is the obstacle blocking the path to the partnership Australia wants with India.
Rudd said this week - being "very, very blunt" - that India's civil nuclear industry did not depend on Australian uranium. That's right. But this is not an argument for keeping the policy. Just the reverse - it is an argument for changing the policy. If India has all the uranium it needs, then uranium from Australia, virtually the last supplier to come aboard, is not going to accentuate profileration risks.
There once was a time when Labor had the usual craven excuse of electoral sensitivity for sticking by the wrong policy. That excuse is dead. Does anybody today think that selling uranium to India will trigger massive voter defections from Labor? You have to be kidding. If Labor has got to the stage that its leaders cannot defend such a policy change then they shouldn't be in the business of politics.
Stephen Loosley says: "I believe if the government argued the national interest and stood up to the Greens it would strengthen Labor's electoral position."
Senior ministers know this policy is wrong. Many admit this in private. Their excuses for inaction are irrelevant; namely that the policy is about the NPT and not India, as such, or that India doesn't need our uranium now.
National Conference is a factional bargain. If Labor doesn't change its policy, that will reflect superior priorities. What are they: same-sex marriage or asylum-seekers? Frankly, that would only make Labor look worse.
This farce about uranium bans in the ALP platform has been going on since the 1977 Perth conference, and that's nearly two political generations. In 2011, there's one message to Labor: get over it. This policy achieves nothing, and claims that it assists a safer world are deluded.
The test for Gillard is how much political capital she will expend for her Asian century foreign policy. So far, Labor has expended no political capital on relations with India. If this continues then Labor casts doubt not just on its commitment to India, but on its ability as a party to manage Asia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scathing remakrs on Gillard's govt. by Australian media.
This Perth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, hosted by Julia Gillard, is no exception. But let me give you an earlier example.
One head of government told a friend he didn't really understand why he was there. The big countries he could see whenever necessary, and the small countries were there mainly to ask for aid. A number of small impoverished African nations that were never part of the empire have joined up, presumably to make sure they don't miss out on any assistance heading in their direction.
