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Attack on PNS Mehran Base - PAF Faisal Base

You sure are not a shrink but you do need to see one.. i'll suggest on ASAP basis..

Its a "person" you caught (apparently) from Pakistan who (apparently) committed a crime in India (apparently), so why not let Pakistan Investigate the matter?? Why should we take your "word of mouth" on as-it-is basis?? You ain't no USA now are you? :P

Until then.. cya.. Adios..
Aatish:
It looks like you are still in a denial mode to this day. What do you guys smoke?
If a crime is committed in Canada by citizen of a foreign nation than the investigation is done by local authority and not by authorities of persons nationality.
I hope you will infuture make a more intelligent argument.
 
Within hours, even as the the attack was on going, forum members were largely agreed that the attack hada great deal of help from the inside the armed forces, and that the one thing was for sure, that we the people of Pakistan would never get the truth, that there would be official leaks and rumors to suggest the Indian, the US and the ever green, Israeli hand -- we also were agreed that apologists would begin by asking " just look who stands to gain" and then proceed to highlight the usual suspects -- but the attack has revealed many things kept secret from the Pakistani nation, in particular the high degree of in Islamist infiltration of the armed forces (Syed Saleem Shahzad may have lost his life for revealing the conection between the Navy and Islamist infiltration :

I
In search of truth
Shahzad Chaudhry


Only a few questions may have been answered on Mehran — even that is charitable — and a lot more still remain to be answered. I do not think the whole story is yet out on either Abbottabad or on Mehran. Perhaps, in the case of Abbottabad there remains a Watergate moment awaiting a ‘deep throat’ in the course of time, a Bob Woodward pale, importantly without the threat of being eliminated in such pursuit. Indeed, if there is such a moment, the cover-up till now has been stupendous. Perhaps the dominating question that will stay with us is: how much did we know, especially on the raid itself? As is now in the public domain, Admiral Mullen’s early morning call to General Kayani not only confirmed the raid to the general, it showed far deeper concern over the fallout of American transgression on the sensitive issue of sovereignty. Aggressors usually do not indulge in such niceties. There was little we could do about the Abbottabad raid, not in the operational sense, but on a larger strategic plane. It was more of a ‘political’ moment than a ‘military’ one: the need to define our position clearly on this war against terror and thus our relationship with the US.

Mehran will always remain different — a home issue built around internal responses to internal threats that by now should have become first nature. Why it did not is where the questions lie. If indeed there was enough brewing between the Navy and the militants, why this criminal neglect? Was it only a matter of administrative detail on who was to man the watchtowers between the PAF and the Navy? Did it ever come up as an issue? If indeed such was the case of ambiguous domains, it was criminal again for such an issue not to be brought to the fore. The PAF remains reasonably well protected on most sides with its own residential set-ups; the only exposed entity there is the Navy, which has no protection of its backyard or flanks. Did someone fail in assessing the threat? Or, did someone not check someone failing to assess the threat correctly? These questions will have to be answered. Because if there was enough warning and still we chose to fail in hypothesising the threat correctly, that is systemic failure. Sadly, such systemic faultlines run through most of our work culture.

Physical and ground security, though much better in current climes, remains perennially eclipsed by the higher calling of the main mission. The Navy’s PR department, in an effort to overhaul its negative image following Mehran, issued a picture of a PN Frigate patrolling the seas around Aden as proof of its professional competence. Not that there is any doubt of the Navy being able to fulfil its mission, just that nearer home there are threats that may just unravel the edifice on which we base our capability matrix both in the sense of physical capacity and resolve to stand up to any challenge. An incremental whittling of a presumed capacity is far more brutal than a one-off knock that a service may subsume in the normal run of events. What we lost in Mehran was critical, both in terms of the material as well as perception. That is why it needs urgent introspection and not banal defiance.

Back to the event and the larger questions that it posed in serious gaps of coordination between various players. To begin with, why did the Navy insist upon going it alone when the gauntlet had been thrown to them on their territory? Why did they remain hesitant in seeking the Pakistan Army’s support which is, whether we like it or not, more attuned to fighting such a menace on the ground? Why did the Air Force not launch a helping pincer from their end of the geographical divide in bringing an early closure to this embarrassment? If the Air Force effort was inadequate for such an undertaking at that point in time, should the army not have been launched as a supporting manoeuvre? The Navy fought it alone, with some help from the Sindh Rangers, and shed priceless blood; we need to save this blood for a larger cause not fritter away resources where complementarity regardless of the colour of uniform will help minimise our losses. Sensitivity to service turf is a known quandary but there are times when we will need to rise above these frivolities.

To the next question then, and this I pose to the three regional commanders in the south: was there an immediate meeting of the three that continued till the fracas ended to gauge the nature of the threat and evolve responses in facing up to the challenge? While the troops on the ground grappled with the situation as it presented itself, where and at what level was the strategy being refined and instituted with consistent allocation of more specialised forces and resources to quickly bring the situation under control? Was the CCTV information being fed to a central ops room where the three commanders would have a view of the unfolding drama as indeed the comfort of undisturbed peace to think things through and order actions accordingly? If not, why not? There is still the need to put in place the necessary accompaniments of fighting this menace through joint resource allocation, especially in large vulnerable defence complexes. To begin with, how about placing a company each of army SSGs at all major defence installations under the local commander to develop a hypothesis of threat and prepare with suitable local additions a robust capacity to fight off any such future venture? How about joint user airfields where civil aviation and a service, primarily the Air Force, operate together without gaps in sharing responsibilities?

One is aware of the Achilles’ heel in this entire gamut of joint operations, and this still is a war of a different kind, seeking integrated responses where such concurrent presence exists. For the common reader this is not an exclusive headache of the Pakistani system alone but of most military systems where hierarchical service structures have sustained. While we do not need a single apex system, we have equally failed to comprehend the joint system of command as a concept. The chairman joint chiefs is the head of a committee, i.e. the joint chiefs committee, without which he essentially remains the head of a secretariat. Only when the three service chiefs convene together as the joint chiefs does he gain relevance. The joint command therefore rightfully belongs to the joint chiefs who must thus, without reservations, convene more than often to grapple with the newer paradigms of both conceiving the 21st century threats as much as to allocate relevant defensive or offensive force to neutralise such threats. When they begin to do so, the subordinate commanders spread all over Pakistan will find it that much easier to coordinate efforts among themselves on a geographical basis to present more credible options in fighting our most impending threats. Let’s cross this bridge — we are there.


The writer, while in service, commanded Air Force’s Southern Air Command under relatively benign environs
 
Back to the event and the larger questions that it posed in serious gaps of coordination between various players. To begin with, why did the Navy insist upon going it alone when the gauntlet had been thrown to them on their territory? Why did they remain hesitant in seeking the Pakistan Army’s support which is, whether we like it or not, more attuned to fighting such a menace on the ground? Why did the Air Force not launch a helping pincer from their end of the geographical divide in bringing an early closure to this embarrassment? If the Air Force effort was inadequate for such an undertaking at that point in time, should the army not have been launched as a supporting manoeuvre? The Navy fought it alone, with some help from the Sindh Rangers, and shed priceless blood; we need to save this blood for a larger cause not fritter away resources where complementarity regardless of the colour of uniform will help minimise our losses. Sensitivity to service turf is a known quandary but there are times when we will need to rise above these frivolities.
Zarar reached the spot within the stipulated time frame. The Navy didnt agree on it's employment, they wanted the their commandos to undertake the operation.

So much for the factual reporting.

To the next question then, and this I pose to the three regional commanders in the south: was there an immediate meeting of the three that continued till the fracas ended to gauge the nature of the threat and evolve responses in facing up to the challenge? While the troops on the ground grappled with the situation as it presented itself, where and at what level was the strategy being refined and instituted with consistent allocation of more specialised forces and resources to quickly bring the situation under control? Was the CCTV information being fed to a central ops room where the three commanders would have a view of the unfolding drama as indeed the comfort of undisturbed peace to think things through and order actions accordingly? If not, why not? There is still the need to put in place the necessary accompaniments of fighting this menace through joint resource allocation, especially in large vulnerable defence complexes.
i agree.

But then the situation was not as vague as the writer points it out. Coordination was carried out at the highest possible level during the assault, though it may not be termed as an text-book type execution of the same. How do you think Zarar and guys reached the spot?

To begin with, how about placing a company each of army SSGs at all major defence installations under the local commander to develop a hypothesis of threat and prepare with suitable local additions a robust capacity to fight off any such future venture? How about joint user airfields where civil aviation and a service, primarily the Air Force, operate together without gaps in sharing responsibilities?
:yahoo:

Sir ji, has retired from PAF, no doubt he has 'high' expectations. The airforce is luxurious, i know that.
To ease it on your nerves:

Airforce
army_vs_airforce_01.jpg


Army
army_vs_airforce_02.jpg


Anywaz, i for one would love to have a SSG Bn in every sensitive installation, but the questions is, can we afford that? Is it possible? Is that what other militaries have done? And most importantly, is that the only answer/option? i would call this action (placement of SSG) as over-doing. SSG are not body guards. Also, a job that can be done by regular forces (immediate protection of a base/cantt etc), must not be given to specialized forces (trained for special ops, CQB, CTC, deep interdiction, recce in depth etc - please bear the fauji terminology). Bases/cantts have worked out quick reaction capabilities post these kinda attacks, so the question should have been regarding the efficiency of such task-forces, rather than suggesting idealized options which are beyond our capability ala fencing the Durand Line, getting rockets to land vertically, having laptop batteries that have uranium as their power source.

On one hand we advocate to down size the military and make it more 'efficient', and if this is how you guys want to do it (converting the entire military into an SSG type force), than i feel sorry for you. BTW, if the writer had known anything about Light Commando Battalions, he would never have asked for a complete fringging SSG company to protect our bases. Though LCBs are not necessarily here for the said purpose.

i wish Blain was here.


One is aware of the Achilles’ heel in this entire gamut of joint operations, and this still is a war of a different kind, seeking integrated responses where such concurrent presence exists. For the common reader this is not an exclusive headache of the Pakistani system alone but of most military systems where hierarchical service structures have sustained. While we do not need a single apex system, we have equally failed to comprehend the joint system of command as a concept. The chairman joint chiefs is the head of a committee, i.e. the joint chiefs committee, without which he essentially remains the head of a secretariat. Only when the three service chiefs convene together as the joint chiefs does he gain relevance. The joint command therefore rightfully belongs to the joint chiefs who must thus, without reservations, convene more than often to grapple with the newer paradigms of both conceiving the 21st century threats as much as to allocate relevant defensive or offensive force to neutralise such threats. When they begin to do so, the subordinate commanders spread all over Pakistan will find it that much easier to coordinate efforts among themselves on a geographical basis to present more credible options in fighting our most impending threats. Let’s cross this bridge — we are there.[/SIZE][/FONT]
i agree in totality.

i suggest, an entity like Disaster Management Authority should be made capable/provided with resources to provide a command center/post for such operations. They should be the first to respond (as regards to a concentrated effort, including Zarars being flown into the zone of ops etc.) AOR should distributed as it is in case of Pulce Thanas, a senior commander (he can be the local Brigade Commander, Base commander, DPO, IG, Commandant FC, a civilian from the DMA, anybody who knows what to do in such situations) within his particular AOR should immediately take charge of the situation - reach the place of attack/office of the DMA etc where he is presented with all the info like the writer suggests - the video feed, the resources at his disposal (Rangers, Pulce, Army, Navy, Airforce, FC, doctor party, 1122, fire brigades, media handling whatever). He shoukd start assessing the sitution and analyse it to form a well thought out and well planned response. He can then task anybody (ranging fron local Police to Zarar Company). Further, the control room and the charge may then be handed over to the next senior upon his arrival/availability.

Fortunately we do have the resources and the capability, but unfortunately we dont have any SOP to synergize them.

This woukd be like a SCHEME (as the Army has Flood Relief Schemes, IS Schemes etc i.e. we have a written SOP entailing very detailed response and action of EVERYBODY, starting from the sweeper till the highest commander, in case floods happen etc), but at the National level. The Schemes include the list of actions that should commence at the onset, it include ph numbers of concerned individuals, Dos and Donts, the sequence of actions, what to do if a senior is not available or is missing and a junior commander has to carry on, in short, it lists all the actions which are self explanatory and can be executed/run/ordered by any Officer, no matter how junior he is, but if he would follow the write up, he would not likely face any major problems during the response.

e.g.
i know when i take over a new appointment and read the Flood Relief Scheme of a particular province/district, then i know that in the months of say, Aug and Sep i must setup a team that would monitor the river flow and rains. i then know that if the rains exceed a particular limit (mentioned in the Scheme) than i must setup a round the clock duty room that should stay updated with the situation as regards to the major rivers. The Scheme tells me the exact point of time i should start contacting the DCO of the district, it also tells me what i should expect out the local police, it also tells me what all assistance i can get from the local population, it also gives me the list schools, BHUs, open spaces that can be used to store releif guuds, it tells me at what point of time the Irrigation Dept should start giving me Situation Reports, now if they dont do it, i have the concerned ph numbers and i can call the chief engineer and tell him to wake up and start doing what he is paid for, and so on and so forth.
 
pnsmehran-taliban-11.jpg


Here's an interesting picture from Pakistan.

Makes you wonder why the bearded, skull capped man is pulled over for random check while everyone else passes by? "Racial" profiling? Not really, its just that his type have been carrying out suicide bombings. Sorta what happens at the airport security.

LOL....... Do u even know his race? haha

Its just checking........ anybdy can go through it...... Even army officers.
 
LOL....... Do u even know his race? haha

Its just checking........ anybdy can go through it...... Even army officers.

Lol, he is making it a race thing, one guy with a beard is stopped and its become a race thing.

He should have stated religious profiling but instead we are accused of being racist.

This is brown on brown crime.
 
I doubt you can have peace in the west either because in 1948 your country attacked independent country of Balochistan and occupied it just the way your brother country of China did to Tibet. I have been reading the history and very well versed in it. I am not going to waste my time on you if you can not visualise the benefits of peacefull co-existence in this world.

It is not my purpose to accuse others without knowing them individually personally. The future of your nation is in the hands of Pakistani citizen they can either take the path off violence or peacefull development off the humanity in their own land. "What you sow shall you reap".

May tou be blessed with peace and good health.

Oh really where exactly have you been reading this HISTORY of yours. Please zip it your hallucinations are not historical facts rather a symptom of mental retardation.
Still cant stop laughing at your claim to be well versed in history hahahahahaha.
 
pnsmehran-taliban-11.jpg


Here's an interesting picture from Pakistan.

Makes you wonder why the bearded, skull capped man is pulled over for random check while everyone else passes by? "Racial" profiling? Not really, its just that his type have been carrying out suicide bombings. Sorta what happens at the airport security.

Yes really when one starts assuming ridiculous stuff. Your stupid if you think that only bearded fellows carry out suicide attacks. They will check any one and every one and the only ones they usually let go off are women or cars which have women sitting in them. Wrong policy but thats it. Dont assume to much based on a picture.
 
i disagree......

in Peshawar i was getting stopped all the time at checkpoints. And I am clean shaven, at the time i was wearing a polo shirt, torn jeans and a Real Madrid cap! Not the appearance of a ''typical'' (if there was such a thing) suicide bomber

in this current environment, ANY vehicle can be pulled over for random checks. It happens in Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar, Karachi and many other cities. And when instructed to pull over, vehicle must pull over.
 
I don't know. What I have heard is that in some ways Saudis consider that they control Pakistan, for when Saudi and Pakistani diplomats are in the same room with Americans the Saudis may enter upon a condescending discussion of domestic Pakistani affairs while the Pakistanis look embarrassed and say nothing.

Suleyman,

where did you hear or observe this?
 
Suleyman,

where did you hear or observe this?

He has heard a lot of things over a span of decades.

The real question to ask here is that, when does the Saudi diplomat has to 'service' his American master?

I am sure they send some coward Pakistani as a 'diplomat', any real Pakistani would make sure that the Saudi isn't able to speak for a while if he ever said anything condescendingly in regards to Pakistan.

Another question to ask here is when does the American take the 'Saudi diplomat' to the local 'service' station.
 
I doubt you can have peace in the west either because in 1948 your country attacked independent country of Balochistan and occupied it just the way your brother country of China did to Tibet. I have been reading the history and very well versed in it. I am not going to waste my time on you if you can not visualise the benefits of peacefull co-existence in this world.

It is not my purpose to accuse others without knowing them individually personally. The future of your nation is in the hands of Pakistani citizen they can either take the path off violence or peacefull development off the humanity in their own land. "What you sow shall you reap".

May tou be blessed with peace and good health.

lol ..you should read up on your own history first , you and your kind stole entire continents from the natives.
The white-anglo-saxon-protestant cabal is yet to fully reap what you people have sown and reap you will
 
He has heard a lot of things over a span of decades...I am sure they send some coward Pakistani as a 'diplomat', any real Pakistani would make sure that the Saudi isn't able to speak for a while if he ever said anything condescendingly in regards to Pakistan.
Yes, it was a second-hand report I heard from one of the participants. Source added that the Pakistani diplomat predicted ahead of time that this is what would happen but didn't say why he'd have to remain silent.

The real question to ask here is that, when does the Saudi diplomat has to 'service' his American master?
As the Saudi family holds a large fraction of the U.S. public debt and has mastered the tricky art of legally bribing American officials it is more accurate to assert that we bend over for them, rather than the reverse.
 
lol ..you should read up on your own history first , you and your kind stole entire continents from the natives.
The white-anglo-saxon-protestant cabal is yet to fully reap what you people have sown and reap you will
LOL
That part of history is conveniently lost upon them
 
Yes, it was a second-hand report I heard from one of the participants. Source added that the Pakistani diplomat predicted ahead of time that this is what would happen but didn't say why he'd have to remain silent.

He remained silent because our current leaders are their slaves, ideologically, financially and in any other capacity that there is. All the people that are appointed from the 70's onwards to positions of power in this country are done so based on their 'Yes, Sir' attitude and meekness.

Saudi Arabia is an easy problem to solve, what makes the task difficult is their support from the street ruling religious right of our nation.

There was a time when Pakistani's successfully fought against the regressive policies of the Saudi's on the international stage, after this they used the religious parties of Pakistan to take their revenge.

In 1948, during a drafting session of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, representatives from Saudi Arabia clashed with Pakistan over Articles 19: freedom to change one’s religion. The furious Saudi delegate had to listen to Zafrullah Khan describe the Article as consistent with Islam’s denunciation of compulsion in religion. This Saudi anger (and possibly money) soon found its way into Pakistan's domestic politics. One year after Zafrullah Khan's clash with the Saudis at the UN, a new group called Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam issued a demand that Khan be removed from the cabinet.

December 2003 News Monitor - Prevent Genocide International

As the Saudi family holds a large fraction of the U.S. public debt and has mastered the tricky art of legally bribing American officials it is more accurate to assert that we bend over for them, rather than the reverse.

I am sure you people have a few tricks up your sleeves too, after all you control them, its not the other way round.

I hear blackmail is a resourceful tool and one that has bore many fruits.
 
Yes, it was a second-hand report I heard from one of the participants. Source added that the Pakistani diplomat predicted ahead of time that this is what would happen but didn't say why he'd have to remain silent.

As the Saudi family holds a large fraction of the U.S. public debt and has mastered the tricky art of legally bribing American officials it is more accurate to assert that we bend over for them, rather than the reverse.

Speaking of diplomats and head of states talking about the internal workings of a third stat here is one first hand report direct from the pi..err horse's mouth

Ariel Sharon:
"Every time we do something you tell me America will do this and will do that . . . I want to tell you something very clear: Don't worry about American pressure on Israel. We, the Jewish people, control America, and the Americans know it."
- Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, October 3, 2001.


Now I know where your loyalties are and just like Ben Gurion never said stuff about Pakistan you'll deny that Sharon ever said this about America.
 
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