Joe Shearer
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I'll come back to this thread in detail tomorrow but will just to say that if India want to attain self sufficency in a reasonable timescale, she will have to do as china did, meaning by hook or by crook.
CardSharp, old buddy, you are a rat fink. It's been more than a tomorrow; where the hell are you?
2. How will this doctrine be implemented on the ground? In strategic terms?China has shown an inclination to bargain her occupation of Aksai-Chin. The bargain involves a quid-pro-quo with the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh to which China also lays a claim. She also disputes some Indian territory in the central sector. During the last war in 1962 there was extensive ground action in both Aksai - Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. After the cease fire the Chinese withdrew in the Eastern sector to the position they were during the start of the war. In the Aksai Chin sector China still holds the areas captured during the 1962 war. In the central sector barring minor skirmishes, no large scale military action took place. China considers vital the retaining of the Line of Communication passing through Aksai-Chin that links Sinkiang with Tibet. Therefore she is likely to hold a defensive position in the Aksai-Chin sector and launch offensive operations in the Arunachal Pradesh sector.
This puts us in an anomalous position.
Aksai Chin lends itself to an open set-piece battle, with strong points adequately defended by artillery and armour (tanks have operated successfully at Zoji La, and the PLA has itself dedicated a number of mechanised infantry formations to this - Lanzhou - military district), and the possibility of air support. There is asymmetry, in the sense that the PLA has an apparent overwhelming superiority in cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, to be used tactically. But the bottom line is that the equation is far more balanced in this sector.
Arunachal is not so good for the Indian Army.
For starters, the terrain is hilly, ranging on mountainous forests, thick forests at places, and tropical in nature, infested with leeches and wet and miserable in the valley bottoms, cold and freezing on the ridge tops. Not as cold as Aksai Chin, but bad enough. It is not that the Indian Army cannot cope with this, it is that the PLA has in the past coped better.
Secondly, there is a steep descent from the Tibetan plateau down to these foothills in this sector, all along the boundary. Descent is easier, physical exertion being the problem that it is at those elevations. In addition, troops already camped at high altitude will be to that extent better acclimatised than troops at a lower altitude.
Thirdly, the logistics infrastructure is maddeningly against India in this sector, in spite of the repeated warnings and the repeated promises made. Multiple road-tracks, avoiding the old military trap of single paths easily dominated by ambush parties, and spur rail lines running up the river valleys from the main line running parallel to the Brahmaputra, are obvious solutions, and with only a little effort, the PLA road- and railway-building exercise can be matched and outdone very, very easily. But until it is done, it remains to be done, and meanwhile, the PLA has the advantage.
Fourth, in the years between 62 and today, the concentration has been on addressing small tribal revolts in other parts of the north-east. Arunachal has always been steadfast in its loyalty, but the forest-dwellers in the Brahmaputra Valley, rebelling partly against the Ahom superior classes of the valley, and more visibly against the government structure at state and country level that gives this domination tangibility, are an on-going problem. So, too, are the Nagas, quiescent now, the Mizos, the Kukis of Manipur, and a multitude of small tribes, each with its grievance against the neighbouring larger tribes, each with a dogged and wholly mistaken belief that if they took to arms, they would get equal treatment as their oppressors. Most of these difficulties are on the south bank of the Brahmaputra, and the north bank is only partly troubled by the Bodos, the forest-dwelling Assamese.
So building a capability to oppose the PLA will mean a sharp and clear departure for the IA. For starters, it does not use aircraft or aircraft armaments, artillery or armour against the insurgents, many segments of which are very heavily armed. Everyone knows who is doing this arming, nobody wants to say the name out loud. This very large super-power in the making is the proverbial elephant in the room. And incidentally, has a direct bearing on this discussion.
The IA must un-learn whatever it has learnt in counter-insurgency, and learn to use its available weapons to the fullest. It must also fight at greater formation levels than the norms of counter-insurgency demand.
Fifth, we still do not fight the shifting, moving battle of separate marching and joint battle-fighting that the PLA used so effectively in 62. This has to be thought through, but 'fortress' defences are unlikely to be useful now as they were then. The question is whether the PLA itself has returned to this Maoist doctrine of warfare, or has other systems and policies in place now; they had certainly lost these skills in Vietnam.
There are several other points that come to mind, but it would be appropriate to mention them after checking their applicability.
The conclusions from this are fairly clear. The tasks that have to be achieved are also very clear, and we only have to join the dots to see the picture.