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Army instructed by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar to launch ‘heavy retribution'

Hahaha

U don't know Indian army .... Possibly if modi give order to be calm they attack.

When congress ordered them to make silence. They silently killed many pak soldiers.

And pak have a history to hide facts from its peoples. And control media

Which is not possible in india
 
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IA is bleeding in Kashmir. Time elemental has shifted to the advantage of the FFs. Alhamdllilah!
 
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Sir g kal pay surgical strike ho gayee
 
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Operation Ginger: Tit-for-tat across the Line of Control

Over a few weeks in the summer of 2011, India and Pakistan staged two of the bloodiest cross-border surgical strikes in which at least 13 soldiers were killed, and six of them decapitated. Five of those heads were carried across the border as trophies — two to Pakistan and three to India.

Official documents, video and photographic evidence accessed by the The Hindu, chillingly capture the two cross-border raids and the brutality of the tit-for-tat cycle which seems far deadlier than what is publicly acknowledged.

Major General (retired) S.K. Chakravorty, who planned and executed the operation as the chief of Kupwara-based 28 Division, confirmed the raid to The Hindu.

However, he refused to discuss further details.

The Pakistani raiders struck a remote army post in Gugaldhar ridge in Kupwara, on the afternoon of July 30, 2011, surprising the six soldiers from the Rajput and Kumaon regiments. The 19 Rajput Battalion was to be replaced by 20 Kumaon around the time the Pakistani Border Action Team (BAT) struck. The attacking team took back the heads of Havildar Jaipal Singh Adhikari and Lance Naik Devender Singh of 20 Kumaon. A soldier of the 19 Rajput, who reported the attack, died later in a hospital.

Reconnaisance mission

In revenge, the Indian Army planned Operation Ginger, which would turn out to be one of the deadliest cross-border raids carried out by the Indian Army in recent memory.

To carry out the revenge attack at least seven reconnaissance — physical and air surveillance mounted on UAV — missions were carried out to identify potential targets.

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Consequently, three Pakistani army posts were determined to be vulnerable: Police Chowki, a Pakistani army post near Jor, Hifazat and Lashdat lodging point. The mission was to spring an ambush on Police Chowki to inflict maximum casualty.

According to a secret report of the raid, accessed by this newspaper, different teams for ambush, demolition, surgical strike and surveillance were constituted following the Gugaldhar beheadings.

A few days after the beheading, Indian Army discovered a video clip from a Pakistani militant who was killed in an encounter while crossing into Kashmir, showing Pakistanis standing around the severed heads of Adhikari and Singh displayed on raised platform. The Hindu has a copy of the video.

After repeated recce over two months, the Army launched Operation Ginger on Tuesday, August 30. According to one of those involved in the operation, “We decided on Tuesday because in the past, including in Kargil war (of 1999) we always tasted victory on this day. We deliberately planned the operation just a day before the Eid as it was the time when Pakistanis least expected a retaliation,” he said.

For the strike, about 25 soldiers, mainly Para Commandos, reached their launch-pad at 3 a.m. on August 29 and hid there until 10 p.m. They then crossed over the Line of Control to reach close to Police Chowki. By 4 a.m. on August 30, the planned day of the attack, the ambush team was deep within the enemy territory waiting to strike.

Over the next hour, claymore mines were placed around the area and the commandos took positions for the ambush, waiting for clearance through secure communication route. At 7 a.m. on August 30, the troops saw four Pakistani soldiers, led by a Junior Commissioned Officer, walking towards the ambush site. They waited till the Pakistanis reached the site then detonated the mines. In the explosions all four were grieviously injured. Then the raiding commandoes lobbed grenades and fired at them.

One of the Pakistani soldiers fell into a stream that ran below. Indian soldiers rushed to chop off the heads of the other three dead soldiers. They also took away their rank insignias, weapons and other personal items. The commandos then planted pressure IED’s beneath one of the bodies, primed to explode when anyone attempted to lift the body.

Hearing the explosions, two Pakistani soldiers rushed from the post but were killed by a second Indian team waiting near the ambush site. Two other Pakistani army men tried to trap the second team but a third team covering them from behind eliminated the two, says an official report.

While the Indian soldiers were retreating, another group of Pakistani soldiers were spotted moving from Police Chowki towards the ambush site. Soon they heard loud explosions, indicating the triggering of the IEDs planted under the body, according to the report. According to assessment, at least two to three more Pakistani soldiers were killed in that blast.

The operation had lasted 45 minutes, and the Indian team left the area by 7.45 a.m. to head back across the LoC. The first team reached an Indian army post at 12 noon and the last party by 2.30 p.m.. They had been inside enemy territory for about 48 hours, including for reconnaissance. At least eight Pakistani troops had been killed and another two or three more Pakistani soldiers may have been fatally injured in the action. Three Pakistani heads — of Subedar Parvez, Havildar Aftab and Naik Imran — three AK 47 rifles and other weapons were among the trophies carried back by the Indian soldiers.

No traces

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“But this was not without the heart pounding moments. We got a message on our secure line that one of our jawans accidentally fell on a mine and blew his finger while exfiltrating. Till the time you have seen the person, it was difficult to say what exactly could have happened. He came back safely with his buddies,” said the source.

The severed heads were photographed, and buried on the instructions of senior officers. Two days later, one of the senior most Generals in the command turned up and asked the team about the heads. “When he came to know that we had buried them, he was furious and asked us to dig up the heads, burn them and throw the ashes into the Kishenganga, so that no DNA traces are left behind. We did so,” said the source.

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keep yourself happy with this 1 operation. we did two within a month.
 
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keep yourself happy with this 1 operation. we did two within a month.

Actually there have been many such cross LOC operations in the past, but very few find their way to India and none find their way to Pakistani media.

Even though hidden from Pakistani public for some reason Pakistan keeps reporting them too UNMOGIP.

You have had your fun, now it is our turn!


Locked in U.N. files, 15 years of bloodletting at LoC



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Complaints by Pakistan of executions, beheadings in secret cross-border raids by Indian forces
In classified protests to a United Nations watchdog that have never been disclosed till now, Pakistan has accused Indian soldiers of involvement in the torture and decapitation of at least 12 Pakistani soldiers in cross-Line of Control raids since 1998, as well as the massacre of 29 civilians.

The allegations, laid out in confidential Pakistani complaints to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), suggest that Indian and Pakistani troops stationed on the Line of Control remain locked in a pattern of murderous violence, despite the ceasefire both armies entered into in November 2003. Earlier this month, bilateral relations were severely damaged after a series of LoC skirmishes, which culminated in the beheading and mutilation of two Indian soldiers Lance-Naik Hemraj Singh and Lance-Naik Sudhakar Singh.

The Ministry of Defence did not respond to an e-mail from The Hindu, seeking comment on the alleged decapitation of Pakistani civilians and troops reported to UNMOGIP. However, a military spokesperson said the issue had “not been raised by Pakistan in communications between the two Directors-General of Military Operations.”

The Ministry of External Affairs also said the UNMOGIP complaints had not been raised in diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.

“Ever since 9/11,” a senior Pakistan army officer told The Hindu, “we have sought to downplay these incidents, aware that a public backlash [could] push us into a situation we cannot afford on the LoC, given that much of our army is now committed to our western borders. Each of these incidents has been protested by us on both military and UNMOGIP channels.”

UNMOGIP, set up after the India-Pakistan war of 1947-1948 to monitor ceasefire violations, does not conduct criminal investigations, or assign responsibility for incidents. The reports of its ceasefire monitors are sent to the organisation’s headquarters in New York, and forwarded to the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi.

Ever since 1972, India has responded to UNMOGIP queries with a standard-form letter, saying it believes the organisation has lost its relevance following the demarcation of the LoC. Earlier this month, India argued in the United Nations that the organisation ought to be wound-up.

Massacre for massacre

The most savage cross-LoC violence Indian forces are alleged to have participated in was the killing of 22 civilians at the village of Bandala, in the Chhamb sector, on the night of March 26-27, 1998. The bodies of two civilians, according to Pakistan’s complaint to UNMOGIP, were decapitated; the eyes of several others were allegedly gouged out by the attackers. The Pakistani military claimed to have recovered an Indian-made watch from the scene of the carnage, along with a hand-written note which asked, “How does your own blood feel”?

First reported by The Hindu’s sister publication Frontline in its June 19, 1998 issue, the Bandala massacre is alleged to have been carried out by irregulars backed by Indian special forces in retaliation for the massacre of 29 Hindu villagers at Prankote, in Jammu and Kashmir, by the Lashkar-e-Taiba. The LeT attackers slit the throats of their victims, who included women and children.

No Indian investigation of the Bandala killings has ever been carried out. However, an officer serving in the Northern Command at the time said the massacre was “intended to signal that communal massacres by jihadists, who were after all trained and equipped by Pakistan’s military, were a red line that could not be crossed with impunity.”

The Lashkar, however, continued to target Hindu villagers in the Jammu region; 10 were killed at Deesa and Surankote just days later, on May 6, 1998. In 2001, 108 people were gunned down in 11 communal massacres, and 83 people were killed in five incidents in 2002 — a grim toll that only died out after the 2003 ceasefire.

Brutal retaliation

Even though the large-scale killings of civilians did not take place again, Pakistan continued to report cross-border attacks, involving mutilations, to UNMOGIP.

Six months after the Kargil war, on the night of January 21-22, 2000, seven Pakistani soldiers were alleged to have been captured in a raid on a post in the Nadala enclave, across the Neelam River. The seven soldiers, wounded in fire, were allegedly tied up and dragged across a ravine running across the LoC. The bodies were returned, according to Pakistan’s complaint, bearing signs of brutal torture.

“Pakistan chose to underplay the Nadala incident,” a senior Pakistani military officer involved with its Military Operations Directorate told The Hindu, “as General Pervez Musharraf had only recently staged his coup, and did not want a public outcry that would spark a crisis with India.”


Indian military sources told The Hindu that the raid, conducted by a special forces unit, was intended to avenge the killing of Captain Saurabh Kalia, and five soldiers — sepoys Bhanwar Lal Bagaria, Arjun Ram, Bhika Ram, Moola Ram and Naresh Singh — of the 4 Jat Regiment. The patrol had been captured on May 15, 1999, in the Kaksar sector of Kargil. Post mortem revealed that the men’s bodies had been burned with cigarette-ends and their genitals mutilated.

Less detail is available on the retaliatory cycles involved in incidents that have taken place since the ceasefire went into place along the LoC in 2003 — but Pakistan’s complaints to UNMOGIP suggest that there has been steady, but largely unreported, cross-border violence involving beheadings and mutilations.

Indian troops, Pakistan alleged, killed a JCO, or junior commissioned officer, and three soldiers in a raid on a post in the Baroh sector, near Bhimber Gali in Poonch, on September 18, 2003. The raiders, it told UNMOGIP, decapitated one soldier and carried his head off as a trophy.

Near-identical incidents have taken place on at least two occasions since 2008, when hostilities on the LoC began to escalate again. Indian troops, Pakistan’s complaints record, beheaded a soldier and carried his head across on June 19, 2008, in the Bhattal sector in Poonch. Four Pakistani soldiers, UNMOGIP was told, died in the raid.

The killings came soon after a June 5, 2008 attack on the Kranti border observation post near Salhotri village in Poonch, which claimed the life of 2-8 Gurkha Regiment soldier Jawashwar Chhame.

Finally, on August 30, 2011, Pakistan complained that three soldiers, including a JCO, were beheaded in an Indian raid on a post in the Sharda sector, across the Neelam river valley in Kel. The Hindu had first reported the incident based on testimony from Indian military sources, who said two Pakistani soldiers had been beheaded following the decapitation of two Indian soldiers near Karnah. The raid on the Indian forward position, a highly placed military source said, was carried out by Pakistani special forces, who used rafts to penetrate India’s defences along the LoC.

Fragile ceasefire

Part of the reason why the November 2003 ceasefire failed to end such savagery, government sources in both India and Pakistan told The Hindu, is the absence of an agreed mechanism to regulate conflicts along the LoC. Though both sides have occasional brigade-level flag meetings, and local post commanders exchange communications, disputes are rarely reported to higher authorities until tensions reach boiling point. Foreign offices in both countries, diplomats admitted, are almost never briefed on crises brewing on the LoC.

In October last year, highly placed military sources said, Pakistan’s Director-General of Military Operations complained about Indian construction work around Charunda, in Uri. His Indian counterpart, Lieutenant-General Vinod Bhatia, however, responded that India’s works were purely intended to prevent illegal border crossings. The unresolved dispute led to exchanges of fire, which eventually escalated into shelling and the killings of soldiers on both sides.

The November 2003 ceasefire, Indian diplomatic sources say, was based on an unwritten “agreement,” which in essence stipulated that neither side would reinforce its fortifications along the LoC — a measure first agreed to after the 1971 war. In 2006, the two sides exchanged drafts for a formal agreement. Since then, the sources said, negotiations have stalled over differing ideas on what kind of construction is permissible. “In essence,” a senior government official said, “we accept that there should be no new construction, but want to be allowed to expand counter-infiltration measures and expand existing infrastructure.”

India insists that it needs to expand counter-infiltration infrastructure because of escalating operations by jihadist groups across the LoC. Pakistan argues that India’s own figures show a sharp decline in operations by jihadists in Jammu and Kashmir. Last year, according to the Indian government, 72 terrorists, 24 civilians and 15 security personnel, including police, were killed in terrorist violence in the State — lower, in total, than the 521 murders recorded in Delhi alone. In 2011, the figures were, respectively, 100, 40 and 33; in 2010, 232, 164 and 69.

“You can’t say that you need more border defences to fight off jihadists when you yourself say there is less and less jihadist violence,” a Pakistani military official said. “The only reason there are less jihadists,” an Indian military officer responded, “is because we’ve enhanced our defences.”

Indian and Pakistani diplomats last met on December 27 to discuss the draft agreement, but could make no headway.

The article has been corrected for a factual error.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/nation...ars-of-bloodletting-at-loc/article4358199.ece
 
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Why we are not finishing this dispute? enough with this killing and all. Solve this either with full fledged war or by peace initiative measure with true heart.
 
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Expect another fake surgical strike than
Because india knows that its the only thing they can do and any misadventure will cause further casualties on Indian as they are facing alot more tougher battle hardened army
 
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