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gowthamraj
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India Reverses Gear, Puts Arjun Tank Back in Production
18-May-2010 18:16 EDT
Related Stories: Asia - India, Events, Force Structure, Issues - Political, Lobbying, New Systems Tech, Other Corporation, Tanks & Mechanized
Arjun tank
Major article updates, as India reverses course. (May 17/10)
Indias indigenous Arjun tank project began in 1974, and originally aimed to replace the Russian T-54 and T-72 tanks which made up the bulk of that countrys armored firepower. As has often been the case in India, its DRDO government weapons development agency sought an entirely made in India solution, even though this would require major advances on a number of fronts for Indian industry. As has often been the case in India, the result was a long and checkered history filled with development delays, performance issues, mid-project specifications changes by Indias military, and the eventual purchase of both foreign substitutions within the project (now 58% of the tanks cost) and foreign competitors from outside it (the T-90S).
The 58.5 tonne Arjun tank wasnt fielded with the Indian Army until May 2009. In contrast, Pakistans much more time-limited, scope-limited, and budget conscious approach in developing and successfully fielding its T-80UD Al-Khalid tank is often cited by Arjuns detractors.
The Russian T-90S will form the mainstay of Indias future force, despite that tanks performance issues in hot weather. That wont change, but the Arjun now has a clear future in India
Arjun Cap, and T-90S Trade [updated]
Contracts & Key Events [updated]
Arjun Cap, and T-90S Trade
T-90, backside ollie
(click to view full)
The Arjun is an indigenous project, but not wholly so. Imported items such as the engine/ power pack, gunners main sight, and other components account for 58% of each tanks cost. This is not uncommon; Israels Merkava tank family also relies on a foreign-built engine, for instance, as does Frances Leclerc.
The Arjun has been plagued with a mix of problems over its 36-year development history, however, including its fire control system, suspension issues, and poor mobility due to excessive weight. It has also grown from a 40-tonne tank with a 105mm gun, to a 58.5 tonne tank with a 120mm gun. Predictably, project costs spiraled up from Rs 15.5 crore in 1974 to Rs 306 crore (INR 3.06 trillion). The army was not pleased. In an unusual stance, they accepted the tank only after a third-party audit by an international tank manufacturer, and orders were strictly limited.
The Indian army did not even stand up its 1st Arjun armored regiment until May 2009, and this event came after a development that seemed to end the platforms future. In July 2008, India had announced that production of the Arjun would be capped at the already-committed total of 124 vehicles. Instead, development would begin on a new next-generation tank, designed to survive and serve until 2040 or so.
That appeared to close the book on a failed project, but opinion in India was sharply split. Many observers cited this as the final failure that will close the book on a failed project. Other were noting the problems with the T-90s, and the Armys refusal to conduct side-by-side tests, alongside recent test successes that are earning the Arun some military fans. DRDO went so far as to make allegation of sabotage involving the Arjuns engine, and insists that a 500 vehicle order will give it the volume needed to iron out all production difficulties and provide a platform for future development.
In May 2010, following desert trials alongside the T-90S, the Army changed course somewhat. Arjun production would double to 248.
The Armys plan still calls for 1,657 T-90S Bhishma tanks at about 12 crore (currently $2.78 million) each if prices remain stable, about 1,000 of which are slated to be built in India by Avadi Heavy Industries, the same firm that builds the Arjuns. They will be joined by just 248 Arjuns at about 16.8 crore (currently $3.92 million) each, as well as 692 older T-72 tanks upgraded to the T-72M1 Ajeya standard. This overall plan changes the force structure proposed in 2006, from 3,780 tanks (1,302 T-90s and 2,480 T-72s) to 2,597 higher-end tanks.
Contracts & Key Events
T-90
(click to view full)
May 17/10: India decides that it will remove the production cap, and double production of the Arjun Mk I tank. So far, 75 of the 124 ordered Arjuns have been delivered, and the remaining 49 were to be delivered by mid-2010. Now, the production line will be extended:
The Army has decided to place fresh order for an additional home-built 124 Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun . [after] the success of the indigenous MBT Arjun in the recent gruelling desert trials. The project for the design and development of the MBT Arjun was approved by the Government in 1974 . After many years of trial and tribulation it has now proved its worth by its superb performance under various circumstances, such as driving cross-country over rugged sand dunes, detecting, observing and quickly engaging targets, accurately hitting targets both stationary and moving, with pin pointed accuracy.
Even so, the mainstay of Indias future tank fleet with remain the Russian T-90S. The governments DRDO agency still wants a minimum of 500 Arjuns ordered, to stabilize production lines until it can develop a Mark-II version. Indian government PIB release | Indias Business Standard | Deccan Chronicle | domain-b | Hindustan Times | Times of India.
May 13/10: The Indian government gives its approval to restructure the DRDO. Among the continued programs, however, is development of an MBT Arjun Mk-II tank. Indian government release | Defense News.
March 25/10: The Hindu Business Standard: Arjun tank outruns, outguns Russian T-90. Excerpts:
The importance of this comparative trial can be gauged from a list of those who attended . The senior officers who attended the trials were taken aback by the Arjuns strong performance, an army officer who was present through the trials frankly stated . The armys Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), which has bitterly opposed buying more Arjuns, will now find it difficult to sustain that opposition . The current order of 124 Arjuns is equipping the armys 140 Armoured Brigade in Jaisalmer. With that order almost completed, the Arjun production line at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) in Avadi, near Chennai, needs more orders urgently. The Rs 50 crore facility can churn out 50 Arjuns annually . The Arjuns sterling performance in the desert raises another far-reaching question: should the Arjun- with its proven mobility, firepower and armour protection- be restricted to a defensive role or should it equip the armys strike corps . Each strike corps has 8-9 tank regiments. If the army recommends the Arjun for a strike role, that would mean an additional order of about 500 Arjuns.
Note also the comparative chart, showing the Arjun compared to many international tanks.
Jan 16/10: IANS reports that the Arjun main battle tank will get its long-requested trials beside the Russian built T-90S tanks, in desert trials at the at Mahajan Range in Rajasthan on March 1st.
Our aim is not to determine a winner in these trials, but to test the core strength of the tanks, a senior official of the Indian Army said, wishing anonymity.
Despite that assurance, its generally acknowledged that poor performance in these tests would have consequences for the Arjun platform.
June 4/09: An article in The Hindu Business Line by a former member of the state-run Factory Ordnance Board, states that the Arjun may be attracting some export interest:
Miffed at the continued reluctance of the Army and armed with the credentials certified by independent audit, the DRDO is challenging the former to conduct comparative trials of T-90 and Arjun. The Army stalled such an exercise by first wanting at least 45 tanks in the regiment and then postponing the trials to October. The Army is also inserting tactical elements in the test directives . However, happily for HVF and the DRDO, it appears that a serious RFP (Request For Proposal) has been received from a Latin American country.
May 25/09: The Indian Army inducts its first Arjun Main Battle Tank armored regiment, adding 16 delivered tanks to bring the 43rd Armored Regiment up to its strength of 45. Lieutenant General D Bhardwaj, Director General Mechanized Forces (DGMF), accepts the new tanks during the induction ceremony. StratPost.
July 22/08: ANI reports from Indias Technology Seminar on Future Infantry Combat Vehicle and Future Main Battle Tank, and the winds all appear to be blowing toward greater private sector involvement.
Current Defence Minister A K Antony noted that the new defense purchase policy envisages a greater role for the private sector in supplying much needed equipment to the countrys armed forces, and added that the focus of the new rules and procedures in the defense procurement procedures 2008 (DPP 2008) is on ensuring speedier procurements. Also:
...Chief of the Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor, pointed out that while technology was critical for any nations defence system, what was also needed was the need to check any time and procedural delays. He said that while it was important to stress on indigenisation and collaborative approach, we should not compromise on our operational capabilities.
....Lt. Gen. Dalip Bhardwaj, Director-General Mechanised Forces, said that the time was right for greater private sector involvement in supplying defence equipment. However, the industry must keep in mind the defence sectors end needs and not just the technology. According to him what the industry needs to do is to develop products that have a longer shelf life.
July 21/08: India and Russia may be gearing up to develop the T-90s successor as a joint project. Rediff quotes Nikolai Malykh, director general of Russias biggest tank producer Uralvagonzavod:
We put forward this idea (of developing the tank) at the turn of the 21st century. The Indian side has now come up with a similar proposal We will take the first step when our experts go to India to attend a conference on the future tank and prospects for the tank-building industry.
Moscow Defence Brief magazine claims that the new tank may have a new main gun of up to 152 mm caliber, higher speed, a smoother ride, improved networking, and an armor-protected crew compartment sealed from an unmanned turret equipped with an automatic loader. A new hunter-killer fire control system would include target acquisition in optical, thermal, infrared and radar spectrum that will be accessible both to the gunner and tank commander.
This is interesting on 2 levels. One item worth noting is the BrahMos programs use as a model. If adopted, the successor program to the Arun tank is likely to have far less DRDO involvement and control. The second item is the feature set itself, which reflects Russian thinking. It is worth reminding oneself, however, no deal has been signed as of yet. And that initial wish lists for features are just that, until a working model is fielded. Rediff report.
18-May-2010 18:16 EDT
Related Stories: Asia - India, Events, Force Structure, Issues - Political, Lobbying, New Systems Tech, Other Corporation, Tanks & Mechanized
Arjun tank
Major article updates, as India reverses course. (May 17/10)
Indias indigenous Arjun tank project began in 1974, and originally aimed to replace the Russian T-54 and T-72 tanks which made up the bulk of that countrys armored firepower. As has often been the case in India, its DRDO government weapons development agency sought an entirely made in India solution, even though this would require major advances on a number of fronts for Indian industry. As has often been the case in India, the result was a long and checkered history filled with development delays, performance issues, mid-project specifications changes by Indias military, and the eventual purchase of both foreign substitutions within the project (now 58% of the tanks cost) and foreign competitors from outside it (the T-90S).
The 58.5 tonne Arjun tank wasnt fielded with the Indian Army until May 2009. In contrast, Pakistans much more time-limited, scope-limited, and budget conscious approach in developing and successfully fielding its T-80UD Al-Khalid tank is often cited by Arjuns detractors.
The Russian T-90S will form the mainstay of Indias future force, despite that tanks performance issues in hot weather. That wont change, but the Arjun now has a clear future in India
Arjun Cap, and T-90S Trade [updated]
Contracts & Key Events [updated]
Arjun Cap, and T-90S Trade
T-90, backside ollie
(click to view full)
The Arjun is an indigenous project, but not wholly so. Imported items such as the engine/ power pack, gunners main sight, and other components account for 58% of each tanks cost. This is not uncommon; Israels Merkava tank family also relies on a foreign-built engine, for instance, as does Frances Leclerc.
The Arjun has been plagued with a mix of problems over its 36-year development history, however, including its fire control system, suspension issues, and poor mobility due to excessive weight. It has also grown from a 40-tonne tank with a 105mm gun, to a 58.5 tonne tank with a 120mm gun. Predictably, project costs spiraled up from Rs 15.5 crore in 1974 to Rs 306 crore (INR 3.06 trillion). The army was not pleased. In an unusual stance, they accepted the tank only after a third-party audit by an international tank manufacturer, and orders were strictly limited.
The Indian army did not even stand up its 1st Arjun armored regiment until May 2009, and this event came after a development that seemed to end the platforms future. In July 2008, India had announced that production of the Arjun would be capped at the already-committed total of 124 vehicles. Instead, development would begin on a new next-generation tank, designed to survive and serve until 2040 or so.
That appeared to close the book on a failed project, but opinion in India was sharply split. Many observers cited this as the final failure that will close the book on a failed project. Other were noting the problems with the T-90s, and the Armys refusal to conduct side-by-side tests, alongside recent test successes that are earning the Arun some military fans. DRDO went so far as to make allegation of sabotage involving the Arjuns engine, and insists that a 500 vehicle order will give it the volume needed to iron out all production difficulties and provide a platform for future development.
In May 2010, following desert trials alongside the T-90S, the Army changed course somewhat. Arjun production would double to 248.
The Armys plan still calls for 1,657 T-90S Bhishma tanks at about 12 crore (currently $2.78 million) each if prices remain stable, about 1,000 of which are slated to be built in India by Avadi Heavy Industries, the same firm that builds the Arjuns. They will be joined by just 248 Arjuns at about 16.8 crore (currently $3.92 million) each, as well as 692 older T-72 tanks upgraded to the T-72M1 Ajeya standard. This overall plan changes the force structure proposed in 2006, from 3,780 tanks (1,302 T-90s and 2,480 T-72s) to 2,597 higher-end tanks.
Contracts & Key Events
T-90
(click to view full)
May 17/10: India decides that it will remove the production cap, and double production of the Arjun Mk I tank. So far, 75 of the 124 ordered Arjuns have been delivered, and the remaining 49 were to be delivered by mid-2010. Now, the production line will be extended:
The Army has decided to place fresh order for an additional home-built 124 Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun . [after] the success of the indigenous MBT Arjun in the recent gruelling desert trials. The project for the design and development of the MBT Arjun was approved by the Government in 1974 . After many years of trial and tribulation it has now proved its worth by its superb performance under various circumstances, such as driving cross-country over rugged sand dunes, detecting, observing and quickly engaging targets, accurately hitting targets both stationary and moving, with pin pointed accuracy.
Even so, the mainstay of Indias future tank fleet with remain the Russian T-90S. The governments DRDO agency still wants a minimum of 500 Arjuns ordered, to stabilize production lines until it can develop a Mark-II version. Indian government PIB release | Indias Business Standard | Deccan Chronicle | domain-b | Hindustan Times | Times of India.
May 13/10: The Indian government gives its approval to restructure the DRDO. Among the continued programs, however, is development of an MBT Arjun Mk-II tank. Indian government release | Defense News.
March 25/10: The Hindu Business Standard: Arjun tank outruns, outguns Russian T-90. Excerpts:
The importance of this comparative trial can be gauged from a list of those who attended . The senior officers who attended the trials were taken aback by the Arjuns strong performance, an army officer who was present through the trials frankly stated . The armys Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF), which has bitterly opposed buying more Arjuns, will now find it difficult to sustain that opposition . The current order of 124 Arjuns is equipping the armys 140 Armoured Brigade in Jaisalmer. With that order almost completed, the Arjun production line at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) in Avadi, near Chennai, needs more orders urgently. The Rs 50 crore facility can churn out 50 Arjuns annually . The Arjuns sterling performance in the desert raises another far-reaching question: should the Arjun- with its proven mobility, firepower and armour protection- be restricted to a defensive role or should it equip the armys strike corps . Each strike corps has 8-9 tank regiments. If the army recommends the Arjun for a strike role, that would mean an additional order of about 500 Arjuns.
Note also the comparative chart, showing the Arjun compared to many international tanks.
Jan 16/10: IANS reports that the Arjun main battle tank will get its long-requested trials beside the Russian built T-90S tanks, in desert trials at the at Mahajan Range in Rajasthan on March 1st.
Our aim is not to determine a winner in these trials, but to test the core strength of the tanks, a senior official of the Indian Army said, wishing anonymity.
Despite that assurance, its generally acknowledged that poor performance in these tests would have consequences for the Arjun platform.
June 4/09: An article in The Hindu Business Line by a former member of the state-run Factory Ordnance Board, states that the Arjun may be attracting some export interest:
Miffed at the continued reluctance of the Army and armed with the credentials certified by independent audit, the DRDO is challenging the former to conduct comparative trials of T-90 and Arjun. The Army stalled such an exercise by first wanting at least 45 tanks in the regiment and then postponing the trials to October. The Army is also inserting tactical elements in the test directives . However, happily for HVF and the DRDO, it appears that a serious RFP (Request For Proposal) has been received from a Latin American country.
May 25/09: The Indian Army inducts its first Arjun Main Battle Tank armored regiment, adding 16 delivered tanks to bring the 43rd Armored Regiment up to its strength of 45. Lieutenant General D Bhardwaj, Director General Mechanized Forces (DGMF), accepts the new tanks during the induction ceremony. StratPost.
July 22/08: ANI reports from Indias Technology Seminar on Future Infantry Combat Vehicle and Future Main Battle Tank, and the winds all appear to be blowing toward greater private sector involvement.
Current Defence Minister A K Antony noted that the new defense purchase policy envisages a greater role for the private sector in supplying much needed equipment to the countrys armed forces, and added that the focus of the new rules and procedures in the defense procurement procedures 2008 (DPP 2008) is on ensuring speedier procurements. Also:
...Chief of the Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor, pointed out that while technology was critical for any nations defence system, what was also needed was the need to check any time and procedural delays. He said that while it was important to stress on indigenisation and collaborative approach, we should not compromise on our operational capabilities.
....Lt. Gen. Dalip Bhardwaj, Director-General Mechanised Forces, said that the time was right for greater private sector involvement in supplying defence equipment. However, the industry must keep in mind the defence sectors end needs and not just the technology. According to him what the industry needs to do is to develop products that have a longer shelf life.
July 21/08: India and Russia may be gearing up to develop the T-90s successor as a joint project. Rediff quotes Nikolai Malykh, director general of Russias biggest tank producer Uralvagonzavod:
We put forward this idea (of developing the tank) at the turn of the 21st century. The Indian side has now come up with a similar proposal We will take the first step when our experts go to India to attend a conference on the future tank and prospects for the tank-building industry.
Moscow Defence Brief magazine claims that the new tank may have a new main gun of up to 152 mm caliber, higher speed, a smoother ride, improved networking, and an armor-protected crew compartment sealed from an unmanned turret equipped with an automatic loader. A new hunter-killer fire control system would include target acquisition in optical, thermal, infrared and radar spectrum that will be accessible both to the gunner and tank commander.
This is interesting on 2 levels. One item worth noting is the BrahMos programs use as a model. If adopted, the successor program to the Arun tank is likely to have far less DRDO involvement and control. The second item is the feature set itself, which reflects Russian thinking. It is worth reminding oneself, however, no deal has been signed as of yet. And that initial wish lists for features are just that, until a working model is fielded. Rediff report.
black flame
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honour
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dude no offense u from kerala rite
enough yaaar...we r from India...that's enough......nothing else
KS
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Aaaawwww...cmon mate we can appreciate the taste of sugar only if we know wat is bitter.
The beauty is we fight for petty issues among tamil,marathi,kannada....but wen situation comes we stand up and say "MERA BHARAT MAHAN"....therein lies the beauty and the meaning of the sentence "UNITY IN DIVERSITY"....:india flag:
CONNAN
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http://*************.net/flag-smiley-7331.gif
اس عظیم بھارتی اتحاد
CONNAN
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When Arjun beat T-90 idrw.org
Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament
The long and intensely tortuous development process of the Arjun has earned it considerable notoriety as a landmark case study of bad project management which crystallised and hardened cynicism amongst the user community, and though the tank still remains technologically contemporary, its prolonged gestation has already made it due for midlife upgradation. This is not unusual in series tank production, but with Arjun this will have to be incorporated on the production line with the very initial batch itself as and when series production commences, again only if substantial orders flow in from the users. In this context, it is understood that the DRDO would like an initial production order of 300-500 numbers of Arjun tanks to be placed, instead of the present 124, understandable as well as justifiable, because a larger run of initial production will facilitate rectification and upgradation on the production line. Generations of armour officers (now mostly superannuated) still shudder at recollections of the Vijayanta where an unproven and basically unsatisfactory design procured in a hurry turned into a highly defect prone tank which had to be intensively modified along the way on the production line until the later models were quite different from the initial batches (but nevertheless remained unsatisfactory!). Transfer of technology is also dependent on production numbers because foreign vendors refuse to transfer their best technology for limited production series if further production appears unlikely.
However, the sunny side is that the development processes has already stimulated growth in small but very high technology manufacturing agencies even if production lines for prototype models have been quite limited. These agencies are of course capital intensive, but have mainly come up in the medium and small scale private sector which is surely encouraging.
Retention of user confidence in the Arjun requires a sustained process of engineering and quality control by the DRDO and the ordnance factories which has not been their strong point so far. Unless the government succeeds in enforcing accountability on its agencies, for continuous technological upgradation of the tank while on the production line as well as quality control standards, MBT Arjun, a tank of contemporary design, will again loose the confidence of the user community. It is evident that MBT Arjun is emerging as touchstone case for the DRDO and HVF Avadi to prove their detractors wrong!
There is a requirement for government to break the mould of its traditional mindset and associate the considerable talents and capacities of the private sector as well as technological academia with the development and production of the Arjun. The private sector is better aware of the importance of continuous quality control for market survival amidst intense competition, something to which ordnance factories, used to assured monopoly markets over the armed forces, are not accustomed, and often accept lower quality standards because their commercial survival is not a factor.
At the end of it all, the Arjun remains a good standard design, extremely badly executed so far which can still be rescued but only if the ministry of defence can enforce accountability on the DRDO and the Ordnance Factory Board for technological upgradation, design rectification and enforcement of quality control within a laid down timeframe and as an ongoing process. This did not appear to be the case earlier, when the initial production batch of five tanks were formally handed over to the Army with much fanfare, and then immediately retrieved by the factory after the ceremony to rectify quality shortfalls as demanded by the exasperated users! These and other negative experiences have hardened user cynicism, but all that must become water under the bridge now, and users must accept Arjun as a Mark I version to be upgraded and improved during further production into a Mark II and beyond. The extension of the MBT programme into variants and derivatives based on the Arjun chassis must also begin to take shape, such as the planned Bhim self-propelled 155mm tracked artillery system for which earlier trials to adapt the T-72 tank chassis on the cheap had failed signally. (Similar ill-judged experimentation with the T-90 would be best avoided!).
In a wider national context, fielding the MBT Arjun is important for Indias contemporary and future strategic leadership as well as nascent military-industrial complex. Indigenous capabilities for development and production of sophisticated capital defence equipment are vital strategic capabilities for which Arjun, Tejas, Agni and the ATV (advanced technology vessel) have to be seen in their true geopolitical perspective as statements by an India seeking a world presence in the 21st century
Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament
The long and intensely tortuous development process of the Arjun has earned it considerable notoriety as a landmark case study of bad project management which crystallised and hardened cynicism amongst the user community, and though the tank still remains technologically contemporary, its prolonged gestation has already made it due for midlife upgradation. This is not unusual in series tank production, but with Arjun this will have to be incorporated on the production line with the very initial batch itself as and when series production commences, again only if substantial orders flow in from the users. In this context, it is understood that the DRDO would like an initial production order of 300-500 numbers of Arjun tanks to be placed, instead of the present 124, understandable as well as justifiable, because a larger run of initial production will facilitate rectification and upgradation on the production line. Generations of armour officers (now mostly superannuated) still shudder at recollections of the Vijayanta where an unproven and basically unsatisfactory design procured in a hurry turned into a highly defect prone tank which had to be intensively modified along the way on the production line until the later models were quite different from the initial batches (but nevertheless remained unsatisfactory!). Transfer of technology is also dependent on production numbers because foreign vendors refuse to transfer their best technology for limited production series if further production appears unlikely.
However, the sunny side is that the development processes has already stimulated growth in small but very high technology manufacturing agencies even if production lines for prototype models have been quite limited. These agencies are of course capital intensive, but have mainly come up in the medium and small scale private sector which is surely encouraging.
Retention of user confidence in the Arjun requires a sustained process of engineering and quality control by the DRDO and the ordnance factories which has not been their strong point so far. Unless the government succeeds in enforcing accountability on its agencies, for continuous technological upgradation of the tank while on the production line as well as quality control standards, MBT Arjun, a tank of contemporary design, will again loose the confidence of the user community. It is evident that MBT Arjun is emerging as touchstone case for the DRDO and HVF Avadi to prove their detractors wrong!
There is a requirement for government to break the mould of its traditional mindset and associate the considerable talents and capacities of the private sector as well as technological academia with the development and production of the Arjun. The private sector is better aware of the importance of continuous quality control for market survival amidst intense competition, something to which ordnance factories, used to assured monopoly markets over the armed forces, are not accustomed, and often accept lower quality standards because their commercial survival is not a factor.
At the end of it all, the Arjun remains a good standard design, extremely badly executed so far which can still be rescued but only if the ministry of defence can enforce accountability on the DRDO and the Ordnance Factory Board for technological upgradation, design rectification and enforcement of quality control within a laid down timeframe and as an ongoing process. This did not appear to be the case earlier, when the initial production batch of five tanks were formally handed over to the Army with much fanfare, and then immediately retrieved by the factory after the ceremony to rectify quality shortfalls as demanded by the exasperated users! These and other negative experiences have hardened user cynicism, but all that must become water under the bridge now, and users must accept Arjun as a Mark I version to be upgraded and improved during further production into a Mark II and beyond. The extension of the MBT programme into variants and derivatives based on the Arjun chassis must also begin to take shape, such as the planned Bhim self-propelled 155mm tracked artillery system for which earlier trials to adapt the T-72 tank chassis on the cheap had failed signally. (Similar ill-judged experimentation with the T-90 would be best avoided!).
In a wider national context, fielding the MBT Arjun is important for Indias contemporary and future strategic leadership as well as nascent military-industrial complex. Indigenous capabilities for development and production of sophisticated capital defence equipment are vital strategic capabilities for which Arjun, Tejas, Agni and the ATV (advanced technology vessel) have to be seen in their true geopolitical perspective as statements by an India seeking a world presence in the 21st century
EyelessInGaza
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Ok, I know the Arjun is supposed to have beaten the T-90 in trials but this article does not reflect the headline.
I guess one is now coming to understand the IA point of view? At it's core - QC, QC, QC.
I don't know if Avadhi (the Ord factory) is up to enforcing QC (not DRDO's fault). I think we need to think about handing over production to the private sector.
Won't be easy but sarkari manufacturing does not fill me with confidence either.
black flame
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no man i just asked him out of curiosity after seeing his profile pic nothing else and i just got excited after meeting so many Tamils thats all
gogbot
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you hit the nail on its head.
The Army's problems with INSAS has also all been quality related.
This is where we desperate need PV or PPP .
shaktiman2010
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Indian Army top brass should be ashamed for delaying such wonderful home-made weapon system.
No wonder corruption is so common even at top level in army. Most of senior RAW agents who sold out themselves were ex-army types.
All these army morons can only whine when some journalist questions them about corruption in army. They want to be treated like saints. LOL.
But, finally DRDO proved them wrong by beating junk and blind T-90 in night trials.
No wonder corruption is so common even at top level in army. Most of senior RAW agents who sold out themselves were ex-army types.
All these army morons can only whine when some journalist questions them about corruption in army. They want to be treated like saints. LOL.
But, finally DRDO proved them wrong by beating junk and blind T-90 in night trials.
flaming arrow
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This comes from the recent trials btw ARJUN & T-90
Comparative trials between MBT Arjun and T-90 tanks were held during 15 February to 12 March 2010, to evaluate the utilisation strategy by the Indian Army. The evaluation parameters were firepower, mobility, maintainability,and medium fording. The trials were conducted in four phases.
Phase I: This was conducted at 180 Armoured Brigade, Bikaner. Acceleration, turning radius, stab performance, ergonomics, static fuel consumption, and serviceability and mean time to repair werechecked for various subsystems of the tanks.
Phase II: This was conducted at Hisar, Haryana.Check was made for medium fording capability.
Phase III: This was conducted at Mahajan Ranges,Rajasthan. Bridge crossing, night driving, maximum speed on cross-country and on hard ground, tilt driving, firing of primary and secondary ammunition,firing at night with thermal imagers (TI), consistency,rate of fire, thermal signature, TI capability and firing of small arms and Air Defence (AD) Gun were compared. In this phase, approximately 100 rounds were fired and 150 km of mobility run was completed by each of the 14 MBT Arjun tanks.
Phase IV:This was conducted at Ranjitpura, Rajasthan. Mobility in the desert and tactical cruising range were evaluated by running three tanks each for additional 150 km.
MBT Arjun displayed its capabilities and successfully passed all the trials.
An indigenous data logger for transmission control system of MBT Arjun has been developed by Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment(CVRDE), Chennai.The data logger is integrated to production series MBT Arjun, and data logging has also been carried out successfully.
http://www.drdo.com/pub/nl/2010/jun10.pdf
Comparative trials between MBT Arjun and T-90 tanks were held during 15 February to 12 March 2010, to evaluate the utilisation strategy by the Indian Army. The evaluation parameters were firepower, mobility, maintainability,and medium fording. The trials were conducted in four phases.
Phase I: This was conducted at 180 Armoured Brigade, Bikaner. Acceleration, turning radius, stab performance, ergonomics, static fuel consumption, and serviceability and mean time to repair werechecked for various subsystems of the tanks.
Phase II: This was conducted at Hisar, Haryana.Check was made for medium fording capability.
Phase III: This was conducted at Mahajan Ranges,Rajasthan. Bridge crossing, night driving, maximum speed on cross-country and on hard ground, tilt driving, firing of primary and secondary ammunition,firing at night with thermal imagers (TI), consistency,rate of fire, thermal signature, TI capability and firing of small arms and Air Defence (AD) Gun were compared. In this phase, approximately 100 rounds were fired and 150 km of mobility run was completed by each of the 14 MBT Arjun tanks.
Phase IV:This was conducted at Ranjitpura, Rajasthan. Mobility in the desert and tactical cruising range were evaluated by running three tanks each for additional 150 km.
MBT Arjun displayed its capabilities and successfully passed all the trials.
An indigenous data logger for transmission control system of MBT Arjun has been developed by Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment(CVRDE), Chennai.The data logger is integrated to production series MBT Arjun, and data logging has also been carried out successfully.
http://www.drdo.com/pub/nl/2010/jun10.pdf
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