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AGMs and Standoff Weapons

YJ-12
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some jf-17 integrations
CM-802, MAR-1, CM-400 AKG, SD-10 Ra'ad , ls6
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CM-400AKG

This supersonic standoff missile was first on display at the 2012 Zhuhai Airshow as part of FC-1/JF-17's "complete" weapon package. Unlike most modern ASMs flying at the low altitude, the missile flies a rare high ballistic trajectory, powered by a solid rocket motor. It appears that CM-400AKG may have evolved from the earlier SY-400 SRBM. Therefore the effectiveness of such attack profile is still unknown. Some specifications: weight 900kg, max range 240km, max speed Mach 5.5 (at diving stage?). It has INS during the mid-course and utilizes active radar/passive radar/IIR seeker with target-recognition capabilities at the terminal stage, which may improve its accuracy. The missile is claimed to be capable of terminal maneuver in some degree to avoid interception by SAM. CM-400AKG is speculated to have been designed to attack fixed or "slow moving", high value ground targets. It has yet to be confirmed that CM-400AGK is in service with PAF's JF-17.

CM-400AKG

At the 9th Zhuhai Airshow, another hypersonic missile designated as CM-400AKG made its debut in real form, though its photo had previously appeared at Paris Airshow. Developed by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), the successor of several developers of YJ-12 after numerous reorganization, CM-400AKG has reduced range of 180 to 250 km in order to meet the export restriction of Missile Technology Control Regime. The original western erroneous claims of CM-400AKG as a development of C-802/C-803 proved to be incorrect,[7] because CM-400AKG is a derivative of YJ-12 instead, using solid rocket motor propulsion as opposed to the ramjet engine of YJ-12,[8] and CM-400AKG is similar to YJ-12 in many aspects, such as the supersonic speed, and more importantly, the exact same high-low flight path of first cruise at higher altitude and then the steep dive on the final approach.[9]
The 400 kg CM-400AKG is termed by CASIC as hypersonic since it can reach speed greater than Mach 4 at its terminal stage, and its guidance system includes GPS, onboard radar, and an image recognition system that can identify a specific target, it can also be pre-programed to destroy the ground targets with precision by uploading the digital imagery of the target or it can be re-targeted using its active radar seeker. Originally developed as a air-to-surface missile (ASM) against fixed and slow moving target,[10] an anti-shipping missile (AShM) is also developed for Pakistan, which claims it as an aircraft carrier killer.[11] The two difference CM-400AKG models can be easily distinguished by the difference between the arrangement of forward control surfaces of the two model: the AShM version has four short and smaller forward control surfaces,[12][13] while the ASM version has four much larger forward control surfaces.[14][15][16] Pakistan is the first export customer of CM-400AKG, deloying it on CAC/PAC JF-17 Thunder
 
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Exocet - Medium-range anti-ship missile

The Exocet has been manufactured in a number of versions, including:

* MM38 (surface-launched)
* AM38 (helicopter-launched - tested only)[6]
* AM39 (air-launched)
* SM39 (submarine-launched)
* MM40 (surface-launched)

The chief competitors to the Exocet are the U.S.-made Harpoon, and the Chinese Yingji series.

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can Jft fire these Exocet,Harpoon too??
 
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C-802,C-803 and CM-400AKG are integrated in jft, giving an option of supersonic or subsonic speed

I think YJ-81 was a copy of the French Exocet
So technically it can fire exocet at least?
then how will it replace the navel mirages who fires these missile n then what will we do with them(missiles) specially harpoon?
 
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There are three significant recognition features that need to be highlighted. First, the C802 has a longer fuselage section aft of the wings, a necessary modification to accommodate the TRI 60 series turbojet. A second related identifier is the pronounced inlet scoop on the C802 for said turbojet. An inlet scoop is unnecessary on the shorter C801 as it is fitted with a solid rocket motor for propulsion. And finally, there are two external cable runs on the C802, located on both sides of the missile, while the C801 has a single cable run on the missile’s underside. Of note, some photos of the air-launched version of the YJ-83 lack cable runs. These photos are of dummy training missiles that do not require an electrical connection between the missile’s flight control computer and rudders
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YJ-8

The YJ-8 was a radical departure from the Soviet P-15 (SS-N-2) Styx-based missiles that were the mainstay of the PLAN’s arsenal throughout the mid-1990s. Considerably smaller and lighter than the Styx, the YJ-8 had essentially the same range and speed, but with a much smaller warhead. The key technological leap forward was the transition from a liquid-fueled rocket engine to a solid rocket motor.

The approval to begin developing a small rocket-powered ASCM was granted by the Central Military Commission in September 1976. The decision to use a solid rocket motor was based on encouraging results from laboratory tests since 1973 and the preliminary work done on the SY-2 (Upstream-2) ASCM. According to a 1991 Aerospace China article, the development of the actual YJ-8 propulsion system began in 1978, with flight-testing completed by 1985. The YJ-8 reached initial operational capability (IOC) with the PLAN in 1987. Although first announced in 1984, the export version of the YJ-8, the C801, wasn’t formally introduced to the international arms market until three years later. This initial version had fixed wings and was stored in small externally ribbed box launchers on surface ships, or in external tubes on a single modified Type 033G Romeo class submarine. Figure 2 shows a YJ-8 missile being loaded into one of the tubes on the modified Romeo

The origins of the YJ-8 are somewhat shrouded in mystery. Several defense analysts have suggested the YJ-8 is a reverse engineered copy of the French MM38 Exocet. The general appearance of the missile, and the externally ribbed launcher, was cited in support of this theory. Other analysts and commentators disagree and argue the Chinese missile was a logical result of the development of a weapon system with similar requirements. The analysts that hold this view point to the differences in the size of the two missiles, and the significant disparity in rocket motor designs. The MM38 uses a sustainer and booster that are housed within the missile’s body, while the YJ-8 uses an internal sustainer motor with a separate, jettisonable booster.

The independent development hypothesis is difficult to support today given our knowledge of the PRC’s weapon acquisition and development strategy. China has perfected the practice of acquiring weapon systems, openly or covertly, analyzing them, and then developing indigenous versions. This is a necessary evil when a country has to close a significant gap in military capabilities within a short amount of time, and with limited resources.

A better argument to support the theory that the YJ-8 design was at least heavily influenced by the MM38, if not a highly modified copy, is to look at the two missiles’ operational characteristics; the YJ-8’s are almost identical to the MM38. Range, speed, and warhead size for both missiles are virtually the same, but the most significant aspect is the flight profile. The French MM38 was the first sea-skimming ASCM, with a highly advanced (for the day) radar altimeter and flight computer. For China’s immature industrial base to successfully replicate the Exocet’s revolutionary flight profile in less than ten years (1976-1985) strongly implies they had access to proven technology

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An article in the Shipborne Weapons journal (Volume 5, 2008) suggests this was the case, as the author states that the Chinese were quite interested in purchasing Exocet missiles from France. Unfortunately, the price the French wanted was too high and the deal was shelved, at least temporarily. The author doesn’t explicitly say whether or not a Chinese purchase of the MM38 eventually occurred. He does say that the flight control system gave Chinese experts “great inspiration.” Therefore, it is probable that the Chinese had either somehow acquired an Exocet missile, obtained individual flight control components, or at least had access to highly detailed production schematics early in the YJ-8’s development.

Beginning in the early 1990s, numerous publications referred to the YJ-8 as the YJ-1, claiming that this was related to the C801 export designation. This is an incorrect assertion, as photographic evidence shows the YJ-1 is the PLAN designation for the unsuccessful C101 supersonic ASCM.
 
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YJ-8A

The YJ-8A appeared very quickly after the YJ-8 entered service, reaching IOC in 1992 or 1993. In fact, the YJ-8 was only deployed by the PLAN on the Jianghu III (Type 053HT) frigates Huangshi (Hull 535) and Wuhu (Hull 536), as well as the single Type 033G modified Romeo class submarine. The only known recipients of the export version of the fixed-wing C801, with the externally ribbed box launchers, were Thailand’s four Jianghu III frigates and Yemen’s three Hounan (Project 021) missile boats. The rationale for the limited fielding of this brand new weapon has not been made public, nor have there been any reports of technical problems or dissatisfaction with the YJ-8’s performance by the PLAN. Indeed, historical accounts of the YJ-8’s development published in the early to mid-1990s indicate the flight tests were quite successful.



The only physical difference that is readily visible is that the YJ-8A had wings and booster fins that folded (see Figure 3), permitting the missile to be stored in an even smaller, non-ribbed launch container. Of note, both the C802 and YJ-83 would also use the same container, as it was specifically designed to hold folding wing missiles. The change in launch canisters went largely unnoticed by Western defense publications, and subsequently so too did the deployment of the YJ-8A. Some ten years later, articles started popping up on an extended range version of the C801 using the designations YJ-12, YJ-81, and C801A to describe this missile. Both the extended range assessment and the majority of the designations are inaccurate.

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The YJ-12 designation basically means YJ-1 Mod 2 in Western nomenclature. As has already been discussed, the YJ-1 is a very different missile from the YJ-8 family, and the repeated references to the YJ-12 being supersonic harken back to its true origins. The YJ-81 designation, on the other hand, is a valid one. However, it is the designation for the rocket-propelled, air-launched member of the YJ-8 family, as we will see in the next section. The C801A designation has been used repeatedly to describe the export version of this new longer-range missile. This makes some degree of sense; if the YJ-8 is the C801, then the YJ-8A must be the C801A. The problem with this assumption is the C801A designation has never been seen at arms shows. CPMIEC mockup displays, placards, and brochures seen throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s (the C801 disappeared from the major shows after 2003) never used this designation. In every circumstance, the designation displayed was C801. Figure 4 shows a mockup of a C801 missile on display at the CPMIEC booth during an arms show in 1998, the C801 designation is clearly visible.

The argument that the YJ-8A has a longer range is also not supported by CPMIEC placard and brochure data. In all characteristics and performance aspects, including maximum range, both the fixed wing and folding wing versions of the C801 (aka YJ-8 and YJ-8A) are identical. In addition, if the YJ-8A truly had a greater range, one has to ask the question why wasn’t the extended range capability also integrated into the YJ-81 and YJ-82 missiles? An extra 28 to 48 km of range would be tactically significant, particularly for an aircraft attempting to penetrate the outer air defenses of a ship or formation. Furthermore, an aircraft with even a moderately capable surface search radar could actually employ the weapon out to near its maximum range. Up until about 2002 or so, the PLAN did not have an indigenous shipboard sensor system that could support over the horizon targeting. Such a targeting system would be necessary for the YJ-8A to be employed against targets at a range of 50 km or more. Still, the vast majority of the standard references, articles, and blog postings consistently hold the C801A as having a maximum range of 70 to 90 km.
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This claim appears to stem from an unspoken assumption in Western journals that since the C801 was considered a reverse engineered MM38 Exocet, then the C801A with folding wings was a copy of the MM40, which has a range of 70 km. The French, by the way, had to add 0.6 meters to the MM40’s length to accommodate the necessary additional fuel. Given the YJ-8 and YJ-8A have the exact same length, the proponents of this argument assert the Chinese came up with a new high-energy density solid rocket fuel. This assertion is weak from a both a technological and programmatic perspective.

The Chinese aerospace industrial base was still in its infancy in the late 1980s, and relied heavily on technological assistance from other nations. Propulsion systems in particular were a significant weakness, one that China has struggled with for decades. Research into solid rocket propellants had started in the mid-1960s, and by 1977 the Chinese had developed a fuel that worked reliably, but represented only the state-of-practice from a technology perspective. It would take another eight years to complete the design and testing of the original YJ-8 rocket motor. To suggest the Chinese had developed a new higher performance solid rocket fuel, tested and deployed it in a modified YJ-8 missile in less than seven years strains credibility to the breaking point. And while translated historical accounts of Chinese weapon systems developments are by no means complete, there is no mention of a new propellant for the YJ-8A in what is available.

Even if the technological leap wasn’t an issue, programmatically the Chinese had already decided on a non-rocket solution for extending their anti-ship cruise missile’s maximum range. By the time the YJ-8 had reached IOC in 1987, the Chinese were already committed toward developing an air-breathing engine for the follow-on missile design that would eventually become the C802 and YJ-83.

China’s Eagle Strike-Eight Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles: Designation Confusion and the Family Members from YJ-8 to YJ-8A | Defense Media Network

YJ-81

The PLAN’s keen desire for an air-launched version of the YJ-8 drove a near simultaneous development and test program alongside the ship-launched missile. The YJ-81 is very similar to the YJ-8, but without the booster (see Figure 5). The shorter section aft of the wings, lack of a scoop, and an underbelly cable run, identify this as a rocket-propelled missile. Like the YJ-8 it has fixed wings, but there is a faired boattail cap over the rocket exhaust to help reduce the missile’s drag when carried on an aircraft’s pylon. The small size and low weight of the YJ-81 provided smaller tactical aircraft in the PLAN inventory with a standoff anti-ship strike capability for the first time.

The YJ-81 is reported to have begun flight-testing in the mid-1980s, and reached IOC in 1989. The missile was marketed as the C801K. The “K” reportedly means “Kongjun” or air force, indicating an aircraft launched missile. Iran purchased the C801K and began receiving shipments in the mid-1990s. The YJ-8K designator that has often been used is incorrect, but it is an understandable mistake. A knowledgeable outside source, which knew the proper designator for the ship version, merely added the “K” to distinguish the missile as an aircraft weapon. And while this is consistent with current PLAN practice (see the YJ-83 discussion) it either wasn’t accepted practice early on, or the policy wasn’t followed for this particular missile as the pictures in Figure 5 clearly illustrate.



YJ-82

Since the late 1970s, the PLAN had eagerly sought to develop a submarine-launched ASCM. But it wasn’t until the YJ-8 program got started that they finally had a weapon they could work with. The Styx-based missiles were far too big, and there were significant safety concerns with putting volatile liquid-fueled missiles on submarines. The small, solid rocket-fueled YJ-8 was exactly what the PLAN was looking for. Their first effort, however, was somewhat half-hearted.

In the fall of 1983, the PLAN accepted delivery of a modified Type 033 Romeo class submarine with six external missile tubes for launching the YJ-8. The new Type 033G submarine began test-firing trials in 1985, and while the launch system appears to have functioned adequately, there was one fatal flaw that effectively ended further development – the submarine had to surface to fire. With a range of only 42 km (22.7 nm), the submarine would be highly susceptible to detection by radar and engaged before it could get all its missiles off. According to one Chinese article, the six missiles could be launched in six to seven minutes after the submarine had surfaced. That’s an uncomfortably long time for a submarine to be on the surface, exposed, that close to a hostile surface ship. A submerged launch option had to be developed to enable the submarine to remain stealthy until it was time to fire, as well as giving it a chance of escape after launching its attack.

For reasons that haven’t been revealed, the Chinese chose a torpedo tube launched approach rather than the external tubes popular with Soviet submarines. This certainly alleviated many complicated submarine design issues, but this choice had problems of its own. In the late 1980s, there were only two ASCMs capable of being launched from a submarine torpedo tube, the French SM39 Exocet and the U.S. UGM-84 Harpoon. Both missiles were encapsulated in a sealed canister to protect the missile from the seawater, but they had very different ways of getting the missile out of the water and into the air.

The French SM39 capsule had a small rocket motor that propelled it out of the water, and once airborne, launched the missile. The U.S. Harpoon employed an unpowered buoyant capsule that used stabilizing fins to guide the capsule upward after being ejected from the tube. As soon as the missile broached the surface, a pressure sensor in the capsule’s nose would detect atmospheric pressure and initiated a small charge that would blow the nose cap off. A split-second later, the booster was ignited and the missile would rise skyward.

Obtaining either missile would have been difficult. France and the U.S. had been slowly warming to China, but it was problematic whether either country would be willing to sell the PRC advanced anti-ship missiles – at least at a price the Chinese were willing to pay. And after the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989, it became even harder as an arms embargo was soon put in place. But China did have a growing relationship with a country that had access to the U.S. missile.


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Pakistan is the most likely source of submarine-launched Harpoon technology that was transferred to China. The two nations were drawing closer to each other diplomatically and militarily due to their mutual concern over India, and the Pakistani Navy’s Agosta and Daphne class submarines had been modified to launch Sub-Harpoon missiles between 1984 and 1986. An additional motivating factor was China’s considerable technical assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. A quid pro quo arrangement for Chinese engineers to exam and/or dissect a Sub-Harpoon missile would not have been an outrageous request.

Western reporting put the first test firing of a YJ-82 in 1997 from the lead Song (Type 039) class submarine. Limited information suggests the initial flight tests didn’t go well. It wasn’t until 2004, at the Zhuhai Airshow China exposition, that the first photo of a model YJ-82 was seen in a CPMIEC brochure. The photo showed a YJ-8 type missile, without a booster, in an unpowered capsule that is an almost exact duplicate of the U.S. Sub-Harpoon system (see Figure 6). Subsequent Internet photos of encapsulated YJ-82 missiles are consistent with the brochure model, and the length of these capsules is virtually the same as the 6.1-meter submarine-launched encapsulated Harpoon missile. Photos of actual launches show a YJ-8 type missile, sans booster, rising from the ocean surface, very similar to submarine-launched Harpoon firings.

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Figure 7 is a photo of an actual YJ-82 missile, and it has all the features of a rocket-propelled missile. The section aft of the wings is short, there isn’t a turbojet scoop, and while the underbelly cable run can’t be seen from this angle, the missile model in Figure 6 does show it. This finding conclusively counters one of the most popular myths propagated in the Western press and on many Internet sites; the YJ-82 cannot be the indigenous version of the export C802 – the two missiles are launched from very different platforms and have radically different propulsion plants. Furthermore, the designation C801Q starting showing up in Western articles and Internet blog sites around the same time and was described as a submarine-launched missile. Reportedly the “Q” means Qian, or submarine. The YJ-82 is most definitely a C801 type missile that is submarine launched, hence the C801Q designation undoubtedly represents the export version.

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Figure 7: The YJ-82 is a rocket-propelled missile, and therefore, cannot be the indigenous version of the turbojet-propelled C802. Chinese internet courtesy of Christopher P. Carlson


As for the other related designator, YJ-8Q, this falls into the same category as the YJ-8K. A knowledgeable outside source added the “Q” behind the YJ-8 designation to distinguish it as a submarine-launched weapon. This was probably a well-intentioned attempt to help reduce the confusion, but nonetheless, it is still inaccurate.

C802

Even as the YJ-8 was undergoing flight tests, the Chinese knew they had to find a way to extend the missile’s range. While it is unknown as to when their deliberations actually began, the Chinese eventually decided on an air breathing solution and reached out to Microturbo SA in France sometime during the mid-1980s. Microturbo SA’s TRI 60 series small turbojets had been widely used in drones and missiles, to include the British Sea Eagle and the Swedish RBS-15 ASCMs. With a diameter of 0.33 meters, the small turbojet was just the right size for a YJ-8 type missile. By 1987, the year the YJ-8 reached IOC, Microturbo SA had delivered the first shipment of TRI 60-2 turbojets. According to a U.S. Congressional Research Service report, up to 150 TRI 60-2 turbojet engines would eventually be purchased through the mid-1990s. Shortly after this first shipment was received, the Chinese began a crash program to reverse engineer the turbojet engine and produce it themselves. But in the meantime, they could still offer an extended range missile on the arms market using the French supplied turbojets.

Like the C801, the C802 was advertised years before it was ready. It was first presented at ASIANDEX 1988, with a follow-on showing at the Paris Air Show in 1989. The C802 missile was 0.58 meters longer than the C801. The extra length was added aft of the wings, to accommodate the turbojet and it’s inlet duct, along with a short, flat-faced inlet scoop nestled between the lower wings. Figure 8 shows a mockup of a C802 missile with the longer aft section, scoop inlet, and flank-mounted cable runs.

The C802’s speed remained in the high-subsonic range, as the TRI 60-2 turbojet has a maximum rated speed between Mach 0.7 and 0.9. The warhead, navigation, and radar homing seeker subsystems remained essentially unchanged from the C801. CPMIEC brochure data, however, suggests that additional electronic counter-countermeasure features were added to the C802 seeker, but this would have had limited impact on the missile’s design. But by far and away the biggest selling point of the new C802 was the 120 km range – nearly three times that of the C801 – a characteristic that caught Iran’s attention. By 1990, Iran was in serious negotiations with China to purchase approximately 200 missiles, 100 or so each of the C801 and C802. These negotiations appear to have been successfully concluded in 1992, however, there would be additional discussions to hammer out disagreements up through the fall of 1994.

There are no known reports in the open press as to when the C802 began flight-testing. A review of news articles indicates the Iranians began receiving C801 missiles in 1993, and C802 missiles in late 1994 or early 1995, suggesting flight tests had to have been completed by 1993 or 1994. The first solid piece of evidence indicating the C802 had reached IOC was in late November 1995, when a C802 missile was launched during the Iranian Saeqa-4 (Thunderbolt-4) exercise.

In examining the designators for the C802, there is a unique aspect to this missile; it can’t be directly linked back to one used by the PLAN. The YJ-82 designator was discussed in the previous section, but the YJ-82K designator, signifying the air-launched variant, has also been used to refer to the export C802K. This designator is incorrect as well, as it presumes the YJ-82 and C802 are directly related, which they are not.

Many Western sources have also used the YJ-2 designation for the domestic version of this missile. Like the YJ-1 designation, this is an early-1990s creation that has its basis in speculation. However, unlike the YJ-1, there isn’t a missile in the PLAN inventory with the YJ-2 designator stenciled on its side to concretely disprove the claim. On the flip side, the lack of any evidence of a missile with the YJ-2 designator doesn’t bolster the other argument either. According to recent technical journal articles, the YJ-8A was the primary PLAN ASCM during most of the 1990s and into the early 2000s. Indeed, there are numerous Internet photos of PLAN ships with double, triple, and even quadruple launchers, which first appeared in 1997-98 on the Luhai (Type 051B) class destroyer, launching YJ-8A rocket-propelled missiles. Just as compelling is the complete lack of photos of a C802 being handled by PLAN sailors or launched from PLAN surface combatants during the 1990s. The lack of any kind of evidence whatsoever makes it very difficult to conclude the C802 was ever adopted by the PLAN.

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Furthermore, all the C802 missiles that were delivered in the mid-1990s were manufactured with Microturbo SA supplied turbojets. The Chinese military rarely accepts a weapon into wide scale use unless its industrial base can produce it. The arms embargo after the Tiananmen Square incident drove that lesson home. And it wasn’t until late 1995, or early 1996, that Chinese engineers mastered the production of an indigenous version of the TRI 60-2 engine. Western news articles only started reporting on China’s negotiations with the Iranians to produce the turbojet in Iran during the 1996-97 timeframe. All this supports the conclusion the C802 missile was an export weapon only, a means to provide funds to pay for the development of the ASCM the PLAN really wanted, the YJ-83.
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/...ti-ship-cruise-missiles-yj-81-yj-82-and-c802/
 
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YJ8
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YJ-83

The YJ-83 showed up on the scene without any advance warning, but even during its so-called début at the National Day Military Parade in Beijing in October 1999, no actual missiles were shown. The trucks that rolled by only sported two of the launch containers on their flatbeds – containers that were also used by YJ-8A missiles. Almost immediately, wild claims as to the YJ-83’s performance began showing up on Internet blog sites. Published largely by enthusiastic Chinese nationals, the claims of supersonic speeds, GPS guidance, and a ship-to-missile data link were made repeatedly.

As photos of missiles with the YJ-83 designation stenciled on them started showing up on Internet sites, questions were raised about the performance claims. The visible configuration of the missile just didn’t support what was being said online. And yet, despite the lack of any solid evidence to support the speculative claims, many Western defense journalists accepted them as gospel, and articles proclaiming China’s unexpected rapid advancement became the norm. Even after some Chinese blog site moderators began raising flags that much of the hype concerning the YJ-83 was unfounded, the content of Western books and articles remained largely unchanged.


The development of the YJ-83 is somewhat blurred as it is closely linked with the C802. A rough estimate is that the technical design was probably locked down as soon as the Chinese were confident the C802 would fly. This lone criterion suggests the design for the YJ-83 was frozen sometime between 1993 and 1994. Several Western sources reported that the new missile entered service in 1994, but hindsight now indicates that this was when the final design was likely approved.

The choice of the TRI 60-2 turbojet essentially defined the YJ-83’s size and aerodynamic form. Measurements of broad aspect photos of missiles with the YJ-83, C802A, and C802 designations all show them to be essentially the same. According to CPMIEC brochure data, the C802A is actually nine millimeters shorter than the original C802, a trivial difference. All other dimensions are the same. With the propulsion plant fixed, and the warhead design largely the same, only about 25% of the YJ-83 missile’s subcomponents were open for significant improvement. Fortunately, those subcomponents were predominantly electronic in nature.

The early YJ-8/8A missiles used hybrid computers for the navigation, autopilot, and radar seeker. A hybrid computer uses a mixture of digital and analog components – that is solid-state elements along with servos, relays, and vacuum tubes. It is interesting to note that only the radio altimeter was fully digital, comprised of solid-state components only, which reflects the likely direct influence from the revolutionary French MM38 Exocet missile.

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The inertial reference unit used small mechanical gyros and accelerometers that feed their input to the autopilot computer. Servomechanisms transmitted the steering commands to the four independent rudders. While the Chinese were satisfied with the YJ-8/8A’s overall performance, the electronic and navigation components were very bulky and took up a considerable amount of space inside the missile’s fuselage. By transitioning to all digital, microprocessor based computers, and a more compact strap-down mechanical inertial reference unit; the YJ-83 had more internal volume available for fuel and a slightly larger semi-armor piercing warhead (190 kg vice 165 kg). These changes increased the maximum range of the YJ-83 and its export variant, the C802A, from 120 km to 180 km.

With a well-established airframe and mature propulsion plant already in place, the YJ-83 benefitted from an exceptionally short development timeline and began flight-testing in 1997. Apparently the missile passed through its trials quickly, as it was reported to have reached IOC in 1998. It was formally announced in October 1999 at the National Day Military Parade, and it has slowly worked up to become the dominant ASCM in the PLAN inventory (see Figure 9). The C802A export variant, shown in Figure 10, wasn’t displayed until the DSEi 2005 arms show in London, England. The seven-year delay was likely due to production limitations, and the more urgent need to replace YJ-8A missiles on the PLAN’s warships. The information presented by CPMIEC C802A brochures since 2005 go a long way toward defining the capabilities of the YJ-83 more accurately.

In regard to maximum speed, the YJ-83 is most definitely a subsonic missile. The TRI 60-2 turbojet is unaugmented, i.e. no afterburner, and is only capable of speeds up to Mach 0.9. In fact, in the 1990s there weren’t any small turbojets with the ability to support supersonic speeds. The first time an engine with this capability is mentioned is in a 2008 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics conference paper, a historical overview of Mircoturbo SA’s engines, which stated the TRI 60-5+ turbojet first demonstrated supersonic flight capability in 2007.

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From a drag perspective, the rounded blunt nose of the YJ-83 is highly inefficient for supersonic flight. Since the effects of the shock wave on the nose dominate supersonic drag, the missile’s overall drag coefficient is heavily influenced by the nose cap’s fineness ratio (length of the nose cap divided by its diameter). The YJ-83 nose has a rather low fineness ratio, thus its drag coefficient would be approximately twice that of a missile with a sharper, more pointed nose such as the one on the 3M-80 Moskit (SS-N-22) family at speeds between Mach 1.5 and 2.0. Higher drag requires more thrust to maintain speed and would dramatically increase fuel consumption, thereby greatly reducing the missile’s range.

Another related problem is the turbojet’s scoop inlet. It is a fixed geometry inlet that is by design optimized for a very narrow speed range. Operating away from that design point incurs a non-trivial loss in engine performance. Furthermore, the inlet face is completely flat, which would make it even less efficient at supersonic speeds as it lacks an upper diverter to isolate the inlet from shockwave interactions with the boundary layer near the missile’s body. Finally, the scoop inlet of the YJ-83/C802A is identical to that on the C802, and similar in design to the scoop inlet on the C602 and C705, all known to be subsonic missiles. All of these observable features strongly point to the inlet design being optimized for subsonic airflow.

Combining the technical limitations of the turbojet, nose cap, and scoop inlet makes it all but impossible for the YJ-83/C802A to be supersonic. And it should be no surprise at all that the CPMIEC brochure lists the C802A’s maximum speed as Mach 0.8 to 0.9 – identical to the earlier C802.

The YJ-83 has often been described as having the ability to use the Global Positioning System (GPS) with its inertial navigation system to improve its accuracy. This claim is also unsupportable.

The first GPS-directed ordnance was the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munition, or JDAM, a free falling bomb with an integrated inertial navigation system (INS) and GPS receiver. JDAM began flight-testing in 1996 and reached IOC in 1998. A B-2A stealth bomber first used the JDAM operationally during Operation ALLIED FORCE in the spring of 1999. An in depth Chinese technical paper, published in 1995, stated that Chinese scientists and engineers were well aware of the benefits that GPS could provide to both manned aircraft, as well as weaponry. But there were technical limitations that had to be overcome before they could be implemented in Chinese systems.

By the time the JDAM reached IOC, the YJ-83 was at the end of its flight-testing phase and was about to enter IOC itself. To even consider replacing the mechanical strap-down INS with one using ring laser gyroscopes, an integrated GPS receiver, and a dedicated computer would have delayed the introduction of this missile for at least five years, as China was still in the research and development stage of an indigenous ring laser gyro and GPS receivers had to be obtained from outside the country. And of course, since the GPS was an American system, there would always be concerns about the accuracy of the satellites’ signals. Programmatically, a decision during the 1994 – 97 timeframe to include a GPS feature in the YJ-83 would make little sense.

Indeed, senior Chinese military leaders seem to show more discipline then their Western counterparts in regard to requirements creep with defense acquisition programs, and in this case they would move any satellite navigation requirement on to the next missile in an earlier stage of development. This requirement would also be tied to the development of the indigenous Beidou system that first went operational, with a limited regional capability, in 2000. In looking at the CPMIEC brochures for the C802A, there is no reference to GPS as part of the navigation system. It is, however, explicitly stated as a feature in the C602 brochures (the PLAN version is the YJ-62) that reached IOC in 2005.

A similar argument can also be made against the data link claim. Prior to the late 1990s, only the very large Soviet ASCMs of the SS-N-3 and SS-N-12 families, and the Franco-Italian Otomat had a limited ship-to-missile data link capability. In 1997, both Israel and the U.S. were well along with their respective Harpoon improvement programs. The U.S. Harpoon II under went its first test flight in 2001, while the Israeli Harpoon Extended Performance (HAP) program was completed around the same time. Both missiles included a full two-way data link and an integrated INS/GPS to improve targeting in littoral environments cluttered with civilian shipping. Again, incorporating a command data link this late in the YJ-83’s development would have incurred significant delays. In addition, articles discussing such an advanced data link assume highly accurate navigation information; implicitly suggesting an integrated INS/GPS navigation capability is required.

The CPMIEC brochure on the C802A doesn’t mention a data link as one of the missile’s features. In fact, it is quite the opposite as the brochure explicitly states the C802A is a “fire and forget” weapon. There are three YJ-83K-based land attack missiles with a command data link, two versions of the KD-88 (one electro optic and the other probably IR-guided) and the electro optical homing CM802AKG. These missiles all showed up much later than the YJ-83. The first Internet photos of the electro optical version of the KD-88 were posted in 2006, while the CM802AKG made its initial appearance at the Zhuhai Airshow China 2010 exposition. For the earlier KD-88 missiles, the data link antennas are clearly visible on the missile’s wings. In the case of the CM802AKG, the display mock-up lacked the wing-mounted data link antennas, however, a Chinese news article covering the 2010 Zhuhai show contained a summarized interview with an unidentified CM802AKG designer who explicitly stated that a data link had to be added to the missile. When combined, all these points rule out the possibility of a data link in the YJ-83. But if this is true, how does one explain the reported attributes of adaptive mission planning and post-launch maneuvers? Again brochure data helps close this loop.

In the CPMIEC 2010 C802A brochure, route planning using waypoints is described for the first time. The missile system is capable of storing four different attacking paths with a maximum of three waypoints each. This enables a single ship to launch a multi-axis attack, a significant improvement over the limited range of launch bearings of the earlier YJ-8 and C802 missiles.

For years, the YJ-83 has been tied to the C803 designation. This linkage is based on a flawed assumption that the YJ-81 is the C801, the YJ-82 is the C802, and therefore, the YJ-83 must be the C803. As has been shown throughout this article, this naming convention is incorrect. The export version of the YJ-83 is the C802A, but there is so much reporting on the C803 that it must be dealt with separately. The air-launched version is the YJ-83K and, as one would expect, the export variant is the C802AK (see Figure 11). As for the submarine-launched version, a missile with the YJ-83Q designation hasn’t been seen; nor is it likely it ever will be.

Indigenously designed and built Chinese submarines have torpedo tubes that are about the same length as Western submarines. A review of Chinese torpedoes shows that they are less than seven meters in length, over a meter shorter than Russian weapons. This puts the torpedo tubes on the Song (Type 039), Yuan (Type 041), Shang (Type 093) and others at about 7.1 meters in length. This assumes an additional 0.25 meters clearance on top of the 6.8 meters of the Yu-4 torpedo with a wire dispenser. The Yu-6 looks to be a little shorter, about 6.5 meters long with the torpedo mount dispenser for the wire.

Going back to the earlier discussion, recall that the YJ-82 capsule is about 6.1 meters long, and this is for a YJ-8-size missile without the booster. If the booster were added, the capsule would be at a minimum 7.3 meters long, probably closer to 7.5 meters as the heavier missile would likely require some additional buoyancy to ensure it reached the surface. Both the C802 and YJ-83 start out at almost 6.4 meters in length, and both missiles must have the booster to operate properly – there is no option with this, as the turbojet can only start when the missile is under powered flight. Using simple ratios, this makes the capsule length of a C802 or YJ-83 missile on the order of eight meters, far too large for the probable torpedo tube length of approximately 7.1 meters. Rumors of a YJ-83 submarine-launched variant being developed are based on speculation that doesn’t take into account the limitations of the potential launching platforms.

YJ83K.jpg

Figure 11: The YJ-83K is the air launched version of the YJ-83, as denoted by the “K” at the end of the designator. The missile in the photo is a training version without the side cable runs. The export variant is the C802AK as shown next to a Pakistani JF-17 fighter-bomber at the Dubai Air Show in 2011.
Chinese internet photos courtesy of Christopher P. Carlson



In addition, the 2011 U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress on China’s military developments stated that a new long-range submarine-launched ASCM, with the NATO designation CH-SS-NX-13, was under development for the Song (Type 039), Yuan (Type 041), Shang (Type 093), and the future Type 095 SSN. If this ASCM were a variant of the YJ-83, it would not have an entirely new NATO designation. The YJ-83, being a variant of the C802, would share a similar NATO designation and nickname. Since the C802 is the CSS-N-8 Saccade, the CH-SS-NX-13 designation (note the change in designator format) explicitly shows the U.S. government believes it is a new weapon.

C803

Since about 2002, the “C803” designation has worked its way into just about every Western naval systems book and article. And yet, in over ten years of reporting there has been no formal evidence to support its existence. If one examines the brochures, placards, and mockup displays that CPMIEC has put up at the various arm shows throughout the years, nowhere will the designation “C803” be found. Never. For example, Figure 12 shows a flat screen display at the CPMIEC booth at the Airshow China 2010 expo. The display lists, by range, all the ASCMs that China had on the market – the C701, C704, C802, C705, C802A, and the C602. Furthermore, there was a full mockup display of each of the above missiles on the exhibition hall floor, as well as a smaller scale model. A missile with the “C803” designation was conspicuous by its absence. The recent Zhuhai Airshow China 2012 also lacked any mention of the C803, even though numerous new missile variants were presented to the public for the first time. That is because the “C803,” if it exists at all, is likely still in the developmental stage, probably in early flight testing, and isn’t ready to be marketed.

If the high performance attributes that have long been ascribed to the YJ-83 are actually for an entirely new advanced missile, a program start date can be roughly estimated by looking at when Western and Chinese-based media sources first started reporting on these capabilities. A quick review of the primary Western references indicates these attributes were first described around 2001-2002. Chinese blog sites, as well as the Kanwa Defense Review, started to mention these capabilities in late 1999. If this new missile began development between 1999 and 2002, then the integrated INS and satellite navigation system (GPS and Beidou) and the command data link would now be within China’s technical capabilities. However, a small supersonic capable propulsion system would undoubtedly still be the most challenging aspect.

Early on, the “C803” was initially described as a supersonic missile throughout its entire flight. The problem with this is that the new missile couldn’t possibly go 200+ km at supersonic speeds and still fit in a torpedo tube; all existing missiles with these speed and range characteristics are much larger than any torpedo tube ever built. The “smallest” missile is the Russian 3M-55 (SS-N-26) Onyx/Yakhont at 0.67 meters in diameter and 8.9 meters long, not including the launch canister. Given that the U.S. Department of Defense’s report explicitly stated the CH-SS-NX-13 is to go on all classes of modern Chinese attack submarines, it is either a torpedo tube-launched weapon, or every PLAN submarine in the Song, Yuan, Shang, and Type 095 classes would have to be fitted with external launch tubes – a significant modification for the vast majority of these submarines.

This would be tremendously expensive, not to mention occupying most of the available submarine construction way space for years. In short, fitting existing submarines with external tubes for a large supersonic missile seems totally unreasonable from a programmatic perspective. It also completely skips the PLAN’s proven acquisition concept of buy some, study thoroughly, then build our own, and is fraught with technological risk. With the recent memory of the unsuccessful YJ-1/C101 and HY-3/C301 large supersonic ASCM programs still fresh in the PLAN leaderships minds’, neither missile was formally accepted into service, it is highly unlikely they would try to go down this path again.

By the mid-2000s, there was a noticeable change in regard to the “C803’s” speed. Chinese blog sites, and some Western sources started questioning the all-supersonic flight profile, and shifted to a subsonic cruise mode followed by a supersonic terminal attack. This change eliminates the problem of requiring a large missile to meet the 250 km range figure that most of the blog sites coalesced about. If one accepts the premise that the missile had a subsonic cruise mode, with a supersonic terminal attack, then this narrows down the possible propulsion system options considerably, as there is only one ASCM in the world that can do this – Russia’s 3M54 Novator Alpha (SS-N-27).

Recall that Mircoturbo only demonstrated a supersonic flight capable small-scale turbojet in 2007; this would be rather late in the design stage for this missile and there is no reason to believe China could count on such a development six or so years earlier. However, China had signed a contract with Russia for eight Project 636M Kilo class submarines with the ability to fire the export Novator Alpha (3M54E/SS-N-27B) in May 2002, with the first submarines and SS-N-27B missiles being delivered in 2005.

C803-Missile.jpg


It is likely Chinese engineer’s had access to detailed design documentation for both the submarine and the missile after signing the contract, and this timing corresponds roughly with the first rumors of China developing a new advanced ASCM – one that the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2010 and 2011 annual reports stated was in “development and testing.” While admittedly speculative, and based largely on coincidental inference, there is at least some basis to suggest that the new CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM may be a modified Chinese copy of the Russian Novator Alpha, a very different missile from the YJ-83.

Z8NAV24.png

http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/...-missiles-the-yj-83-c803-and-the-family-tree/
 
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So technically it can fire exocet at least?
then how will it replace the navel mirages who fires these missile n then what will we do with them(missiles) specially harpoon?

Harpoon solution =P3-C and F-16 and not JFT....
exocet will be integrated maybe if needed....
 
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Exocet MM40 Successfully Test-Fired With Its New Brazilian Motor




The Brazilian Navy has successfully carried out a firing trial of an Exocet MM40 missile, equipped with a motor developed, produced and certified by Avibras in partnership with MBDA. This is the first time that the Brazilian Navy has carried out such a test which represents the country’s autonomy in obtaining anti-ship missile motors which, in the future, could also be used on other kinds of missile, both national and foreign. The test was carried out in the open ocean from the Brazilian Navy corvette Barroso.
According to Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto, Commander of the Brazilian Navy, the firing was an example of a successful programme of technology cooperation, saying: “this test marks one of the great successes of recent times for the Brazilian Navy”. The programme, launched in 2008, benefited from a total investment of around 75 million Reals (€ 30 million).
This firing and the cooperative development carried out between the two companies is part of the Exocet MM40 missile renovation and operational maintenance programme and for MBDA, an element of its strategy aimed at creating long-term partnerships with Brazilian industry.
The objective of this trial was to verify and validate the maximum performance of the missile’s new flight propellant over its maximum range which was achieved without any difficulty.
Another aspect of the trial was the replacement of the Exocet warhead by a telemetry unit supplied by the Brazilian company Mectron which was equally involved in the development. This equipment permitted the real-time measurement of all the relevant parameters of the fired missile (velocity, pressure, cruise trajectory etc.). Two frigates and three helicopters of the Brazilian Navy, equipped with interconnected monitoring devices covering the deployment area, also participated in the exercise.
The success of this test demonstrates the ability of Avibras concerning the development, production and certification of this type of Exocet MM40 missile propulsion technology as well as the possibility of carrying out series production. It also demonstrated the successful technical and personnel cooperation of the different companies involved.

“I welcome the success of this firing exercise which reinforces the cooperation between our government and both national and international companies as well as the way it opens up new markets to the companies involved in the programme”, stated Sami Youssef Hassuani, CEO of Avibras.


“This test reinforces our strategic partnership with Brazil, a prominent power in the global geopolitical arena”, stressed Patrick de La Revelière, Vice President of Export Sales MBDA.
Founded in 1961, Avibras is a 100% privately owned national aerospace company. Its principal capabilities lie in integration of systems, missiles, rockets, armoured vehicles and C2. Its industrial facilities are situated in Vale do Paraiba and in the cities of Sao Jose dos Campos, Jacarei and Lorena located in the state of Sao Paolo.

Among other projects, Avibras is currently supplying the Brazilian Armed Forces with the artillery system ASTROS 2020, comprising armoured vehicles, rockets, missiles and C4 command and control systems. In addition, it is supplying missiles to the Brazilian Air Force and Navy. Avibras is also responsible for the development of the Aeronave Remotamente Pilotada Falcao project (also known as VANT) which aims at giving Brazil total control of all the technology involved in the programme.
Founded through an association of engineers from technology companies and institutions in Sao José dos Campos, Mectron has been active for 21 years in the defence and aerospace markets, developing and manufacturing smart weapons, avionics systems, radars and satellite equipment. In 2011, Mectron integrated the Odebrecht Organisation by means of Odebrecht Defesa e Technologia, active in the management, development and installation of integrated projects in the area of defence, public and national security.



With regards to the defence market, and having as its principal customer the Brazilian Armed Forces, Mectron develops and manufactures the air-to-air missiles MAA-1, MAA-1B et A-Darter (the latter in partnership with south Africa and other Brazilian companies), MSS1.2 the surface-to-surface anti-tank missile, the air-to-surface MAR-1 anti-radar missile and the Acauan GPS and inertial guidance kit for conventional bombs. In the area of avionics, Mectron develops and manufactures the SCP-01 radar on board the AMX aircraft in partnership with the Italian company Selex Galileo, as well as various other installed avionics systems allowing the integration of its other products on different types of aircraft such as the F-5M, AMX and the Super Tucano ALX.
In addition to its participation in the Exocet MM40 maintenance and renovation programme, Mectron has also provided other services to the Brazilian Navy, namely refitting, telemetry and technical support permitting the launch of AIM-9H air-to-air missiles from the A-4 aircraft as well as the Aspide air defence missiles from Brazilian frigates

Exocet is a complete family of all-weather heavy anti-ship missiles suitable for all types of carriers. It is available in several versions:
surface to surface (MM40) for ships
air-to-sea (AM39) for aircraft and helicopters
submarine-surface (SM39) for submerged submarines
land-sea (BC) for coastal batteries.

Exocet has an OTH (Over The Horizon) firing capacity and a range of other operational benefits including: low signature, late seeker activation, sea-skimming at very low altitude, enhanced target discrimination and ECCM, and high penetrative power against modern naval air defences.
With industrial facilities in four European countries and within the USA, in 2011 MBDA achieved a turnover of € 3 billion with an order book of € 10.5 billion. With more than 90 armed forces customers in the world, MBDA is a world leader in missiles and missile systems. MBDA is jointly held by BAE Systems (37.5%), EADS (37.5%) and Finmeccanica (25%).

http://www.****************/exocet-mm40-successfully-test-fired-with-its-new-brazilian-motor-42480/
 
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