Gessler
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Israelis have the luxury of taking the time of their life for deciding to intercept the missile or not , whether it is going to fall in the cities or towns because Hamas fires a bunch of rockets by a delay of days , even then the successful intercept rate is close to 70% assuming that the Israelis aren't exaggerating , something which wont happen in a theater level warfare when both sides are heavily armed with sophisticated weaponry . There is no parallel , none at all . Tel Aviv faces different threats of different severity than you do . How much time do you have in such case ?
What if the artillery shells headed for the protected zones ( assuming your 100x50 meters area ) are simply in high number ? Think , just too many credible threats for the system to be feasible . After all , you cant field X systems of Iron Dome for X number of MBRLs/Artillery , right ? .
It is not just Israelis,,, but there are also many top-ranking US Defence experts who are
confirming ID's intercepting probability as truth in the articles they write.
Here's one by James Dunnigan, heard of him, didn't you?
Iron Dome faces bad numbers | Strategy Page
Although the new Israeli Iron Dome system succeeded in shooting down about 85 percent of the 500 hundred rockets (of 1,500 launched) headed for Israeli populated areas, this was something of a shock. This was the original situation the system was designed for. It was originally believed that only ten percent of less accurate rockets would need to be intercepted by Iron Dome missiles. The rest would fall into un-populated areas that are common near the northern and southern borders. But the eight day bombardment by Hamas rockets last November saw 1,500 larger or longer ranged rockets fired at larger targets (cities). This meant a third of the rockets headed for populated areas and thus needing an Iron Dome interceptor missile. Even though Israel has ordered more Iron Dome missiles, too many rockets headed for populated areas in a short time means some incoming rockets that should get an interceptor missile won’t.
Meanwhile, the key to Iron Dome’s success continues to be its software. Iron Dome uses two radars to quickly calculate the trajectory of the incoming rocket and does nothing if the rocket trajectory indicates it is going to land in an uninhabited area. But if the computers predict a rocket coming down in an inhabited area, a Tamir guided missile is fired to intercept the rocket. This makes the system cost-effective. That's mainly because most of these unguided rockets land in uninhabited areas but the few of those that do land in populated areas inflict casualties. The system was so successful and reliable that it was found safe to fire one missile, instead of two, at each rocket. In addition, during the eight day campaign last November, the Iron Dome software was updated almost daily as users reported any problems which were collected and fixed quickly and a new version of the software created, tested, and issued.
There’s nothing special about the rest of the Iron Dome system. The Tamir missiles each weigh 90 kg (200 pounds), are three meters (9.8 feet) long, and 160mm in diameter. They have the usual components of a guided missile (rocket motor, electronics, and mechanical devices to actuate the fins and batteries). Without the predictive software Iron Dome would quickly run out of missiles and be much more expensive to operate as well.
The most recent Israeli rocket threat was from a terrorist organization (Hamas) operating out of an area (Gaza) that is basically home for Palestinian refugees who have been there for over 60 years and want nothing less than the destruction of Israel. A similar organization (Hezbollah) controls southern Lebanon and is also dedicated to the destruction of Israel, using 40,000 unguided rockets they received from Iran. Hezbollah last attacked with rockets in 2006.
Israel is organizing a force of 13 Iron Dome batteries to defeat Hezbollah and Hamas rocket attacks. Each of the five existing Iron Dome batteries has radar and control equipment and three or four missile launchers (each containing twenty missiles). Two more batteries are on order. Each battery costs about $40 million, which includes up to a hundred Tamir missiles (costing $90,000 each). The U.S. contributed nearly $300 million for development of Iron Dome.
It is true numbers can overwhelm any system, but numbers don't grow on trees.
For example, if IA acquires some 2-3 batteries of ID, it will take 100 x MBRL rockets to do a job which
would otherwise be done by just 20-30 rocket arty. That's the key to it's game.
Same will apply to Nasr provided ID undergoes the software changes needed to take care of
IA's threats. It can distinguish between what projectile is going to hit you, and what is going to fall
away from you (including possibly a safe-distance line, but that depends...).
To overwhelm the system, you need to go into an overdrive to procure massive numbers of
projectiles, for whatever purpose, to serve as weapons of attack, or just decoys. And that will end
up costing just as much money as a few batteries of ID.
Anyway, saturating a column/base of IA forces defended by ID will take a much larger number of offensive weapons than previously needed, and these PA offensive formations will also be under attack by their counterparts in IA (i.e. Pinaka/Smerch/Prahaar/BrahMos/Shaurya-type missiles/rockets), as well as air strikes (Israelis could not effectively take out the rocket launching sites used by Hama/Hezbollahs because these sites are often situated deep inside civilian population areas, whom Israel has an obligation not to hurt. But this won't be the case in an all-out war where Pak is expected to use something like Nasr.)
So it won't be that easy to overwhelm the ID either.