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Afghanistan Developments Will Have "Very Significant Consequences": India

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US-Taliban Deal: Foreign Minister S Jaishankar said the latest developments in the Afghanistan crisis are going to "have very, very significant consequences for all of us, and we are so close to the region."
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India was not taken into confidence on various aspects of the Doha deal inked between the US and the Taliban last year and the latest developments in Afghanistan will have "very, very significant consequences" for the region and beyond, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has said.

He also said that the key concerns for India at this juncture included whether Afghanistan will have an inclusive government and that Afghan soil is not used for terrorism against other states and the rest of the world.

Speaking virtually at the annual leadership summit of the US-India Strategic Partnership Forum (USISPF) on Thursday, Mr Jaishankar also suggested that India was in no hurry to deliberate on giving any recognition to the new dispensation in Kabul.

In an interactive session with former American ambassador Frank Wisner, the External Affairs Minister also said that the Quad or Quadrilateral coalition comprising India, the US, Australia and Japan is not against any country and it should not be seen as some kind of "ganging up" and a negatively driven initiative.

India and the US are on the same page on many issues relating to the recent developments in Afghanistan including apprehensions about the possible use of Afghan soil for terrorism.

"I think, to some degree, we would all be justified in having levels of concern and to some degree, I think the jury's still out. When I say levels of concern, you know, there were commitments which were made by the Taliban, at Doha, I mean, the US knows that best I mean, we were not taken into confidence on various aspects of that," he said.

"So whatever, whether deal which was struck in Doha, I mean, one has a broad sense. But beyond that, you know, are we going to see an inclusive government? Are we going to see respect for the rights of women, children, minorities?" he asked.

"Most important are we going to see an Afghanistan whose soil is not used for terrorism against other states and the rest of the world, I think, these are our concerns," Mr Jaishankar added.

He said what had happened in Afghanistan, is going to "have very, very significant consequences for all of us, and we are so close to the region."

The minister said that the key concerns were captured by a UN Security Council resolution in August and that how those questions are addressed today is still an open question, which is why "I said the jury is still out".

"If you ask me is this the time to draw sharp conclusions, I would sort of take my time and study this with a certain degree of deliberation, because as I said, a lot of this, whatever understandings, there have been, many of these are not known to the entire international community," he added.

To another question on how India and the US looked at the situation in Afghanistan, Mr Jaishankar said both sides are on a similar page, at a principle level on many of the issues, particularly on the possible usage of Afghan soil for terrorism.

He said the issue figured in discussions between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Joe Biden in Washington last week.

"Again, look, there would be issues on which we would agree more, there would be issues on which we would agree less. Our experiences in some respects are different than yours (the US). You know, we have been victims of cross border terrorism ourselves from that region," Mr Jaishankar said.

"And let us say that has shaped in many ways, our view of some of the neighbours of Afghanistan. So now, how much, the US shares that view, and where is it that the US sort of makes its tactical compromises I think that is for the Americans to figure out," he said.

Asked whether it included a joint signal to Pakistan, he only said: "There are aspects that we share, and there are aspects where maybe our positions are not exactly the same."

To a query on Quad and ways to manage the rise of Chinese power, Mr Jaishankar said the four-nation partnership is not against somebody.

"I think it's very important not to be sort of railroaded into some kind of negative discourse, which actually is not from our script, it is somebody else's script. And I don't think we should fall for that. I think we need to be positive," he said.

On the question of how to deal with the rise of China, Mr Jaishankar said: "I would say, in many ways, those are bilateral choices that all of us have to make, we each have a very substantial relationship with China."

"And, in many ways, China being today is such a big player and so salient in the international economy, I think it's natural that these relationships are quite unique. So what are my problems, or my opportunities would not be the same as that for the US, or Australia, or Japan, or Indonesia or France," he added.

Mr Jaishankar said it would be different for each country and added that the rise of China has had a very fundamental impact on the international order.

"So as participants in the international order, we need to assess that and respond to that, in the light of our own interest. So I think it's sort of essential to look normalise this conversation," he said.

 
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India was kept away because it acted like a stupid teenager spoiling the peace agreements. Evwn the US knows what india is upto in Afghanistan and have always told them to keep it down.
 
. . . .
Keep whining, at the time when NATO and US were calling them come and fight along with us , PAJEETS start pissing in pants , but now these Shameless complaining why we not included in peace process with taliban …
 
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India was not taken into confidence on various aspects of the Doha deal inked between the US and the Taliban
Haha. Trump was discussing everything with Modi when Bhakts were mocking Pakistanis that Trump is not talking to Pakistan. Trump was straight forward with Indian establishment that either you send your soldiers in Afghanistan or you have no right to say a word in Doha talks. Indians thought that Yanks will extend their honeymoon period of 20 years however Yanks saw through Ghani govt and tall talkers from India and decide what was best for US.
 
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US-Taliban Deal:
India was kept away because it acted like a stupid teenager
it is the usual Indian Marasi drama, and bullshi.t
The Indians are shitting bricks
India has overestimated their status
Keep whining
Bhakts were mocking Pakistanis

I point out a different and truer analysis. If the mods would allow me to post a Pakistani journalists analysis and do not immediately delete it. Link is at the bottom so feel free


How the Taliban Used Pakistan
The Taliban have returned to power in Afghanistan. Far from a victory, that could ultimately be a setback for Pakistan.
Kunwar Khuldune Shahid

By Kunwar Khuldune Shahid
August 19, 2021

How the Taliban Used Pakistan

Credit: Depositphotos
Pakistan had already won the Afghanistan war when the Trump administration signed a deal with the Taliban last year. The fall of Kabul has formalized the triumph. Or so the narrative reverberating in Islamabad, and around the world, goes.

The army’s “good Taliban, bad Taliban” strategy has been rooted in distinguishing between jihadist groups that target Pakistan and those that can be controlled to fulfill the geostrategic objectives of the military establishment. The return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan is naturally considered the culmination of two decades of Pakistan providing the group, and its affiliates, with havens to sustain themselves until the departure of the U.S.-led coalition.

And yet, the endgame wasn’t bringing the Taliban back to power; it was setting up a radical Islamist regime that would toe Pakistan’s line in the region. Viewed through this lens, Pakistan’s success is less certain.

Moments after taking charge in Kabul, the Afghan Taliban released leaders of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), including former deputy chief Faqir Mohammad. The Afghan Taliban have released around 2,300 leaders of the TTP, who have duly felicitated the former for taking over Kabul, after having already pledged allegiance to Hibatullah Akhundzada.

The Taliban are already negotiating with India. They have called the Kashmir issue “internal and bilateral,” clarifying that the jihadist group, at the very least, does not intend to take sides in a conflict that Pakistan has actively Islamized.



Pakistan’s premise of backing Taliban rule in Afghanistan to counter “Hindu India,” conceived almost half a century before the Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) regime came to power, is unraveling amid uninhibited Islamist-Hindutva engagement.

This, along with the booming alliance of Taliban on both sides of the Af-Pak border, begs the question of whether Pakistan, and its “good Taliban, bad Taliban” strategy, has actually been victorious. Even more ominously, the developments suggest that as much as Pakistan used Taliban for its gains, so too did the Taliban use Pakistan for its gains.

We are witnessing the Taliban’s rendition of a “good/bad” strategy. “Good” Pakistan helped Taliban leaders dodge the U.S.-led forces, while diverting some of the resources taken from the West toward the Taliban. “Bad” Pakistan now believes the Taliban have any geopolitical, or ideological, obligation to reciprocate.

To ensure Talibanization in Afghanistan, and Islamist inertia at home, Pakistan sacrificed over 80,000 of its citizens, which the military establishment has loudly dubbed “collateral damage.” The investment in the project was to such an extent that immediately after the Trump-Taliban deal, Prime Minister Imran Khan began echoing eulogies for Osama bin Laden. This week, Khan touted the Taliban takeover as “breaking shackles of slavery,” prompting demands in the United States to cut aid to Pakistan. The ubiquitous cheerleading for the Taliban’s triumph delineates the extent to which the pro-Taliban Islamist rhetoric has been etched in Pakistan.

While Pakistan’s Islamization was an inevitable corollary of its birth and sustenance as a multiethnic realm, the mullah-military takeover has been the result of both regional and domestic ambitions of the army. This has translated into a political setup in Pakistan where today both the prime minister and the leader of the antigovernment opposition coalition are unflinching Taliban cheerleaders. However, in the decades dedicated to sustaining an Afghanistan that suits the Taliban, the military establishment has also created a Pakistan that suits the Taliban.

The Taliban’s vocal allies, this side of the border, are those that excommunicated the Pakistan Army and launched some of the most brutal attacks in the country to “establish true Islam.” The gory Islamic Sharia might be incorporated in the Pakistan Penal Code, but will be more visibly implemented in Afghanistan. The rhetoric of Medina state might be echoing in Islamabad, but will be more accurately mimicked in Kabul. What, then, is stopping the Taliban from channeling these political narratives, and its jihadist allies, to aspire to align Pakistan with Afghanistan’s strategic interests, and not the other way around?

Pakistan, and the army that runs it, are completely subservient to China, but have failed to reassure Beijing that Islamabad can safeguard the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from the country’s multipronged militancy. Such has been the fixation with Talibanization in Afghanistan that Islamabad has seemingly been willing to alienate China just to cling on to its duplicitous security policy of picking and choosing jihadist groups, which the establishment believes are its sure-shot bet to dictate matters along the Af-Pak border. What if the Taliban convince Beijing that they can be better orchestrator of these groups?

Already agreeing to facilitate China’s crackdown on Uyghur separatists and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Taliban have $1 trillion worth of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth to offer Beijing as well. If the group can also become a more convincing guarantor of projects currently affiliated with CPEC, the fulcrum of the $1.9 trillion worth Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), not only can the Taliban forge a stronger alliance with China, the group can also help extend its influence across the Af-Pak frontier, which it doesn’t recognize as a border.

The Pakistani Taliban have duly been making gains in synchrony with the Afghan Taliban’s return to power. And if South Asian jihadist outfits continue to gravitate toward the consolidated Islamic Emirate, they would be more than willing to
create turmoil in Pakistan as the Taliban’s strategic assets.

The Diplomat
 
Last edited:
.
I point out a different and truer analysis. If the mods would allow me to post a Pakistani journalists analysis and do not immediately delete it. Link is at the bottom so feel free


How the Taliban Used Pakistan
The Taliban have returned to power in Afghanistan. Far from a victory, that could ultimately be a setback for Pakistan.
Kunwar Khuldune Shahid

By Kunwar Khuldune Shahid
August 19, 2021

How the Taliban Used Pakistan

Credit: Depositphotos
Pakistan had already won the Afghanistan war when the Trump administration signed a deal with the Taliban last year. The fall of Kabul has formalized the triumph. Or so the narrative reverberating in Islamabad, and around the world, goes.

The army’s “good Taliban, bad Taliban” strategy has been rooted in distinguishing between jihadist groups that target Pakistan and those that can be controlled to fulfill the geostrategic objectives of the military establishment. The return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan is naturally considered the culmination of two decades of Pakistan providing the group, and its affiliates, with havens to sustain themselves until the departure of the U.S.-led coalition.

And yet, the endgame wasn’t bringing the Taliban back to power; it was setting up a radical Islamist regime that would toe Pakistan’s line in the region. Viewed through this lens, Pakistan’s success is less certain.

Moments after taking charge in Kabul, the Afghan Taliban released leaders of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), including former deputy chief Faqir Mohammad. The Afghan Taliban have released around 2,300 leaders of the TTP, who have duly felicitated the former for taking over Kabul, after having already pledged allegiance to Hibatullah Akhundzada.

The Taliban are already negotiating with India. They have called the Kashmir issue “internal and bilateral,” clarifying that the jihadist group, at the very least, does not intend to take sides in a conflict that Pakistan has actively Islamized.



Pakistan’s premise of backing Taliban rule in Afghanistan to counter “Hindu India,” conceived almost half a century before the Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) regime came to power, is unraveling amid uninhibited Islamist-Hindutva engagement.

This, along with the booming alliance of Taliban on both sides of the Af-Pak border, begs the question of whether Pakistan, and its “good Taliban, bad Taliban” strategy, has actually been victorious. Even more ominously, the developments suggest that as much as Pakistan used Taliban for its gains, so too did the Taliban use Pakistan for its gains.

We are witnessing the Taliban’s rendition of a “good/bad” strategy. “Good” Pakistan helped Taliban leaders dodge the U.S.-led forces, while diverting some of the resources taken from the West toward the Taliban. “Bad” Pakistan now believes the Taliban have any geopolitical, or ideological, obligation to reciprocate.

To ensure Talibanization in Afghanistan, and Islamist inertia at home, Pakistan sacrificed over 80,000 of its citizens, which the military establishment has loudly dubbed “collateral damage.” The investment in the project was to such an extent that immediately after the Trump-Taliban deal, Prime Minister Imran Khan began echoing eulogies for Osama bin Laden. This week, Khan touted the Taliban takeover as “breaking shackles of slavery,” prompting demands in the United States to cut aid to Pakistan. The ubiquitous cheerleading for the Taliban’s triumph delineates the extent to which the pro-Taliban Islamist rhetoric has been etched in Pakistan.

While Pakistan’s Islamization was an inevitable corollary of its birth and sustenance as a multiethnic realm, the mullah-military takeover has been the result of both regional and domestic ambitions of the army. This has translated into a political setup in Pakistan where today both the prime minister and the leader of the antigovernment opposition coalition are unflinching Taliban cheerleaders. However, in the decades dedicated to sustaining an Afghanistan that suits the Taliban, the military establishment has also created a Pakistan that suits the Taliban.

The Taliban’s vocal allies, this side of the border, are those that excommunicated the Pakistan Army and launched some of the most brutal attacks in the country to “establish true Islam.” The gory Islamic Sharia might be incorporated in the Pakistan Penal Code, but will be more visibly implemented in Afghanistan. The rhetoric of Medina state might be echoing in Islamabad, but will be more accurately mimicked in Kabul. What, then, is stopping the Taliban from channeling these political narratives, and its jihadist allies, to aspire to align Pakistan with Afghanistan’s strategic interests, and not the other way around?

Pakistan, and the army that runs it, are completely subservient to China, but have failed to reassure Beijing that Islamabad can safeguard the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from the country’s multipronged militancy. Such has been the fixation with Talibanization in Afghanistan that Islamabad has seemingly been willing to alienate China just to cling on to its duplicitous security policy of picking and choosing jihadist groups, which the establishment believes are its sure-shot bet to dictate matters along the Af-Pak border. What if the Taliban convince Beijing that they can be better orchestrator of these groups?

Already agreeing to facilitate China’s crackdown on Uyghur separatists and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Taliban have $1 trillion worth of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth to offer Beijing as well. If the group can also become a more convincing guarantor of projects currently affiliated with CPEC, the fulcrum of the $1.9 trillion worth Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), not only can the Taliban forge a stronger alliance with China, the group can also help extend its influence across the Af-Pak frontier, which it doesn’t recognize as a border.

The Pakistani Taliban have duly been making gains in synchrony with the Afghan Taliban’s return to power. And if South Asian jihadist outfits continue to gravitate toward the consolidated Islamic Emirate, they would be more than willing to
create turmoil in Pakistan as the Taliban’s strategic assets.

The Diplomat

Opinion of a Pakistani libtard, so? Unlike bhaRAT we have opinions of all kinds. Its just in bhaRAT that there is one opinion and all others are traitors.
 
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Opinion of a Pakistani libtard, so? Unlike bhaRAT we have opinions of all kinds. Its just in bhaRAT that there is one opinion and all others are traitors.
Its your interpretation of what he is. He is a reputable journalist being printed in the PREMIER MAGAZINE for the worlds diplomats.

I can bet you your foreign office is studying this carefully
 
.
I point out a different and truer analysis. If the mods would allow me to post a Pakistani journalists analysis and do not immediately delete it. Link is at the bottom so feel free


How the Taliban Used Pakistan
The Taliban have returned to power in Afghanistan. Far from a victory, that could ultimately be a setback for Pakistan.
Kunwar Khuldune Shahid

By Kunwar Khuldune Shahid
August 19, 2021

How the Taliban Used Pakistan

Credit: Depositphotos
Pakistan had already won the Afghanistan war when the Trump administration signed a deal with the Taliban last year. The fall of Kabul has formalized the triumph. Or so the narrative reverberating in Islamabad, and around the world, goes.

The army’s “good Taliban, bad Taliban” strategy has been rooted in distinguishing between jihadist groups that target Pakistan and those that can be controlled to fulfill the geostrategic objectives of the military establishment. The return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan is naturally considered the culmination of two decades of Pakistan providing the group, and its affiliates, with havens to sustain themselves until the departure of the U.S.-led coalition.

And yet, the endgame wasn’t bringing the Taliban back to power; it was setting up a radical Islamist regime that would toe Pakistan’s line in the region. Viewed through this lens, Pakistan’s success is less certain.

Moments after taking charge in Kabul, the Afghan Taliban released leaders of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), including former deputy chief Faqir Mohammad. The Afghan Taliban have released around 2,300 leaders of the TTP, who have duly felicitated the former for taking over Kabul, after having already pledged allegiance to Hibatullah Akhundzada.

The Taliban are already negotiating with India. They have called the Kashmir issue “internal and bilateral,” clarifying that the jihadist group, at the very least, does not intend to take sides in a conflict that Pakistan has actively Islamized.



Pakistan’s premise of backing Taliban rule in Afghanistan to counter “Hindu India,” conceived almost half a century before the Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) regime came to power, is unraveling amid uninhibited Islamist-Hindutva engagement.

This, along with the booming alliance of Taliban on both sides of the Af-Pak border, begs the question of whether Pakistan, and its “good Taliban, bad Taliban” strategy, has actually been victorious. Even more ominously, the developments suggest that as much as Pakistan used Taliban for its gains, so too did the Taliban use Pakistan for its gains.

We are witnessing the Taliban’s rendition of a “good/bad” strategy. “Good” Pakistan helped Taliban leaders dodge the U.S.-led forces, while diverting some of the resources taken from the West toward the Taliban. “Bad” Pakistan now believes the Taliban have any geopolitical, or ideological, obligation to reciprocate.

To ensure Talibanization in Afghanistan, and Islamist inertia at home, Pakistan sacrificed over 80,000 of its citizens, which the military establishment has loudly dubbed “collateral damage.” The investment in the project was to such an extent that immediately after the Trump-Taliban deal, Prime Minister Imran Khan began echoing eulogies for Osama bin Laden. This week, Khan touted the Taliban takeover as “breaking shackles of slavery,” prompting demands in the United States to cut aid to Pakistan. The ubiquitous cheerleading for the Taliban’s triumph delineates the extent to which the pro-Taliban Islamist rhetoric has been etched in Pakistan.

While Pakistan’s Islamization was an inevitable corollary of its birth and sustenance as a multiethnic realm, the mullah-military takeover has been the result of both regional and domestic ambitions of the army. This has translated into a political setup in Pakistan where today both the prime minister and the leader of the antigovernment opposition coalition are unflinching Taliban cheerleaders. However, in the decades dedicated to sustaining an Afghanistan that suits the Taliban, the military establishment has also created a Pakistan that suits the Taliban.

The Taliban’s vocal allies, this side of the border, are those that excommunicated the Pakistan Army and launched some of the most brutal attacks in the country to “establish true Islam.” The gory Islamic Sharia might be incorporated in the Pakistan Penal Code, but will be more visibly implemented in Afghanistan. The rhetoric of Medina state might be echoing in Islamabad, but will be more accurately mimicked in Kabul. What, then, is stopping the Taliban from channeling these political narratives, and its jihadist allies, to aspire to align Pakistan with Afghanistan’s strategic interests, and not the other way around?

Pakistan, and the army that runs it, are completely subservient to China, but have failed to reassure Beijing that Islamabad can safeguard the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from the country’s multipronged militancy. Such has been the fixation with Talibanization in Afghanistan that Islamabad has seemingly been willing to alienate China just to cling on to its duplicitous security policy of picking and choosing jihadist groups, which the establishment believes are its sure-shot bet to dictate matters along the Af-Pak border. What if the Taliban convince Beijing that they can be better orchestrator of these groups?

Already agreeing to facilitate China’s crackdown on Uyghur separatists and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Taliban have $1 trillion worth of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth to offer Beijing as well. If the group can also become a more convincing guarantor of projects currently affiliated with CPEC, the fulcrum of the $1.9 trillion worth Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), not only can the Taliban forge a stronger alliance with China, the group can also help extend its influence across the Af-Pak frontier, which it doesn’t recognize as a border.

The Pakistani Taliban have duly been making gains in synchrony with the Afghan Taliban’s return to power. And if South Asian jihadist outfits continue to gravitate toward the consolidated Islamic Emirate, they would be more than willing to
create turmoil in Pakistan as the Taliban’s strategic assets.

The Diplomat
Kanwar is as much pro pakistan as Gaurav Arya. The typical partisan who knows nothing about ground realities and continue to pedal his drawing-room analysis on geopolitical issues. These people are the ones who were of the opinion that taliban will never reach kabul after US withdrawal. So yeah quote him as much you want him but fact remains that he is another useless voice from a drawingroom.
 
. . .
India was kept away because it acted like a stupid teenager spoiling the peace agreements. Evwn the US knows what india is upto in Afghanistan and have always told them to keep it down.

End result is you are forced to talk with recognised terrorists TTP ,

" ibtda i ishq hai rota hai kya , aage aage dekhiye hota hai kya ?"

Kanwar is as much pro pakistan as Gaurav Arya. The typical partisan who knows nothing about ground realities and continue to pedal his drawing-room analysis on geopolitical issues. These people are the ones who were of the opinion that taliban will never reach kabul after US withdrawal. So yeah quote him as much you want him but fact remains that he is another useless voice from a drawingroom.

Lol now kanwar is traitor because he talks sense .
 
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