read this in today's Hindustan Times paper copy..thought of worth sharing with you folks so got hold of ePaper and posting the stuff for your..
The next Pakistan-sponsored major terrorist strike could lead to conventional conflict along with the risk of nuclear exchanges, writes GURMEET KANWAL
Pakistan’s former foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri said in an interview on India Today TV a few days ago that “all hell would have broken loose” if India had bombed Muridke after the 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai. India has shown immense strategic restraint in the face of grave provocation from Pakistan. However, another major trans-border terrorist strike sponsored by Pakistan will almost certainly trigger Indian military retaliation. While it will be calibrated, it could spin out of control. The fictional scenario described below could be actually played out, though the probability of its occurrence is low.
Terrorism from Pakistan must end ... India and Pakistan must institute genuine nuclear risk reduction measures. It must be recognised that de-escalation during conflict requires strategic communications and trustworthy back channel interlocutors'
The Trigger: Dussehra-Diwali holidays, 2015. Tensions between India and Pakistan have escalated. At 1900 hours a day before Diwali (Day 1), serial bomb blasts on multiple targets in crowded markets in New Delhi result in approximately 300 casualties, including 12 foreign tourists. Cutting across party lines, political leaders demand immediate military retaliation against Pakistan.
The Response: Day 2. The Indian director general of military operations (DGMO) calls his Pakistani counterpart on the hotline and asks him to hand over the perpetrators of the terrorist strikes immediately or face military action. The Pakistani DGMO expresses sympathy, but denies the involvement of the Pakistan army or the ISI. Strategic partners share evidence with India.
Day 3. Based on multi-source intelligence inputs, the Indian government determines that the attack was launched by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); and, there is incontrovertible evidence of the ISI’s involvement in the planning and conduct of the strikes. Chaired by the prime minister, the cabinet committee on security (CCS) approves military retaliation to inflict punishment on the Pakistan army.
Day 4. At 0600 hours, Indian Air Force fighter aircraft launch strikes against military targets in Pakistanoccupied Kashmir (Azad Kashmir); artillery strikes, border action teams and Special Forces (SF) raids are also launched; collateral damage is carefully avoided.
The Indian government orders mobilising the armed forces, including the nuclear forces. Pakistan follows suit.
Days 5-6. Pakistan responds, but on a smaller scale. Pakistan Air Force aircraft do not cross the LoC. Pakistan expels the Indian high commissioner.
Conventional Conflict: Days 7-8. Indian military strikes in Azad Kashmir cause substantial damage. F-16 aircraft of the PAF cross the international boundary and strike three Indian airfields in the Jammu and Punjab sectors. Six IAF aircraft are destroyed. The Indian CCS approves trans-border offensive operations.
Day 9. The IAF initiates full-scale counter-air operations. The Indian army launches multi-pronged thrusts into Pakistan in the Sialkot, Lahore, Cholistan and Thar Desert sectors. The Indian Navy enforces a Maritime Exclusion Zone off the Makran Coast of Pakistan; war at sea ensues.
Days 10-11. The PAF retaliates, but with decreasing vigour. The IAF and the army’s missiles, rocket launchers and artillery inflict heavy damage on Pakistani forces. India’s IBGs (integrated battle groups) make good progress.
Pakistan launches a limited offensive with a division plus an armoured brigade from Chhamb towards Akhnur in the Jammu sector.
Nuclear strikes: Day 12. Pakistan’s army chief warns India to pull back immediately or face the wrath of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Several of India’s IBGs have succeeded in capturing territory to a depth ranging from 8-10 km in Punjab to 20 km in the desert terrain.
Day 13. Pakistan orders the civilian population in the Cholistan Desert to be evacuated. The PAF launches a large-scale strike against Indian Strike Corps South; substantial damage is caused.
Day 14. Ignoring the advice of his prime minister, Pakistan’s army chief approves nuclear strikes. At 1800 hours, the Army Strategic Forces Command launches one low-yield nuclear strike each on the two Indian brigades advancing in Cholistan. Personnel and tank casualties force Indian operations in this sector to a temporary halt.
At 1830 hours, the US president calls the Indian prime minister and appeals to him not to retaliate with nuclear strikes; he also offers to mediate.
At 1900 hours, the Indian PM chairs a meeting of the political council of the Nuclear Command Authority in the National Command Post. The three chiefs give their assessment and recommendations. The national security adviser recommends multiple nuclear strikes in retaliation. After a brief discussion, the political council approves the launching of nuclear strikes.
Day 15. At 0700 hours, India launches four nuclear strikes of appropriate yield on the reserve forces of the Pakistan army — two strikes on 4 Corps reserves south-east of Kasur and two strikes on 2 Corps (Army Reserve South) near Bahawalpur. Pakistani casualties: 660 civilians killed or wounded, 345 troops killed or wounded, 56 tanks, infantry combat vehicles and missile launchers destroyed or damaged.
De-escalation: At 1000 hours, the Indian PM addresses the people of Pakistan and warns of complete annihilation if any more nuclear strikes are launched. He also offers a ceasefire effective 1800 hours the same day. Pakistan promptly rejects the ceasefire offer unless India agrees to vacate all Pakistani territory within 48 hours.
At 1430 hours, with the PM’s approval, India’s COAS authorises offensive operations by two Strike Corps, commencing at 1830 hours.
At 2000 hours, the US president speaks to the Pakistani PM and the army chief. At 2100 hours, Pakistan accepts India’s ceasefire offer effective 2200 hours.
Terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil must end if this fictional scenario is to remain fictional. India and Pakistan must institute genuine nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs). It must be recognised that de-escalation during conflict requires strategic communications and trustworthy back channel interlocutors. Finally, third party mediation has its limitations, but can be useful during conflict. Gurmeet Kanwal is former director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies,
New Delhi The views expressed are personal
Hindustan Times e-Paper
The next Pakistan-sponsored major terrorist strike could lead to conventional conflict along with the risk of nuclear exchanges, writes GURMEET KANWAL
Pakistan’s former foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri said in an interview on India Today TV a few days ago that “all hell would have broken loose” if India had bombed Muridke after the 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai. India has shown immense strategic restraint in the face of grave provocation from Pakistan. However, another major trans-border terrorist strike sponsored by Pakistan will almost certainly trigger Indian military retaliation. While it will be calibrated, it could spin out of control. The fictional scenario described below could be actually played out, though the probability of its occurrence is low.
Terrorism from Pakistan must end ... India and Pakistan must institute genuine nuclear risk reduction measures. It must be recognised that de-escalation during conflict requires strategic communications and trustworthy back channel interlocutors'
The Trigger: Dussehra-Diwali holidays, 2015. Tensions between India and Pakistan have escalated. At 1900 hours a day before Diwali (Day 1), serial bomb blasts on multiple targets in crowded markets in New Delhi result in approximately 300 casualties, including 12 foreign tourists. Cutting across party lines, political leaders demand immediate military retaliation against Pakistan.
The Response: Day 2. The Indian director general of military operations (DGMO) calls his Pakistani counterpart on the hotline and asks him to hand over the perpetrators of the terrorist strikes immediately or face military action. The Pakistani DGMO expresses sympathy, but denies the involvement of the Pakistan army or the ISI. Strategic partners share evidence with India.
Day 3. Based on multi-source intelligence inputs, the Indian government determines that the attack was launched by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); and, there is incontrovertible evidence of the ISI’s involvement in the planning and conduct of the strikes. Chaired by the prime minister, the cabinet committee on security (CCS) approves military retaliation to inflict punishment on the Pakistan army.
Day 4. At 0600 hours, Indian Air Force fighter aircraft launch strikes against military targets in Pakistanoccupied Kashmir (Azad Kashmir); artillery strikes, border action teams and Special Forces (SF) raids are also launched; collateral damage is carefully avoided.
The Indian government orders mobilising the armed forces, including the nuclear forces. Pakistan follows suit.
Days 5-6. Pakistan responds, but on a smaller scale. Pakistan Air Force aircraft do not cross the LoC. Pakistan expels the Indian high commissioner.
Conventional Conflict: Days 7-8. Indian military strikes in Azad Kashmir cause substantial damage. F-16 aircraft of the PAF cross the international boundary and strike three Indian airfields in the Jammu and Punjab sectors. Six IAF aircraft are destroyed. The Indian CCS approves trans-border offensive operations.
Day 9. The IAF initiates full-scale counter-air operations. The Indian army launches multi-pronged thrusts into Pakistan in the Sialkot, Lahore, Cholistan and Thar Desert sectors. The Indian Navy enforces a Maritime Exclusion Zone off the Makran Coast of Pakistan; war at sea ensues.
Days 10-11. The PAF retaliates, but with decreasing vigour. The IAF and the army’s missiles, rocket launchers and artillery inflict heavy damage on Pakistani forces. India’s IBGs (integrated battle groups) make good progress.
Pakistan launches a limited offensive with a division plus an armoured brigade from Chhamb towards Akhnur in the Jammu sector.
Nuclear strikes: Day 12. Pakistan’s army chief warns India to pull back immediately or face the wrath of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Several of India’s IBGs have succeeded in capturing territory to a depth ranging from 8-10 km in Punjab to 20 km in the desert terrain.
Day 13. Pakistan orders the civilian population in the Cholistan Desert to be evacuated. The PAF launches a large-scale strike against Indian Strike Corps South; substantial damage is caused.
Day 14. Ignoring the advice of his prime minister, Pakistan’s army chief approves nuclear strikes. At 1800 hours, the Army Strategic Forces Command launches one low-yield nuclear strike each on the two Indian brigades advancing in Cholistan. Personnel and tank casualties force Indian operations in this sector to a temporary halt.
At 1830 hours, the US president calls the Indian prime minister and appeals to him not to retaliate with nuclear strikes; he also offers to mediate.
At 1900 hours, the Indian PM chairs a meeting of the political council of the Nuclear Command Authority in the National Command Post. The three chiefs give their assessment and recommendations. The national security adviser recommends multiple nuclear strikes in retaliation. After a brief discussion, the political council approves the launching of nuclear strikes.
Day 15. At 0700 hours, India launches four nuclear strikes of appropriate yield on the reserve forces of the Pakistan army — two strikes on 4 Corps reserves south-east of Kasur and two strikes on 2 Corps (Army Reserve South) near Bahawalpur. Pakistani casualties: 660 civilians killed or wounded, 345 troops killed or wounded, 56 tanks, infantry combat vehicles and missile launchers destroyed or damaged.
De-escalation: At 1000 hours, the Indian PM addresses the people of Pakistan and warns of complete annihilation if any more nuclear strikes are launched. He also offers a ceasefire effective 1800 hours the same day. Pakistan promptly rejects the ceasefire offer unless India agrees to vacate all Pakistani territory within 48 hours.
At 1430 hours, with the PM’s approval, India’s COAS authorises offensive operations by two Strike Corps, commencing at 1830 hours.
At 2000 hours, the US president speaks to the Pakistani PM and the army chief. At 2100 hours, Pakistan accepts India’s ceasefire offer effective 2200 hours.
Terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil must end if this fictional scenario is to remain fictional. India and Pakistan must institute genuine nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs). It must be recognised that de-escalation during conflict requires strategic communications and trustworthy back channel interlocutors. Finally, third party mediation has its limitations, but can be useful during conflict. Gurmeet Kanwal is former director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies,
New Delhi The views expressed are personal
Hindustan Times e-Paper
