A Vision of a New Combined Arms Philosophy & Doctrine

[Armchair]

Here is a thought:

120 mm high velocity, recoiling mortars.

These have range and accuracy between traditional mortars and traditional artillery. Because they have a recoiling mechanism, they tend to be easy to fit onto mobile platforms like an APC.

One problem between the doctrines of Blitzkreig and Deep Battle is that, in a fast moving formation, artillery has a hard time keeping up.

This has cause armies to invest in self propelled artillery systems but these would again have a hard time keeping up at the pace of MBTs. They would have a harder time keeping up with wheeled tanks such as the Rooikat. The other major problem with SPGs is that they require long ammunition supply lines often by trucks, thus ultimately slowing down the pace of the strike formation.

Yet another problem is that SPGs are expensive and difficult to manufacture. Pakistan doesn't seem to have the capability to produce them. Additionally, even the ammunition for a traditional artillery piece is harder, more expensive to produce than mortars.

If you put such a mortar onto a Rooikat chasis or a Ratel chasis, you have a very effective artillery system that can keep pace with the armor and yet be relatively cheap and easy to operate. They would have ready ammunition on-board, would be cheap and easy to produce, and yet give you a meaningful punch.

Rooikats are about 30 tons but because they are wheeled vehicles, and because they have a 76mm gun, in reality, their armor is equal to a 40 ton tracked tank with a 125mm gun. They could also be uparmored with reactive and spaced armor, and have a built in second ATGM turret.

This means that they can effectively target enemy MBTs. Even the 76mm gun designed by South Africa has a very high velocity, and should be able to disable enemy MBTs. They would also be perfectly effective against all the APCs, bunkers, etc that India could throw at them.

Given that for every 1 MBT, you can essentially afford 5-8 Rooikat type "Flex" tanks, the sheer firepower that you can bring to the battlefield negates any perceived disadvantages. Given that the enemy outnumbers you, this is even more important. Given that your brigades are mostly infantry brigades, without meaningful number of tanks and non-existent IFVs, this is even more critical.

 

[CriticalThought]

I dont think Ratel has been tested or any wheeled tank for that matter. The concept of light tanks or wheeled tanks in Sub-continent is not that significant, probably due to the nature of combat.

Firstly, heavier armor protection on MBT is criteria. There are no light tanks operating in Indian or Pakistan Armies which could be facing heavier MBT's. AMX-13, Staurt etc were phased out on first given opportunity. Over time, the new inducted MBT's in both armies had more armor which meant more weight, bigger cannon, bigger engine.
Putting more armor, bigger ammunition type for bigger gun means more weight. Wheeled AFV could be 30 Tons or 35 Tons max ? Tracked MBT can go 50 Tons+.

Second is terrain. Its not one type of terrain. There are plains, desert, mountains etc. In desert, more heavier types of MBT's (42+ Tons) with bigger engines are preferred. Tracks have an advantage in desert and won't get bogged down in thick mud and thick snow. Wheels have advantage in plains or mountains though can encounter mud and snow. Its easier to operate one type of machinery and use it all over the terrain.

Third, Anti-tank role is mainly given to ATGM's. There is much more required from MBT's than to primarily be engaged in a tank vs tank battle. 106mm is becoming obsolete yet operational to some extent, unlike before. Older MBT's (T-59,69) are used in infantry support roles.

Fourth, 125mm gun is the standard now for MBT's. Anything below, even 105mm equipped T-59 and T-69 are slated for quick replacement. 76mm, 90mm, 100mm might not be inducted.

If PA is considered; PA puts heavier AFV's in direct contact with the enemy and deploys best available MBT (AK,T-80) in desert and upgraded MBT (AZ) in plains. Consider M-113, its not supposed to be in direct contact with the enemy. Its very light, aluminium protection catches fire rapidly and its not adequately equipped with a main gun or a turret. Ratel is 20T, Rooikat is 30T. For direct contact with enemy, they would need more armor protection, ERA, caged armor maybe, increasing weight affecting mobility. Considering terrain; Sialkot, Narowal axis could be a terrain where wheeled AFV's could be deployed. Lahore and south of Lahore, lots of obstacles like canals, irrigated lands etc, then bunkers, mines, tank traps etc which will slow down the speed that is required from wheeled AFV's.

There is one very important use case for high speed, light armored, combat vehicles: flanking maneuvers.

Now, these are maneuvers of opportunity. There is a possibility that in any particular war or skirmish, the opportunity to flank the enemy never arises. But where it does, it can lay waste to a larger opponent by engaging from multiple sides. We need highly agile vehicles armed with ATGMs, machine guns, and rocket launchers to be used for flanking at the discretion of core commanders.

 

[Armchair]

Long Run Average Costs (LRAC) and Economies of Scale & Scope

For a country that does not have a legacy of industrialization and mass production, to understand economies of scale and scope, it is very difficult. It creates a mentality of comparing spec for spec without realizing the industrial implications. Here is a basic Long Run Average Cost Curve.

P2 shows where, because of increasing production rates, your costs go down significantly more. This is because of specialization and other benefits that arise when you produce something at a large scale. Companies that cannot produce at that output, will have high costs, and will not be able to compete.

They will eventually go out of business as the large production firms will dominate. In the car industry, the minimal output to get the maximum benefit of mass production and economies of scales is approximately 150,000 cars per year. You will seldom find a small quantity car manufacturer that can compete in the market, except in rare niche and luxury segments.

Now imagine Pakistan Army is a company and it is competing with other armies, all of whom are vying with each other in a conflict. How can you compete when you are not being able to even make 25 tanks a year? How competitive is that?

How can you compete when, in a war that lasts more than 1 month, you are unable to sustain operations because you have no meaningful replenishment? This is a problem for both India and Pakistan.

What kind of a military-industrial strategy is this? Anyone who studied Production and Operations Management (POM) would tear his hair out of his head and grow bald from seeing this as a strategy for a country.

Pakistan is a third world country, with a large army, 800,000 strong with mainly infantry brigades. The equipment is old and worn out in many cases. And yet, this army that can not afford any aircover, and in most formations will have a handful of tanks at best, holds fast to building only complex, 48-50 ton tanks with French and other varies subsystems, and nothing less than this is "acceptable" to them. Where does this mindset come from? Is this mindset that of an educated people or of an egotistic zamindar who wants to compete with his neighbor?

When in most COIN operations they are unable to have any kind of aircover, where is the sense in buying attack helicopters at 50 million US per piece, 30 of them and leave it at that? Why not build a basic armored CAS aircraft that can get the job done at 5 to 7 million dollars?

I've asked this question for the last 15 years and have yet to find a coherent reply.

 

[jhungary]

In a conversation with @Signalian I was reminded of some work that I had been doing over the past 15 years off and on. Mainly idle thinking and daydreaming, and some written stuff.

The basic idea that has been brewing in my head has been that military doctrine has mainly been imported from the West, and never truly grown and bred in South Asia. At a time when Western military doctrine is in shambles and stagnant, it is strange to see this.

For one thing, the terrain, the labour to capital ratio, the weather, the scenarios are largely different from what the West has faced. So it made no sense to me to keep being mentally enslaved by their thinking.

I daydreamed of a form of warfare and an epistemological approach that would shock and dramatically change the dynamics. For instance, the use of tanks and fighters, whose quantities are so precious, is constrained in India and Pakistan because they are psychologically conditioned to preserve assets and take lower risk maneuvers. The armor to infantry ratio is also abysmal compared to what takes places in Europe.

In this state, it makes far more sense to produce, for instance, a cheap and effective tank that can be locally mass produced. But neither India nor Pakistan did that. Instead, they copied the patterns of Russian and Western tanks, and tried to up-gun each other. Rather than creating the necessary infrastructure for a sustained mass production of tanks and munitions that would mean they can outnumber and outlast the opponent.

Another issue has been that CAS aircraft have lost out. Not because they aren't effective, but because of a very curious politics and Western requirement. Firstly, the West needs attack helicopters because they are a lot easier to deploy in LHDs and in expeditionary units. Secondly, because of US Army - USAF politics, the US Army was banned from having its own CAS aircraft. The USAF neglected this requirement like a step-child. the US Army countered by building Attack helicopters.

CAS aircraft are the cheapest and sanest way to build effective airpower as concerns ground support. For instance, a simple CAS aircraft that has armor, something like the BAe SABA, can be built for 5 million to 7 million USD, while the recently acquired Apaches cost 60 million US each (Pakistani T-129s cost about 40 million each). The value for money has never been a question for anyone who technically studied and compared the two.

Another issue that outdates and makes modern Western doctrine insufficient is that emerging disruptive technologies such as ATGMs make armor doctrine and battlefield doctrine less relevant and in need of updating.

Armor increasingly needs to move with infantry, more than the eras without ATGMs. Infantry itself is effected as bunkers and other structures become less effective. This means, in WW2 terms, infantry tanks are needed rather than the Tiger tank philosophy followed so far.

The tiger tank philosophy is also less meaningful in face of modern precision bombing and airpower.

Another impact of precision battlefield weapons is that direct fire weapons such as tank guns are less relevant. NLOS (non line of sight) weapons are more relevant. This means that the time is ripe for a platform that combines mobility and the indirect firepower of artillery-like systems to come to the fore.

All of these issues taken together, one could imagine a new form of warfare. I've day dreamed of that in my own scenarios and solutions. And have written of it on occasion. What I believe is that we can create a new form of military, something like what the Germans did before the start of WW2.

This could potentially defeat India in a manner from which there would be no recovery. Over the years I've come to believe it is very practical, real and possible. And over the years I've been frustrated that it hasn't been done or that no one seems to be able to think outside of the box enough to imagine it.

Mass production, such a vital ingredient of battle, has been near completely forgotten. Today's tanks are so complex they have production rates that WW2 veterans would be left astounded, and not in a good way.

I want to start this thread to discuss and envision new forms of warfare that can take place in the context of today's South Asia. I want to imagine such innovative weapons and tactics employed to completely shatter the old way of thinking.

I believe it is possible. Will you join me on a journey to imagine it?

@Signalian @FuturePAF @MastanKhan

Doable for a country like US, China, Russia or may even work in India, but the concept of Combine Arms Doctrine is not workable in Pakistan.

First of all, technically, combine arms mean using the same structure in the same combat command but with different unit, you combine them together and work out a strategy that way, and therefore, all those units within your combine arms "division" have to be under the same command structure. Ie Tanks and Infantry or Artillery and Infantry, or Tanks + Special Force + Infantry.

What you are describing is Joint Operation, which different unit from different command work together in a single operation. Fighter and Armoured unit have different command structure, one belong to the Air Force and one belong to the Army.

Also, to work as a combine arms unit, you need to have a even distribution across the whole spectrum of your armed force, which Pakistan is an infantry orientated force, if you combine armoured, IFV and infantry and use it in a strategy, some unit within your infantry is going to lose out because there aren't enough tank and artillery to combine them together, and either you separate both combine arms and traditional arms unit, or you simply forego the command structure of either one, which make the other one structure dependent and subordinate, and render that structure (whichever you forego) a dependent unit to the one you focus on.

Finally, combine arms work almost exclusively offensive, in which in any case if India and Pakistan goes to war, Pakistan would most likely to be in defensive role, which basically cut off one of the best quality of combine arms tactics, which is mobility. Because you cannot defend your enemy when you are mobile. Pakistan can set up a subordinate combine arms unit (like USSOCOM) but if you want to implement Combine Arms spectrum-wise, it will do more harm than good on the current doctrine.

Not enough time to answer this. If you want more information I will come back for more when I have more time on my hand.

 

[Armchair]

Doable for a country like US, China, Russia or may even work in India, but the concept of Combine Arms Doctrine is not workable in Pakistan.

First of all, technically, combine arms mean using the same structure in the same combat command but with different unit, you combine them together and work out a strategy that way, and therefore, all those units within your combine arms "division" have to be under the same command structure. Ie Tanks and Infantry or Artillery and Infantry, or Tanks + Special Force + Infantry.

What you are describing is Joint Operation, which different unit from different command work together in a single operation. Fighter and Armoured unit have different command structure, one belong to the Air Force and one belong to the Army.

Also, to work as a combine arms unit, you need to have a even distribution across the whole spectrum of your armed force, which Pakistan is an infantry orientated force, if you combine armoured, IFV and infantry and use it in a strategy, some unit within your infantry is going to lose out because there aren't enough tank and artillery to combine them together, and either you separate both combine arms and traditional arms unit, or you simply forego the command structure of either one, which make the other one structure dependent and subordinate, and render that structure (whichever you forego) a dependent unit to the one you focus on.

Finally, combine arms work almost exclusively offensive, in which in any case if India and Pakistan goes to war, Pakistan would most likely to be in defensive role, which basically cut off one of the best quality of combine arms tactics, which is mobility. Because you cannot defend your enemy when you are mobile. Pakistan can set up a subordinate combine arms unit (like USSOCOM) but if you want to implement Combine Arms spectrum-wise, it will do more harm than good on the current doctrine.

Not enough time to answer this. If you want more information I will come back for more when I have more time on my hand.

Hi JHungary,

The idea is combined arms not joint operations. This is to be done using a unified command structure under what I'm calling "Flex" Divisions. These will have mechanized, morotized, armor, infantry and artillery organic to the unit. Even CAS aircraft under one unified command.

So, so for instance, a Flex Division could have 2 Flex Brigade, 1 Motorized Infantry Brigade. A Flex Brigade basically is a mechanized brigade with some unique characteristics (you can learn more about the Flex brigade in the first page, for instance, in post #6).

I believe Pakistan can be capable of combined arms operations. Additionally, Combined arms operations are highly effective in open plains and deserts. A large segment of area between India and Pakistan falls under this. In this case, maneuver warfare is very effective both for defense and offence. For a purely defensive role, Pakistan has a vast number of Infantry divisions.

In terms of offensive forces, Pakistan currently has some armored and mechanized divisions. Total number of divisions is about 30 for Pakistan currently.

The proposal in this thread is to increase that to 45, with an increase in 4500 new "Flex" tanks / IFVs / mobile mortars and a very large number of APCs (3600). Flex tanks are a kind of tank envisioned here to be about 35 tons armed with ATGMs, a 76 mm gun and 4 organic infantry.

So, very roughly equivalent of something like the IFVs the US uses (Bradley). You also have 100 CAS aircraft organic at the Corps level.

The idea is to produce simple, large scale, mass produced armor, in scale. When all is said and done, you'd have 20 new combined arms divisions, and your traditional divisions would be reduced to 25.

 

[Armchair]

A vision of the kind of military operations such an upgraded PA force would be able to conduct.

Imagine 12 years down the line, its 2030, and after an economic recovery, Pakistan under Imran Khan and PTI's leadership decides that they wish to free Kashmir. The DGMO @Signalian has been given special authority to set up a national plan for this sacred objective.

DGMO Signalian has the following forces at his disposal:

1. 15 Infantry divisions
2. 1 Mountain division
3. 2 Armored divisions
4. 4 Mechanized divisions
5. 15 Flex divisions
6. 1 Marine division

This is a total of 38 divisions. Our DGMO has organized these divisions into 12 Corps. He has also segmented them into 5 Commands:

Northern Command: Northern Areas - Kashmir - Sialkot
Central Command: Sialkot - Lahore - Bahwalpur
South-Central Command: Bahwalpur - Rahimyar Khan - Sukkur
Southern Command: Sukkur - Nawabshah - Mirpurkhas - Hydrabad
Marine Command: Mekran - Karachi - Sir Creek

DGMO Signalian has organized a plan to create a "Hammer and Anvil" strategy, whereby defensive formations will hold the line, while offensive formations will flank and maneuver behind the enemy.

The map depicts such a potential battleplan:

Brown boxes depict the Anvil, and green lines depict the hammer. Red triangle depicts major losses to the enemy from encirclement. Orange lines depict newly liberated territory.

Battle could be started after a major atrocity in Kashmir by Indian Occupation Forces. An attack in Kashmir will be launched full-scale and with (hopefully) the element of surprise. This will cause India to respond, and at that very response, a full scale blitz will be launched from Southern Punjab, as well as on the Kutch salient. The scale and fast-paced assault will look to maneuver and attack the enemy from the flank and from behind, acting as an anvil against Indian forces looking to attack the Lahore-Sialkot axis.

While the enemy will imagine that the main aim is in Kashmir, the real aim will be to capture Indian Punjab and Kutch, and trade land there for Kashmir. If no trade is possible, a massive territory of the best Indian cultivable land would now be under Pakistan, and given the new LOC, whatever remains with India of Kashmir will be unsustainable to maintain, and at best a burden.

New Dehli is now in artillery range, Siachin supply lines are cut off and realistically lost, half of Kashmir now is under Pakistan, and Kutch becomes a strategic gain that puts a large number of Indian cities and coast within striking distance.

 

[jhungary]

Hi JHungary,

The idea is combined arms not joint operations. This is to be done using a unified command structure under what I'm calling "Flex" Divisions. These will have mechanized, morotized, armor, infantry and artillery organic to the unit. Even CAS aircraft under one unified command.

So, so for instance, a Flex Division could have 2 Flex Brigade, 1 Motorized Infantry Brigade. A Flex Brigade basically is a mechanized brigade with some unique characteristics (you can learn more about the Flex brigade in the first page, for instance, in post #6).

I believe Pakistan can be capable of combined arms operations. Additionally, Combined arms operations are highly effective in open plains and deserts. A large segment of area between India and Pakistan falls under this. In this case, maneuver warfare is very effective both for defense and offence. For a purely defensive role, Pakistan has a vast number of Infantry divisions.

In terms of offensive forces, Pakistan currently has some armored and mechanized divisions. Total number of divisions is about 30 for Pakistan currently.

The proposal in this thread is to increase that to 45, with an increase in 4500 new "Flex" tanks / IFVs / mobile mortars and a very large number of APCs (3600). Flex tanks are a kind of tank envisioned here to be about 35 tons armed with ATGMs, a 76 mm gun and 4 organic infantry.

So, very roughly equivalent of something like the IFVs the US uses (Bradley). You also have 100 CAS aircraft organic at the Corps level.

The idea is to produce simple, large scale, mass produced armor, in scale. When all is said and done, you'd have 20 new combined arms divisions, and your traditional divisions would be reduced to 25.

When you started putting in Fix Wing CAS platform into your organic division, then you have a joint operation instead of a combine arms operation, I mean what do you suggest the command structure will be for these CAS asset? Are they permanently attached to the Army for operational use? Or they are an inorganic element and called upon when required?

That is because if you put the CAS platform under army control (Assuming you put the supreme command to the Army) they will then have to operate the airfield those aircraft belong to, and then they will have to be part of your organisational TO&E and everyone in that division can share that asset, which then bring to the second question, how are you planning to operate with the Organic Command Structure , are they all focus on one AO or you split the division up and use it in different AO and attach them to other Unit? If this is the former, you then take away the independence of the combine arms brigade, which mean they are secondary to other unit, if that is the latter case, how are you going to dedicate the asset in different AO? Because one CAS element can only be at one AO at a time, you cannot spread them over a wide area, well, you can, but then their strength will be dilute.

Then you also need to consider the first wave of likely Indian attack, which mean HQ and staging point have to be preselected, for you to use the combine arms brigade effectively, you need to look at the possible route of invasion, Pakistan lacking of strategic depth (wrt India) is that if and when Pakistan cannot absorb the first wave attack, those HQ and staging point would likely be overrun by the Indian Troop on day one.

Traditionally, in a defensive situation, you need to look at how India attack you, most likely they are going to applies equal pressure and press the line, so playing mobile defence is not going to do you good, because your own force's flank might get rolled before you get to the Indian unit. Also if you are to operate Combine Arms tactic, intelligence is quite important as well, because you will need it to tell you which and where you want to hit when their offence is stretched, or the weak point on the line. Pakistan lacking of ISTAR asset would mean you will have a hard time guessing which point is the weakest on enemy attack and fall back on attacking their anchor point, which itself would mean you are prone to get ambushed.

If China let Pakistan operate within Chinese territories, then I can see how Combine Arms are being useful for Pakistan to initiate a counter attack, otherwise you probably run out of land before your enemy run out of steam, considering India outnumber Pakistan enormously in sheer number.

 

[Armchair]

When you started putting in Fix Wing CAS platform into your organic division, then you have a joint operation instead of a combine arms operation, I mean what do you suggest the command structure will be for these CAS asset? Are they permanently attached to the Army for operational use? Or they are an inorganic element and called upon when required?

Hi jhungary, just the way US Army uses Apaches as part of combined arms operation, we will be using CAS aircraft, as well as some helicopters.

If you know of how crop dusters and small aircraft are used in rural America, sometimes hoping from farm to farm, they can land in rough fields - semi-prepared fields. This is how the CAS aircraft we have in mind will be utilized. As such, no PAF airbases will be needed or will be used.

Precedent for this is WW2, when such methods were often employed.

CAS aircraft will be available at the Corps level as well as the Army Group level. So will armed UAVs. At below this, armed UAVs can be available at the division level. At the brigade level, unarmed UAVs may be available.

Deployment will be 8 - 12 aircraft per Corps, this is diluted and diversified, rather than concentrated. This will help protect them better in contested airspace at the expense of greater efficiency in concentration. It will also make them more survivable due to the dispersed deployment and utilization.

Then you also need to consider the first wave of likely Indian attack, which mean HQ and staging point have to be preselected, for you to use the combine arms brigade effectively, you need to look at the possible route of invasion, Pakistan lacking of strategic depth (wrt India) is that if and when Pakistan cannot absorb the first wave attack, those HQ and staging point would likely be overrun by the Indian Troop on day one.

If the Corps headquarters and surrounding areas are being overrun, then that would mean the end of the war anyways. This has never come close to happening between India and Pakistan in any prior war.

Traditionally, in a defensive situation, you need to look at how India attack you, most likely they are going to applies equal pressure and press the line, so playing mobile defence is not going to do you good, because your own force's flank might get rolled before you get to the Indian unit. Also if you are to operate Combine Arms tactic, intelligence is quite important as well, because you will need it to tell you which and where you want to hit when their offence is stretched, or the weak point on the line. Pakistan lacking of ISTAR asset would mean you will have a hard time guessing which point is the weakest on enemy attack and fall back on attacking their anchor point, which itself would mean you are prone to get ambushed.

CAS aircraft will have the added benefit of providing better situational awareness to the combined arms units. Pakistan is not as bad in terms of recon assets. Now there are even remote sensing satellites. But that is not even needed for combined arms operations, which have been used since WW2 without such assets quite successfully.

 

[Armchair]

If China let Pakistan operate within Chinese territories, then I can see how Combine Arms are being useful for Pakistan to initiate a counter attack, otherwise you probably run out of land before your enemy run out of steam, considering India outnumber Pakistan enormously in sheer number.

Sorry but you don't know what you are talking about - Pakistan is more than twice the size of Germany. Its bigger than any Western European country. Its sometimes quite surprising the kind of misconceptions people have about Pakistan. Must be the media.

 

[Armchair]

THE DIFFERENT DIVISIONS AND THEIR COMPOSITION

INFANTRY DIVISION

3 Infantry Brigades each brigade: 2 Infantry Battalion + 1 Mechanized Infantry Battalion
Trucks for regular infantry battalions, 6x6 APCs for mechanized infantry battalion with 10 organic flex tanks
1 Regiment of Tanks MBT / Flex Tanks
Artillery Brigade with MLRS
LAT Regiment with Flex Tanks / 6x6 APC armed with Flex turret weaponry
AD regiment
Aviation - 4 UAVs at both division HQ and 4 UAVs at brigade level Corps Level: CAS Aircraft
Recon Regiment 6x6 IFV (recon by fire)


ARMOURED DIVISION

Uparmed to 2 Armored Brigades and 1 Mechanized Infantry Brigade
Mechanized Infantry Brigade - 2 Mechanized Infantry Battalions + 1 Flex tank regiment
6x6 APCs for mechanized infantry battalion

Artillery Brigade armed with SPGs, wheeled SPGs, mobile 120 mm high velocity recoiling mortars (Flex chassis)

LAT / HAT regiment armed with Flex tank chassis based 125 mm MBT gun, 6x6 chassis based ATGMs

Aviation - 4 UAVs at both division HQ and 4 UAVs at brigade level. Corps Level: CAS Aircraft
Recon Regiment 6x6 IFV (recon by fire)

MOUNTAIN DIVISION

3 Infantry Brigades each brigade: 2 Infantry Battalion + 1 air assault battalion
1 Regiment of Tanks MBT / Flex Tanks
Double Artillery Brigade with MLRS, with emphasis on light artillery
LAT Regiment with ATGMs deployed using APCs, Attack Helicopters, CAS Aircraft
Aviation - 4 UAVs at both division HQ and 4 UAVs at brigade level. Helicopters for airborne assault
Recon Regiment: Recon helicopters

MECHANIZED DIVISION

There are 3 brigades in the mechanized division
Each Brigade:
2 of the three brigades: 2x armor regiments + 1x mechanized infantry battalion
3rd brigade: mechanized infantry brigade
Mechanized Infantry Brigade - 2 Mechanized Infantry Battalions + 1 Flex tank regiment
6x6 APCs for mechanized infantry battalion

Artillery Brigade armed with SPGs, wheeled SPGs, mobile 120 mm high velocity recoiling mortars (Flex chassis)

LAT / HAT regiment armed with Flex tank chassis based 125 mm MBT gun, 6x6 chassis based ATGMs

Aviation - 4 UAVs at both division HQ and 4 UAVs at brigade level. Corps level: CAS aircraft
Recon Regiment 6x6 IFV (recon by fire)

 

[jhungary]

Hi jhungary, just the way US Army uses Apaches as part of combined arms operation, we will be using CAS aircraft, as well as some helicopters.

If you know of how crop dusters and small aircraft are used in rural America, sometimes hoping from farm to farm, they can land in rough fields - semi-prepared fields. This is how the CAS aircraft we have in mind will be utilized. As such, no PAF airbases will be needed or will be used.

Precedent for this is WW2, when such methods were often employed.

CAS aircraft will be available at the Corps level as well as the Army Group level. So will armed UAVs. At below this, armed UAVs can be available at the division level. At the brigade level, unarmed UAVs may be available.

Deployment will be 8 - 12 aircraft per Corps, this is diluted and diversified, rather than concentrated. This will help protect them better in contested airspace at the expense of greater efficiency in concentration. It will also make them more survivable due to the dispersed deployment and utilization.

Chopper gunship is NOT fix wing aircraft, even with prop driven aircraft like the Tucano, you still need a team to service it, and logistic to support such an aircraft, let alone the choice of weaponry would be diverse and the protection offered to those aircraft. While Chopper is usually under Army command, or shared between Air Force and Army, fix wing usually design to be a sole Air Force command, because you also need to provide CAP over these CAS Fix Wing support aircraft, especially in a war between India and Pakistan, when Pakistan at most can achieve local superiority. And you cannot function properly if your CAS aircraft is under one command, and your CAP aircraft is under a different command.

And Corps level is too high and too large to share between 8 to 12 aircraft per organic unit, you do know Corps level means multiple Divisions, right? You are suggesting 30,000 to 40,000 soldier to share between 8 to 12 aircraft.

And also, you did not answer how you are going to fit the command structure of fix wing element into your combine arms "corps"

If the Corps headquarters and surrounding areas are being overrun, then that would mean the end of the war anyways. This has never come close to happening between India and Pakistan in any prior war.

Crops are too big to be a combine arms unit, the key to combine arms unit is manoeuvrability and swiftness, that is why you form a combine arms force, corps level would see 2 or 3 division manoeuvre together, which is not effective.

Also Combine Arms unit offer flexibility and cohesion between unit, and hence must be modular, how are you supposed to modular a Corps level unit? How are you supposed to do that?

Most country adopted a Brigade level CA unit or some even lower, in the US Army, a division is made of 4 Combine Arms Brigade, and a corps is made out of 3 divisions. And you are calling for a whole corps to be combine arms?

How do you suggest and what do you suggest to overcome the organic/inorganic unit harmony between division?

CAS aircraft will have the added benefit of providing better situational awareness to the combined arms units. Pakistan is not as bad in terms of recon assets. Now there are even remote sensing satellites. But that is not even needed for combined arms operations, which have been used since WW2 without such assets quite successfully.

WW2 is a different time and we all know that the way USAAF uses of the air asset is not suitable to work at modern time, because command and control section of USAAF and US Army Command were constantly in conflict with USAAF command because both wanted different thing. The US Army wanted their airwing corps to use their asset and protect their soldier, while the USAAF wanted to use their asset to eliminate the German Luftwaffe hence achieve total air superiority.

And CAS aircraft is not a recon or ISTAR asset, it's a terminal platform, and Satellite did not provide you with 24/7 coverage, which mean satellite alone is not a reliable ISTAR asset as well, Pakistan lack of electronic surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and ground unit would blunt the damage on any Combine Arms strategy. And if you are thinking of a Corps level CA unit, it's nearly impossible to cover that many unit even with asset like the US military.

 

[Armchair]

Chopper gunship is NOT fix wing aircraft, even with prop driven aircraft like the Tucano, you still need a team to service it, and logistic to support such an aircraft, let alone the choice of weaponry would be diverse and the protection offered to those aircraft. While Chopper is usually under Army command, or shared between Air Force and Army, fix wing usually design to be a sole Air Force command, because you also need to provide CAP over these CAS Fix Wing support aircraft, especially in a war between India and Pakistan, when Pakistan at most can achieve local superiority. And you cannot function properly if your CAS aircraft is under one command, and your CAP aircraft is under a different command.

And Corps level is too high and too large to share between 8 to 12 aircraft per organic unit, you do know Corps level means multiple Divisions, right? You are suggesting 30,000 to 40,000 soldier to share between 8 to 12 aircraft.

And also, you did not answer how you are going to fit the command structure of fix wing element into your combine arms "corps"



Crops are too big to be a combine arms unit, the key to combine arms unit is manoeuvrability and swiftness, that is why you form a combine arms force, corps level would see 2 or 3 division manoeuvre together, which is not effective.

Also Combine Arms unit offer flexibility and cohesion between unit, and hence must be modular, how are you supposed to modular a Corps level unit? How are you supposed to do that?

Most country adopted a Brigade level CA unit or some even lower, in the US Army, a division is made of 4 Combine Arms Brigade, and a corps is made out of 3 divisions. And you are calling for a whole corps to be combine arms?

How do you suggest and what do you suggest to overcome the organic/inorganic unit harmony between division?



WW2 is a different time and we all know that the way USAAF uses of the air asset is not suitable to work at modern time, because command and control section of USAAF and US Army Command were constantly in conflict with USAAF command because both wanted different thing. The US Army wanted their airwing corps to use their asset and protect their soldier, while the USAAF wanted to use their asset to eliminate the German Luftwaffe hence achieve total air superiority.

And CAS aircraft is not a recon or ISTAR asset, it's a terminal platform, and Satellite did not provide you with 24/7 coverage, which mean satellite alone is not a reliable ISTAR asset as well, Pakistan lack of electronic surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and ground unit would blunt the damage on any Combine Arms strategy. And if you are thinking of a Corps level CA unit, it's nearly impossible to cover that many unit even with asset like the US military.

Hi, please allow me to answer your questions in points:

1. With 38 divisions, there would not be enough CAS aircraft to give more than 8-12 aircraft per Corps. What most smaller armies do is not a good argument.

2. The large size of the proposed formations actually even make Corps too small a unit as you're going to have about 12-15 or so Corps. This is why ultimately, you'd need Army Groups

3. If you look at the first page of this thread, you will learn more about the CAS fixed wing aircraft and why it can be utilized from rough semi-prepared fields (its designed that way, as a simple prop, similar to the BAe SABA concept)

4. The mountain division will have its own fixed wing and attack helicopters, as well as UAVs

5. Recon is done by a wide assortment of assets and not just sophisticated EW / ELINT / ET aircraft. Incidentally, PAF does have some of those assets as well, but recon is a full spectrum function.

6. If we can afford more than 100 - 200 CAS fixed wing, then perhaps we could look at utilization at a lower level of operations and in larger numbers.

7. In large wars, even Corps are too small a unit - you then have Army Groups or Armies that become the main unit on the chess board.

8. By many accounts, the USAF monopoly of fixed wing is a major issue and is inefficient and creates problems for the US Army. Pakistan is not the US and does not need to replicate its division of fixed wing to helicopters by service assignment.

Thank you for taking the time to reply and share. Please do feel free to contribute more.

 

[jhungary]

Sorry but you don't know what you are talking about - Pakistan is more than twice the size of Germany. Its bigger than any Western European country. Its sometimes quite surprising the kind of misconceptions people have about Pakistan. Must be the media.

umm, I am talking about Strategic Depth, not how big a country is....

While Strategic Depth have some relation to land size, the main thing is how big an area you can give out before you can stall or hold your enemy at bay. It have to related to several thing, the defending force/invading force ration, the border between the two army, and terrain.

Flatland score the lowest point in Strategic Defence, because it offer nothing to the defender, then you have slope/hill/mountain, and river and finally seas score the best point of Strategic Defence because it funnel the enemy troop.

When you look at India's capability and how you plan your Strategic defence in Pakistan, you see three things,

1.) India OUTNUMBER Pakistan armed force by a large margin.
2.) Most of the borderland between Pakistan and India is flat (except the Eastern border)
3.) India could cover Pakistan in 3 sides, from the border SSE, from the mountain E and from the sea W

Which mean India can launch a 3 pronged attack on Pakistan, an amphibious attack via the sea, plus a general invasion over the border, and finally an airborne attack over the Eastern border over the Himalayas. And as half of the country is rising from the flatland against Indian border, that mean the only real Chance Pakistan can stop an Indian invasion in a conventional war is over in the central/northern mountain, which bordering Afghanistan.

Which mean it is harder for Pakistan to defence, and thus the wrong side of the Pak border is facing the Indian, and that side of the border is not going to give Pakistan any strategic depth because all the card stack against it.

Hi, please allow me to answer your questions in points:

1. With 38 divisions, there would not be enough CAS aircraft to give more than 8-12 aircraft per Corps. What most smaller armies do is not a good argument.

2. The large size of the proposed formations actually even make Corps too small a unit as you're going to have about 12-15 or so Corps. This is why ultimately, you'd need Army Groups

3. If you look at the first page of this thread, you will learn more about the CAS fixed wing aircraft and why it can be utilized from rough semi-prepared fields (its designed that way, as a simple prop, similar to the BAe SABA concept)

4. The mountain division will have its own fixed wing and attack helicopters, as well as UAVs

5. Recon is done by a wide assortment of assets and not just sophisticated EW / ELINT / ET aircraft. Incidentally, PAF does have some of those assets as well, but recon is a full spectrum function.

6. If we can afford more than 100 - 200 CAS fixed wing, then perhaps we could look at utilization at a lower level of operations and in larger numbers.

7. In large wars, even Corps are too small a unit - you then have Army Groups or Armies that become the main unit on the chess board.

8. By many accounts, the USAF monopoly of fixed wing is a major issue and is inefficient and creates problems for the US Army. Pakistan is not the US and does not need to replicate its division of fixed wing to helicopters by service assignment.

Thank you for taking the time to reply and share. Please do feel free to contribute more.

Wow, I don't know what to say. Because I don't know how you envision your Combine Arms unit would be.

However, if you can only spare 8 - 12 CAS aircraft on a Corps level unit, you might as well struck them off, because using them would be more of a hassle than maintaining them, unless all your corps level unit have a single objective, even then it would not make sense as 8 - 12 aircraft would let you do almost next to nothing in war with a corps level. Also, if you move the same corps as a whole why you need to do combine arms unit in the first place?

And its not meaning for CAS aircraft to operate without CAP, again, unless you pull the CAP aircraft under your combine arms unit command as well, it is not effective, but if so, you may as well disband your Airforce.

And finally, the job of the Air Force is to contest Air Superiority and it should be independent toward what the Army need, myself as an US Army Officer, I know first hand how and why we need Air Force support (such as A-10 or AC-130) but if you look at the Air Force side of the problem, they cannot give us those asset unless they know they can send them to us and will not get shoot down. Which is why the Air Force is separated from the Army in the first place. What you are proposing is not doable. Especially when India is with a upper hand on Pakistan with respect to Air Superiority. If Pakistan do what you said, then your CAS asset would have a hard time to be in the sky, because all they can depend on is the army unit to protect them, while Indian jet flooded the sky which mean if you fly, you die.

 

[Armchair]

I'd have to disagree with that assessment that Pakistan is too small to engage in maneuver warfare.

About size of Indian Army - it has 40 divisions currently. Assuming this goes up to say 43 by the time such a plan comes to fruition, this scenario above calls for about 38 divisions.

Given that India has a long border with a host of other countries, it won't have all its divisions in play. So, we can assume in combat, if in the future the Indian Army goes up to 43 divisions from its present 40, they will have to assign at least 5 divisions to protect other fronts - 1 division for Bangladesh, 1 for Myanmar, 2-3 for its long border with China.

Furthermore, Pakistan can mobilize its entire force in 1 day, while, because of the wide dispersion in the interior for India, it takes a lot longer.

Suffice it to say 38 Pakistani divisions will meat approximately the same number in combat.

In any case, the disparity in numbers is not that great neither in current terms, or in the proposed combined arms expansion.

It will be foolhardy and hard to do a large airborne assault against Pakistan without air superiority, otherwise the helis and transports will be shot down like flies by Pakistan's extensive IADS.

As for assault from the sea, again, unlikely to be very successful given the massive modernization taking place in PN and the unsuitability of the Sir Creek area for amphibious landing and penetration.

And its not meaning for CAS aircraft to operate without CAP, again, unless you pull the CAP aircraft under your combine arms unit command as well, it is not effective, but if so, you may as well disband your Airforce.

This is illogical because you're ignoring how contemporary armies use attack helicopters without having to force the entire air force under army command. So I'd say that's a red herring in your argument and a scarecrow.

 

[Signalian]

@Armchair

I haven't been able to reply you in depth, i can list a few points.

1. Wheeled vs Tracked AFV:

a. Weight issue on wheels due to increased/extra armor.
b. Higher caliber weapon 125mm on wheeled AFV.
c. Mobility in the desert.

2. Effectiveness of 30mm, 35mm, 40mm or 76mm caliber.

a. Above mentioned calibers installed on IFV like CV-90 or Bradley. Considering that PA uses M-113 with 12.7mm as battle taxi only and why should M-113 be replaced by a tracked or wheeled IFV like Ratel.

b. Should MRAP capability become a standard in all future APC/IFV.

c. should ATGM be a standard on all IFV's.

3. Coming to combined arms; an independent armored brigade usually has armor, mech infantry, artillery and can get AD from Corps.

a. Its the division level where either its infantry or armored oriented. If the focus is on division, then its battalion or brigade structure should effective distribution of armor, infantry, artillery, air defence, aviation apart from support elements. Corps is already combined arms, Corps already has infantry, armor, artillery Divs or brigades.

b. In the division lay out of post 51, air assault or air borne formations are required foremost. Then the disparity between infantry and armor divs is too much. Pakistan needs more armor formations. Infantry needs APC or IFV battalions. In fact Infantry divisions should have at least one armored brigade, instead of a lone armor regiment covering 9 infantry battalions. Armor formations need not just Tanks, but SP Arty, SP AD, more IFV's/APC's. Increasing tanks doesn't help.