A Vision of a New Combined Arms Philosophy & Doctrine

[Armchair]

IABG's have 2 Armor + 1 mech inf Bat +1 SP Arty configuration. Problem is that they are only 7 or 8.

4500 Tanks need alot of support units like more APC's, more ATGM teams, more SP Arty, more SP AD, more utility trucks, more oil tankers, more EME wksp units, more ordnance units, more production of ammo by POF.

The tank friendly terrain will require these 25 flex divisions, where will you deploy them?

I have 1.7 billion dollars left but it may not be enough to get all the support that's needed for 25 odd new divisions (almost double the divisions PA presently has, and quadrupling the firepower).

Is it possible to take equipment from current divisions and / or re-purposing current infantry / armor brigades? That could really help transforming a good chunk of the infantry divisions into Flex divisions.

There are not enough APCs in PA inventory for this.

So, for the motorized infantry brigades, lets assume that this can be taken care of by cannibalizing PA's infantry divisions.

Let's also assume that of the potential of 25 new Flex divisions, we actually only build 20, and the rest of the equipment is absorbed into current PA divisions of all types.

For the mechanized Infantry regiments in the flex brigades, let's assume we need 45 APCs per regiment. Using the 500 hp engine (that is being mass produced for trucks, tanks, APCs and more), we build a 400hp engine version, and use this as the basis for a large 8x wheeled APC. About 15 tons, simple, straightforward design, nothing fancy. A basic battle taxi.

Let's assume we can build this at 100,000 USD each. So 4,500,000 USD per regiment, and $9 million per Flex brigade takes care of the mechanized infantry component. 2 Flex brigades per division, for 20 division = $360 million.

This now leaves us with about $1.3 billion.

We still have to deal with the SPH and the various support units as you mentioned. We are probably at least $1 billion short.

 

[Signalian]

I have 1.7 billion dollars left but it may not be enough to get all the support that's needed for 25 odd new divisions (almost double the divisions PA presently has, and quadrupling the firepower).

Is it possible to take equipment from current divisions and / or re-purposing current infantry / armor brigades? That could really help transforming a good chunk of the infantry divisions into Flex divisions.

There are not enough APCs in PA inventory for this.

So, for the motorized infantry brigades, lets assume that this can be taken care of by cannibalizing PA's infantry divisions.

Let's also assume that of the potential of 25 new Flex divisions, we actually only build 20, and the rest of the equipment is absorbed into current PA divisions of all types.

For the mechanized Infantry regiments in the flex brigades, let's assume we need 45 APCs per regiment. Using the 500 hp engine (that is being mass produced for trucks, tanks, APCs and more), we build a 400hp engine version, and use this as the basis for a large 8x wheeled APC. About 15 tons, simple, straightforward design, nothing fancy. A basic battle taxi.

Let's assume we can build this at 100,000 USD each. So 4,500,000 USD per regiment, and $9 million per Flex brigade takes care of the mechanized infantry component. 2 Flex brigades per division, for 20 division = $360 million.

This now leaves us with about $1.3 billion.

We still have to deal with the SPH and the various support units as you mentioned. We are probably at least $1 billion short.

Since you are talking mostly in terms of money:

1. you are not looking at reserves in man and material. You need both vehicles and men to fill in destroyed/beyond-repair weapons and wounded/MIA/KIA troops.

2. Looking at global structure of Military formation, you would have seen that some western armies are moving to brigade structure. If you put 20-25 Flex (independent) brigades instead of your 20-25 flex divisions, your budget may just cover that.

3. You DO NOT need armor/mechanised forces everywhere, which means you dont need 20-25 Tank/APC formations, you may need half of that and rest to be formed as air-assault/air borne or SF or amphibious.

For the point 3, you have few variable strategies that you can use when using formations:

a. one armored brigade assigned/attached to a standard infantry Division, is enough to act as divisions offensive platform for attacking enemy forces, harassing bigger enemy armored formations if encountered by Infantry division and even covering the retreat of infantry division when required.

b. If you attach two armored brigades to one infantry division, these armored brigades further expand their role in directly attacking an enemy armored division and fall back to defensive area held by infantry division during counter attack of enemy armored division. These brigades can also choose two different maneuvers of axis in different directions with enough strength (90 tanks +50 APC each) for an attack and force enemy to commit greater forces to stop two armored brigades going in different directions, although may meet at the same junction after flanking/maneuvering.

c. If you attach one mechanised brigade and one armored brigade to an infantry division, you can increase mobility of the infantry division by using extra 50-100 APC's to bring up infantry quickly behind the attack of armored brigade. The trick is not to use APC in direct combat but use them as fast transports. If the armored brigade is halted by enemy resistance, which means there will be no more extra tanks to flank the enemy, so what do you do? start pouring in infantry on the left and right of enemy through APC deployment and start encircling the enemy with fortified positions of infantry as to trap the enemy in a complete circle; the front from tanks, the sides and and then back from infantry deployed quickly through APC's. Rest assured that the enemy will try its best NEVER to get itself encircled from the back, as it will get cut off in this pocket, so it will keep this route open for retreat and as well as supplies from rear lines. The enemy will need to shift its forces towards this pocket at the back and will eventually start retreating, unless some other enemy formation comes to its rescue.

Food for thought:
d. If you attach an airborne brigade and an armored brigade with an infantry division?
e. If you attach an SF Battalion and an armored brigade with an infantry division?
f. If you attach an amphibious brigade and an armored brigade with an infantry division?

Now,WHY independent BRIGADES instead of DIVISIONS?
Brigades are easily and quickly deployed not only the combat units but the HQ too. In comparison, the divisional HQ has 3 maneuver brigades and deploying Div HQ where and when is another big hassle. Brigades being smaller in strength require less transports. They can spring in action straightaway with 3-4 units instead of waiting for other support units from Division. . The area of operation of a brigade is smaller than a division, so decisions by brigade commander are made quickly and promptly without many other external factors.

Happy brain-storming.

 

[Armchair]

Now,WHY independent BRIGADES instead of DIVISIONS?
Brigades are easily and quickly deployed not only the combat units but the HQ too. In comparison, the divisional HQ has 3 maneuver brigades and deploying Div HQ where and when is another big hassle. Brigades being smaller in strength require less transports. They can spring in action straightaway with 3-4 units instead of waiting for other support units from Division. . The area of operation of a brigade is smaller than a division, so decisions by brigade commander are made quickly and promptly without many other external factors.

Hi Signalian, thanks for the extensive reply. If you see the structure of the Flex brigades:
2 tank regiments per brigade, 1 mechanized infantry (APCs), 1 mobile artillery regiment. Since our tanks have 4 infantry within the tank each, this will provide close integration and cooperation of the units. Every 8th unit will be a mobile mortar NLOS. Every 10th tank will be an MBT.

As you can see, basically, each brigade is more like an independent brigade. This will allow significant flexibility in tactical combat. We will call these brigades "Flex" brigades.

However, remember, Indians outnumber PA forces. There can be no conclusive victory against them unless numbers are significantly increased. This means 20-25 independent brigades will not be enough. 20 Flex divisions, and 5 divisions of equipment as reserve / distributed among current divisions would be.

Also, if you have 30 traditional divisions plus 20 Flex divisions, that's a lot of divisions. This means it will be very hard for the Corps commanders to manage them at the level of independent brigades. 50 divisions means about 16 Corps. Even that will be difficult to manage. You'd need WW2 style 1st Army, 2nd Army, etc.

Having too many independent brigades would create a confusing situation at this level of battle. This is the reason that, while I've organized the Flex brigades essentially as independent brigades, they still need to be organized as Flex Brigades.

The other problem with attaching a Flex brigade with a traditional infantry division is lack of efficiency. A Flex division will be able to move a lot faster and maneuver better, because the base unit is not a traditional infantry brigade (that would slow the flex brigades down), but a motorized infantry brigade.

RESERVES

Given that 5 divisions worth of equipment from the potential of 25 flex divisions are going to the traditional 30 divisions, there is some room as reserve and replenishment. Also, here is the game changer: unlike in past wars were the tanks, apc, aircraft are bought from abroad or with critical parts from abroad, and built slowly in batch production, the production process allows us to churn these tanks out like hot cakes. The factories can produce hundreds of tanks and APCs a year, and quickly replenish forces. This is the beauty of mass producing simple and effective weapons. This is how WW2 was won.

If the armored brigade is halted by enemy resistance, which means there will be no more extra tanks to flank the enemy, so what do you do? start pouring in infantry on the left and right of enemy through APC deployment and start encircling the enemy with fortified positions of infantry as to trap the enemy in a complete circle; the front from tanks, the sides and and then back from infantry deployed quickly through APC's. Rest assured that the enemy will try its best NEVER to get itself encircled from the back, as it will get cut off in this pocket, so it will keep this route open for retreat and as well as supplies from rear lines.

This will not happen in the normal setting, as Indian forces outgun and outnumber Pakistani forces. Meaning - when you try to encircle them they will have reserve units to effectively counter you, and may even have units in reserve to outflank you.

Now,WHY independent BRIGADES instead of DIVISIONS?
Brigades are easily and quickly deployed not only the combat units but the HQ too. In comparison, the divisional HQ has 3 maneuver brigades and deploying Div HQ where and when is another big hassle. Brigades being smaller in strength require less transports. They can spring in action straightaway with 3-4 units instead of waiting for other support units from Division. . The area of operation of a brigade is smaller than a division, so decisions by brigade commander are made quickly and promptly without many other external factors.

This is a good idea and why I organized the Flex brigades as essentially in the form and spirit of independent mechanized brigades.

Food for thought:
d. If you attach an airborne brigade and an armored brigade with an infantry division?
e. If you attach an SF Battalion and an armored brigade with an infantry division?
f. If you attach an amphibious brigade and an armored brigade with an infantry division?

Some brilliant ideas. I just lay the general topography and such ideas can sketch the details and the variations.
Airborne + armored + infantry >>> problem is infantry slows down everything. Make it motorized. Armored doesn't have infantry and needs to borrow infantry, making it complicated, a coordination hassle and time-consuming. How about instead: Airborne + Flex + motorized Infantry ?

SF + armored + infantry >>> would love to hear a scenario. SF is all about context

Amphibious + armored + infantry >>> I see Kutch operation in that. Put the infantry on APCs to make it more potent.

Here is another variation:
Armored + Motorized + Flex + Airborne. This would give it the max punch in taking terrain quickly and outflanking the enemy.

 

[Armchair]

So where does one get the necessary men for 20 Flex divisions? I think the answer is partly by cannibalizing infantry divisions, say 5 of them. Total numbers needed is approximately 300,000.

Here is how:

1. 4 infantry divisions cannibalized - 60,000
2. Raise conscript people's brigades (more on this later) - 100,000
3. Utilize civil works brigades (more on this later) - 50,000
4. Weekend warriors program 50,000
5. Reassignment during war of irregular forces such as NLA, FC, Rangers, etc. 25,000
6. Increase reserve of retired personnel 15,000

CONSCRIPT PEOPLE'S BRIGADES

On matriculation, 6 months of service for random selection of list. On degree graduation, random selection of list. These brigades will be used to replace infantry brigades in the infantry divisions, whose professional soldiers would be reassigned to the Flex divisions.

UTILIZATION OF CIVIL WORKS BRIGADES

The country has a large number of desperately poor and unemployed youth. A program to employ such persons with a low paying, hard labor job, building basic infrastructure country-wide, planting trees, reclaiming desert areas, and more. These brigades will spend 80% of their time developing the country while 20% of their time training for war.

Again these brigades would replace traditional infantry brigades in the infantry divisions, whose soldiers would be re-assigned to the Flex divisions. Basically the Flex divisions will remain manned by professional full-time divisions.

@Signalian this is how I would raise the required personnel, what say you?

 

[Armchair]

Issues of Doctrine & Historical Context

Till now, in all the major wars fought by both India and Pakistan, no real independent thought, military strategy or great strategist have emerged. Generalship has been poor, except for the 1971 East Pakistan operation by the Indians, but then they may have had Israeli help.

In terms of tactics, neither force is anything meaningful, they are a jumble of copy-pastes that yield nothing. No large-scale armored pincer or flanking moves, using shock and awe has ever been successfully attempted. Indeed, it has never even been meaningfully thought of.

The weapon systems used by both sides have consistently been foreign sourced, quantitatively small, compared to the size of their armies. And unsustainable for more than 2 weeks of battle. Essentially, these are more like toy armies rather than real ones (if we take a look at the backdrop of the major world wars, or the major cold-war era wars).

The moment a foreign power cuts off supply, these armies become cripples. So with poor generalship, non-existent military strategists, and foreign procured arms, the scope for improving these armies is vast. The will, the intellectual capacity, and the correct political climate is needed only.

Deep Battle Vs Blitzkreig

While the Germans preferred shock and awe, with lightening strikes and flanking maneuver, the British and the Soviets preferred a slower and steadier combined arms operation. The Soviets called this Deep Battle strategy. If armored brigades attempt to replicate the blitzkreig idea, the concept of the Flex brigade / division is an iteration of the Deep Battle conception. It is a half-way compromise between the very numerous infantry brigades on all sides, and the toy-like, never-known-to-be-effective armored brigades, that have never proved decisive in South Asia. With little infantry, (always needing to be borrowed, what a hastle for a force that was meant to be fast and overwhelming), these armored formations are just a "me too" trying to tell the world that India and Pakistan are practicing armored warfare ala Guderian. Or Desert Storm.

A few helicopters and an airborne assault battalion to show a lesson has been learned from Vietnam / Afghanistan. But nothing really of substance.

With a combined strategy of using the Flex brigades as the base ingredients, a whole host of variations and combinations become possible. Thus:

Infantry Brigade: provide cheap, numerous, most efficient at defensive and holding strategies
Armored Brigade: Blitz, flank, maneuver. The fastest and most powerful formations
Flex Brigade: The middling formations, neither as fast as the armored brigade, nor as cost efficient as the Infantry brigade, but with mobility and firepower greater than the latter, and enough infantry in the mix to be more cost-effective and efficient in defense than the former.

One could imagine that a division with an armored brigade, a flex brigade and an infantry brigade would be an interesting combination. The armored brigade punching through, the Flex brigade providing timely support to hold those gaps, and the infantry brigade in holding positions. The Flex brigade in this case, and in many other scenarios, provides a happy balancing force to the division.

 

[Armchair]

PROBLEM OF TRAINING AND MANEUVER WARFARE

Training is a very important issue in actually conducting effective "blitzkreig" style operations. The present state of PA is that they have courses that officers must pass. Most officers memorize notes and pass these exams. And after this, it is claimed that this force is trained for such kinds of operation.

Reality is that blitzkreig requires officers to really understand and absorb the philosophies and principles that there is. People like @Signalian exist in the armed forces that understand this, but vast majority of officers don't have a proper grasp. Remember, they just passed exams.

Secondly, real maneuver warfare requires training at the NCO level. It requires Sargents more than officers, who understand the application of manuver warfare at the tactical level. Even the individual soldiers have to understand its application and its philosophy. Then, all of them need to practice this in a meaningful way.

The main organizational philosophy of PA and IA isn't maneuver warfare. Their organizational culture can best be described closest to Soviet Deep Battle but without the industrial capacity to back that up, and with a colonial mindset of minimizing loss of equipment.

Employment of tanks is seen almost separate from this - in 1965 and 1971, there was a clear lack of coordination between the infantry, artillery and armored elements. As such, armor was found alone and employed like cavalry in pre-20th century.

To change this organizational culture will not be easy. Even if there is agreement to change, it will take years and a dedicated leadership.

 

[Sine Nomine]

The basic idea that has been brewing in my head has been that military doctrine has mainly been imported from the West, and never truly grown and bred in South Asia. At a time when Western military doctrine is in shambles and stagnant, it is strange to see this.

You bloody Traitor Desi,Gora saheb sai always right.

Except, a cheap ATGM wont be able to penetrate depleted uranium armor topped with ERA and guarded with active protection.

The future battlefield may even see something like Iron Dome optimized for ATGMs. In any case, we know for sure that robots will be used in large numbers.

Cheap on this thread is a compromise, versus cheap as in indigenously mass produced.

cheap ATGM would be raining as hell while you wont be able to produce and afford Tanks with depleted uranium armor topped with ERA and guarded with active protection.

 

[CriticalThought]

You bloody Traitor Desi,Gora saheb sai always right.

cheap ATGM would be raining as hell while you wont be able to produce and afford Tanks with depleted uranium armor topped with ERA and guarded with active protection.

Try raining cheap ATGMs on a well funded enemy, who can spend billions on armor.

In your haste, you failed to comprehend the full significance of what I wrote.

 

[Sine Nomine]

Try raining cheap ATGMs on a well funded enemy, who can spend billions on armor.

In your haste, you failed to comprehend the full significance of what I wrote.

I comprehended it fully.
A tank would be able to withstand not more then 3 Hits.You must know that Tanks have many soft spots and if they are hit and tank isn't destroyed it's still out of game.
Tank weak spots.

1. Tank sides
   
2. Tank rear
3. Turret cupolas/ hatches
4. Hull machine gun hatch/ driver’s visor
5. Lower glacis
6. Turret Ring

 

[bananarepublic]

I comprehended it fully.
A tank would be able to withstand not more then 3 Hits.You must know that Tanks have many soft spots and if they are hit and tank isn't destroyed it's still out of game.
Tank weak spots.

1. Tank sides
   
2. Tank rear
3. Turret cupolas/ hatches
4. Hull machine gun hatch/ driver’s visor
5. Lower glacis
6. Turret Ring

How about a MLRS type weapon but with cluster munitions..

 

[Storm Force]

Your thread starter is trying to replicate a template for war used by largest man army in world war two IE Russia thst was funded constantly by USA and Britain by air drops to defeat Germany in east .

He mentions modern European military tactics and doctrine.

Pakistan is poor developing country it can be Israel turkey or Germany or Russia I .tactics equipment or doctrine

South Asia is south Asia
All mouth no brains
Bravado and completely unorganised .

Typical south Asian traits

 

[CriticalThought]

I comprehended it fully.
A tank would be able to withstand not more then 3 Hits.You must know that Tanks have many soft spots and if they are hit and tank isn't destroyed it's still out of game.
Tank weak spots.

1. Tank sides
   
2. Tank rear
3. Turret cupolas/ hatches
4. Hull machine gun hatch/ driver’s visor
5. Lower glacis
6. Turret Ring

You still fail to take into account everything:

1. Active protection.
2. Iron dome type area defence.

Also, what makes you think the enemy will let you rain cheap ATGMs on it? I mean you are describing a situation where the enemy has brought forth his armor to get wasted. Try raining ATGMs under a massive counter-assault.

 

[Sine Nomine]

You still fail to take into account everything:

1. Active protection.
2. Iron dome type area defence.

Also, what makes you think the enemy will let you rain cheap ATGMs on it? I mean you are describing a situation where the enemy has brought forth his armor to get wasted. Try raining ATGMs under a massive counter-assault.

APS is still unproven,we have seen in Syria.
Iron dome systems are still far away from mass deployment.

 

[blueazure]

wars have evolved.

now the realms are Social media, confusion, deployment of special forces masked with irregulars, snipers , EW systems, ELS systems, jamming of other drones and signals.

cost to produce one JF 17 = 15 mil USD

for the same 15mil USD, you can deploy spec forces , train irregulars and create mayhem via social media + numerous small surv drones . these irregular hybrid mix will do far more damage vs the single JF 17 that will be shot down in a full blown battle in a few minutes

far more cost effective

far more impactful

far more leverage to negotiate

------------------------

 

[Signalian]

PROBLEM OF TRAINING AND MANEUVER WARFARE

Training is a very important issue in actually conducting effective "blitzkreig" style operations. The present state of PA is that they have courses that officers must pass. Most officers memorize notes and pass these exams. And after this, it is claimed that this force is trained for such kinds of operation.

Reality is that blitzkreig requires officers to really understand and absorb the philosophies and principles that there is. People like @Signalian exist in the armed forces that understand this, but vast majority of officers don't have a proper grasp. Remember, they just passed exams.

Secondly, real maneuver warfare requires training at the NCO level. It requires Sargents more than officers, who understand the application of manuver warfare at the tactical level. Even the individual soldiers have to understand its application and its philosophy. Then, all of them need to practice this in a meaningful way.

The main organizational philosophy of PA and IA isn't maneuver warfare. Their organizational culture can best be described closest to Soviet Deep Battle but without the industrial capacity to back that up, and with a colonial mindset of minimizing loss of equipment.

Employment of tanks is seen almost separate from this - in 1965 and 1971, there was a clear lack of coordination between the infantry, artillery and armored elements. As such, armor was found alone and employed like cavalry in pre-20th century.

To change this organizational culture will not be easy. Even if there is agreement to change, it will take years and a dedicated leadership.

A lot of factors are involved.
The compromise on tank type, APC vulnerability, low SPG numbers, only Short range AD and incomplete logistic system. Support and supply is not top notch. Lack of proper IFV. Not every Commander can pull of maneuvers like Lt Col Nisar of 25 Cavalry. Not committing Armor Divs in 1971. The T-59/69 replacement saga. Small Div formations. Lack of reserve MBT's.

It can be a long debate.

1. What will change if proper IFV is used e.g. BMP-3, CV-90 etc. IFV as in 6-troop carrier or 9 or 11. What role will M-113 have after that. Will the role of infantry change after that.
2. What will happen if there is a unified tank type of same generation, AK- T-80UD, OPlot, VT-4, AK-II in every formation of PA. No more T-59,69,85.
3. Are tracked SPG the only solution in all terrains. The numbers are limited. Will a large number of Wheeled SPG change infantry formations doctrines. Standardization of 155mm howitzer.
4. Medium SP AD is still required even if its argued that UCAV's and gunships fly low.
5. What advantages do smaller formations hold, when enemy has bigger formations. How big of a formation it should be to conduct maneuver and blitzkrieg operations.
6. How will reserve older MBT's be used: replacement or newer formations in war.
7. What is an efficient logistics, supply and support system. How can modern tech move along with fighting arms.
8. Will infantry formations ever become fully motorized with MRAP's and wheeled APC's, not jeeps, hilux's or trucks.
9. What are the realistic objectives inside Indian territory for PA Armored formations to hold and secure OR will the formations just remain on defensive.

Not going into Aviation for now.